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THE

FRENCH CAMPAIGN

1870—1871.

MILITARY DESCRIPTION

BY

A. NIEMANN.

WITH MAPS AND PLANS.

Translated from the German by


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FIRST PART.
TO THE CAPITULATION OF SEDAN. "

INTRODUCTION.

The great war of 1870 and 1871 was carried on between two nations whose warlike renown was equal whilst it stood far above that of any other nation. This war in which proud France bowed her head to the German conqueror, in all its principal phases offer, examples of the art of war which indicate a new epoch, and in complete variety give new laws to the generals for new and hitherto unheard of problems.

It is true that Germany is not indebted to her arms alone for victory, nor solely to the genius of her generals and the ability of her officers and soldiers. These grounds of victory which are at once apparent to the eye of the observer, are only the evidences and effects of higher laws, in the fulfilment of which nations rise and fall in the ocean of struggling humanity. Moral force decided this conflict for Germany. Victory resulted from the application of the strength of a whole nation, which rose superior to its foe in earnest morality and high intelligence, and burst the narrow limits of the false and obsolete statesmanship of its enemies both abroad and at home, as a giant breaks the chains with which dwarfs encompassed him whilst he slept.

Yet marvels enough are to be found in glancing at the external phases of this development of noblest powers, and in following the victorious advance of the German army upon the enemy's territory.

Having the same object of operations in view as in earlier wars with France, namely the complete overthrow of the enemy in his capital Paris, German generalship has accomplished feats in this war,

with forces cemented in the same manner as formerly, which have never been approximately reached in any previous war, both as regards the mass of the troops and their provisioning, as well as in their employment in the greatest combined operations. The capture of the whole army which France had formed in the beginning of the campaign for the invasion of Germany, together with the reserves called out after the first great defeats, is a wonderful fact, unparalleled in the history of wars. The single results also, each considered separately, the investment and conquest of the Fortress of Paris, a city within whose walls were half a million of men bearing arms, whilst three large armies were in movement for her relief; the capture of one French army exceeding a hundred thousand men in strength, with the head of the state himself in their midst, through the capitulation of Sedan; the surrounding, enclosing and capture of another army of two hundred thousand men, the special corps d'élites of France, in the fortress of Metz; the defeat of an army of threefold overpowering numbers in the three days battle at Belfort, and its being driven on to the neutral ground of Switzerland, are events of war such as absolutely never occurred before.

These incomparable successes must be regarded, in general, as the results of a military science which understood how to take into account the improved means of transport, the altered army organization and the arms of precision, new factors which the adversary was as yet unable to appreciate; of a military art which knew how to mobilise with the greatest rapidity armies of unparalleled magnitude, provided with weapons brought to great perfection, and to move them according to new principles of strategy and tactics, whilst the adversary, it is true, also possessed large armies, yet did not understand their organization, and employed them according to ancient rules.

Since the rapid advances in science exercise their influence upon military matters, so that new and more perfect fire arms are provided every ten years, it is the constant endeavour of army-leaders to adapt their *tactics* to this technical progress in the various kinds of weapons, and to make such changes as their new claims demand. This can only be successfully done by the earnest persevering endeavours of intelligent and discerning men. It is a very laborious and difficult task.

When this earnestness and judgment are wanting, the inclination is to trust to the weapon alone as an efficacious lever of victory; endeavours are made to employ arms of a particularly deadly and perfect kind, the spirit is neglected and the machine is confided in.

Thus it was with France. Possessing a superior infantry rifle and a description of gun, not in use in the German army, the French believed victory to be certain, as, from a superficial judgment of the Prussian victories in 1866, they had attributed their success to the needle gun alone. They consequently practised the single tactical formations which most enhanced the efficacy of their fire arms, for example, the fighting of the infantry from shelter trenches, but the general character of their tactics remained upon the old system. No one who has read the French regulations for the use of the Mitrailleuse and the report of the commission upon the trial of the Chassepot rifle, can avoid the conviction that the French actually grounded their confidence in victory for the greatest part, in the superiority of their weapons.

A strange delusion!

Then again *Strategy* is a science, which always progresses and takes account of the changed laws of arms of modern times in the same way as she employs the new means of communication, the railway and the telegraph, for their corresponding ends. The universal obligation of arms, whilst considerably increasing the strength of the army, alters the rules of strategy.

Armies of half a million of men can no longer be moved upon the principles which held good for those of a hundred thousand.

France, as well as Germany possessed an enormously large army, but she did not understand how to make these masses flexible, to unite them upon the decisive points, or to throw them quickly from one line on to another.

The German leaders possessed this skill. They understood, in the first place, how to make use of the numerous lines of railway which lead to the frontier, simultaneously and without confusion, in such a manner that masses of troops were enabled to form up against the enemy with astonishing rapidity, upon points which had been previously decided upon. Then in the whole further course of the war, thanks to the capability of the officers and to the superb

discipline, they understood how to make judicious use of so many roads and ways running parallel, that armies of a hundred thousand men were moved forward, united and divided, with the rapidity of small divisions.

The Prussian staff has called into life an entirely new strategy.

The different armies march in such connection with one another that their heads form a single strategical front. During the advance so many roads near one another are made use of, by which the columns can move forward level in height, that the quickest development and concentration to the front can take place at the moment of collision with the enemy. Thus the enemy who perhaps hoped to overthrow a dismembered army or to break through its line, immediately finds himself kept back by the ranks quickly deployed in his front and energetically supported, and he is entangled and surrounded as if ensnared in the meshes of a net which is drawn together round him. This is the only explanation for the enormous number of prisoners made by the German armies. It is a phenomenon which has occurred in no previous war. The plan of a concentrated attack, of outflanking and of surrounding, predominates in all the battles as well as in all operations which have a battle for their aim, and has produced more brilliant results than any other previous method.

The beginning of the war offers a striking example of this strategy, whilst at the same time it throws a clear light upon the defects of French generalship.

The German operations at the commencement of the campaign consisted in a *concentrated strategical attack* upon the whole of the enemy's position.

A plan which aims, at once, at surrounding and crushing the enemy in front and on both flanks, can only be carried out with a prospect of success by an army numerically superior and under a Direction which is secure of the most precise execution of its complicated dispositions.

In earlier wars similar plans have frequently been proposed but have never been carried out so effectually.

A plan of this kind can only succeed with completely drilled

and disciplined troops, under distinguished leaders. This has clearly been made evident in history. The frequent failure of the concentrated attack had even led to the opinion, that operations such as Prussia undertook in 1866 and even in the last campaign were entirely faulty.

It is true that, generally, in a concentrated attack the danger for the assailant is great, the moment that any part of the army machinery fails. The different bodies of troops advance upon lines of operation which converge, but only meet upon the enemy's territory, consequently at a point the possession of which must first be obtained. The danger is imminent, lest the enemy with concentrated forces should defeat these bodies one after another by attacking them in detail.

Prussian generalship however succeeded in holding together in one hand all the threads of the numerous members.

There was always a single direction in chief.

With this idea of a concentrated attack, it knew how to combine and carry out a tactic, which at the same time secures to itself all advantages and avoids all disadvantages, which is able to bring into full effect all the superiority of the means of communication of progressing modern times, above all the telegraph, and fire arms brought to the highest degree of perfection.

A comparison of the different battles with the strategical operations as a whole, clearly shows how greatly this idea of the concentrated attack lies at the foundation of the whole Prussian war system. In the same way that armies advance surrounding and closing in towards the enemy's forces, so do regiments and battalions march upon single positions in the battle, out-flanking and enclosing them. Tactics and strategy come from the same source.

The final aim of the strategical movements has, also, frequently been the object of the concentrated strategical attack, whilst at the same time the final aim was the object of the concentrated tactical attack. This was the case in the battle of Königgrätz.

On the other hand the campaign of 1870 took another form at the commencement.

The French army was divided into corps, each of which took up

independently, an excellent tactical position, without perceptible connection, and without essential mutual support, forming altogether a strategical line, still not having a disposition in common, no opportunity was offered for a general engagement.

The single direction was wanting. The corps gave battle independently by standing in the way of, or throwing themselves upon the German armies which were pressing forward in pursuance of a previously determined line of operation.

They were conquered, completely broken up, destroyed and taken prisoners.

In contrast with German leadership, the French generals still did homage to obsolete traditions, to which the name of Napoleon I. imparted sacred lustre. Instead of the well grounded military instruction which gave a secure foundation to the original plans of the German leaders, the French, for the most part, only possessed a military routine, above which they were never capable of raising themselves, being entangled in the fatal illusion of their own absolute superiority. The French had fought against the Chinese, the Kabyles and the Mexicans, for which no particular art of war was necessary; here they had conquered by tactical routine and the bravery of the soldiers as well as through superior arms. They had further triumphed over the Russians and Austrians. Here also their superior tactics and the impetuosity of the troops were the grounds of victory, whilst their faulty strategy in the Crimea and Upper Italy had well merited such defeats as Prussian generalship prepared for them at last. The strategy of the Russians and Austrians was however still more deplorable than that of the French.

In order to give greater freedom of action to the individual corps leaders, a system was current in the French army which left each corps to follow a particular strategy for itself, that should, however, correspond with the general plan. This system had already borne evil fruit in the Crimea and Upper Italy. Undertakings such as Mac Mahon's flank march from Chalons to Sedan, and exhibitions such as the splitting up of the Army in the beginning of August 1870 were nothing new in French generalship. Similar things had happened in 1859 and as great follies had also taken place in 1854. In both wars although the French conquered, a great want of unanimity was

exhibited in military action; however, since victories had been won in former wars in spite of faulty generalship, this generalship was estimated as being of the highest genius, and its maxims were established in the heads of French strategists as approved principles. The generals who had commanded in the Crimea and Upper Italy, in Mexico and Algeria were esteemed distinguished commanders, and in 1870 the Emperor committed to them, in full confidence, a power of authority which he ought to have kept in his own hands if he had possessed the capacity for it. When these generals now saw an enemy opposed to them who did not remain inactive and waiting for them, but who unexpectedly attacked them, they fell into the greatest embarrassment and each caring for himself, left one another in the lurch.

Thus, the superiority of the German *art of war* was established over that of the French.

But the *quality of the materials* which formed the armies is another important factor, the military capacity of the officers and men, as well as the moral qualities of the private soldiers.

The Germans have gained many victories by understanding how to collect superior forces upon critical points, others they have won with equal forces through skill and bravery, and in isolated cases when they have been inferior in numbers, by the tenacity and courage of the troops alone. They have proved themselves superior to the French, battalion against battalion, squadron against squadron, battery against battery.

At the same time, the arms of the French infantry were superior to those of the Germans.

There can however be no doubt, that as the German officer stood above the French officer in education and military capacity, so the German soldier was also superior to the French soldier, and for the following reasons:

The motive powers in the French army were chiefly ambition, vanity and avarice. These qualities are only restrained with difficulty by discipline, and in victory only by good fortune.

In the African regiments this army had received elements which had a destructive influence upon its spirit. The license which it was necessary to allow these troops of low moral standing, whilst endeavouring to gloss over their licentiousness by flattery

about their warlike fierceness, was a contagious example for all corps.

The motive powers in the German army were chiefly a high sense of duty, love for the fatherland and exasperation.

The discipline in the German army was at the highest pitch that can, in general, be reached; the faculty of obedience is especially a German quality.

The French army was in a high degree warlike, the German army as far as the men were concerned, peace loving; but this love of peace did not injure their courage in the smallest degree. In general of a prevailing melancholy temperament, the German warrior much more frequently went into action with his thoughts upon death, than did the French who was of a prevailing sanguinary temperament; but just because he had made himself familiar with the king of terrors in his thoughts, nothing was able to shake him. He had made up his mind to conquer or to die, he carried out his resolution with the greatest integrity — his bearing when advancing to the assault, terrified the French.

There is still an element in the German army which is not to be found in the French. This is the number of highly educated men who carry the rifle. These men transported into a position which rouses all the faculties, and incorporated in all parts of the troops, exhibit warrior qualifications, which being developed in them by culture, might still never have been drawn out in peace relations, and a light of intelligence spreading from them as it were, illuminates a wide circle of their less cultivated comrades and is capable of ennobling the spirit of the whole army.

Thus a highly educated nation, trained for many years in grave discipline and the most elevated sciences shows the slowly ripened fruits of an harmonious growth by the results also of a development of its warlike power.

CHAPTER I.

THE STRATEGICAL FORMATION.

The formal *declaration of war from France to Prussia* was delivered to Count Bismarck at 1.30 o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th of July. However, the agreement to the demands for credit for the war in the assembly on the 15th of July, and the declaration of the French government upon that day, constituted in fact, a declaration of war, and the North German Confederation consequently began its preparations on the 16th of July. It may be inferred from the speech of the president Rouher to the Emperor, as well as from official and other information, that France had been preparing for a German war ever since 1866, and considering the present as the most favourable moment, had taken special military measures to have a numerous mobile army for disposal in the middle of the month of July.

The most important of these measures was the addition to the army in the camp of Châlons, which in consequence of the number of troops being doubled, consisted in the middle of July of about 80,000 men, and thus comparatively near the German frontier. The circumstance that in the eastern departments there were a preponderating number of garrisons, and that besides, a number of small fortified places with the fortresses of Metz and Strasburg lay opposite the German frontier, facilitated in a high degree, the concentration of an army for the invasion of Germany, upon a secure base of operations.

On the other hand the North German Confederation, which the attack most nearly concerned, neither possessed the considerable

frontier fortresses nor the accumulation of garrisons in the threatened provinces, nor a standing camp. Except at the fortresses of Cologne, Coblenz and Mayence, the Prussian Rhine provinces lay open to the enemy, and a large portion of the army had to be brought a long distance from the eastern provinces, to the threatened frontier.

If France, as she had reckoned on, had only had the North German Confederation opposed to her, probably the occupation of the left Rhine territory by the French army would have formed the commencement of the war.

The conduct of the South German States first gave the war an unfavourable turn for France. Surprised by the adhesion of these countries to the alliance with the Confederation, the French Government found itself compelled to change its war plans, and even apart from political grounds, this change in the military situation explains in a great measure, the delay of action.

The theatre of war extended along the whole frontier from Saargemünd to Hünningen, and it must have been the consideration of an attack from Baden or from the Bavarian Palatinate, which paralyzed the advance of the French army into Rhinish Prussia.

In order to compensate for the numerical superiority of the German armies opposed to the Emperor Napoleon, which the conduct of the southern states now made still more striking, the French Direction conceived the idea of passing quickly over the Rhine in order to hinder the junction of the North and South German Armies, and in the hope of gaining allies among the neutral states, through the impression produced by a first success.

In conformity with this idea the French active forces were formed up in three large bodies, disposed in such a manner that the enemy should be kept in ignorance as to their destination. At Metz 150,000 men were to be concentrated, 100,000 at Strasburg, and 50,000 in the camp of Châlons. This arrangement gave scope for the conjecture that an attack would be made either against the Rhine provinces or against Baden.

After the concentration was completed, the Emperor Napoleon would unite the Metz and Strasburg armies and cross the Rhine at Maxau with an army of 250,000 men, leaving Rastatt on his right

and Germersheim on his left, and thrust himself between the North German Confederation and the Southern States.

Meanwhile the army of Châlons was to direct its march upon Metz in order to cover the rear of the invading army and to watch the north-western frontier; at the same time a fleet with an army to effect a landing, would threaten the Prussian coasts from the North-Sea and the Baltic, and retain there a portion of the North German army.

It will not be uninteresting to mention the grounds given by the Emperor himself for the failure of these plans, in his publication "*Des causes qui ont amené la capitulation de Sedan*".

He here says:

"This plan had not a chance of succeeding, unless the enemy could be outstripped in quickness. For this object, not only must the required number of soldiers be assembled at fixed points in a few days, but also the essential accessories, such as waggons, train, artillery parks, pontoons, gunboats to protect the passage of the Rhine, and finally the indispensable provisioning with biscuit for the support of a numerous army marching in an united body.

"The Emperor flattered himself that these results could be attained, and this was his error; for like every one else he cherished the illusion that a concentration of so many men, horses and war material could take place by the railways with the necessary order and precision although it had not all been regulated by a careful administration long beforehand.

"The chief cause of our retardation lay in the faults of our military organization, as it had existed for fifty years, and which showed themselves from the first moment. Instead of having army corps always organized as in Prussia, which are recruited in one province and possess the necessary material and accessories upon the spot, the troops forming the army of France are scattered over the whole territory, whilst the material is accumulated in a few cities, and stored in magazines.

"If is required to form an active division upon some point of the frontier, the artillery usually comes from a far distant place, the military train and ambulances from Paris and Vernon, almost the whole of the provisioning from the capital, and the soldiers of the reserve from all parts of France. The railroads are insufficient to

transport the men, the horses and the material, confusion everywhere arises, and the railway stations are often full of objects, whose nature and destination are unknown.

"In 1860 the Emperor had decided that the recruits of the second category of the contingent should be exercised at the dépôts of their departments, in order in time of war to be allotted to the regiments taking the field. This disposition combined the advantages of the Prussian system with those of the French. It was only necessary for the reserves to repair from their villages to the chief towns of their departments where they could be collected, equipped in a short time and enrolled in the different regiments.

"Unfortunately this system was modified by the war ministry in 1866, and from the first moment of his levy each soldier was told off to a certain regiment. By this plan the reserve troops, when called to arms in 1870, had frequently to reach their regiments in the most complicated manner. For example those in Strasburg and whose regiments belonged to Alsace, instead of assembling in the Strasburg dépôts, were sent to their respective dépôts, perhaps in the south of France, or even in Algeria, and had to return again from there to Alsace in order to be incorporated in their regiments.

"It will be understood ~~what~~ delay such an organization must occasion in collecting the reserve troops.

"The same thing occurred in the camp equipage of the men and officers, as well as in the ambulance waggons.

"Instead of being distributed in the dépôts in the centre of each department, they were stored up in a small number of magazines, and by this means a large number of reserve troops came to their regiments very imperfectly equipped, without knapsacks, tentes-abri, dishes, flasks, cooking kettles, all objects of absolute necessity.

"To these faults must be added the small initiative committed to the generals who commanded the departments and to the intendants. A ministerial order was necessary for the smallest article. For example, it was impossible to give the officers what was indispensable, or even the necessary arms to the soldiers without an order from Paris.

"This routine of administration deprived the generals of all that activity and foresight which sometimes redeem the faults of organization.

"We will therefore hasten to say that in order to place an army together, the intelligence of individuals must not be so much depended on, as a solid organization which sets in motion a simple machine capable of working with regularity in war, because it has been accustomed to work with regularity in peace."

Thus spoke the Emperor Napoleon.

The weaknesses which have been disclosed in this representation may be considered as really proved by what the German troops saw and heard when in France, and especially by a great number of documents found in the Chateau of St. Cloud, which bear witness to the profligate confusion and unprepared state of the French army, and furnish a wonderful illustration of the fact, that the French provoked the war, in the opinion that they had brought their preparations to the highest point of completion.

But supposing that these weaknesses had not existed, that the Emperor Napoleon had even been able to mobilise his whole army as quickly as Germany, the attempt to throw it between North and South Germany would have been a ruinous imprudence. The army of the North German Confederation alone might have been able to cause a deplorable fate for the invading French army.

That Napoleon actually wanted to carry on an offensive war, is fully proved by the circumstance that maps of Germany only, were distributed through his army.

In the face however of manifest impossibilities, he gave up all bold plans very soon after the declaration of war.

Thus a delay arose in forming up the French army, which gradually brought the intended offensive into a defensive disposition.

For on the German side, the mobilization of the immense forces took place with unparalleled celerity and circumspection, and in the space of fourteen days overtook the long preparations of the French.

In consideration of the supposed French plans, the question arose for the German Direction whether it would be more advantageous in the first instance, to keep back a French invasion with stationary troops, or whether *a concerted movement should be made* at the risk of abandoning the frontier provinces.

The latter course was decided upon. The garrisons stationed nearest to the frontier only, were to form a frontier cordon in order to

deceive the enemy, whilst the mobilization was being pressed forward in the interior of the country, with that steadiness which a lasting army direction alone renders possible.

Brilliant generalship and the sacrifice of weak detachments, which the safety of the frontier required, made the execution of this bold idea possible. From the moment of the declaration of war to the storming of Weissenburg, a period of seventeen days, a few isolated regiments held the whole of the French army in check, by raising the belief that there were already considerable corps on the frontier, and so made the French imagine that the whole of the military preparations were completed.

The strategical formation of the French army immediately after the declaration of war, which only imperfectly corresponded with the above quoted idea of the three bodies, was as follows :

1st Corps, Commandant, Marshal Mac Mahon, head-quarters Strasburg. The railway lines from Lyons, Epinal and Nancy conducted the troops to this place.

The 5th Corps, Commandant, General de Failly, composed of four Infantry and one Cavalry Divisions, head-quarters Bitsch, joined the left wing of the 1st Corps. This corps had no line of railway to itself but must base its operations towards the rear either upon the line already named, or on that from Metz and Thionville. The front was directed towards the railway from Kaiserslautern to Zweibrücken, and the line from Landau to Rastatt. The left wing joined the *2nd Corps, Commandant, General Frossard*, head-quarters St. Avold. This village lies to the north of the railway between Metz and Saarbrücken, only a few miles from the Prussian towns Lauter and Karlsbrunn to the south of Saarlouis; here there is an important junction of roads which permits of operations being carried on towards Saarbrücken and Saarlouis, or towards Bitsch and Strasburg.

The 3rd Corps, Commandant, Marshal Bazaine, was based upon Metz and threatened the fortress of Saarlouis, by the high roads through Boulay and Bouzonville.

The 4th Corps, General Ladmirault, forming the left wing, rested upon Thionville, and could advance by two roads into the


Moselle country. One towards the north, leading by Sierk to Saarburg and Trier, the other through Bouzonville to Saarlouis by the road joining that from Metz.

Canrobert's Corps at Châlons, *Felix Douay's* at Belfort and the *Imperial Guard* under *Bourbaki* in and about Nancy, formed the second line.

The French army was therefore extended upon a line 20 miles in length (72 English miles) threatening South Germany with its right wing at Strasburg, the Prussian Saar with its left wing at Thionville and Sierk, and the Bavarian Rhine Palatinate with its centre at Bitsch, whilst the Guards, Canrobert's and Douay's Corps formed the reserve.

During the last few days before hostilities began, a change was made in this original formation, on account of the concentration of considerable German forces in the Rhine Palatinate and in the southern part of the Prussian Rhine province, which made Napoleon apprehensive that his long line might be broken through. Marshal Mac Mahon was ordered to draw nearer to the main army and to march towards the neighbourhood of Bitsch. This retrograde movement in the defensive was, already, the surrender of all the earlier offensive plans against South Germany and the Rhine, and the French, consequently, now entrenched themselves in great haste in all their positions. Mac Mahon pushed forward Abel Douay's Division towards the Lauter, to occupy Weissenburg for the purpose of covering his intended flank march.

17, 994



ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE FRENCH ARMY

at the beginning of the war.

Commander in chief of the Army: *Emperor Napoleon III.* — Chief of the Staff of the Army: *Marshal Leboeuf.* — Deputy chief of the Staff: General of Division *Lebrun.* — Deputy chief of the Staff: General of Division *Jarras.* — Commander in chief of Engineers: General of Division *Solcille.* — Commander in chief of Artillery: General of Division *Coffinières de Nordeck.* — Commandant of Imperial Head Quarters: General *Letellier de Blanchard.*

THE GARDE CORPS.

General of Division *Bourbaki.* Chief of the Staff, General *Dauvergne.*

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
1st Inf. Div. General of Division Deligny.	1st Brig. Gen. Brincourt.	Jäger Battalion.—1st and 2nd Voltigeur R.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Gassiot.	3rd and 4th Voltigeur R.
2nd Inf. Div. General of Division Picard.	1st Brig. Gen. Janingros.	Zouave R. — 1st Grenadier R.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Poitevin.	2nd and 3rd Grenadier R.
Cavalry Div. General of Division Desvaux.	1st Brig. Gen. du Frétay.	Guides R. — Chasseurs R.
	2nd Brig. Gen. de France.	Lancer R. — Dragoon R.
	3rd Brig. Gen. du Preuil.	Cuirassier R. — Carbineer R.

The Garde Corps numbered 21 battalions, 24 squadrons and 12 batteries.

FIRST CORPS.

(The alterations which took place after the battle of Wörth are shown in parenthesis.)

Marshal *Mac Mahon*, Duc of Magenta. (General Ducrot.) — Chief of the Staff, General Colson. (General Faure. — Col. Robert.)

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
1st Inf. Div. General of Division Ducrot. (Gen. Wolff.)	1st Brig. Gen. Wolff.	13th Jager Bat. — 18th and 96th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. du Postis du Houlbec.	45th R. of the Line. — 1st Zouave R.
2nd Inf. Div. General of Division (Abel) Douay. (G. Pellé.)	1st Brig. Gen. Montmarie.	16th Jager Bat. — 50th and 74th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Pellé.	78th R. of the Line. 1st R. Algerian Tirail. 1st R. de Marche.
3rd Inf. Div. General of Division Raoul.	1st Brig. Gen. L'Hérillier. (Gen. Cartret-Trecourt.)	38th Jager Battalion. — 36th and 48th R. of the Line. (2nd Zouave R.)
	2nd Brig. Gen. Lefebvre.	2nd Zouave R. — 2nd R. Algerian Tirail. (48th R. of the Line. — 1 Bat. Franc-tireurs from Paris.)
4th Inf. Div. General of Division de Lartigue.	1st Brig. Gen. Fraboulet.	1st Jager Batt. — 56th and 87th R. of the Line (remained in Strasburg (2nd R. de Marche).
	2nd Brig. Gen. Lacretelle.	3rd Zouave R. — 3rd R. Algerian Tirailleurs.
Cavalry Div. General of Division Duhesme.	1st Brig. Gen. de Septeuil.	3rd Hussar and 11th Chasseur R.
	2nd Brig. Gen. de Nansouty.	2nd and 6th Lancer R. — 10th Dragoon R.
	3rd Brig. Gen. Michel.	8th and 9th Cuirassier R.

The first Army Corps numbered in July, 52 battalions, 28 squadrons and 18 batteries.

SECOND CORPS.

General of Division *Frossard*. Chief of the Staff, General *Saget*.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
1st Inf. Div. General of Division Vergé.	1st Brig. Gen. Tixier, later Gen. Letellier-Valazé.	3rd Jager Bat. — 32nd and 56th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Jolivet.	76th and 77th R. of the Line.
2nd Inf. Div. General of Division Bataille.	1st Brig. General Pouget.	12th Jager Bat. — 8th and 23rd R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. G. Fauvart-Bastoul.	66th and 67th R. of the Line.
3rd Inf. Div. General of Division de Laveaucoupet.	1st Brig. Gen. Doëns, later Gen. Maudhuy.	10th Jager Bat. — 2nd and 63rd R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Michelet.	24th and 40th R. of the Line.
Cavalry Div. General of Division Lichtlin.	1st Brig. Gen. Valabrègue.	4th and 5th Chasseur R.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Bachelier.	7th and 12th Dragoon R.

The second Army Corps numbered 39 battalions, 16 squadrons and 15 batteries.

THIRD CORPS.

Marshal *Bazaine* (later Gen. *Decaen*, later Marshal *Lebœuf*). Chief of the Staff, General *Manèque*.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
1st Inf. Div. General of Division Montaudon.	1st Brig. Gen. Aymard.	18th Jager Bat. — 51st and 62nd R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Clinchaut.	81st and 95th R. of the Line.
2nd Inf. Div. General of Division de Castagny.	1st Brig. Gen. Cambriels.	15th Jager Bat. — 19th and 41st R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Duplessis.	69th and 90th R. of the Line.
3rd Inf. Div. General of Division de Mettmann.	1st Brig. Gen. de Potier.	17th Jager Bat. — 7th and 29th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Arnaudcau.	59th and 71st R. of the Line.
4th Inf. Div. General of Division Decaen.	1st Brig. Gen. de Bauer.	11th Jager Bat. — 44th and 60th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. G. Sanglé-Ferrières.	80th and 85th R. of the Line.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
Cav. Div. General of Division de Clerambault.	1st Brig. Gen. Bruchard.	2nd 3rd and 10th Chas- seur R.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Maubranches.	2nd and 4th Dragoon R.
	3rd Brig. Gen. de Juniac.	5th and 8th Dragoon R.

The third Army Corps numbered 53 battalions, 28 squadrons and 18 batteries.

FOURTH CORPS.

General of Division *de Ladmirault*. Chief of the Staff, General Desaint.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
1st Inf. Div. General of Division de Cisse.	1st Brig. Gen. Brayer.	20th Jager Bat. — 1st and 6th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. de Colbert.	57th and 73rd R. of the Line.
2nd Inf. Div. General of Division Rose.	1st Brig. Gen. Bellecourt.	5th Jager Bat. — 13th and 43rd R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Pradier.	64th and 98th R. of the Line.
3rd Inf. Div. General of Division de Lorencey.	1st Brig. Gen. Pajol.	2nd Jager Bat. — 15th and 33rd R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Berger.	54th and 65th R. of the Line.
Cav. Div. General of Division Legrand.	1st Brig. Gen. de Montaignu.	2nd and 7th Hussar R.
	2nd Brig. G. de Gondrecourt.	3rd and 7th Dragoon R.

The fourth Army Corps numbered 39 battalions, 16 squadrons and 15 batteries.

FIFTH CORPS.

General of Division *de Failly* (later de Wimpffen). Chief of the Staff,
General Besson.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
1st Inf. Div. General of Division Goze.	1st Brig. Gen. Grenier.	4th Jager Bat. — 11th and 46th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Nicolas.	61st and 86th R. of the Line.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
2nd Inf. Div. General of Division de l'Abadie.	1st Brig. Gen. Lapasset*).	14th Jager Batt. — 49th and 84th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. de Maussion.	88th and 97th R. of the Line.
3rd Inf. Div. General of Division Guyot de Lespart.	1st Brig. Gen. Abatucci.	19th Jager Batt. — 17th and 27th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. de Fontange.	30th and 68th R. of the Line.
Cavalry Div. General of Division Brahaut.	1st Brig. Gen. de Bernis.	5th Hussar and 12th Chasseur R.
	2nd Brig. G. de la Mortière.	3rd and 5th Lancer R.

The fifth Army Corps numbered 39 battalions, 16 squadrons and 16 batteries.

SIXTH CORPS.

Marshal Canrobert. Chief of the Staff, General Henri.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
1st Inf. Div. General of Division Tixier.	1st Brig. Gen. Péchot.	9. Jager Batt. — 4th and 10th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. G. Leroy de Dais.	12th and 100th Reg. of the Line.
2nd Inf. Div. General of Division Bisson.	1st Brig. Gen. Noël.	9th and 14th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Maurice.	20th and 30th Reg. of the Line.
3rd Inf. Div. General of Division Lafont de Villiers.	1st Brig. Gen. de Sonnay.	75th and 91st Reg. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Colin.	93rd and 94th Reg. of the Line.
4th Inf. Div. General of Division Levassor-Sorval.	1st Brig. G. de Marguenat.	25th and 26th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. G. de Chanaleibles.	28th and 70th R. of the Line.
Cav. Div. General of Division de Fénélon.	1st Brig. Gen. Tilliard.	1st Hussar and 6th Chass. R.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Savaresse.	1st and 7th Lancer R.
	3rd Brig. Gen. de Béville.	5th and 6th Cuirassier R.

*) This Brigade which held possession of Saargemünd in the beginning of August, got separated from the Corps in the retreat to Chalons, and retired upon Metz with the third Corps.

The sixth Army Corps numbered 49 battalions, 24 squadrons and 18 batteries. The 14th 80th and 30th Regiments of the Line were separated from the sixth Corps at Frouard, and afterwards joined the 13th Corps which was reformed in Chalons. The whole Cavalry Division was unable to reach the Corps in Metz, and later formed the cavalry of the 12th Corps.

SEVENTH CORPS.

General of Division (*Felix*) Douay. Chief of the Staff, Gen. Renson.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
1st Inf. Div. General of Division Conseil-Dumesnil.	1st Brig. Gen. Bretteville, later Gen. Morand.	17th Jager Bat. — 3rd and 21st R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Maire, later Gen. St. Hilaire.	47th and 99th R. of the Line.
2nd Inf. Div. General of Division Liebert.	1st Brig. Gen. Guiomar.	6th Jager Bat. — 5th and 37th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. G. de la Bastide.	53rd and 89th R. of the Line.
3rd Inf. Div. General of Division Dumont.	1st Brig. Gen. Bordas.	52nd and 72nd R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Bittard des Portes.	82nd and 83rd R. of the Line.
Cav. Div. General of Division Ameil.	1st Brig. Gen. Cambriel.	4th Hussar and 4th and 8th Lancer R.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Jolif du Coulombier.	6th Hussar and 6th Drag. R.

The seventh Army Corps numbered 38 battalions, 20 squadrons and 15 batteries. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade which was formed in Lyons, never reached the Corps.

FIRST RESERVE CAVALRY DIVISION.

General du Barrail.

1st Brig. Gen. Margueritte. 1st and 3rd Chasseurs d'Afrique.
2nd Brig. Gen. de Lajaille. 2nd and 4th — —

SECOND RESERVE CAVALRY DIVISION.

General de Bonnemain.

1st Brig. 1st and 2nd Cuirassier R.
2nd Brig. 3rd and 4th — —

THIRD RESERVE CAVALRY DIVISION.

1st Brig. Prince J. Murat. 1st and 9th Dragoon R.
2nd Brig. Gen. de Grammont. 7th and 10th Cuirassier R.

The strength of this mobile Field Army, at the beginning of the war is reckoned therefore in the following manner: The Infantry Divisions consisted almost without exception of 13 Battalions, and the Cavalry Divisions of 4, 5, 6, even 7 Regiments. The Battalions numbered about 720 men, the Cavalry regiments numbered 500 horses.

CORPS.	No. of DIVISIONS.		MEN.	HORSES.	BATTALIONS.	GUNS.
	INFANTRY	CAVALRY.				
Garde C.	2	1	17.280	3000	12	72
1st*	4	1	37.440	3500	20	108
2nd	3	1	28.080	2000	15	90
3rd	4	1	37.440	3500	20	108
4th	3	1	28.080	2000	15	90
5th	3	1	28.080	2000	15	90
6th	4	1	37.440	3000	20	108
7th	3	1	27.360	2500	15	90
Cavalry Reserve.		3		6000		
Total			241.200	27.500		756

The Corps which was destined for landing on the German coast, or probably for co-operation with the Danes in Jutland, is not here taken into account, for its formation was not completed, by reason of the rapid victories of the Germans.

This *effective strength of the army formed up in the eastern provinces at the beginning of the war* and estimated at a united capitulation of 310,000 men, differs without doubt considerably from

*) In order to distinguish more easily between the French and German Corps, the former will be always indicated by Arabic figures, and the latter by Roman figures.

the *said strength* of the whole Field Army, whose war state in combatants was reckoned as follows :

304,000	Men Infantry
40,000	„ Cavalry,
46,000	„ Artillery,*
11,000	„ Engineers,
10,000	„ Train,
as well as 13,000 Officers of all arms.	
<hr/> Total 424,000 Men.	

In Artillery 3 batteries, including one mitrailleuse battery, were allotted to each Infantry Division, and a reserve of 6 batteries including one horse battery ~~was~~ **was** in the Artillery Corps.

Thus a Corps of 3 Divisions had 15 batteries with 90 guns, and a Corps of 4 Divisions 18 batteries with 108 guns.

The *Engineer troops* in each corps were composed of a company of Engineers for each Division, and one company with the Engineer Park for the Corps.

According to the preceding order of battle the following troops were not employed with the army in the field: the 16th 38th 39th and 92nd Regiments of the Line, 3 Battalions of African Light Infantry, 1 Foreign Regiment, the 8th Hussars, the 1st and 9th Chasseurs, and 3 Regiments of Spahis. These troops were stationed in Algeria and in addition, the 22nd 34th 58th and 79th Regiments of the Line which were stationed on the Spanish frontier.

Lastly the 35th and 42nd Regiments of the Line which were in Civita Vecchia, and the 7th and 8th Chasseurs which were in France, but not with the Army.

In contrast to the precipitate haste with which the French troops had been thrown upon the frontier immediately after the declaration of war, followed by the loss of a series of days in uncertain delays and insecure operations, the strategical formation of the armies in Germany was only commenced after the mobilization according to a settled plan had been completed, and its accomplishment was indicated by an immediate, energetic advance, and a victorious encounter with the enemy upon hostile territory.

17.994

Three armies had been organized in the last week of July, and concentrated upon Coblenz, Mayence and Mannheim as their basis of operations.

The *First Army*, under the command of General *von Steinmetz*, head quarters Coblenz, formed the right wing.

The *Second Army*, under the command of *Prince Frederick Charles*, head quarters Mayence, formed the centre.

The *Third Army*, under the command of the *Crown Prince of Prussia*, head quarters Mannheim, formed the left wing.

This disposition, owing to the peculiar rapidity and energy of German Leadership, combined with the irresolution of the enemy, resulted in the desired power of taking the offensive being now entirely given up to the Germans. Until this favourable state of affairs the German Direction had to consider the probability of an attack on the part of the French, and could not lose sight of the possibility that the French army would make use of the railroad so favourably situated via Metz-Thionville-Luxemburg for an invasion of the Rhine provinces, although in violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg. The position of the right wing in Coblenz, was a position of defence opposite the Luxemburg frontier.

At the same time this disposition showed how disadvantageous the German-French frontier was for Germany. Whilst the French army could be concentrated in the immediate neighbourhood of the frontier upon secure points, the German army must abandon considerable pro-

vinces in order to obtain a safe basis of operations. Between the line mentioned and the frontier such an one was not to be found.

• Besides the unexpected attack upon Alsace which was carried into execution, the position of the German left wing also made the defence of Baden feasible, in case the French army had directed its attack against South Germany. The enemy's entry into Baden would have been a flank march against the army of the Crown Prince. However the position of the three armies collectively, at once removed the danger for South Germany, because by it the main body of the Germans was brought nearer to its object of operations, just as the French army would have been nearer to theirs by an invasion of South Germany. Paris on the one side, and Berlin on the other had been the chief aims of the strategical operations from the beginning, and all the movements which might have had other aims could only be of secondary interest.

Thus, through its strategical importance, the disposition from Mannheim to Coblenz defended South Germany.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GERMAN ARMIES

in the beginning of the war, until after the battle of Gravelotte

on the 18th August 1870.

Commander in Chief: King *William 1st of Prussia*. — Adjutant Generals: Infantry General *von Boyen*, Lieut. General *von Treskow*, Major General *Baron von Steinicker*, Lieut. Colonel Count *von Lehdorff*, Lieut. Colonel *Anton Radziwill*, Lieut. Colonel Count *von Waldersee*, Major *von Alten*. — Chief of the Staff of the Army: Infantry General *Baron von Moltke*. — Quarter master General: Lieut. General *von Podbielski*. — Deputy Chiefs of the Staff: Lieut. Colonel *Bronsart von Schellendorff*, Lieut. Colonel *von Verdy du Vernois*, Lieut. Colonel *von Brandenstein*. — Inspector General of Artillery: Infantry Gen. *v. Hindersin*. — Inspector General of Engineers: Lieut. General *v. Kleist*.

FIRST ARMY.

Commander in Chief: Infantry General *von Steinmetz*. — Chief of the Staff: Major General *v. Sperling*. — Chief Quartermaster: Colonel Count *v. Wartensleben*. — Commander of the Artillery: Lieut. General *Schwartz*. — Commander of the Engineers and Pioneers: Colonel *Biehler*.

FIRST ARMY CORPS.

Cavalry Gen. *Baron v. Manteuffel*. Chief of the Staff, Lieut. Col. *v. d. Burg*.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
1st Inf. Div. Major General von Bentheim.	1st Inf. Brig. Major General v. Gayl.	Gren. R. Crown Prince No. 1. Inf. R. No. 41.
	2nd Inf. Brig. Major Gen. v. Falkenstein.	Grenadier R. No. 3. Infant. R. No. 43.
	Jager Battalion No. 1 and Dragoon Regiment No. 1.	

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
2nd Inf. Div. Major General v. Pritzelwitz.	3rd Inf. Brig. Major General v. Memerty.	Grenadier R. No. 4. Infantry R. No. 44.
	4th Inf. Brig. Major General v. Zglinitzki.	Grenadier R. No. 5. Infantry R. No. 45.
	Dragoon Regiment No. 10.	
Regiment of Field Artillery No. 1, Pioneer Battalion No. 1, Battalion of Train No. 1.		

Altogether 25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 84 guns, besides pioneers and train. This Corps is recruited in, and garrisons East and West Prussia.

SEVENTH ARMY CORPS.

Infantry General v. Zastrow. Chief of the Staff, Colonel v. Unger.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
13th Inf. Div. Lieutenant General v. Glümer.	25th Infantry Brig. Major General Baron v. d. Osten called Sacken	Inf. R. No. 13. Fusilier R. No. 73.
	26th Infantry Brig. Major General Baron v. der Goltz.	Inf. R. No. 15. Inf. R. No. 55.
	Jager Battalion No. 7 and Hussar Regiment No. 8.	
14th Inf. Div. Lieutenant General v. Kamecke.	27th Infantry Brig. Major General v. François.	- Fusilier R. No. 39. Infantry R. No. 74.
	28th Inf. Brig. Major General v. Woyha II.	Infantry R. No. 53. Infantry R. No. 77.
	Hussar Regiment No. 15.	
Regiment of Field Artillery No. 7, Pioneer Battalion No. 7, Train Battalion No. 7.		

Altogether 25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 84 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps is recruited in Westphalia, Niederrhein and Hanover, and garrisons Westphalia and the Rhine province.

EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

Infantry General v. Goeben. Chief of the Staff, Col. v. Witzendorff.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
15th Inf. Div. Lieutenant General v. Weltzien.	29th Infantry Brig. Major General v. Wedell.	Fus. Reg. No. 33. Inf. Reg. No. 65.
	30th Infantry Brig. Major General v. Strubberg.	Inf. Reg. No. 28. Inf. Reg. No. 67.
	Jäger Battalion No. 8, and King's Hussar Reg. No. 7.	
16th Inf. Div. Lieut. General Baron v. Barnekow.	31st Infantry Brig. Major General Count Neid- hardt v. Gneisenau.	Inf. Reg. No. 29. Inf. Reg. No. 69.
	32nd Infantry Brig. Colonel v. Rex.	Fusilier Reg. No. 40. Infantry Reg. No. 72.
	Hussar Regiment No. 9.	

Regiment of Field Artillery No. 8, Pioneer Battalion No. 8, Train
Battalion No. 8.

Altogether 25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 90 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps is recruited in the Rhine province and garrisons it, regiment No. 33 in East Prussia. The 68th and 70th remained in Coblenz and Saarlouis as garrisons, and their places were filled by the 67th and 72nd regiments from the IV. Corps, but who afterwards changed again with them.

CAVALRY DIVISIONS ALLOTTED TO THE FIRST ARMY.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
1st Cav. Div. Lieut. General v. Hartmann.	1st Cavalry Brig. Major General v. Lüderitz.	Cuirassier R. No. 2. Uhlán R. No. 4. Uhlán R. No. 9.
	2nd Cavalry Brig. Major General Baumgarth.	Cuirassier R. No. 3. Uhlán R. No. 8. Uhlán R. No. 12.
3rd Cav. Div. Major General Count v. d. Groeben.	6th Cavalry Brig. Major General v. Mirus.	Cuirassier R. No. 8. Uhlán R. No. 7.
	7th Cavalry Brig. Major Gen. Count zu Dohna.	Uhlán R. No. 5. Uhlán R. No. 14.

Altogether 40 squadrons, 12 guns.

SECOND ARMY.

Commander in Chief: Prince *Frederick Charles of Prussia*. — Chief of the Staff: Major General v. Stiehle. — Chief Quartermaster: Colonel von Hertzberg. — Commander of the Artillery: Lieut. General v. Colomier. — Commander of the Engineers and Pioneers: Colonel Leuthaus.

GARDE CORPS.

Cavalry General Prince *Augustus of Wurtemberg*. Chief of the Staff, Major General v. Dannenberg.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
1st Guards Inf. Div. Major General v. Pape.	1st Guards Infantry Brig. Major General v. Kessel.	1st Foot Guards. 3rd Foot Guards.
	2nd Guards Infantry Brig. Major General v. Medem.	2nd Foot Guards. 4th Foot Guards. Fusilier Guards.
	Guards Jäger Battalion.	
2nd Guards Inf. Div. Lieut. General v. Budritzki.	3rd Guards Infantry Brig. Col. Knappe v. Knappstädt.	Kaiser Alexander's Grenad. Guards No. 1. Queen Elizabeth's Grenadier Guards No. 3
	4th Guards Infantry Brig. Major General v. Berger.	Emperor Franz Grenadier Guards No. 2. Queen's Grenadier Guards No. 4.
	Guards Schützen Battalion.	
Guards Cavalry Division Lieut. General Count v. d. Goltz.	1st Guards Cavalry Brig. Major General Count v. Brandenburg I.	Garde-du-Corps Cuirassier Guards.
	2nd Guards Cavalry Brig. Lieut. General Prince Albert of Prussia.	1st Uhlans of the Guard. 3rd Uhlans of the Guard. Hussar Guards.
	3rd Guards Cavalry Brig. Major General Count v. Brandenburg II.	1st Dragoon Guards. 2nd Dragoon Guards. 2nd Uhlans of the Guards.
The Guards Field Artillery Regiment, the Guard Pioneers and the Guard Train Battalions.		

Altogether 29 battalions, 32 squadrons, 90 guns besides pioneers and train. The Corps is recruited in the whole kingdom, and chiefly garrisons Berlin and its neighbourhood.

SECOND ARMY CORPS.

Infantry General v. *Fransecky*. Chief of the Staff, Colonel v. *Wichmann*.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
3rd Inf. Div. Major General v. <i>Hartmann</i> .	5th Infantry Brig. Major General v. <i>Koblinski</i> .	Frederick William IVth Grenadiers No. 2. Inf. Reg. No. 42.
	6th Inf. Brig. Colonel v. d. <i>Decken</i> .	Inf. Reg. No. 14. Inf. Reg. No. 54.
4th Inf. Div. Lieut. General Hann v. <i>Weiher</i> n.	Jäger Battalion No. 2 and 3rd Dragoons.	
	7th Inf. Brig. Major General du <i>Trossel</i> ,	Colberg Grenadiers No. 9. Inf. Reg. No. 49.
	8th Infantry Brig. Major General v. <i>Kettler</i> .	Inf. Reg. No. 21. Inf. Reg. No. 61.
Dragoon Regiment No. 11.		

Regiment of Field Artillery No. 2, Pioneer Battalion No. 2, Train
Battalion No. 2.

Altogether 25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 84 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps is
recruited in the provinces of Pomerania and Posen, and garrisons them.

THIRD ARMY CORPS.

Lieutenant General v. *Abensleben* II. Chief of the Staff, Colonel v.
Voigts-Rhetz.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
5th Inf. Div. Lieut. General v. <i>Stilpnagel</i> .	9th Infantry Brig. Major General v. <i>Döring</i> .	Leib Grenadiers No. 8. Inf. Reg. No. 48.
	10th Infantry Brig. Major General v. <i>Schwerin</i> .	Grenadiers No. 12. Inf. Reg. No. 52.
6th Inf. Div. Lieut. General v. <i>Buddenbrock</i> .	Jäger Battalion No. 3 and 12th Dragoons.	
	11th Infantry Brig. Major General v. <i>Rothmaler</i> .	Inf. Reg. No. 20. Inf. Reg. No. 60.
	12th Infantry Brig. Colonel v. <i>Bismarck</i> .	Inf. Reg. No. 24. Fusilier Reg. No. 35.
Dragoon Regiment No. 2.		

Regiment of Field Artillery No. 3, Pioneer Batt. No. 3, Train Batt. No. 3.

Altogether 25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 84 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps is recruited in the province of Brandenburg and garrisons it.

FOURTH ARMY CORPS.

Infantry General v. *Alvensleben* I. Chief of the Staff, Colonel v. Thile.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
7th Inf. Div. Lieut. General v. Gross, called v. Schwarzhoff.	13th Infantry Brig. Major General v. Borries.	Inf. Reg. No. 26. Inf. Reg. No. 66.
	14th Infantry Brig. Major Gen. v. Zychlinski.	Inf. Reg. No. 27. Anhalt Inf. Reg. No. 93.
Jäger Battalion No. 4 and Dragoon Reg. No. 7.		
8th Inf. Div. Lieut. General v. Schöler.	15th Infantry Brig. Major General v. Kessler.	Inf. Reg. No. 31. Inf. Reg. No. 71.
	16th Infantry Brig. Colonel v. Scheffler.	Fusilier Reg. No. 86. Inf. Reg. No. 96.
Hussar Regiment No. 12.		
Regiment of Field Artillery No. 4, Pioneer Battalion No. 4, and Train Battalion No. 4.		

Altogether 25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 84 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps garrisons the provinces of Saxony and Anhalt, and is recruited from the same places with the exception of the 86th Regiment from Schleswig Holstein.

NINTH ARMY CORPS.

Infantry General v. *Manstein*. Chief of the Staff, Major Bronsart von Schellendorff.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
18th Inf. Div. Lieut. General Baron v. Wrangel.	35th Infantry Brig. Major Gen. v. Blumenthal.	Inf. Reg. No. 25. Inf. Reg. No. 84.
	36th Infantry Brig. Major General v. Below.	Grenadier Reg. No. 11. Inf. Reg. No. 85.
Jäger Battalion No. 9 and Dragoon Reg. No. 6.		

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
25th Grand Ducal Hessian Division Lieut. General Prince Louis of Hesse.	49th Infantry Brig. Major General v. Wittich.	Hess. Leib-Guard B. No. 1. Hess. Infantry Reg. No. 2. Hess. Guardjager Bat. No. 1.
	50th Inf. Brig. Major General v. Lyncker.	Hess. Leib-Reg. No. 3. Hess. Inf. Reg. No. 4. Hess. Leibjag. Bat. No. 2.
	Hessian 25th Cavalry Brig. Major Gen. v. Schlotheim.	Hess. 1st Horse Reg. Hess. 2nd Horse Reg.

2 divisions of the 2nd Regiment of Field Artillery, Hessian Field Artillery, $\frac{1}{2}$ Pioneer Battalion No. 9, Hessian Pioneer Company, $\frac{1}{2}$ Train Battalion No. 9, and Hessian Train Division.

The Hessian Infantry Regiments numbered only 2 battalions, therefore altogether there were 28 battalions, 13 squadrons, 90 guns, besides pioneers and train.

The 18th Infantry Division, which properly belonged to the 9th Army Corps, remained behind for the defence of the coast.

The 18th Division garrisoned Schleswig-Holstein, the 9th regiment was recruited in Silesia, the 25th in the Rhine province, and the 6th Dragoons in the Magdeburg province, the remaining troops in Schleswig-Holstein.

TENTH ARMY CORPS.

Infantry General v. *Voigts-Rhetz*. Chief of the Staff, Major v. Caprivi.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
19th Inf. Div. Lieut. General v. Schwarzkoppen.	37th Infantry Brig. Colonel Lehmann.	Inf. Reg. No. 78. Oldenburg Inf. R. No. 91.
	38th Infantry Brig. Major General v. Wedell.	Inf. Reg. No. 16. Inf. Reg. No. 57.
9th Dragoons.		
20th Inf. Div. Major General v. Kraatz-Koschlau.	39th Infantry Brig. Major General v. Woyna I.	Inf. Reg. No. 17. Inf. Reg. No. 56.
	40th Infantry Brig. Major General v. Diringshofen.	Inf. Reg. No. 70. Braunschw. Inf. R. No. 92.
	Jager Battalion No. 10 and Dragoon Reg. No. 16.	

Regiment of Field Artillery No. 10, Pioneer Battalion No. 10 and Train Battalion No. 10.

Altogether 25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 84 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps is recruited in the provinces of Hanover and Westphalia, and in Oldenburg and Braunschweig.

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS (ROYAL SAXON).

General Crown Prince *Albert of Saxony*. Chief of the Staff, Lieut. Colonel
v. Zezschwitz.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
23rd Inf. Div. Lieut. General Prince George of Saxony.	45th Infantry Brig. Major Gen. v. Craushaar.	1st (Leib-) Gren. R. No. 100. 2nd Grenadier Reg. No. 101.
	46th Infantry Brig. Colonel v. Montbé.	Inf. Reg. No. 102. Inf. Reg. No. 103. Schützen Reg. No. 108.
24th Inf. Div. Major General Nehrhoff v. Holder- berg.	47th Infantry Brig. Major General Tauscher.	Inf. Reg. No. 104. Inf. Reg. No. 105.
	48th Infantry Brig. * Colonel v. Schultz.	Inf. Reg. No. 106. Inf. Reg. No. 107. Jäger Battalion No. 12. Jäger Battalion No. 13.
Cavalry Division Major General Count zur Lippe.	23rd Cavalry Brig. Colonel Krug v. Nidda.	Guard Horse Reg. 1st Horse Reg. Uhlán Horse Reg. No. 17.
	24th Cavalry Brig. Colonel Senfft v. Pilsach.	2nd Horse Reg. 3rd Horse Reg. Uhlán Horse Reg. No. 18.
Regiment of Field Artillery No. 12, Pioneer Battalion No. 12, Train Battalion No. 12.		

Altogether 29 battalions, 24 squadrons, 96 guns, besides pioneers and train. Throughout Royal Saxon troops.

CAVALRY DIVISIONS ALLOTTED TO THE SECOND ARMY.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
5th Cav. Div. Lieut. General Baron v. Rheinbaben.	11th Cavalry Brig. Major General v. Barby.	Cuirassier Reg. No. 4. Uhlán Reg. No. 13. Dragoon Reg. No. 19.
	12th Cavalry Brig. Major General v. Bredow.	Cuirassier Reg. No. 7. Uhlán Reg. No. 16. Dragoon Reg. No. 13.
	13th Cavalry Brig. Major General v. Redern.	Hussar Reg. No. 10. Hussar Reg. No. 11. Braunsch. Hus. R. No. 17.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
6th Cavalry Div. Lieut. General Duke William of Mecklenburg- Schwerin.	14th Cavalry Brig. Colonel Baron v. Diepen- broick-Grüter.	Cuirassier Reg. No. 6. Uhlán Reg. No. 3. Uhlán Reg. No. 15.
	15th Cavalry Brig. Major General v. Rauch.	Hussar Reg. No. 3. Hussar Reg. No. 16.

Altogether 56 squadrons, 18 guns.

THIRD ARMY.

Commander in Chief: General of Infantry Crown Prince *Frederick William of Prussia*. — Chief of the Staff: Lieut. General v. Blumenthal. — Chief Quartermaster: Colonel v. Gottberg. — Commander of the Artillery: Lieut. General Herkt. — Commander of the Engineers and Pioneers: Major General Schulz.

FIFTH ARMY CORPS.

Lieut. General v. *Kirchbach*. Chief of the Staff, Colonel v. d. Esch.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
9th Inf. Div. Major General v. Sandrart.	17th Infantry Brig. Colonel v. Bothmer.	Inf. Reg. No. 58. Inf. Reg. No. 59.
	18th Infantry Brig. Major Gen. v. Voigts-Rhetz.	King's Grenadier Reg. No. 7. Inf. Reg. No. 47.
	Jäger Battalion No. 5, and Dragoon Reg. No. 4.	
10th Inf. Div. Major General v. Schmidt	19th Infantry Brig. Colonel v. Henning auf Schönhoff.	Grenadier Reg. No. 6. Inf. Reg. No. 46.
	20th Infantry Brig. Major General Walter v. Monbary.	Fusilier Reg. No. 37. Inf. Reg. No. 50.
	Dragoon Reg. No. 14.	

Regiment of Field Artillery No. 5, Pioneer Battalion No. 5, Train Battalion No. 5.

Altogether 25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 84 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps is recruited in the districts of Posen and Liegnitz, and garrisons them.

SIXTH ARMY CORPS.

Cavalry General v. *Timpling*. Chief of the Staff, Colonel v. *Salviati*.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
11th Inf. Div. Lieut. General v. Gordon.	21st Infantry Brig. Major Gen. v. <i>Malachowski</i> .	Grenadier Reg. No. 10. Inf. Reg. No. 18.
	22nd Infantry Brig. Major Gen. v. <i>Eckartsberg</i> .	Fusilier Reg. No. 38. Inf. Reg. No. 51.
	Jäger Battalion No. 6, and Dragoon Reg. No. 8.	
12th Inf. Div. Lieut. General v. <i>Hoffmann</i> .	23rd Infantry Brig. Colonel <i>Gündell</i> .	Inf. Reg. No. 22. Inf. Reg. No. 62.
	24th Infantry Brig. Major General v. <i>Fabeck</i> .	Inf. Reg. No. 23. Inf. Reg. No. 63.
	Dragoon Reg. No. 15.	

Regiment of Field Artillery No. 6, Pioneer Battalion No. 6, Train Battalion No. 6.

Altogether 25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 84 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps is recruited in the districts of Breslau and Oppeln and garrisons them.

ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS.

Lieutenant General v. *Bose*. Chief of the Staff, Major General *Stein von Kaminski*.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
21st Inf. Div. Lieut. General v. <i>Schachtmeyer</i> .	41st Infantry Brig. Colonel v. <i>Koblinski</i> .	Fusilier Reg. No. 34. Fusilier Reg. No. 80.
	42nd Infantry Brig. Major General v. <i>Thile</i> .	Inf. Reg. No. 82. Inf. Reg. No. 88.
	Jäger Battalion No. 11, and Dragoon Reg. No. 5.	
22nd Inf. Div. Lieut. General v. <i>Gersdorff</i> .	43rd Inf. Brig. Colonel v. <i>Kontzki</i> .	Inf. Reg. No. 32. Inf. Reg. No. 95.
	44th Infantry Brig. Major General v. <i>Schkopp</i> .	Inf. Reg. No. 88. Inf. Reg. No. 94.
	Hussar Reg. No. 13.	

Regiment of Field Artillery No. 11, Pioneer Battalion No. 11, Train Battalion No. 11.

Altogether 25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 84 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps is recruited in the provinces of Hesse and Nassau, in Saxe-Weimar, Coburg-Gotha and Meiningen, and garrisons these places.

CAVALRY DIVISIONS ALLOTTED TO THE THIRD ARMY.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.*
2nd Cav. Div. Lieut. General Count zu Stolberg- Wernigerode.	3rd Cavalry Brig. Major General v. Colomb.	Leib Cuirassier Reg. No. 1. Uhlán Reg. No. 2.
	4th Cavalry Brig. Major General Baron v. Barnekow.	1st Leib Hussar Reg. No. 1. Blüchers Hussar R. No. 5.
	5th Cavalry Brig. Major General v. Baumbach.	Hussar Reg. No. 4. Hussar Reg. No. 6.
4th Cav. Div. General of Cavalry Prince Albert of Prussia.	8th Cavalry Brig. Major General v. Hontheim.	Cuirassier Reg. No. 5. Uhlán Reg. No. 10.
	9th Cavalry Brig. Major General v. Bernhardi.	Uhlán Reg. No. 1. Uhlán Reg. No. 6.
	10th Cavalry Brig. Major General v. Krosigk.	2nd Leib Hussar Reg. No. 2. Hussar Reg. No. 14.

Altogether 48 squadrons, 24 guns.

ROYAL BAVARIAN FIRST CORPS.

Infantry General Baron v. d. *Tann-Rathsamhausen*. Chief of the Staff,
Colonel Diehl.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
1st Division Lieut. General v. Stephan.	1st Infantry Brig. Major General Dietl.	Leib-Reg. 1st Inf. Reg. 2nd Jager Battalion. 9th Jager Battalion.
	2nd Infantry Brig. Major General Orff.	2nd Inf. Reg. 11th Inf. Reg. 4th Jager Battalion.
	1st Cavalry Brig.	1st Cuirassier Reg. 2nd Cuirassier Reg. 3rd Light Horse Reg.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
2nd Division Lieut. General Count Pappenheim.	3rd Infantry Brig. Major. Gen. Schuhmacher.	3rd Inf. Reg. 12th Inf. Reg. 1st Jager Battalion.
	4th Infantry Brig. Major General Straub.	10th Inf. Reg. 13th Inf. Reg. 7th Jager Battalion.
	2nd Cavalry Brig. Major General v. Mayer.	4th Light Horse Reg. 1st Uhlán Reg.

1st Regiment of Artillery, and 1 Field Engineer Division.

Altogether 29 battalions, 20 squadrons, 96 guns.

ROYAL BAVARIAN SECOND CORPS.

General of Infantry v. *Wartmann*. Chief of the Staff, Colonel Baron v. Horn.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
3rd Division Lieut. General v. Walther.	5th Infantry Brig. Major General v. Schleich.	6th Inf. Reg. 7th Inf. Reg. 8th Jager Battalion.
	6th Infantry Brig. Major General Joner- Tettenweiss.	14th Inf. Reg. 15th Inf. Reg. 3rd Jager Battalion.
	3rd Cavalry Brig. Major General Baron v. Dietz.	1st Light Horse Reg. 6th Light Horse Reg. 2nd Uhlán Reg.
4th Division Lieut. General Count v. Bothmer.	7th Infantry Brig. Major General v. Ribeau- pierre.	5th Inf. Reg. 9th Inf. Reg. 6th Jager Battalion. 10th Jager Battalion.
	8th Infantry Brig. Major General Maillinger.	4th Inf. Reg. 8th Inf. Reg. 5th Jager Battalion.
	4th Cavalry Brig. Major General v. Tausch.	2nd Light Horse Reg. 5th Light Horse Reg.

2nd Regiment of Artillery and 1 Field Engineer Division,

Altogether 29 battalions, 20 squadrons, 96 guns.

COMBINED WURTEMBERG AND BADEN CORPS*).

Lieut. General v. Werder. Chief of the Staff, Lieut. Colonel v. Leszczynski.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
Royal Wurtemberg Division. Lieut. General v. Qbernitz. Chief of the Staff Colonel v. Bock.	1st Infantry Brig. Major General v. Reitzen- stein.	1st Inf. Reg. 7th Inf. Reg. 2nd Jager Battalion.
	2nd Infantry Brig. Major General v. Starkloff.	2nd Inf. Reg. 5th Inf. Reg. 3rd Jager Battalion.
	3rd Infantry Brig. Colonel v. Hügel.	3rd Inf. Reg. 8th Inf. Reg. 1st Jager Battalion.
	Horse Division Major General Count v. Schéler.	1st Horse Reg. 2nd Horse Reg. 3rd Horse Reg. 4th Horse Reg.
1 Field Artillery Regiment, 2 pioneer companies, 1 Fieldjager squadron.		

The Wurtemberg Infantry Regiments only numbered 2 battalions, therefore there were altogether 16 battalions, 16 squadrons, 54 guns. 2 Wurtemberg regiments remained behind in Ulm.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
Grand Ducal Baden Division Lieut. General v. Beyer.	1st Infantry Brig. Lieut. General Baron v. Laroche du Jarry.	1st Leibgrenadier Reg. 2nd Grenadier Reg.
	2nd Infantry Brig. Major General Baron v. Degenfeld.	3rd Inf. Reg. 4th Inf. Reg.
	3rd Infantry Brig. Major General Keller.	5th Inf. Reg. 6th Inf. Reg.
	Cavalry Brig. Major General Baron v. Laroche-Starkenfels.	1st Leib-Dragoon Reg. 2nd Dragoon Reg. 3rd Dragoon Reg.

Baden Field Artillery Regiment, detachments of Baden Pioneers, and Train.

Altogether 18 battalions, 12 squadrons, 54 guns, besides pioneers and train.

* After the battle of Wörth the Corps unity was dissolved, and from that time the Division unity only remained.

THE MOBILIZED TROOPS LEFT BEHIND AT FIRST IN NORTH GERMANY FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE COUNTRY.

THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT, IN THE CONSCRIPTION OF THE I. II. IX. AND X. ARMY CORPS.

General of Infantry *Vogel v. Falkenstein*. Chief of the Staff, Colonel Veit.

THE GENERAL COMMAND OVER THE MOBILE TROOPS, IN THE CONSCRIPTION OF THE I. II. IX. AND X. ARMY CORPS.

General of Infantry the Grand Duke of *Mecklenburg-Schwerin*. Chief of the Staff, Colonel v. Krenski.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
	33rd Infantry Brig. Major General Baron v. Kottwitz.	Fusilier Reg. No. 36. Infantry Reg. No. 75. Infantry Reg. No. 76.
17th Inf. Div. Lieut. General v. Schimmelfmann.	34th Infantry Brig. Colonel v. Manteuffel.	Mecklenb. Gren. R. No. 89. Mecklenb. Fusil. R. No. 90. Mecklenb. Jäger Battalion No. 14.
(Belonging to the IX. Corps.)	17th Cavalry Brig. Major General v. Rauch.	1st Mecklenb. Dragoon R. No. 17. 2nd Mecklenb. Dragoon R. No. 18. Uhlán Reg. No. 11.

¹/₂ Regiment of Field Artillery No. 9, ¹/₃ Pioneer Battalion No. 9, ¹/₂ Train Battalion No. 9.

Altogether 16 battalions, 12 squadrons, 48 guns.

The Division garrisons Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg, the 36th regiment is recruited in Magdeburg, the 76th and 76th in Hansestädten and Hanover, the 11th Uhlans in Brandenburg.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
Guard Landwehr Inf. Div. Lieut. General Baron v. Loën.	1st Guard Landwehr Brig. Colonel Girodz v. Gaudi.	1st Guard Landwehr Reg. 2nd Guard Landwehr Reg.
	1nd Guardlandwehr Brig. Colonel v. Roehl.	2st Gren. Guard Landw. R. 2nd Fren. Guard Landw. R.
1st Landw. Div. (Pomeranian) Major General v. Treskow.	1st Pom. Landwehr Brig. Colonel Baron v. Budden- brock.	1st comb. Pom. Landw. Reg. 2nd comb. Pom. Landw. Reg.
	2nd Pom. Landwehr Brig. Major General v. Avemann.	3rd comb. Pom. Landw. Reg. 4th comb. Pom. Landw. Reg.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
2nd Landw. Div. (Brandenburg) Major General v. Selchow.	1st Brandenburg Landwehr Brig. Colonel v. Arnoldi.	1st comb. Brandenburg Landwehr Reg. 2nd comb. Brandenburg Landwehr Reg.
	2nd Brandenburg Landwehr Brig. Colonel Ranisch.	3rd comb. Brandenburg Landwehr Reg. 4th comb. Brandenburg Landwehr Reg.
3rd comb. Landwehr Division: Major General Schuler v. Senden.	West Prussian Landw. Brig. Major General v. Ruville.	West Prussian comb. Land- wehr Reg. Niederschl. comb. Landwehr Regiment.
	Posen Landwehr Brig. Colonel v. Gilsa.	1st comb. Pos. Landw. R. 2nd comb. Pos. Landw. R.

Each Landwehr Regiment of the Guard numbered 3 battalions, each Regiment of the Line 4 battalions.

LANDWEHR CAVALRY.

Reserve Dragoon Reg. Nos. 1 and 3.
Reserve Dragoon Reg. Nos. 2, 3 and 5.
Reserve Uhlan Reg. Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5.

Altogether 16 Reserve Cavalry Regiments were formed. 9 of these as above were allotted to the mobile Landwehr Divisions, the other 7 (2nd Reserve Dragoons, 1st, 4th and 6th Reserve Hussars, and 1st, 6th and 7th Reserve Uhlans) were appointed to occupy fortresses.

ARTILLERY.

Reserve Foot divisions of the Guard and of the 11 Line Artillery Regiments, 3 batteries to each (18 guns).

Of these batteries only 2 were allotted from each division to the mobile Landwehr Divisions, but the third was subdivided for the formation of 2 sortie batteries to each, and assigned to the garrisons of fortresses.

Total of the mobile Landwehr-Divisions: 60 battalions, 36 squadrons, and 144 guns.

The first, second, and sixth Corps also remained behind in the country at the beginning of the war, and only joined their respective armies after the beginning of hostilities.

STRENGTH OF THE NORTH GERMAN ARMY CORPS.

THE GARDE CORPS.

9 Infantry Regiments, 1 Garde-Jäger and 1 Garde-Schützen Battalion, 2 Regiments of Divisional Cavalry, 4 Batteries of Divisional Artillery, 1 Cavalry Division consisting of 8 Regiments with 3 Horse Batteries, finally 1 Foot detachment of the Artillery Corps. In addition to these 1 Battalion of Pioneers, 1 Battalion of Train and 9 Munition columns. Total 29,000 Infantry, 4800 Horses and 90 Guns.

The I., II., III., IV., V., VI., VII., X. and XI. Army Corps each consisted of: 8 Infantry Regiments, 1 Jäger Battalion, 2 Regiments of Cavalry, 2 detachments of Foot Artillery, also a detachment of Foot Artillery and 2 Horse Batteries from the Artillery Corps, 1 Battalion of Pioneers, 1 Battalion of Train and 9 Munition columns. Total of each Army Corps: 25,000 Infantry, 1200 Horses and 84 Guns.

The VIII. Army Corps counted 1 additional Horse Battery, consequently it had 90 Guns.

The IX. Army Corps consisted of the 18th Infantry Division and the Hessian (25th) Division. It numbered 8 Infantry Regiments, 3 Jäger Battalions, 3 Regiments of Cavalry, 15 Batteries. Total 23,000 Infantry, 1800 Horses and 90 Guns.

The XII. (Saxon) Army Corps numbered 9 Infantry Regiments, 2 Jäger Battalions, 2 Horse Regiments and 2 detachments of Foot Artillery. It had further a Cavalry and Artillery reserve: 4 Regiments of Cavalry, 2 Horse Batteries, 2 detachments of Foot Artillery and in addition to these 1 Battalion of Pioneers, 1 Battalion of Train, and 9 Munition columns. Total 29,000 Infantry, 3600 Horses and 96 Guns.

The first Cavalry Division consisted of 24 Squadrons and 1 Horse Battery; the second numbered 24 Squadrons, 2 Horse Batteries; the third, 16 Squadrons, 1 Horse Battery; the fourth, 24 Squadrons, 2 Horse Batteries; the fifth, 36 Squadrons, 2 Horse Batteries; the sixth, 20 Squadrons, 1 Horse Battery. The first and third were assigned

to the I. Army, the fifth and sixth to the II. Army, the second and fourth to the III. Army.

The 17th Division = 13,000 Infantry, 1800 Horses and 36 Guns, as well as 4 Landwehr Divisions, 3 of which consisted of 9600 Infantry, 1 of 12,000 Infantry, with 600 Horses to each, and 18 Guns remained behind for coast defences.

In addition to these, 4 Infantry Regiments remained behind to garrison the fortresses of Mayence and Rastatt, and 1 Infantry Regiment was left at Cologne, 1 at Coblenz and 1 at Saarlouis, none of which have been included in the order of battle at the commencement of the war.

The mobilised Field Army of the North German Confederation, reckoning the Battalions at 1000 men and the Cavalry Regiments at 600 Horses, consisted of 382,000 Infantry, 48,000 Horses and 1218 Guns without including the Landwehr.

The united capitation of combatants in the North German Field Army, exclusive of the Landwehr, was therefore about 550,000 men.

The Landwehr numbered 198,000 combatants.

The Army of the North German Confederation, including the Landwehr amounted in all to about 750,000 men.

The *Bavarian Army* numbered 16 Regiments of Infantry and 10 Jager Battalions; 10 Regiments of Cavalry, 32 Field Batteries of Artillery, including 4 Batteries of Horse Artillery, besides 1 Regiment of Engineers and 4 Companies of Train. Its strength without reckoning the Landwehr and the troops for replacing casualties amounted to 58,000 Infantry, 5800 Horses and 192 Guns.

The *Wurtemberg Army* consisted of 8 Regiments of Infantry, 3 Jager Battalions, 4 Regiments of Cavalry, 9 Field Batteries of Artillery, besides 2 Companies of Pioneers and a detachment of Train. Its strength, exclusive of the Landwehr and reinforcing troops, was 16,000 Infantry, 2400 Horses and 54 Guns.

The *Baden Army* numbered 6 Regiments of Infantry, 3 Regiments of Cavalry, 9 Field Batteries of Artillery, besides 2 Companies of Pioneers and 1 detachment of Train. Its strength, exclusive of the Landwehr and reinforcing troops, was 10,600 Infantry, 2800 Horses and 54 Guns.

The whole South German Field Army is therefore reckoned at:

Infantry	84,600 Men.
Cavalry	9000 Horses
Artillery	300 Guns

i. e. an united capitation of over 100,000 Combatants.

The *total strength of the German Field Army* at the beginning of the war amounted therefore to about 850,000 Combatants.

Until the concentration of these Armies was accomplished in the last days of July, the weak detachments upon the extreme frontier were entirely without reserves, with the charge of making the enemy imagine that they were in considerable masses. They succeeded in this so well by bold attacks, by marching hither and thither, even by disguises which made them appear to the enemy like new kinds of troops, that the accounts in the French newspapers of the German forces in the Palatinate and Rhine provinces, raised their strength to more than 200,000 men, and the French Corps were also so completely deceived that they would not risk an attack. A mixed Baden Corps composed of the three arms roused the belief, at the same time, that South Germany was strongly occupied, by continually marching backwards and forwards during the whole time and showing itself at different points on the Baden Rhine frontier.

The following are some of the *smaller Fights* which took place with the French outposts, without reckoning the raids which were of daily occurrence.

On the 19th of July, an encounter between French Chasseurs d'Afrique who had passed the frontier at *Saarbrücken* and Prussian Uhlans.

On the 21st of July, likewise at *Saarbrücken* upon French territory, a skirmish between a part of the Hohenzollern Fusilier Regiment No. 40 and French troops.

On the 24th of July, the enemy endeavoured with one battalion to take possession of the bridge of *Wehrden*, it was however forced to retreat by a battalion sent out from Saarlouis and a detachment of Uhlans. On the same day there was a skirmish at *Gersweiler* near *Saarbrücken* when a company of the 8th Rhinish Infantry Regiment

Nr. 70 took the custom house at *Schrecklingen*, and Uhlans of the 7th Regiment blew up a viaduct at the railway junction of Saargemünd and Hagenau.

On the 24th of July, French Infantry were repulsed by Prussian Uhlans and Pioneers together with Bavarian Jagers at the bridge of *Rheinheim* on the Blics, to the north-east of Saargemünd, and a recognisance of the country round *Hagenau* was made by the Wurtemberg staff officer, Count Zeppelin with three Baden officers.

On the 27th of July three companies of French Infantry and 80 men of the Cavalry made an attack at *Völklingen* to the west of Saarbrücken and were repulsed.

On the 29th of July, firing took place between Bavarian Jagers and French Cavalry at *Schweyen* near Neuhornbach in the Palatinate.

On the 30th of July a French column of Infantry with Artillery made an attack upon Saarbrücken without success.

On this day however, the German Armies were already about to advance. Prince Frederick Charles removed his head-quarters from Mayence to the westward, the Crown Prince of Prussia repaired to Speyer and General von Steinmetz directed his columns from the Rhine on to the line Trier-Saarlouis-Saarbrücken. From this moment the danger of a French invasion was averted, and the superiority of the strategical position on the other side, began clearly to show itself.

The constantly increasing attempts made by the French to procure single advantageous positions, chiefly in the country about Saarbrücken, as well as to induce the Germans to develop their strength, bore the character of indecision and aimlessness, until at last upon the 2nd of August, the *attack of the whole of Frossard's Corps upon Saarbrücken*, proved that a general combined offensive movement no longer existed in the French war plan.

This attack, in the presence of the Emperor and the Prince Imperial, had apparently the sole object of producing a victory for the impatient French people, with which the Imperial name should be associated.

For after the battalion of the Hohenzollern Fusilier Regiment, which held Saarbrücken all alone for an hour, had been compelled to retreat from the town, and it had been occupied by Frossard's Corps,

the conqueror made no use of his advantages, but was satisfied with holding a defensive position opposite the line of the Saar, until this strong position, together with the apparent advantages gained on the 2nd, was torn from him on the 6th of August, by the Prussian Corps which had then arrived.

The helplessness of the French chief command appears all the clearer, if one considers the grand preparations which preceded this theatrical manoeuvre.

Frossard's Corps had been stationed at St. Avold since the 20th of July. Ladmirault's Corps had been moved forward from Thionville towards Bouzonville on the Nied, for the support of his left flank, Bazaine's Corps to Forbach for the support of his centre, and Lapasset's Brigade from the 5th Corps, occupied Saargemünd in order to cover Frossard's right flank. Over 100,000 men were brought together in order to assist at the Prince Imperial's baptism of fire.

Upon the same day an aimless demonstration was also made at Rheinheim to the east of Saargemünd, by the advance of a strong French column. The column moved back again after a vigorous fire upon German patrols.

Thus the energetic, powerful advance of the numerically superior German Armies found itself opposed by an enemy, inferior in numbers, and still with no decided aim.

CHAPTER II.

THE CONCENTRATED OFFENSIVE MOVEMENT OF THE GERMAN ARMIES IN THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST.

On the 2nd of August *King William of Prussia*, accompanied by his chief of the Staff, Baron von Moltke, arrived in the head-quarters at Mayence and took command of the united German armies which were approaching the French frontier, with their leading divisions extending over a front from Trier to Landau.

The army of the left wing, the *Third Army*, under the command of the *Crown Prince of Prussia* was appointed to advance as far as the Lauter on the 5th of August, and to cross it with the advanced troops. For this purpose the Crown Prince had to pass through the Bienwald by four roads, and was commanded to drive back the enemy wherever he might be met.

Marshal *Mac Mahon*, against whose strategical position this advance of an army of 160,000 men was directed, had his corps scattered about like all the rest of the French army. On the 25th of July, his 1st Division (Ducrot) was to the eastward of Woerth, the 2nd (Douay) at Hagenau, the 3rd and 4th (Raoul and de Lartigue) in Strasburg. The cavalry were placed in front, de Septeuil's Brigade in Sulz, de Nansouty's in Selz, covering the whole space between the Vosges and the Rhine, and Michel's Cuirassier Brigade in reserve. The Marshal had, in a peculiar manner, attached single infantry battalions to this cavalry with the view of supporting it. By this means he robbed the cavalry of all power of moving.

On the 2nd of August he gave General Douay the command to occupy Weissenburg, in order to cover his right flank more securely during his intended march towards Bitsch.

After having carried out the order, this General heard on the evening of the 3th of August, of the approach of the third German army, and communicated the intelligence to General Ducrot who was stationed at Woerth, and to whom the Marshal had given the command of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, contingently.

General Ducrot imparted to him, in the name of the Marshal, the strict command to give battle.

For the 4th of August the following disposition was given out for the German Corps.

"The advanced guard, Bothmer's Division from Hartmann's Bavarian Corps, to move off from its bivouac at 6 o'clock a. m. in the direction of Weissenburg, and to endeavour to take possession of the town. To secure its right flank by sending a detachment through Bellenborn towards the Bobenthal. The remainder of the Corps, Walther's Division, to move off from its bivouac at 4 o'clock a. m., and march to Ober-Otterbach going round Landau through Impflingen and Bergzabern.

"The Cavalry Division to concentrate at 6 o'clock a. m. on the south of Mersheim, and to march by Insheim, Rohrbach, Billigheim, Barbelroth, Kappellen as far as the Otterbach, 4000 paces to the west of Ober-Otterbach.

"The V. Prussian Corps to move off from its bivouac at Billigheim at 4 o'clock a. m., and to march through Barbelroth and Nieder-Otterbach upon Gross-Steinfeld and Kapsweyer. It was to form a special advanced guard, which would cross the Lauter at St. Remy and Waghäusel, and place out-posts upon the heights on the opposite side.

"The XI. Corps to move off at 4 o'clock a. m. from Rohrbach and to march by Steinweiler, Winden, Scheidt through the Bienwald upon the Bienwaldshütte. It was to form a special advanced guard which would cross the Lauter and place out-posts upon the heights on the other side.

"Werder's Corps to march by the high road towards Lauterburg, to endeavour to take possession of the place, and to place out-posts upon the opposite shore.

"Von der Tann's Corps to move off from its bivouac at

4 o'clock a. m., and to march by the high road through Stülzheim to Langenkandel, to the west of which place it would bivouac.

"The head-quarters would be previously removed to Nieder-Otterbach."

The *Weissenburg lines* (v. map), for the capture of which these dispositions were made, offered military hindrances, chiefly in the ancient fortress of Weissenburg, and in the entrenchments erected in earlier times along the Lauter. These fortifications were again brought into use the last time the frontier was occupied, and had been augmented by artificial strengthening of the Geisberg, a position naturally difficult to assault.

The whole elevation rising about 800 feet, with its north-eastern slopes falling to the Lauter, presented peculiar disadvantages to the assailants crossing, not only from its lying behind the river and offering good positions for the Artillery, but also from its being especially favourable for the fire of riflemen from behind the stone walls enclosing the vineyards.

General *Douay*, reinforced by the 74th Line Regiment, the 3rd Hussars, and the 11th Chasseurs à cheval, thus having a force of 16 Battalions, 8 Squadrons and 4 Batteries including 1 Mitrailleuse battery, occupied Weissenburg with 1 battalion of the 1st Regiment of Algerian Tirailleurs and 1 battalion of the 74th Regiment, and had barricaded the gates of the town. Upon the southern heights he had posted 2 battalions and 1 battery, and with the main body of his Division he strongly held the Geisberg.

The morning of the 4th of August was dull and rainy.

The Crown Prince left Landau with his staff and suite at 5. 15 o'clock a. m. On his arrival upon the heights to the eastward of Schweigen at about 9. 15 o'clock a. m., the head of Bothmer's advanced guard had come up in front of Weissenburg and *the first shots fell*. The place showed itself completely prepared for defence, the advanced guard deployed its 3 battalions, the regiment of light cavalry and 1 battery of artillery and opened fire, in order to await the arrival of the remaining columns.

In consequence of the cannonade fires very soon broke out in two places in the town.

Meanwhile the advanced guard of the V. Corps, the 17th Infantry Brigade, after having crossed the Lauter, debouched at St. Remy and Waghäusel, at a quarter to 10 o'clock, and formed for attack upon the opposite heights, where they received a vigorous cannonade at 10 o'clock a. m.

An hour later, the 18th Brigade began to develope itself upon the right flank of the 17th, at 11.30 o'clock a. m. it took Altenstadt, and debouched upon the south bank of the Lauter for the purpose of going forward to attack the Geisberg.

Up to this moment Bothmer's Division had confined itself to a cannonade against Weissenburg, now however, the 9th Division having crossed the Lauter, it was also possible to make an attack upon the town from the south east; 2 battalions of the 47th Regiment, 18th Brigade, and 1 battalion of the 58th Regiment, 17th Brigade, were sent out for this purpose from Altenstadt, on to the south bank of the Lauter, and *at 12 o'clock the general storming of Weissenburg commenced.*

The barricaded gates of the town were broken open by artillery. The Prussian and Bavarian battalions, attacking simultaneously, took the entrance at the first assault. An obstinate fight then developed itself in the town, which ended in the garrison being taken prisoners.

The southern height of Weissenburg was assaulted at the same time.

At 11 o'clock the heads of the XI. Corps arrived on the left, near the 17th Brigade of the V. Corps. General von Bose had marched through the Bienwald and crossed the Lauter without meeting with opposition, and had then, in accordance with the orders given to him, continued the advance by Schleithal in the direction of Ingolsheim. Debouching upon Schleithal at 11 o'clock, the heads of the corps were immediately directed towards the Geisberg.

After a vigorous artillery fight, carried on by the V. Corps, in which the Artillery Corps also shared, the 18th Infantry Brigade advanced at 12. 15 o'clock from Altenstadt, and the 41st Brigade of the XI. Corps from Schleithal, thus marching in a westerly direction for a concentrated attack upon the Geisberg.

The appearance of the 41st Brigade had already induced the

enemy to throw back his left flank. The line of his front now corresponded exactly with the configuration of the Geisberg. Swarms of riflemen carried on a devastating fire from the vineyards upon the advancing columns, in which the superiority of the Chassepot rifle, in percussion strength at long ranges, was for the first time clearly manifested.

The mitrailleuse battery opposed to Prussian artillery, did not answer the expectations which the French had placed on this newly introduced arm. Three shots only could be delivered, before a shell striking in the midst of the battery, produced such destruction among the serving troops, that it had to be withdrawn.

The Prussian Infantry advanced in columns up the steep height, with incomparable calmness and bravery, in spite of the great difficulties of the ground and the murderous fire. The steady movement of the battalions never wavered for an instant.

Amid great losses, in which the King's Grenadiers, at the head, especially suffered, *the outer premises were taken at 12.30 o'clock, and at 1 o'clock, the castle, lying behind, in the first assault.*

At 1.30 o'clock p.m., the Crown Prince rode through Altenstadt on to the Geisberg heights.

With the loss of this hill the French position was deprived of its principal *point d'appui*. The French certainly endeavoured to make another offensive attack at 1.30 o'clock, but this fruitless effort may only have been to cover the retreat, which was commenced, in three columns, towards the south-west, pursued by the Artillery fire of the two Prussian Corps, and from 2 o'clock on, by the two Cavalry Regiments of the 9th and 10th Divisions. Over 1000 unwounded prisoners, amongst whom were about 30 officers, fell into the hands of the conquerors, also a gun taken from the 5th Jäger Battalion, and the whole camp equipment and baggage of the 2nd Division. General Douay had fallen, his Division had lost about 1200 men in killed and wounded.

The loss of the Germans in killed and wounded was also great, it may perhaps have surpassed that of the French.

All the German troops which had been in the battle moved forward as far as the heights to the south of the Lauter and placed out-posts. Werder's Corps, which had not been engaged, had occupied Lauter-

burg, pushed forward one Brigade towards Selz and stationed outposts in connection with those of the XI. Corps.

In winning this battle, besides the moral effect upon the two armies, the possession of the important roads leading to Strasburg and Bitsch was obtained. Consequently the right flank of the French position was placed in imminent danger; Alsace, unprotected, lay open to the third army, and the isolation of Strasburg could now hardly be averted.

The valley of the Rhine, extending open and free from the south of Weissenburg to Strasburg, and thence beyond, is bounded on the west by the Vosges, which rise from the Weissenburg heights, now taken by the third army.

It now became necessary that the French Army, whose right wing had lost as it were the key of their position, should endeavour above all things to hold the passages of the Vosges, unless they already wished to change the whole strategical front, and move back upon the line of the Moselle.

The flank of the main body of the French Army was separated from the assailants by the Vosges. Mac Mahon's task should be to defend this chain to the utmost, for which object all his strength must be employed, and the Marshal determined to accomplish this task by a defensive battle near Woerth.

Upon the other side, the Crown Prince's Army moved off on the morning after the victorious fight, in order to follow the same direction in which it had hitherto advanced. This march direction must infallibly lead on to the flank and rear of the French position. It offered the chance of completely rolling up this position, unless the French Army at once commenced a general retreat.

The Crown Prince's Army, being numerically superior to each single French Corps, and even to two or three of them, was more than a match for any possible concentration of the enemy to the front. It was foreseen that the French army could only offer sufficient resistance to the Crown Prince by a concentration towards the rear, consequently upon the left flank. Without however taking into consideration the French confidence of victory, which this defensive movement did not revoke, such an operation on the part of the enemy would have had the disadvantage of giving full time to the first

and second German armies, to join in the action on their side, and by a simple advance, to unite with the third Army.

A combined operation on the part of the French Army could not, however, be arranged. As already mentioned, Marshal Mac Mahon threw himself alone, against the enemy and on the 5th of August occupied a favourable position along the *Sauerbach*, upon the eastern slopes of the Vosges (v. map of the battle of Woerth). This position was fitly chosen for the defensive, whilst offering at the same time favourable opportunities for the offensive.

It was formed by the valley of the *Sauer*, 800 paces wide, running from north to south, whose western bank, bordered by steep and partly wooded heights, indicated the natural front of the French Army. The village of Elsashaussen, forming by its position on a steep hill a kind of retired bastion, was the key of the whole position, to which the village of Froschweiler was a favourable *point d'appui*. The flanks were protected by the villages of Morsbronn and Eberbach in the south, Neuweiler in the north, as well as by deep entrenchments most favourably placed. At the foot of the whole position about one and a half hours*) wide, the highroad leading from Hagenau to Woerth upon an embankment formed a first rate line of communication, whilst its elevation above the wide meadow valley of the Sauer could also be most advantageously used as the first line of defence, and was so used. The eastern slopes, partly planted with vines, which greatly impeded the movement of the German troops, fall down steeply towards the Sauer, and are commanded from the opposite shore. The little stream itself, only about 10 paces wide, has such steep banks, and after the continued rain was so much swollen, that the French commander in chief may probably have considered it impossible to wade through. The only passages across this mountain stream, were at the Bruchmühle, at Spachbach and Woerth.

It is, however, a great question whether the Marshal acted wisely, in here placing himself in the way of the Crown Prince's force, although the position in itself was very strong, and could be advantageously defended. He must be prepared to resist an army

*) between 4 and 5 English miles.

of much greater strength and must bear in mind that if the Corps had the misfortune of being completely routed, the passage through the Vosges would be quite open to the German Army. The Marshal staked all his chances upon one throw, by placing his Corps in position at Woerth, whilst had he declined one great battle, and by distributing his forces, occupied all the most important defiles of these barrier-like mountains, he would probably have succeeded in making a longer and more obstinate resistance in defence of the Vosges.

On the day that Douay's Division was beaten at Weissenburg, Mac Mahon had three Divisions still at his disposal, concentrated to the east of Reichshofen. He had been apprised of the attack upon Weissenburg after he had sent an order by telegraph to the commandant of the 7th Corps (General Douay), which was provisionally under his command, to dispatch Conseil-Dumesnil's Division for his support. On the night of the 4th of August, he received the news of the defeat, and on the morning of the next day he made preparations to deliver a battle in the position of Woerth and Gunstett, as he could not doubt that the Crown Prince's Army would advance towards Hagenau by the roads commanded from here.

In a tactical point of view this position was, without doubt, excellently chosen. But, even reckoning upon Conseil-Dumesnil's Division and Douay's beaten Division, the Marshal could not assume that he would be able to bring together more than 50,000 men, consequently his plan was very rash, and testifies to the want of a correct estimation of his adversary, which was so frequently to be observed in this war.

The first idea was to occupy the plateau of Gunstett with one Division and the heights upon the right (west) bank of the Sauer with the main body; as, however, this position would have been greatly extended in proportion to the strength of the troops, the Marshal confined himself to the occupation of the latter entrenched position, and made the following disposition: the 1st Division near Langensulzbach, the 3rd near Woerth, the 4th upon the right flank at Elsashaussen, the Division retiring from Weissenburg to form the Reserve of the centre, the Reserve Artillery to form up between Froschweiler and Elsashaussen, the numerous Cavalry consisting of

Bonnemain's Cuirassier Division, Michel's and Septeuil's Brigades to the plain in rear of the centre and right wing, and he then awaited the arrival of Conseil-Dumesnil's Division to reinforce the right wing.

This Division was delayed although it still came up in time for the battle. On the 4th, upon the erroneous announcement of a concentration of troops at Lörrach in the Black Forest, it had left its station at Colmar to go to Mühlhausen, to which place Liébert's 2nd Division of the 7th Corps was also directed, whilst the 3rd, Dumont's, was still being formed in Lyons.

Conseil-Dumesnil's Division had scarcely left the railway at Mühlhausen when it was again embarked in the evening between 8 and 10 o'clock, and arrived at Hagenau at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 5th of August, from whence it took the route towards Reichshofen. There it arrived upon the evening of the 5th, and was formed up in rear of Lartigue's Division. The Artillery belonging to it, which was upon the march from Colmar to Mühlhausen on the 4th August, was at Ensisheim when it received a counter order. On the 5th it marched back to Colmar where it was embarked on the railway in the evening. The 2nd Division, now commanded by General Pellé, which had retired from Weissenburg to Hagenau, arrived from thence on the evening of the 5th, by railway, and was formed up in reserve.

At the same time that the plateau of Gunstett was abandoned, at 11 o'clock a. m. on the 5th of August, the Marshal issued an order that all the bridges over the Sauer, between Woerth and the Bruchmühle, were to be destroyed; which proves that he intended merely to deliver a defensive fight. An hour later, however, when the heads of the German advanced guard already showed themselves upon the left bank, he recalled the order, in order to keep the possibility of an offensive movement, yet at that time he was carefully occupied with the lines of retreat, he obtained detailed information about them from engineer officers acquainted with the country, and issued the necessary instructions for a retreat, to which he added the remark, that they would have to deal with considerable forces, and a powerful Artillery.

A dispatch from the Emperor however, which arrived at 8. 30 o'clock p. m. announcing that the 5th Corps, de Failly's, was placed at his disposal, changed this aspect of the military situation.

The Marshal immediately sent a telegram to General de Failly, the tenor of which was: "The Emperor places your Corps at my disposal, endeavour to join me as soon as possible." —

The Marshal was so delighted at this unexpected reinforcement and had such confidence in the strength of the position he had chosen, that he exclaimed joyfully "*Messieurs les Prussiens je vous tiens!*" —

On the 5th of August the *Crown Prince's Army* was moved forward on the line of the Selz, the V. and XI. Prussian Corps in the centre on the road to Hagenau, the two Bavarian Corps on their right, the Wurtemberg and Baden Divisions on their left flank, the Cavalry Division in reserve.

During the night of the 5th of August, the II. Bavarian Corps bivouacked at Lembach, the I. Bavarian Corps at Ingolsheim, the V. Corps at Preuschedorf, the XI. at Sulz, von Werder's Corps at Aschbach and the Cavalry Division at Schönenburg. The Baden troops, which were not engaged in this battle, were stationed more to the south, at Buhl. The head-quarters were at Sulz. Advanced posts were stationed along the Sauer towards the south and to the east of Woerth.

The Crown Prince had issued no dispositions for the attack on the 6th of August, as it was not the intention to give battle upon that day. On the contrary, only a narrower concentration towards the front had been commanded, in order to make a complete approach, with all the Corps together, upon the French position, before attacking it.

The Wurtemberg Division was to advance from Aschbach to Hohweiler and Reimerswiller, the XI. Corps from Sulz to Hölschloch, whilst the V. Corps was to remain stationary, fronting the Sauer, the I. Bavarian Corps was drawn near Preuschedorf towards the Centre, the Cavalry Division at Schönenburg, and the head-quarters in Sulz, would remain there.

By day break, however, whilst the Corps which had to change their positions had just begun to move, a small skirmish took place between the out-posts, of both sides, along the Sauer.

Hartmann's Bavarian Corps was on the extreme right flank, and *Bothmer's* Division of it encountered the advanced troops of *Ducrot's* Division. The fight was hot and earnest, the Bavarians followed up the advantage which they had gained beyond Lembach as far as Langensulzbach.

Upon General Ducrot's announcement of the Bavarians' attack, Marshal Mac Mahon repaired, at about 7 o'clock a. m., to his left flank for the purpose of observation. He declared that the enemy could not yet be sufficiently far advanced to make a real attack; it was evidently nothing more than a demonstration, and he only expected the battle on the following day.

Thus the Marshal, judging from the distance between Weissenburg and Woerth, and the German dispositions based thereon, calculated quite correctly. But he had not taken into account the extraordinary warlike ardour and enthusiasm of the German officers and soldiers, which led to the victory 24 hours sooner than originally intended by their commander in chief.

The Marshal therefore, during the first hours of the battle, planned out instructions for General de Failly, founded upon the supposition that a battle would take place on the 7th of August.

An officer of the engineers, well acquainted with the country, was charged with the delivery of this dispatch. He left Froschweiler at 9. 30 o'clock, and selected for his road a neighbouring valley behind Reichshofen; for the nearest way, the valley of Niederbronn was considered endangered by German scouring patrols. He reached Bitsch at about 1 o'clock. General de Failly, however, did not afford the Marshal the requisite support, although he had received the order to march to Woerth, the previous evening at 9 o'clock. His conduct offers a striking example of the want of a single Direction in the French Army, and of the defectiveness of a principle, which allowed great independence to the individual corps leaders, and the initiative in situations of the greatest moment and of entirely general importance.

Of the 5th Corps, the 1st Division (Goze's), and Maussion's Brigade of the 2nd Division (Labadie's) were stationed about 2 kilometres*)

*) 1 English mile.

to the west of Bitsch, and guarded the débouchés of the roads from Zweibrücken and Saargemünd. The 1st Brigade, Lapasset's, of the 2nd Division, Labadie's, occupied the latter town. Upon General de Failly's receipt of Mac Mahon's dispatch, instead of immediately commencing the march with his whole Army Corps, excepting the detachments of observation necessary for keeping up the connection with the 1st Army Corps, he contented himself with issuing an order for the march of the 3rd Division on the following day.

General Guyot de Lespart consequently commenced the march early on the 6th of August, but a few hours after, the commandant of the Corps sent him a counter order, commanding him to halt, in the apprehension that he would himself be attacked from Zweibrücken. At this time the Division was at Philippsburg, at most 15 kilometres*) from the field of battle.

When the engineer officer, sent from the Marshal, arrived at Bitsch at 1 o'clock, and delivered his dispatch, de Failly declared that it would be impossible to carry out the order, his Corps would be scattered, he dared not abandon Saargemünd, he must keep a Division with the reserve Artillery in Bitsch, and had many other arguments to justify his inactivity. Finally, however, upon its being represented to him, how near Guyot de Lespart's Division was to the field of battle, he decided to give him the order to advance, and it arrived upon the field of battle in the course of the afternoon, for the most part by railway.

Major General *Walther von Montbary* commanding the out-posts of the German V. Corps was, like General Bothmer on the right flank, involved in a fight in the centre. He could not help inferring from the movements of the enemy, that he was carrying out a retreat, and therefore ordered a reconnaissance to be made. A battalion of the Westphalian Fusilier Regiment Nr. 37 was moved forward against Woerth, under cover of the fire of the out-post batteries, in order to make the enemy unfold his forces, and to gain an insight into his comparative strength. This battalion

*) 9 English miles.

came upon a front which was very strongly occupied, and was consequently, drawn into a vigorous fight.

General *von Kirchbach*, commanding the V. Corps, however, issued an order at 8 o'clock, to break off the fight, in pursuance of the dispositions made for this day by the commander in chief.

But from this point a lively cannonade was now audible upon the right flank, caused by the fight of the II. Bavarian Corps, whilst on the left flank the XI. Corps was observed to be engaged with the enemy. In consequence of this, the fight was also continued here at Woerth. By breaking it off, the adjacent Corps would have been isolated, and their flanks endangered.

The thunder of cannon upon the right, had been perceived by Major General *von Schachtmeyer*, who was with the advanced guard of the XI. Corps, as early as 7 o'clock, at Hölzschloch. Soon after, the firing ceased for a short time, and the General ordered his Division, the 21st, to move into bivouac at the place named, in accordance with the previously issued dispositions. From here, the French camp could be seen upon the heights to the west of Gunstett, on the opposite side of the Sauer. *Gunstett* itself was occupied by 2 companies and 2 squadrons of the V. Corps. The cannonade at Woerth now began afresh, and became more violent every moment. General *Schachtmeyer* therefore formed his advanced guard at the western egress of the Niederwald (it was about 8 o'clock, when the 87th Regiment, the first corps, debouched from the Niederwald with *Gunstett* in its front), sent a battalion to reinforce the detachment at *Gunstett*, and directed the artillery of the main body to the same place, for which purpose it would have to pass the Niederwald.

These preliminary movements had hardly been carried out when a French battery showed itself in position opposite, and French columns of Infantry were also observed, marching on *Gunstett*.

Immediately after the advanced guard had developed, the 4 batteries formed upon the height to the north-west of *Gunstett* and opened fire; the order being given to hold *Gunstett*, and the line east of the Sauer.

Thus at 9 o'clock, the fight had begun along the whole line, although the greater part of the Corps were still far in rear. As yet the I. Bavarian Corps had not been engaged at all, of the V. Corps only the advanced troops, the 22nd Division of the XI. Corps had just reached Surburg, and General von Werder's Corps had only arrived at Reimerswiller.

The V. Corps had been engaged, since soon after 8 o'clock, in a serious attack upon the position at Woerth. After the Artillery of the advanced guard had again opened fire, the Artillery Corps was also ordered to form up on the heights to the east of Woerth. Soon after, the 10th Infantry Division was formed up in the first line, and the 9th Infantry Division in the second line, both of them *à cheval* of the road from Preuschkdorf to Woerth.

At 10 o'clock all the 14 Batteries of the Corps had opened fire, and an hour later, when the superiority of this Artillery over that of the French had become evident, and the XI. Corps had also made progress, General von Kirchbach commanded the advanced guard to take Woerth, and establish itself upon the hills on the other side.

In the XI. Corps, the 22nd Division which had made preparations to bivouac at Surburg, was apprised of the state of affairs by the thunder of cannon, and at the same time by a report from the 21st Division, the General commanding, *von Bose*, appearing with it. The Division immediately commenced to march on *Gunstett*, the 43rd Infantry Brigade, and the Artillery in front, then the 44th Infantry Brigade, both taking the route round the southern corner of the Niederwald. The 6th Thuringian Infantry Regiment Nr. 95, and the Artillery were afterwards directed to the north of Gunstett, and the 2nd Thuringian Infantry Regiment No. 32 to the south of the village, on the Sauerbach.

General von Werder's Corps received intelligence that the battle had begun, at 11 o'clock. The General at once ordered Count Scheler's Brigade of Cavalry and Starkloff's Infantry Brigade (whose baggage was left behind), from the Wurtemberg Division, under Lieutenant General von Obernitz, with the Artillery belonging to it, to move off from Reimerswiller, by Surburg, towards Gunstett. All the remainder waited in bivouac ready to march off.

In the meanwhile a change had taken place upon the right flank, the effects of which extended as far as the centre.

Shortly after the battle had begun, on receiving the intelligence that the Artillery of the V. Corps was to be brought into action upon the heights against Woerth, as before mentioned, the Crown Prince had ordered the fight to be broken off until the other Corps had come up in sufficient strength. But before this command had reached the field of battle, Bothmer's Division, of the II. Bavarian Corps, had already gained ground towards Woerth beyond Langensulzbach; this General also wrongly received the command to break off the fight at 10. 30 o'clock, in consequence of which he now retreated upon the position at Langensulzbach.

Marshal Mac Mahon, being thus relieved upon his left flank, was now able to direct his whole force against Woerth.

This was the critical moment of the battle. The V. Prussian Corps in a thrice repeated assault endeavoured in vain to advance beyond Woerth.

Whilst the battle was here raging at its highest, the Crown Prince, accompanied by Lieutenant General von Blumenthal and suite, came to take the command of the troops collected upon the battle field, and occupied the rising ground immediately in front of Woerth, in the centre of the fighting lines, as a point of observation. It was now about 1 o'clock.

The French offensive had not been confined to Woerth.

At 10. 30 o'clock, the same moment at which the Bavarians broke off the fight, Lacretelle's French Brigade, composed of Zouaves and Algerian Tirailleurs, broke forward from Morsbronn against Gunstett, now occupied only by the advanced guard of the 21st Division.

To meet this attack, the Division strengthened the position at *Gunstett* by 2 battalions from the main body, pushed forward one battalion of the 87th Regiment to the Bruchmühle which was occupied by a company of Jagers, and sent 3 battalions into the ravine to the north of the village of Spachbach. This was done under the fire of 2 of the enemy's batteries and a mitrailleuse battery in position opposite Gunstett, which fire was soon after augmented in a dangerous manner by 2 fresh French batteries which were

driven up to the edge of a hill, flanking Elsashaufen on the east. However the chief effect of these latter, was averted from the columns of the 21st Division by the fire of a battery of the V. Corps, in position to the north of Spachbach, and the 3 first mentioned batteries were played upon by the Artillery of the XI. Corps, posted on the north of Gunstett.

The French Brigade met with a vigorous reception at the Bruchmühle; it was repulsed, and pursued across the meadows to the highroad embankment, where it obtained excellent cover.

Further north, however, French tirailleurs had established themselves upon this side of the Sauerbach, and French columns now appeared in still greater strength upon the heights.

At 11 o'clock, General *von Bose* came into Gunstett, promising the arrival of the 22nd Division and the Artillery Corps.

Half an hour later, the anticipated second attack upon Gunstett began. It was carried on to the outskirts of the village, but was nevertheless repulsed, with the assistance of the Jäger Battalion No. 11, which had just arrived.

At about 12 o'clock, the 22nd Division was also seen advancing in the direction of Landsberg (also called Albrechts-hauserhof) and Eberbach, to the south of Gunstett.

The right flank of the French Army here made a desperate resistance, but in spite of it, was forced to give ground, and the Artillery of both Divisions united upon the height of Gunstett.

Thus the battle stood at 1 o'clock, surging to and fro under the repulsed assaults of the French Army; then the arrival of the Crown Prince in the centre of the line of battle, indicated the commencement of the irresistible pressure of the German columns.

About this time the Wurtemberg Cavalry appeared upon the extreme left flank, the Artillery Corps of the XI. Corps had arrived at 12.45 o'clock; upon the right flank, the leading troops of the I. Bavarian Corps began to draw near the line of battle, between *Langensulzbach* and *Gorsdörf*, and the II. Bavarian Corps took up the fight anew upon the extreme right. The battle having been maintained for five hours, by single divisions against a greatly superior French force, numerical equality was now restored

by the gradual arrival of fresh troops, which produced an alteration every moment in favour of the Germans, until at last the superiority in numbers was also entirely on the German side.

General von Werder had received orders, shortly after 12 o'clock, to leave one regiment for the protection of the headquarters on the south of Sulz, and to push forward with all his remaining troops through the Niederwald towards Gunstett in order to support the XI. Corps. Hügel's Wurtemberg Brigade, as yet left behind, as well as the Artillery Corps now immediately advanced, and carried out the prescribed march beyond Gunstett; the out-posts stationed towards the south were also withdrawn and Beyer's Division followed that of Obernitz.

General von Werder repaired to Gunstett just as Starkloff's Brigade reached it.

At the same time that the XI. Corps, reinforced by the Wurtembergers, was in a position to undertake a successful offensive attack, the V. Corps in the centre attacked the position of *Woerth* with irresistible strength. The village was taken by the advanced guard after an obstinate resistance.

Twice the French columns threw themselves upon the Prussian Regiments to rescue Woerth, but the village was held, the French retired, the 19th Infantry Brigade reinforced the 20th and the wood to the south of Woerth was occupied by a battalion of the 18th Infantry Brigade.

At 1 o'clock the Infantry of the 21st Division of the XI. Corps under General von Thile crossed the Sauer to the south of Spachbach. They were followed by part of the Artillery of the Corps whilst the other part remained in position at Gunstett. The Division directed its attack against *Elsashaussen*. At the same time the Wurtemberg Cavalry Brigade appeared upon the left flank to the west of Gunstett.

Thus between 1 and 2 o'clock, the bow of the German front of attack had been drawn closer and firmer round the French position, and encompassing it from north to south began to stifle the desperate attacks of the marshal.

(The moment in the battle represented on the map.)

Amid sanguinary fighting, General von Bose gained the high-road embankment and the heights to the west of it; step by step the 21st Infantry Division pressed forward towards Elsashaussen, until at 2 o'clock, in conjunction with parts of the V. Corps, it succeeded in taking the burning village. General von Bose was here wounded by a shot in the thigh, but remained on horseback at the head of his Corps.

In vain Marshal Mac Mahon made a furious attack with Infantry and Cuirassiers from *Froschweiler*, with the intention of breaking through the German centre. He was repulsed.

The V. Corps was now joined by the I. Bavarian Corps, which entered at once, energetically into the fight, in spite of the long march it had already made, and to this was united the II. Bavarian Corps from the north. The brave Bavarians drove the left wing of the French before them with irresistible power. Upon the left, the Wurtemberg Division joined the XI. Corps. Thus *Froschweiler*, the centre and chief *point d'appui* to the French position, was attacked.

This village, situated upon the hill on the road from Woerth to Reichshofen, commanding the surrounding country, was most obstinately held. Both lines stood for a long time opposite to one another without wavering, whilst clouds of smoke rose up all over the battle field from burning farms and villages. It was here that the French Cuirassiers were destroyed, when throwing themselves with impetuous valour upon the German Infantry, in order to break through the enemy, in old Napoleon fashion, by the weight of their masses. General von Bose was here wounded for the second time.

Froschweiler was taken at 3. 30 o'clock. The Bavarians on the north, the Prussians on the east and west and the Wurtembergers on the south, attacked on all sides and took the village with several thousand of the enemy enclosed in it.

With this the battle was definitively decided.

The French Regiments, which had been unable to obtain any success in spite of the utmost bravery, broke into disorderly flight, some towards Reichshofen, some in a north-westerly direction towards Jägerthal, some even back towards the south, leaving guns,

colours and numerous prisoners in the hands of the victors. A small detachment of Infantry had occupied Jägerthal before the commencement of the battle, as the Marshal recognized the importance of this defile, which led towards Bitsch.

After Froschweiler was taken, the Cavalry of all the German Divisions immediately commenced the pursuit and continued it for six miles,)* reckoning from Woerth to Zabern (Saverne).

Guyot de Lespart's Division of the 5th Corps, alone was in a position to resist in some measure this pursuit, and to cover the retreat of the 1st Corps. This Division was then moved back to its Corps at Bitsch, and by this movement made the Germans believe that the main body of Mac Mahon's Army had retired upon Bitsch, so that the pursuit was diverted from the principal line of retreat.

The loss of the French in killed and wounded was 5000 men, in prisoners 8000 men, among whom were 2500 wounded. General *Colson*, the French Chief of the Staff, had fallen. They lost, in guns 35 cannon and 6 mitrailleuses, besides 2 eagles and a quantity of valuable baggage, including the Staff carriages and the Marshal's correspondence.

A large proportion of this booty was taken by the Wurtemberg Cavalry Brigade, which in conjunction with the Reserve Artillery was sent out from Gunstett on the enemy's right flank, and also the Kurmärkische Regiment of Dragoons No. 14, the 2nd Regiment of Hessian Hussars No. 14, and the Bavarian 3rd Light Horse Regiment.

The loss of the Germans in killed and wounded, was equal to that of the enemy.

Owing to the unfortunate course of the war for France, there are, in general, no accurate French accounts of the battles. The tactics adopted on the French side therefore, can at present only be inferred from observations made on the German side. From these it appears that in the battle of Woerth, Mac Mahon at different times attempted changes of front, and that his prevailing

*) 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ English miles.

idea was to break through the enemy's centre, by means of large masses. Assaults were made from Morsbronn against Gunstett and especially, at a later phase in the battle, from Froschweiler against Elsashaufen and against Woerth.

At all events the French fought very bravely, and until the numerical superiority of the Germans told, they offered a successful resistance.

The Marshal had, also, managed his troops well in the battle; this is clearly proved, by the fact that the Germans after the fight estimated the strength of his corps, as greater than it actually was.

His Army, after the losses in Douay's Division, may still have numbered 33,000 Infantry, 3,400 Cavalry and 107 Guns, to which must be added Bonnemain's Cavalry Division of 16 squadrons, Conseil's Division of 13 Battalions and 3 Batteries, and Guyot de Lespart's Division of 13 Battalions and 3 Batteries which bring the whole force under the Marshal at the battle of Woerth to about 52,000 Infantry, 5,400 Cavalry and 143 Guns.

On the same day that the German left wing gained the victory of Woerth, their *right wing* stormed a strong position, which served as a point of *appui* to the French position at Saarbrücken. As at Woerth, this fight took place a day sooner than the General commanding had intended.

The impatience of the troops to measure their strength with the French, led to a wonderful feat at Saarbrücken. The leading troops of the columns, on the line of march, fought a battle with the most favourable results, which would have been the duty of the columns themselves after they had completed their formation in position.

Opposite the town of *Saarbrücken*, upon French territory, the heights of Speicherren rise, with one corner jutting out towards the north, and steep, partly wooded slopes towards the north-west and north-east, similar to a natural fortress. (v. map.)

The approach to these heights from the town is rendered difficult by numerous lakes and ponds, and by wooded ground whose different declivities form so many positions for the combat.

* This strong position was occupied by *Frossard's Corps*, and strengthened by artificial defences.

From here, Saarbrücken had been taken on the 2nd of August, yet the offensive had been carried no further; the untenable part of Saarbrücken together with the exercising ground on the south of the town had been evacuated, and only the slope of the valley to the south-west of the exercising ground, and the Galgenberg hill lying behind it; thus the ground in front of the actual position, remained occupied. The French Direction having been convinced, since the 2nd, of August, that no hostile forces would be opposed, to Saarbrücken, Bazaine's Corps had been drawn off towards the east. His 1st Division had marched towards Saargemünd, to strengthen Lapasset's Brigade, the 2nd Division towards Puttlingen, and the 3rd and 4th had taken up a position between St. Avold and Marienthal.

Meanwhile the guards were moved from Metz towards Boulay, and on the 6th of August were stationed at Courcelles, about $3\frac{1}{3}$ miles*) in rear of St. Avold.

Frossard's Corps, on this day, was still upon the heights of Speicheren; Laveaucoupet's Division was stationed to the north of this village, on the right of the road from Forbach to Saarbrücken, Vergé's Division was on the left of the road, Bataille's Division formed the reserve. The Speicheren heights were especially adapted for the defence. Frossard's Corps, encamped in the neighbourhood of Forbach, could easily be reinforced by the railroad from Metz, as well as quickly effect its retreat; Saarbrücken and the line of the Saar in front, gave him moreover, in great measure, the power of observing the movements of the enemy.

Nevertheless this observation was entirely neglected.

The dispositions of the Commander in Chief of the first German Army, on the 5th of August, had ordered the VII. Army Corps to advance as far as the Saar on the 6th. The 13th Division was

*) $15\frac{1}{3}$ English miles.

directed towards Puttlingen; their out-posts, to be pushed forward as far as Völklingen and Rockershausen. The 14th Division was to reach Guichenbach, and out-posts to be pushed forward towards Saarbrücken and Loulsenthal. The Artillery Corps was to follow the 14th Division as far as Hensweiler. These dispositions coincided with the movements of the second Army, whose head-quarters were removed to Homburg on the 6th, and whose advanced guard approached the French frontier at Saargemünd.

General von Rheinbaben's Division of Cavalry, which was on the strength of the first Army, had, on the morning of the 6th of August, already pushed forward a Light Cavalry Regiment as far as the Saar, for the purpose of observing the position of the enemy. It was ascertained that Saarbrücken and its environs were evacuated, and that the enemy had withdrawn to the heights of Speicherern. The General commanding, *von Zastrow*, received this report shortly before 10 o'clock in the morning, when he was on the point of marching towards Dilsburg, and the news was confirmed and amplified at 10 o'clock, by a report from Lieutenant General von Kamecke, commanding the 14th Infantry Division, according to which the enemy had taken up a position on the heights of Speicherern, and appeared to be embarking on the railway at Forbach.

In consequence of this, General von Zastrow, at 1 o'clock, ordered the 13th Infantry Division, under General von Glümer, to march towards Völklingen and Wehrden, to push forward their advanced guard across the Saar upon Forbach and Ludweiler, and to gain information as to the strength and intentions of the enemy.

The 14th Infantry Division was to reinforce its advanced guard, which was to take up a position near Saarbrücken, upon the left bank of the Saar, and its main body to be directed by Neudorf upon Rockershausen. Patrols to be sent forward in the direction of Forbach.

The Artillery Corps was to follow to Puttlingen.

The General's intention, on this day, was to push up the main body of his Corps on to the Saar, at Völklingen and Rockershausen, and early on the 7th, to attack the enemy at Forbach.

The independent advance of the 14th Infantry Division did not allow this plan to be carried out, but brought on a serious encounter with the enemy on the 6th. Rheinbaben's Cavalry Division was the first to arrive in Saarbrücken. It passed through the town at 12 o'clock, and sent out some squadrons towards the heights on the south side, who were fired upon when advancing beyond them.

Between 12 and 1 o'clock the 14th Division had already reached Saarbrücken, consequently before the General commanding had given the order for it to remain at Rockershausen. It passed the town, and immediately attacked the portions of Frossard's Corps which were in the valley, below the heights of Speicheren.

The French troops were forced to evacuate the ground in front, and were pursued as far as the steep heights, which presented an extraordinary obstacle to the advance of the 14th Division.

General von Kamecke made dispositions for the attack of these heights upon both flanks, and sent information of his position to General *von Zastrow*. He received this report at 3 o'clock, and immediately repaired to the battle field, by Saarbrücken; yet before reaching Saarbrücken he heard the thunder of the fight, and sent an officer to inform the 13th Division at Völklingen, of the action in which the 14th Division was engaged.

The advanced guard of the 13th Division had arrived at Völklingen, in accordance with the order, at 2. 30 o'clock; the main body commenced the march from Tuttlingen to Völklingen at 3 o'clock. Nothing was here known of the fight begun near Saarbrücken, as the woody, mountainous country intercepted the sound of the firing. The information from General von Zastrow, brought by the officer mentioned, only reached its destination at 5 o'clock.

When General von Zastrow arrived to take command at 4. 30 o'clock, *the situation* upon the field of battle was as follows (v. this moment upon the map):

Upon the *German right flank*, the 28th Infantry Brigade, after heavy losses, had gained possession of the wood, bordering

he railway between Drathzug and Stiring, and held it. In the front, 6 batteries in position upon the Focksterhöhe and Galgenberg, had opened fire, viz: the foot division of No. 7 Regiment of Field Artillery and 2 batteries belonging to the VIII. Corps. The Hohenzollern Fusilier Regiment No. 40, of the latter Corps, had also come up to the support of the 14th Division, and the General commanding, *von Göben*, was himself upon the spot and conducted the fight.

To the east of Drathzug, the 15th Hussars, of the 14th Infantry Division, and the 11th Hussars, of the 5th Cavalry Division, were halted under cover. There was no infantry at all in front.

Upon the *left flank*, the 27th Infantry Brigade, commanded by General *von François*, had effected an unparalleled feat, amid the heaviest losses. Under the very eyes of the antagonists, who were far superior in murderous artillery and infantry fire, it had climbed to the summit of a projecting nose of the heights, and established itself upon the plateau, partly in the midst of a wood which was defended by the enemy. Here General von François fell, killed in the fight.

The Hohenzollern Fusilier Regiment No. 40, was advancing in support of this brigade.

Several regiments of the 5th Cavalry Division were in rear of the left wing, concealed at the foot of the hill.

The position of all these troops was hazardous in the highest degree. The overpowering army held the heights with inflexible firmness, so that the right wing, the 28th Infantry Brigade, was unable to gain much ground. With the assistance of the 40th Regiment, which had come up, the 27th Infantry Brigade succeeded it is true in completely taking the wood at 5 o'clock, but it was impossible for the present to press further forward. There were no more infantry in reserve. In endeavouring to push on against the Kreutzberg, from the acquired south-west point of the wood, the German lines were brought to a stand by the powerful attacks of the enemy.

The greatest devotion and bravery of these troops alone prevented the ground obtained, being again lost.

The thunder of cannon, however, audible afar in the direction

of Saarbrücken and beyond, had reached the columns of the III. Army Corps, which was approaching the frontier; they followed the direction of the sound in accelerated march, and at 5 o'clock, General *von Alvensleben*, the commanding General of this corps, arrived upon the field of battle with 5 or 6 battalions.

These battalions were immediately sent to support the troops on the heights.

But in spite of this most necessary reinforcement, they did not succeed in progressing further than the ravine, which the Kreutzberg forms at a particular segment of the Speicherer heights and which offered an especially favourable position for the French offensive.

At 5. 30 o'clock, the action here came to a stand, and remained in the same position until 8. 30 o'clock.

At 7. 30 o'clock the first artillery arrived upon the plateau, a battery of the III. Corps having, by the utmost exertions, succeeded in bringing the guns up the hill. It took up a position upon the south-west point of the wood, and fired with success upon the French batteries.

During these three hours French columns advanced five or six times, but each time the attack was repulsed by the Germans.

The battle at this place, only died out when complete darkness set in.

The 16th Division which reached Saarbrücken in the evening, was placed at the disposal of General von Zastrow, in a reserve position, by the verbal order of General *von Steinmetz*, who appeared upon the field of battle at 7 o'clock, having received an announcement of the fight, at 5 o'clock, when at Eiweiler.

The French on the left also attempted an attack upon the German right flank at 6. 30 o'clock, and commenced it with a strong battery in position at Stiring. But the efficacious fire of a German battery, concentrated upon this point, very soon obliged the enemy's battery to drive off, and forced the infantry to return.

About 8 o'clock in the evening, however, the surrounding of the French line of retreat towards Forbach was effected by the

13th Division, upon the extreme right flank. This pressure upon the French position, which General von Zastrow had prepared by his march dispositions for the 7th of August, and accelerated by the announcement of the attack made by the 14th Division, induced the severely-shaken enemy to vacate the position, so long and obstinately held, and at the same time caused a Division of Bazaine's Corps, which was approaching to Frossard's assistance, to return to St. Avold.

The 13th Infantry Division, which had crossed the Saar at Wehrden, marched towards Forbach by Rosseln, the advanced guard, under General *von der Goltz*, debouched from the Forbach wood towards 8 o'clock, and 2 battalions of the 55th Regiment with 1 battery, immediately went forward to attack the Kaninchen hill, which was strongly occupied and strengthened by cover trenches. These trenches were taken just before dark, and the battery was enabled to open fire upon Forbach and the masses of the enemy still visible there.

At the sound of this fighting upon the flank and in the rear, the troops, who were still energetically defending the Kreutzberg, began a rapid and disorderly retreat.

With this the action came to an end. The fall of night put a stop to the pursuit.

To cover the retreat, several batteries were driven up on to the Belschberg and its western projections, and continued the fire for long, without however producing any effect upon the German troops. At 9 o'clock, the French Army withdrew by Eslingen upon Blittersdorf leaving behind numerous prisoners, the camp equipage, a pontoon column, several provision waggons, and large stores of forage and clothing in Forbach.

The loss in killed and wounded, in this hot and murderous fight, was extraordinarily great upon both sides. It amounted in each Army to at least 6000 men.

General Frossard had remained entirely without support from Bazaine. Montaudon's Division of the 3rd Corps, which was stationed in Saargemünd on the 5th and 6th of August, had moved back to the 2nd Division which held Puttlingen, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 6th. The latter Division marched about the

whole day, now towards Saargemünd now towards Saarbrücken, but not upon the field of battle.

The important result of the three victories, at Weissenburg, Woerth and Saarbrücken, was that the whole of the French Army gave up its original position and began a general rapid retreat. By this means alone was it enabled to escape the fate of being rolled up by the Army of the Crown Prince, or surrounded and forced back from its line of retreat towards the north.

THIRD CHAPTER.

THE INVESTMENT OF STRASBURG AND THE FIRST BATTLE NEAR METZ (COURCELLES).

The north-east of France, which became the theatre of war shortly after the German victories on the 6th of August,—the table land of Lorraine and the Rhine valley separated from it by the Vosges—, by its natural formation and consequent limited military character caused the operations of the war to be divided into two parts.

The acquisition of *Strasburg* was no less important to the German Leadership than the pursuit and destruction of the main body of the French Army, whose next, natural front must be the *line of the Moselle*. Strasburg possessed a double importance as a fortress by its position in front of the great passes of the Vosges and in the middle of the open plain, which leads in a southerly direction to Franche Comté and Bourgogne in the centre of France.

The Vosges, the natural western boundary wall of Germany, which border the Rhine valley on the west, rise quickly upwards from the plateau land of the Burgundy gate in the south, and form an unbroken chain to the valley of the Lauter, diminishing in height towards the north, with steep declivities towards the Rhine and sloping gradually down towards the table land of Lorraine on the west. In the southern third, these mountains attain the greatest height and width, the ridge is no where less than 3000 feet high and rounded off, near the eastern side, the granite, wooded summits rise 1000 feet higher.

Where the granite masses cease at the sources of the Meurthe, the mountains are smaller, lower, and the peaks are less important.

Then comes the *principal pass of the mountains*, which begins on the eastern slope at Zaberne (Saverne) and leads by Pfalzburg to the Meurthe towards Luneville.

This pass, the entrance gate as it were between Germany and France, and near the gate of Burgundy which is occupied by the fortress of Belfort, has been, since the most ancient times, a road for the Roman, French and German Army columns, and the position of Strasburg was deemed essential to it. The railroad from Paris, by Châlons and Toul to Strasburg, passes through it, and the canal, which in its further continuation leads to the Marne. On the other side of the pass, the last third of the mountain range begins, stretching as far as the Lauter valley, where the advanced troops of the French Army were overthrown on the 4th of August, and is a very intersected, hilly country, with citadels crowning the summits. The small fortresses of Bitsch, Lichtenberg and Lützelstein lie in this northernmost part of the Vosges.

Strasburg, the largest town in Alsace and the strongest fortress in this eastern part of the theatre of war, formed a bulwark to the great pass of the Vosges just described, it was also a central point of defence for the Rhine valley, and the first rampart against an entry by the gate of Burgundy.

For the successful defence of this fortress, the support of an army holding the Vosges was certainly necessary. After Mac Mahon was beaten at Woerth, and his troops had evacuated the passes of the Vosges in disorderly flight, Strasburg became an isolated fortress, similar to the fortress of Pfalzburg lying by itself in the great pass; only much larger, far more important in a political point of view, and provided with a numerous garrison, which might have been able to undertake dangerous operations in rear of the German Army, and became in consequence, an important object of operations for the left wing of the advancing Army.

The *table land of Lorraine* which stretches out as far as the Ardennes towards the north, and to the deeply indented valley of the Meuse towards the west, became the other principal theatre of war, upon the further side of the Vosges. The upper level of this table land is hilly, its streams mostly flow in deeply cut beds, and are difficult to cross. The chief river is the Moselle which

rises at Ballon de Sulz, south of the Vosges, and leaves the plateau of Langres at Epinal. It forms an excellent defensive position through its mountainous banks, and a strategical line of great importance by the powerful fortress of Metz and the fortress of Thionville. Upon its right side, first the Meurthe runs into it, upon which Luneville and Nancy are situated, then comes the Saar, the stream which the first Army Corps and part of the second victoriously crossed on the 6th of August, which rises in the north of the Vosges, and upon which are the towns of Saarburg and Saargemünd.

The effect produced upon the French army, by the defeats on the 4th and 6th of August, was that all the Corps, without reference to their original formation, streamed on to the Moselle line, fused into two large masses, without any determined plan for continuing the defensive struggle. A rent went through the army, which even violently shattered the corps unity of de Failly's troops, so that Lapasset's Brigade which was in Saargemünd, separated itself entirely from its own Corps, and joined the 3rd Corps in the retreat towards Metz, whilst the main body, under the command of the General himself, endeavoured to form a junction with the army which was being formed at Châlons.

The retreat of the French Corps necessarily led to the formation of two different armies, the army of Metz and the army of Châlons. The latter was formed of the 1st, 5th, 7th and the 12th Corps which was raised at a later period, and the former of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th Corps and the Imperial Guard.

After the defeat at Woerth, the 1st Corps fled, in the first instance, in all directions, the main body however arrived at Saverne, and upon the 7th of August some order was again restored in the regiments. The Marshal then made them march through the night, and on the morning of the 8th they reached Saarburg. On the 9th the Corps was at Blamont, on the 10th in Luneville. Then, under the apprehension that the enemy might have pressed forward to Nancy and destroyed the railroad by Bar-le-Duc to Châlons, the Marshal decided upon taking a more southerly direction. He wished to make use of the railway which follows the valley of the Marne, by Chaumont, Joinville and St. Dizier.

The march was therefore directed by a branch line of that railway upon Neufchâteau, first to Bayon on the Moselle, where it was encamped on the 11th, the next day to Haroué, on the 13th to Vicherey; on the 14th, the Corps arrived at Neufchâteau, from whence one part embarked on the railway, so as to arrive at Châlons on the 15th, whilst the remainder, especially the cavalry, marched, and only later made use of the railway at Joinville and St. Dizier. The strength of the 1st Corps, on arriving at Châlons, was from 20,000 to 22,000 men.

General de Failly heard of the defeat at Woerth on the evening of the 6th, and immediately gave orders to commence the retreat on the following morning. In the well grounded apprehension that he might be cut off, he decided to move off during the night. The train was directed that evening towards Saargemünd, the whole of the baggage was taken into the fortress of Bitsch, and at 8 o'clock in the evening the Corps began to march, and arrived at Lützelstein on the 7th, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. From here it followed the 1st Corps, keeping about two days march in its rear, eventually covering its retreat. On the 8th, General de Failly arrived at Lixheim, on the 9th at Saarburg, on the 10th at Avricourt, and on the evening of the 11th at Lunneville. From this place he marched to Chaumont, and drew in his rear guard, Guyot de Lespart's Division. From Chaumont the Corps travelled by rail to Châlons, where it arrived on the 19th and 20th of August.

The 7th Corps, which after the departure of Conseil-Dumesnil's Division to the 1st Corps, only consisted of Liébert's Division, a Brigade of Cavalry and the Reserve Artillery (the 3rd Division was still in course of formation in Lyons), had gone from Belfort to Mülhausen on the 6th of August, for the purpose of encountering the supposed enemy in the Black Forest. On the following morning General Douay received a dispatch from Mac Mahon, informing him of the loss of the battle at Woerth, and an hour later a second dispatch which ran thus:

"If possible throw one Division into Strasburg, and cover Belfort with both of the other Divisions." signed: Napoleon.

The Commander in Chief of the army and the Chief of the Staff consequently did not know that the 3rd Division (Dumont's) of the

7th Corps, was still in process of formation in Lyons, and that the 1st Division (Gonseil-Dumesnil's) had been detached, two days before, to the 1st Corps.

In consequence of this command, General Douay drew back towards Belfort. The departure from Mühlhausen took place, at midday on the 7th of August, with real precipitation. These troops arrived in Belfort again on the 8th of August, and prepared to complete the fortifications of the place, especially the three advanced works, the Barres, the Grandes Perches, and the Petites Perches, the earthworks of which had only been traced out.

The different portions of Dumont's Division arrived in Belfort about the 13th of August, and, besides the 1st Division which remained with Mac Mahon, only Jolif du Coulombier's Cavalry Brigade was wanting. It was kept back at Lyons, and never joined its corps.

This was therefore the new destiny of those corps which, later on, formed the principal part of the Army of Châlons.

The corps which formed the army of Metz arrived in the following manner for the purpose of concentration at this fortress.

When the German advanced guard approached Saargemünd on the 7th of August, General Frossard who had on that morning retired there from Blittersdorf, considering it wiser to place more ground between himself and the enemy, departed at 1 o'clock for the purpose of reaching Bazaine at Puttlingen. He arrived there at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. This hasty retreat, before an enemy who had only just shown himself, brought disorder and mistrust among the troops, who had previously accused their General of not having allowed himself to be seen during the action.

General Frossard had, in fact, been engaged in business transactions about minor concerns with the Mayor of Forbach during the attack of Kamecke's Division upon the heights of Speicheren.

Upon receiving the news of the overthrow of the 2nd Corps, Marshal Leboeuf, the chief of the Staff, ordered an immediate concentration of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and Guards Corps, around Metz. This was effected on the 7th, 8th and 9th of August. At the same time the 6th Corps arrived, by railway from Châlons, at Metz, where the Imperial head-quarters had been established, and thus

five corps were assembled there, *an army of about 200,000 men with 468 guns.*

On the 12th of August, these active forces were in position on the right bank of the Moselle, under cover of the eastern outer forts of Metz.

The news of the condition of the army, which had emanated from the French Chief command, had in the meantime produced an uneasy feeling throughout the whole country, which, reacting again, had a pernicious effect upon the Direction of the army.

Although the defeats of the 4th and 6th of August must have been a terrible awakening from the delusions under which France laboured, yet only two corps and single divisions of two other corps had been immediately concerned in them, consequently only the smaller part of the army, and it was the duty of the Chief command to remind the army and the country, in an appropriate manner, of the forces still at hand.

But the dispatches from head-quarters, instead of having a calming influence, represented a complete helplessness in the Direction of the army, and made a change in the Chief command necessary, in opposition to public opinion in the country and in the army.

The kind of dispatches were as follows:

Metz, 7th August 8 o'clock a.m.

"It is necessary that France and Paris should prepare for the greatest efforts, for the greatest sacrifices. No weakness! Mac Mahon covers Nancy. Frossard's Corps is well led. The Chief of the Staff is with the advanced posts."

11.55 o'clock a.m.

"The concentration of the troops upon Metz is carried on without difficulty. The trial which we have to encounter is severe, but it does not exceed the patriotism of the nation."

4 o'clock p.m.

"The enemy is not pursuing Mac Mahon. The Marshal is concentrating his troops."

On the morning of the 7th, Paris had already been declared in a state of siege, a decree called upon all young men, under 30 years, to serve in the Garde Mobile, and all citizens, between 30 and 40 years of age, to serve in the Garde Nationale.

The Division, which occupied Papal territory, was embarked for France as early as the 6th of August, all the dispensable troops were brought away from Algiers, and even some that were necessary there; the embarkation of an army to invade the German coasts was interrupted and the troops recalled, and even the marines were incorporated in the land army.

The 12th Corps was also formed, under General *Trochu* (later *Lebrun*, v. the order of battle), and the 13th Corps, under General *Vinoy*, (the Corps numbered 8, 9, 10 and 11 were intended for the military commands in Paris, Lyons, Toulon and Algiers).

In the mean time the *German Army Corps*, following up the advantages they had already gained, poured across the frontier in uninterrupted succession.

On the 9th of August the Chief head-quarters were removed to Saarbrücken; the head-quarters of the second army, upon the same day, were in Saargemünd, the head-quarters of the third army in Ober-Modern, having been at Mersweiler on the 8th, and the previous day in Hegweiler, Eberbach and Surburg.

The German armies made a strategical wheel to the right, and by that means gained a new front, which corresponded with the line of retreat taken by the enemy.

This new disposition imposed the following conditions: that the country between the Saar and the Moselle should be firmly held by the first army whilst remaining stationary, that the second army should be opened out, whilst the heads of the columns only moved slowly forward, and that the third army should force its way through the Vosges chain by rapid marches.

How far the second army extended towards the rear, in conformity with the original disposition, at the time that the battle of Woerth was fought, is evident from the Saxons (XII. Corps) having only reached Kaiserslautern on the 7th, Homburg on the 8th, and Saarbrücken not until the 11th.

But whilst the main bodies of the first and second armies, moving slowly forward, were united in compact membership, the independent cavalry Divisions at their heads formed an advanced line two days march in front, keeping at the heels of the retiring French corps, carefully watching them and at the same time concealing the German operations by an impenetrable veil. As early as the 10th of August these heads had passed the districts of Saar-Union, Gros-Tenquin, Faulquemont, Fouligny and Les Etangs.

The task which had devolved upon the third army, besides the advance through the Vosges, included various other operations against the fortresses lying among the mountains, and also the important detaching of forces whose aim was Strasburg.

Bitsch, the most western of the Vosges fortresses, bars a cross road through the mountains. Here three roads leading from the valley of the Rhine unite, and continue as two to the Saar. From its natural strength, situated upon the cone of a hill and on a lake, with bomb-proof casemates, a well 246 feet deep, richly provided with stores, furnished with 80 guns and 1000 men, Bitsch offered an invincible resistance to the detachment of the II. Bavarian Corps, which had moved forward to besiege it on the 8th of August and at once commenced the bombardment with a field battery. The corps had therefore to make a long détour by Lemberg, Montbronn, and St. Lorenzen, by mountainous roads, with the greatest difficulty and to content itself with investing the fortress.

The castle of *Lichtenberg*, situated upon rocks, likewise refused the summons to surrender, but by the Wurtemberg Division, but capitulated however on the 10th, after the houses had been partially set on fire, the day before, by the bombardment. This success was gained by the 1st and 2nd Jäger battalions, the 1st Field Artillery division and two companies of the 2nd Infantry Regiment, under General Hügel, when 280 prisoners besides the fort itself were delivered into the hands of the Germans.

Fort *Lützelstein* (*la Petite Pierre*), lying somewhat further south, was taken by the II. Bavarian Corps on the 9th of August.

On the other hand, the important little fortress of *Pfalzburg*, unusually strongly situated upon a hill 1160 feet high, in the middle of the principal pass mentioned above, held out like Bitsch

and compelled the third army to make a circuit by Petersbach. The fortress was invested.

The head-quarters remained in Petersbach from the 11th to the 13th of August. Here the town of Luneville surrendered, after having been visited by the cavalry of the advanced guard. Nancy had already been ridden through by German cavalry patrols on the 12th. Upon the same day the I. Bavarian Corps, on the right flank, reached Diemerdingen near Saar-Union.

Immediately after the battle of Woerth, whilst the main body of the third army thus passed the Vosges, and with its extreme right flank effected a junction with the left flank of the second army, the Baden Division was moved forward towards the south. On the morning of the 7th, the cavalry brigade, under General von La Roche, appeared before the gates of Hagenau, and took the town by a *coup de main*, capturing over 100 prisoners, 80 horses, and a great many arms and articles of equipment. The Division marched in on the evening of the same day.

On the 8th, the Baden cavalry appeared before *Strasburg*, and destroyed the railway and the telegraph wires to Lyons; the division followed them; on the night of the 7th, the troops stationed at Rastatt had already thrown a bridge across the Rhine, by which 24 heavy guns were moved over for the attack upon *Strasburg*. On the 9th, the north side of the great fortress was invested, and General *von Beyer*, Commandant of the Baden troops, sent a summons to the Commandant of the fortress, General *Uhrich*, to surrender.

The French General refused the summons.

Strasburg is not laid out according to the most modern principles of the art of fortification, there are no outer forts; still it is as strong a fortress as Vauban's more simple system alone could produce; the Rhine and the Ill used for inundating, offer a natural means of strength. A rich equipment of artillery was at hand for the defence, as the fortress had been destined for the principal point of exit for the invasion of Germany.

The town, with a population of 84.000 inhabitants, is surrounded by a cincture of fortifications which nearly takes the form of a conical bullet, lying with its blunted point towards the east south east.

The longimeter of the fortress is 4 kilometres*), the transverse diameter, measured at the base of the triangle, considered as an isosceles, surrounding the fortress, is $2\frac{1}{4}$ kilometres**).

On the east side, the fortifications extend as far as the western arm of the Rhine and enclose the citadel, which is quite separated from the town proper. The citadel is an enclosed work composed of five bastions, commanding the wall of the enceinte which surrounds the whole town, and horn works are thrown out below the citadel towards the north-east and south-east. The enceinte consists of bastions, which can be inundated on the south-east front by the Rhine and the Ill, and are strengthened by advanced works and outer lines the north and north-west fronts, on the other hand, have large horn works and advanced lunettes, thrown out in front of the bastions. The railway station which unites the line from Kehl with those from Paris and Lyons, lies behind the north front.

An excellent system of flooding enables the east and southern fronts to be inundated by the waters of the Rhine and of the navigable Ill, which flows through the town.

The garrison of the fortress consisted of 11.000 men of infantry of the Line and Artillery, besides Gardes Mobiles and Gardes Nationaux. On the other hand, Engineer troops were entirely wanting. A tolerably large number of troops had, moreover, been driven into the fortress by the panic produced by the defeats of Weissenburg and Woerth, and formed a motley crew, which had to be organized afresh in the necessary formation. At the beginning of the campaign, the defence of Strasburg had never been taken into consideration.

The north side of the fortress had already, on the 9th, been invested by the Baden Division, as before mentioned, the head-quarters

*) $2\frac{1}{2}$ English miles.

**) about $1\frac{1}{2}$ English miles.

were in Lampertheim. On the 14th, General *von Werder* was nominated to the Chief command of the siege corps, which was to consist of the Baden Division, the Prussian 1st reserve Division and the Garde-Landwehr-Division, as well as the siege artillery and technical troops. Lieutenant General von Decker was appointed to the command of the siege artillery, and Major General v. Mertens commanding engineer.

On the 13th, the head-quarters were transferred to Mundolsheim, and the investment was drawn closer upon the north-west, north and east fronts, whilst the enemy shewed no activity in the offensive.

On the 15th, Schiltigheim, Ruprechtsau, and Königshoffen were brought into the cordon of the investment, but the regular siege had not as yet begun and the guns required for the bombardment were still wanting.

Upon the other side of the Vosges, the advance of the three German armies had progressed without delay. The table land of Lorraine had been passed as far as the line of the Moselle without fighting, whilst the first army continued its direction towards Metz, the second army upon Pont-à-Mousson and the third upon Nancy.

The Chief head-quarters were in St. Avold on the 12th and were removed, on the 13th, to Faulquemont, near which place is the castle Herny, 3 miles*), from Metz, in which the King himself took up his quarters.

The first army, now joined by the I. Army Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division, had advanced as far as the line of St. Barbe-Frontigny at midday on the 14th; their advanced posts were one mile**) from Metz and felt the enemy.

The second army, whose head-quarters were transferred to Gros-Tenquin on the 12th, having satisfied themselves that the

*) $13\frac{1}{2}$ English miles.

**) $4\frac{3}{4}$ English miles.

Nied would not be defended by the French, in spite of the entrenchment which had been thrown up and the villages having been placed in a state of defence, made preparations to cross the Moselle on the 14th and 15th. For this purpose the head-quarters moved off, on the morning of the 13th, to *Pont-à-Mousson*, the principal passage over the river. From the different reconnaissances which had been made it was foreseen that no opposition would be offered to crossing at this place. Neither the stone work of the bridge in the town nor the small wooden portion of it on the left bank, had been destroyed. As the German infantry were taking possession of the town on the 13th, a French battalion, which was coming up by the railway from Metz, returned to Metz by the same route. Upon this the cavalry destroyed the rails and telegraph wires upon the other side of the Moselle. On the following day the head-quarters had, already, been established in the town.

The main body of the third army was approaching Nancy on the 14th, on the 15th the II. Bavarian Corps came upon the fortress of *Marsal*, 4½ miles*) from Nancy. This fortress situated in the marshy fells of the Seille, completely surrounded with wet ditches and furnished with a garrison of 600 men and 70 guns, formed the central point of a natural defensive position; it offered however no defence. After a short bombardment on the south side, it capitulated upon the same day; 512 unwounded prisoners, about 600 remounts, 60 guns and a large quantity of provisions fell into the hands of the conquerors.

In Nancy nothing was to be seen of the enemy, on the 14th the advanced guard of the Germans had already reconnoitred the fortress of *Toul*, and summoned it to surrender.

The French army had, therefore, given up the whole of the country east of the Moselle, without making any further fight. The positions on the German and those on the French Nied, which streams unite in the Nied, midway between St. Avold and Metz, 1½ miles**) north of the straight road which joins both places, were as little defended as the positions on the Seille although an obstinate resis-

*) 207/10 English miles.

**) Nearly 7 English miles.

taunce might here have been made by the rear guard, and they were also found by the Germans to have been prepared for defence.

It is doubtful whether the line of the Moselle might not even now have been held by the French, by summoning up their whole strength. The circumstance, that Pont-à-Mousson was not occupied, and that, on the 14th, Toul had already been summoned to surrender, indicates that the general defence of the whole line was not intended, or else that Mac Mahon had given up the defence of the southern tract in adopting the views of the French Chief command in opposition to his own.

With the passage at Pont-à-Mousson, the possibility of surrounding Metz at once appeared.

In the publication*) inspired or written by the Emperor Napoleon himself it is said: "the Prussians concealed their movements so well behind their formidable curtain of cavalry, which they spread out before their front in all directions, that in spite of the most persevering researches it was never really known where the main body of their troops was." But even had the French Direction been acquainted with the position of the Germans on each day as they advanced from the frontier, it still might not have been able to accomplish the defence of the line of the Moselle, but only to secure and hasten, in a more cautious manner, a further retreat to the line of the Meuse. For the insufficiency of their forces made it impossible to hold so long a line against such an extended assailant. It is true that the army assembled round Metz was sufficient for the northern part, but as Mac Mahon was no longer able to take the field, or as yet unable to take it again, and his army consequently, not in a fit state to form the right wing of the position, even if a front had also been opposed to the second army, it would have been impossible to avoid a surrounding by the army of the Crown Prince. *Under these circumstances the line of the Moselle was absolutely untenable.* And now the French Direction committed the fault, of not commencing the retreat

*) Campagne de 1870. Des causes qui ont amené la capitulation de Sedan par un officier attaché à l'état major général. Bruxelles, J. Rozet.

in time from this untenable position; they still retained the army in the fortress of Metz, whilst the first German army appeared in front and the second army threatened the right flank. The interference of the ministry in Paris in the military operations, as well as the change made in the chief command bore no small share in the half measures of this epoch. The defeats of the army, as previously mentioned, had roused a general distrust in the generalship of the Emperor; in consequence of this feeling, on the 12th, he transferred the Chief command of the "Rhine Army," viz. the corps united at Metz, to Marshal *Bazaine*, to whose command General *Decaen* succeeded. Marshal *Lebœuf* was dismissed from being Chief of the Staff.

The Emperor, however, still remained with the army, his influence always carrying weight, the ministry sent urgent counsels, and a ruinous insecurity in the military measures necessarily resulted from these complicated relations.

The German Direction, on the other hand, well aware of the advantages of its own situation, and the disadvantages of that of the enemy, *hoped to get in rear of the French Army, by making a circuit upon the left bank, whilst the advance of the third army averted any danger that might by chance arise to the second army during the wheel, from Mac Mahon.*

At midday on the 14th of August, the I. Army Corps was stationed on the French Nied, with its 1st Division at Courcelles-Chaussy, on the road from St. Avold to Metz, and its 2nd Division at Les Etangs, upon the road from Boulay to Metz. Of the VII. Army Corps, the 13th Division was at Pange, and the 14th Division, on the same stream, at Domangeville. The VIII. Army Corps was in reserve at Varize and Vionville on the German Nied. The 3rd Cavalry Division was stationed upon the right wing at Ste. Barbe, the 1st Cavalry Division on the left wing at Frontigny.

The French army was, on the morning of this day, in large bivouacs to the east of the outer forts of Metz, and between them, upon the right bank of the Moselle. The troops stationed furthest to the east occupied earth entrenchments at Colombey and Nouilly, upon the little rivulets, which flow to the Moselle from the right, about 3000 paces beyond the outer forts.

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The ground between the German troops and the outer forts, offered hindrances difficult to surmount, in the projecting heights, sinking down to the Moselle, which are here intersected by numerous brooks, and had been rendered of military importance to the French by cover trenches and gun-emplacements, one behind another in different lines.

The 26th Infantry Brigade, forming the advanced guard of the VII. Army Corps, under the command of General von der Goltz, observed movements in the enemy opposite, during the afternoon, which led to the inference that they were departing. In consequence of this an attack was ordered at about 4 o'clock, for the purpose of making a reconnaissance, which being directed against *Colombey*, would ascertain whether this was actually the case, and at the same time compel the enemy to develop his strength. In this attack the 26th Infantry Brigade encountered an obstinate resistance from the 3rd French corps, and was involved in a violent fight, in which it suffered great losses from the energetic, deliberate fire of the infantry lying concealed. General von Zastrow ordered the 25th Infantry Brigade to move forward in support, from their bivouac at Pange, and directed their attack against Marsilly beyond Colligny. At the same time the 14th Infantry Division received the order to move off from its bivouac at Domangeville, and to march upon Laquenexy. The artillery corps, which was bivouacking at Bazoncourt, was also ordered to follow the 14th Infantry Division. Upon the right wing, the advanced guard of the I. Army Corps, under the command of Major General von Falckenstein, moved forward, at the same time, for the attack; the Corps followed the direction of the two high roads leading to Metz from Boulay and St. Avold, the 2nd Division, under General von Pritzelwitz, by the north road upon Noisseville, the 1st Division, under General Bentheim, by the south upon Montoi. (v. the map of the battle of Courcelles.)

The 26th Infantry Brigade which was first engaged, came upon an overpowering enemy, whose masses were continually being more strongly developed, and was in a very perilous position; it was only by bringing up the last reserves and by the greatest devotion, that it was able to make a stand until the 25th Infantry

Brigade had come up by Colligny, which did not take place until about 6 o'clock in the evening. This Brigade deployed so that three battalions attacked the entrenchments in the wood to the north of Colombey, on the right flank of the 26th Brigade, and two battalions remained closed to the west of Coincy. The artillery of the 13th Division came into position upon the hills to the east of Colombey, and prepared for the attack upon the French position by opening an efficacious fire, even though exposed to infantry fire.

The French had by degrees developed two Corps, Decaen's and Ladmirault's. They made such a powerful offensive attack towards Colombey and Noisseville, that both the 13th and the 2nd Divisions could with difficulty hold their positions.

At Colombey a more favourable turn was first produced by the arrival of the head of the 14th Infantry Division at 6.50 o'clock. General von Zastrow directed the 28th Infantry Brigade, under Major General von Woyna, against the right flank of the enemy, still in position at *Colombey*, whilst he made the 27th Infantry Brigade form up as a reserve, upon the heights to the east of Colombey. This attack upon his right flank compelled the enemy to give way; he fell back slowly upon Borny, and gave up the wood which lies to the south-east of this place, after an obstinate defence. The wood lying to the north of Colombey was also taken, after a severe fight, by the 25th Infantry Brigade, under Major General von Osten-Sacken. At *Noisseville*, by the timely co-operation of the Artillery Corps and Infantry reserves, the I. Army Corps succeeded in repulsing the enemy's assault, and thus a great danger for the VII. Army Corps was averted, its right wing having been threatened by the French offensive movement at this place. General Count von der Gröben's Cavalry Division, upon the extreme right flank of the army, also took an active part in the fight, pressing upon the left wing of the French at *Servigny*.

The French army fell back slowly, holding successively the fortified earth entrenchments, lying one behind the other, and thus inflicting heavy losses on the German army.

The 1st Cavalry Division upon the left flank was engaged in the same way as the 3rd Cavalry Division upon the right. Lieutenant General von Hartmann, who was commanding, directed

his attack against Mercy-le-Haut, and commenced it with his Horse battery. It was supported by the extreme right flank of the second army, the 18th Infantry Division, which took part in the battle when it was at its height. The Fusilier Regiment No. 36, captured Jury and stormed Mercy-le-Haut, and a battalion of the 84th Regiment took Peltre. Thus these troops gained the enemy's flank and threatened his line of retreat.

Towards 8 o'clock in the evening, the French army was repulsed on all points, and driven back until it was between the outer forts, Queulen, Les Bottes and St. Julien. The Germans, naturally, could not attempt a further pursuit, as they would have come under the fire of the fortifications; they bivouacked in the position wrested from the enemy, in order to insure the care and transport of the numerous wounded, although contrary to the order of the Commander in Chief of the first army, who had directed that the original position, on the Nied, was again to be occupied in the night. The VIII. German Army Corps was not engaged in the combat.

In forming a judgment upon the importance of this battle, there are many sides to be considered.

The circumstance that the attack was only begun towards evening, and that it was undertaken with a comparatively weak force, indicates that, at midday at least, it was not the intention to give battle, but that the alteration in the military situation, through the departure of the French army, which was noticed by the advanced guard, had induced the German attack. It therefore became the duty of the first army to attack the enemy, in order to hold him fast in the retreat which he appeared to be beginning, but in other respects to maintain the waiting position it had taken up.

The position of the French army on the 14th, indicated the intention of a battle upon the right bank of the Moselle, rather than a premeditated retreat. The whole army stood that morning in the open country, with an entrenched line, 9 kilometres*) in

*) 5½ English miles.

length, their rear covered by the unassailable fortifications of Metz, consequently in an excellent tactical position, carefully prepared for fighting. This position raised the conjecture, that the resistance originally projected on the Nied against further pursuit having been made, a pitched battle was to be fought here on the 15th, Napoleon's fête day.

The obstinate, partly offensive fight which was carried on at Colombey and Noisseville, has also more the appearance of a defensive movement for the purpose of holding the position than of a retreating fight. Had the French Direction really intended to evacuate the right bank of the Moselle and the fortress, before the attack of Goltz's Brigade, it surely, could easily have carried out this movement in spite of this attack, when so close to the outer-forts, by withdrawing the army completely between the fortifications, whilst leaving a rear guard behind. Bazaine should either have attacked the first army with his whole force, or retired in good time. On the part of the French, this battle was a half measure, resulting from complete ignorance of the enemy's movements, and from their own want of design. That the Prussian divisions should have been allowed to deploy in front of an army of more than 60,000 men, whilst there was not a moment to be lost, is an incomprehensible error, its principal fault being that it permitted the surrounding movement, by the second army, to be carried out.

Various important statements exist concerning the French Army Direction, which lead to the conclusion that the retreat upon Verdun was a settled affair even before the beginning of the battle, and these agree with the report of Major General von der Goltz on the afternoon of the 14th. "The enemy has begun his retreat, and the advanced guard will therefore attack him."

Again, it is significant that the Emperor left Metz with the Prince Imperial at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and at 10 o'clock in the evening of this day sent off a dispatch from Longeville, (under Mont St. Quentin, near Metz). "Our army commences to retreat upon the left bank of the Moselle. In the morning, our reconnoitring patrols had not reported the presence of any hostile Corps. When however, the half of our army had crossed the Moselle, the Prussians

attacked us with considerable forces &c." Then Marshal Bazaine says*): "After the brilliant fight at Borny (on the 14th to the east of Metz) the troops engaged in it received the command, on the morning of the 15th, to *continue* their retreating movement upon Verdun, in the two directions assigned to them." From this it follows that a retreat upon Verdun had been ordered, even before the battle. The Marshal further says most distinctly in another publication**): "I had instructions to lead the army from the right bank of the Moselle, where it had been united since the 11th, over to the left bank, in order to direct it upon Verdun. In the middle of the execution of this movement on the 14th, which took place from both flanks, towards 2 o'clock in the afternoon the German troops began the attack upon Mettman's Division of the 3rd Corps. . . . We had not the satisfaction of frustrating the enemy's plan, which was to delay our concentration upon the plateau of Gravelotte, and so gain time to arrive there before us."

In another publication***) which appears to be drawn up from excellent sources, it is maintained that a council of war was held at Metz on the 13th, which led to the decision that a retreat should be made upon Châlons. Orders were therefore given to commence the march of the troops upon the morning of the 14th, and the 2nd Corps began to retire at 3 o'clock a.m. of this day, but had only progressed very slowly.

If one now considers the observations in the publication mentioned above as proceeding from the Emperor himself "on the 14th of August, as also upon the 16th, no one had an idea that the whole of the enemy's army was before us, and no one doubted at Gravelotte that it would be possible to reach Verdun with ease upon the following day," it is probable that the resolution for a general battle upon the right bank of the Moselle, was definitively abandoned when it was learnt that the enemy's reconnoitring patrols

*) Rapport du Maréchal Bazaine, bataille de Rezonville le 6 Août 1870.

**) Rapport sommaire sur les opérations de l'armée du Rhine du 13 Août au 29 Octobre 1870, par le commandant en chef Maréchal Bazaine.

***) La campagne de 1870 jusqu'au 1er Septembre, par un officier de l'armée du Rhin.

had arrived in Vigneulles, and in the country round Briey, on the line of retreat towards Verdun, and the movements of the second army towards Gorze also became known; therefore on the morning of the 14th or even on the 13th, although attention had been drawn to the threatened danger, it was imagined that there was still time enough to escape from it.

The first army consequently obtained a brilliant result in obliging the enemy to show front, when on the point of withdrawing. *The Battle of Courcelles* (Borny) rendered possible the surrounding of Metz and the battles on the 16th and 18th. Without this conflict the French army would have been able to commence its march towards Verdun on the 14th and 15th under cover of the fortress, unencumbered by a large number of wounded, and with their organization undisturbed by a defeat. In Marshal Bazaine's first named report it says: "The delays occasioned to the 2nd and 3rd Corps, by participating in the battle of Borny, unfortunately prevented their being able to begin their movements (the retreat on the 15th) sufficiently early to enable them to complete it in the time fixed."

On the morning after the battle the King made a reconnaissance of the field of battle in person. From the highest points nothing more could be seen of the enemy upon the right bank of the Moselle. Thick clouds of dust upon the other side of the river disclosed the departure of the French army.

FOURTH CHAPTER.

THE BATTLE OF VIONVILLE ON THE 16th OF AUGUST.

In the King's dispositions on the 15th of August, further steps were taken to arrest the departure of the French Army, which had been commenced towards Verdun, and to cut off their line of retreat, whilst at the same time, measures were taken to offer a strong resistance to any offensive movement which might possibly be contemplated upon the right bank.

Of the first army, the I. Army Corps remained in the position, to the east of Metz, that the whole of the first army had occupied on the previous day of battle; the VII. and VIII. Army Corps moved off at day break, from their bivouac positions before Metz, and marched, in columns to the left, upon the line between Arry and Pommerieux which they were to occupy on the 16th.

Of the second army, the II. Army Corps remained stationary at Hansur-Nied and the IX. at Buchy, having in view the same object as the I. Army Corps, viz. to hold Metz in check upon the east. The Hessian (25th) Division of the IX. Army Corps was pushed forward as far as the village and castle of Mercy le Haut.

All the remaining Corps' made progress in crossing the *Moselle* between Metz and Frouard.

The whole of this tract presents considerable obstacles to such large masses of troops in columns of march, in consequence of the numerous bends of the *Moselle*, enclosed by steep and wooded heights. The river itself, winding through a narrow

valley, had only two standing bridges, which the French had neglected to break up, at Pont-à-Mousson and at Novéant.

The Moselle hills upon the right bank from Metz to Pont-à-Mousson are only small, rising about 1000 feet, with narrow, difficult, transverse valleys at Corny, Arry and Champey; the hills become higher and wider to the south of Pont-à-Mousson, where they are intersected by the valleys leading to Dieulouard and Marbach.

The heights upon the left bank are steeper, and a few hundred feet more lofty, their average width is a German mile*). They sink gradually towards the west, whilst falling precipitously towards the river. There are only a few narrow defiles leading from the Moselle, in a north-westerly direction, towards the road from Metz to Verdun which the German army had to reach. Gorze and Onville are situated in the only two valleys to the north of Pont-à-Mousson.

Thus the Army Corps which had commenced the march simultaneously, were obliged, for the greater part, to make considerable détours to the west and south-west, in order to gain ground without stoppages and confusion, and then by wheeling to the north, had to press forward against the line of retreat of the French army between the Moselle and Meuse hills. The nearer to Metz that the corps concerned could penetrate the chain of hills so much the quicker would they reach their destination. Those divisions only, which, being furthest towards the north, had to describe the smallest arc, could advance sufficiently far to be in time to cross the enemy's line of march, and it therefore depended upon their tenacity whether the enemy could be detained sufficiently long, to allow the remaining corps, which were wheeling round, to be brought effectually into operation as they, gradually, came up.

Pont-à-Mousson, where the Commander in Chief's headquarters, of the second army, were established during the whole of this détour, was from its situation, the proper focus of all the operations. From this place a road traverses both chains of hills in an unbroken line, and roads also lead to the north and south on both banks of the river. Besides these, the principal roads for

*) $4\frac{2}{3}$ English miles.

the movements of the troops were those which led across from Dieulouard and Marbach by Les Saizerais, and all the causeways, high roads and by ways which run parallel with the Moselle, in the approximate direction of Toul, towards Conflans.

The ordering and execution of these marches by so many different roads, through a country in which there was the greatest difficulty in keeping up the connection between the corps, is a master work in tactics.

On the 15th of August, Prince *Frederick Charles's* Army Corps, which had been appointed for operations upon the left bank, occupied the following positions and was carrying out the following movements. (v. the general map.)

The III. Army Corps was on the march from Vigny to Cheminot.

The 6th Cavalry Division was pushed forward, on the right flank, towards Metz.

The XII. Army Corps (Saxons) was stationed at Solgne.

The X. Army Corps was passing Pont-à-Mousson, the advanced guard was beyond it.

The 5th Cavalry Division was stationed at Thiaucourt, upon the left bank of the Moselle, and towards the road from Metz to Verdun. This Division was, therefore, the most advanced.

The Garde Corps was stationed at Dieulouard, with the advanced guard at Les quatre Vents.

The V. Army Corps was on the march from the Seille towards Marbach.

On the French side, the whole army began its departure by both roads towards Verdun, upon the morning of this day.

The 2nd Corps was ordered to take the southern high road, by Rezonville, Mars-la-Tour and Manheulles, followed by the 6th Corps, the Imperial Guard, the reserve Artillery and Parks; the 3rd and 4th Corps were to move by the northern road by Conflans and Etain. The first column was protected by the Division of reserve Cavalry under General de Forton, consisting of two Dragoon and two Cuirassier Regiments, and the second column by the Division of reserve Cavalry under General du Barrail, consisting of four Regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique.

The points to be reached on the 15th of August, were Vionville by the 2nd Corps, Rezonville by the 6th, Doncourt by the 4th, St. Marcel and Verneville by the 3rd Corps. The Guards were to occupy Gravelotte, in reserve.

After reaching Vionville, de Forton's Division was to investigate the country towards the south-west, and du Barrail's Division was to hold Jarny, and watch the road to Conflans.

The backwardness shown in the development of the Park and Train columns, and the retardment of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Corps occasioned by their participation in the battle of Courcelles, prevented this army (which since the commencement of the war had been pursued by the misfortune of being surprised in its formation), from completing this intended concentration round the plateaux of Gravelotte and Vionville in sufficient time.

The 3rd Corps, which was to have followed the 4th, had taken the lead, whilst the 4th was altogether unable to commence the march upon the 15th. But even the 3rd Corps was only able to reach the plateau of Gravelotte at 10 o'clock in the evening of the 15th.

Only the 2nd and 6th Corps with the Guards arrived near the points appointed for them.

In the course of this day the German Chief command was convinced that an offensive movement on the part of the French was not to be expected, but that Bazaine's departure for the west had been commenced. Orders were therefore given for the further advance of the 5th Cavalry Division (Rheinbaben's) at 7 o'clock in the morning, towards the road from Metz to Verdun, in connection with the Dragoon Guards Brigade (Count Brandenburg II.) which had drawn towards the north from Rogéville; part of the X. Army Corps was to support this cavalry by marching upon Thiaucourt; and finally, a reconnaissance was to be made upon the left bank of the Moselle towards Metz, by portions of the X. Army Corps.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the III. Army Corps was ordered to cross the Moselle by the bridge which had been laid at Champey, and that corps was to advance, on the following day, by Gorze to Mars-la-Tour, and the XII. Army Corps, at Nomény, was also to advance.

On this day Marshal Bazaine had learnt the movements of the enemy upon the left bank of the Moselle, and inferred that a strong concentration would be made upon his left flank. As he would be able to offer an energetic resistance to any possible attack, and was sure of the reciprocal support of his two great columns, he issued commands, in the evening, for the corps to maintain the positions they then occupied until midday on the 16th, in order to await the arrival of the 4th Corps.

The conjecture that an attack would be made, was, without doubt, well founded. Prince Frederick Charles issued the following Army order, at 7 o'clock in the evening, at Pont-à-Mousson for the 16th of August (v. the general map):

The III. Army Corps and the 6th Cavalry Division will cross the Moselle below Pont-à-Mousson, and reach the road from Metz to Verdun at Mars-la-Tour and Vionville, marching by Novéant-sur-Moselle and Gorze.

The X. Army Corps and the 5th Cavalry Division will continue the advance, by the road towards Verdun, nearly as far as St. Hilaire and Maizeray.

The XII. Army Corps will march from Nomény to Pont-à-Mousson, with the advanced guard as far as Regnéville-on-Haye.

The Garde Corps will march to Bernécourt, with the advanced guard as far as Rambucourt.

The IV. Army Corps will march to Les Saizerais and Marbache, the advanced guard to Jaillon (upon the road to Toul).

The IX. Army Corps will march to Sillegny in order to follow the III. Army Corps, across the Moselle, and by Gorze on the 17th.

The II. Army Corps will march with its head as far as Buchy, and will commence the passage of the Moselle on the 17th, at Pont-à-Mousson.

The head-quarters of the army will remain at Pont-à-Mousson.

These orders were modified in the evening after receiving directions from the Chief head-quarters, dated Herny, 15th of

August 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ o'clock p. m., that two corps were to take up a position on the line from Arry to Pommerieux on the 16th. The IX. Army Corps was therefore now directed to continue the march on the 16th, to move near to the Moselle, and, in immediate connection with the III. Army Corps, to cross the Moselle by the bridge which they had repaired, and to continue following the III. Corps to Mars-la-Tour, with parts on the 16th and parts on the 17th.

On the evening of the 15th, the III. Army Corps commenced the passage of the Moselle at three points.

The 5th Infantry Division (*Stülpnagel's*) and the 6th Cavalry Division (Duke *William von Mecklenburg's*), being the furthest north, crossed by the standing bridge at Novéant, the 6th Infantry Division (*Buddenbrock's*) by the bridge laid at Champcy; the Artillery Corps crossed the river at Pont-à-Mousson in order to continue the march towards the north, in junction with the 6th Infantry Division, by the high road along the Moselle.

These troops had two valleys before them, by which they could *penetrate through the Moselle hills*. The Corps commander, Lieutenant General *von Alvensleben*, directed that the 6th Cavalry Division, after it had crossed the bridge at 5. 30 o'clock on the morning of the 16th, should march upon Vionville by Gorze, that the 5th Infantry Division should follow it, that the 6th Infantry Division and the Artillery Corps should direct their march, by Arnville and Onville, upon Mars-la-Tour. The heads of the two Infantry Divisions were to be pushed forward, on the evening of the 15th, as far as Gorze on one side, and Onville on the other, which points were reached between midnight and 3 o'clock in the morning of the 16th. One column had to accomplish a march of 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles*) from Novéant, by Gorze to Vionville, the other about 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles**) from Arnville, by Onville, to Mars-la-Tour. The X. Army Corps, which was next to these divisions, had to march from Pont-à-Mousson to St. Hilaire, 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles***). Consequently these bodies of troops could only form up successively

*) 6 $\frac{1}{10}$ English miles.

**) 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ English miles.

***) 20 $\frac{7}{10}$ English miles.

against the Metz and Verdun road. The position of the points of operation, Vionville, Mars-la-Tour and St. Hilaire, offered however the probability of still being able to stop the enemy, even if he had continued his march towards the west with unforeseen rapidity, and so had escaped the effective flank attack of the columns pressing forwards by Gorze.

It was about 9. 30 o'clock on the morning of the 16th when the French videttes, upon the plateau of Vionville, perceived the approach of the enemy. (v. the general map.)

At this moment the army, under the command of Marshal *Bazaine*, was standing with the 2nd Corps to the west of Rezonville, and with the 6th Corps, in the same line, to the right of the high road. Three Divisions and the Cavalry of the 3rd Corps were between Verneville and St. Marcel, but Mettman's Division was still on the march to join his Corps, the 4th Corps was marching in the direction of Conflans, but was, as yet, far behind. The Guards were at Gravelotte.

The out-posts had hardly announced the advance of the Germans, when two regiments of the 6th Cavalry Division, accompanied by horse artillery, debouching at Vionville, rushed upon the bivouac of de Forton's and Valabrègue's Cavalry Divisions of the 2nd Corps, and drove them back in rapid flight to Rezonville, behind the bivouac of the 2nd Corps.

At the sound of the cannon General *Frossard* made his Corps seize their arms, and occupy the positions which had been reconnoitred for this purpose on the previous day. Bataille's Division deployed upon the right flank, on the plateau commanding Flavigny, Vergé's Division to the left, upon the same rise of ground. Lapasset's Brigade, of the 3rd Corps, wheeled to the left in the rear, in order to watch the extensive woods to the south of Rezonville and Gravelotte, and to cover the exit of the defile from Gorze.

Marshal *Canrobert* also deployed his Corps and occupied the ground between the road to Verdun and the village of St. Marcel; Tixier's Division on the right, the 9th Regiment of the line (the only one belonging to Bisson's Division which had arrived) and Lafont de Villier's Division on the left, with the left

flank reaching to the road. In rear, and parallel to this highway, by which it had advanced, Levassor-Dorval's Division (formerly Martimprey's) took up its position. Its mission was to support Lapasset's Brigade and to watch the numerous gullies which lead from Novéant and Ars, through the woods, on to the flank and in rear of the army.

Marshal *Lebocuf*, who commanded the 3rd Corps (General *Decaen* having been severely wounded in the battle of Courcelles), was ordered to wheel up his left wing and seize the assailants in flank.

The French position thus presented important tactical advantages. Commanding the plateaux of the heights, so difficult to surmount, in possession of the débouchés of all the defiles, master of the highroads which facilitated the communications of the troops, Marshal Bazaine's army had considerable advantages over the German army, whose leading troops had to climb laboriously up the heights from the narrow valleys. The French, moreover, were considerably superior in numbers, and were almost completely united, whilst the Germans had to carry on the fight for many hours with only the III. Corps and parts of the Corps which was next coming up.

But even at this moment, in spite of all tactical advantages, the situation of the surrounded army, in a strategical point of view, might be called a desperate one. Even had they succeeded in completely beating the assailants for the moment, and throwing them back upon Gorze, they would have been exposed to flank attacks, from the corps marching in the direction of Mars-la-Tour and St. Hilaire, whilst prosecuting their retreat upon Verdun, and would, besides, be exposed to the pursuit of the enemy who in the first instance had been repulsed.

But they did not even succeed in vanquishing the first enemy; General von Alvensleben's Corps sufficed to stop them. It is true this was only done amid the greatest losses in the German regiments, which attacked with matchless pertinacity.

After a reconnaissance had been made of the enemy's outposts at Tronville and Vionville, Buddenbrock's Division had continued its march by Onville in a northerly direction as far as

the edge of the plateau to the south of Vionville, and there, in a covered position, awaited the approach of the 6th Cavalry Division. At 8 o'clock, a second report from the patrols led to the supposition that the enemy was departing in a northerly direction, and the Division was therefore ordered to continue its march in the direction of Mars-la-Tour and Jarny. Upon arriving at Tronville General von Buddenbrock received the command to wheel to the right, and to proceed to the attack.

The 6th Cavalry Division had by this time reached the plateau, and by its unexpected attack, had thrown back the enemy's cavalry upon Rezonville, which compelled Bazaine to develop his army.

On the German side, it was known that the rising ground round Vionville and Flavigny was occupied, whilst the mass of the enemy was stationed to the north and east of Vionville and at Rezonville. The artillery opened the battle by firing upon the French positions.

By the march towards Tronville, Buddenbrock's Division and Rheinbaben's Cavalry Division had become connected. The latter had bivouacked at Xonville, had moved off from the bivouac at 8 o'clock, and had met de Forton's Division at Mars-la-Tour. At 9. 15 o'clock, they trotted on from Puxieux towards Tronville, taking with them four batteries, two of which had been supplied to them for this day by the Artillery Corps. General von Rheinbaben announced that he was to support the attack of Buddenbrock's Division upon the left flank, by Mars-la-Tour, and at the same time to send word to the X. Army Corps, on the march to St. Hilaire. A detachment under Colonel Lehmann, commander of the 37th Infantry Brigade, was allotted, in addition to support this Cavalry Division, on the 16th; the detachment consisted of the 91st Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 78th Regiment, the 2nd and 4th Squadrons of the 9th Dragoons, and a heavy battery. Colonel Lehmann had started from Thiaucourt at 4. 15 o'clock, and moved on to the battle field by Dommartin and Chambley. He kept up the connection with another detachment under Colonel von Lynker, which had joined the 5th Infantry Division (Stülpnagel's). This consisted of the 2nd and Fusilier Battalions of the

78th Regiment, the 1st and 3rd Squadrons of the 9th Dragoons and a light battery, and was pushed forward on the 15th, from Vandières to Novéant. Stülpnagel's Division mounted the plateau upon the road from Gorze to Vionville before 10 o'clock, hit upon the enemy's infantry to the west of the thicket near Vionville, who were endeavouring to reach the edge of the plateau from Rezonville by Flavigny, for the purpose of preventing the Division from debouching. A vigorous combat was here carried on between the enemy and General von Stülpnagel, supported by Lynker's detachment, which ended, after a bayonet fight, in the retreat of the French upon Rezonville, and a cessation for a short time. At the same time, 10. 15 o'clock, Buddenbrock's Division had also moved forward, and taken the rising ground in front of Flavigny and Vionville after a severe fight, and had then wrested the villages from the enemy in the first assault.

During this engagement, the Artillery Corps had taken up a position upon the edge of the heights, in front of the road from Gorze to Vionville, with their left flank near Flavigny.

As soon as Marshal Bazaine clearly understood the direction of the attacks of the two German Divisions of the III. Army Corps, one from the south, the other from the west, he completed the dispositions already made, by ordering the Guards to take up a reserve position before Gravelotte with their front to the south-west, being especially anxious to secure his left flank and fearing the loss of his line of retreat to Metz. At the same time he counted upon Ladmirault's Corps coming up to the assistance of the 3rd Corps, which had been wheeled, in order to come upon the left flank of the Germans by Bruville, and at the same time took into consideration the safety of his right flank, before the arrival of the 3rd Corps in the line of battle, by forming de Forton's Division in rear of the 6th Corps with its back upon the wood Villers-aux-Bois. At the same time, the 12-pounder batteries of the reserve artillery were drawn forward, in order to oppose the German artillery in position, facing the 2nd Corps.

General von Alvensleben had to carry on the fight alone, with his Corps, the two Cavalry Divisions and Lynker's Detachment against these greatly superior forces, until 11. 30

o'clock, and then only an inconsiderable reinforcement arrived in Lehmann's Detachment at Tronville.

The X. Army Corps, which was the nearest for the support of the III., was widely distributed over the ground to the south of the Metz and Verdun road. Lieutenant General von Schwarzkoppen, commanding the 19th Infantry Division, had still for duty under his immediate command, after deducting Lehmann's and Lynker's two Detachments, the 38th Infantry Brigade (von Wedell's) and two batteries, and had commenced the march from Thiaucourt, by St. Benoit-en-Voëvre, upon St. Hilaire at 5 o'clock, in connection with the Dragoon Guards Brigade. The 20th Infantry Division (Kraatz) and the Artillery Corps were moved off from Pont-à-Mousson at 4. 30 o'clock. The latter, at Thiaucourt, was commanded to march to the field of battle at 11. 30 o'clock, and Lieutenant General von Schwarzkoppen, at St. Hilaire, at 12 o'clock. Colonel Lehmann however, being nearer to the field of battle, took the road by Chambley, upon the sound of cannon becoming audible, and Count Brandenburg II. that from St. Hilaire with the Dragoon Guards Brigade.

At midday the III. Army Corps held the positions which it had gained at Flavigny and Vionville, and with the aid of parts of the 6th Cavalry Division which at 1 o'clock in the afternoon attacked in the direction of the high road, leaving Flavigny on the left, successfully repulsed all attempts made by the enemy to retake Vionville. The French General of Division, Bataille, was wounded at 12. 30 o'clock, his Division began to yield, and this movement drew back part of Vergé's Division with it, the left wing of which, together with Lapasset's Brigade, alone remained in position. In order to fill up this gap for the moment, Marshal Bazaine ordered a charge to be made against the enemy's infantry, by the 3rd Lancers and the Cuirassiers of the Guard. The attack of the Lancers was repulsed, and the Cuirassiers, who charged in three echellons, were unable to shake the squares. A squadron of the Braunschweigschen Hussars from Rheinbaben's Division, pursued the retiring cavalry as far as a battery of the Guards, in the midst of which the Marshal himself was standing, so that

he and his Staff had to draw their swords and engage in the fight with bare weapons.

General von Buddenbrock was now ordered to direct his further attack so as to be able to press forward to the north of Vionville with the mass of his Division, for the purpose of gaining ground in the wood situated to the north, whilst his right wing held Vionville and Flavigny. The 24th Regiment supported by the 2nd Battalion of the 91st Regiment (Lehmann's Brigade) pressed into the wood and carried on a vigorous, obstinate fight, with varying success.

Fresh troops were again brought forward on the French side. Picard's Division, the Grenadiers of the Guard, under the leadership of General Bourbaki, gathered together Vergé's and Bataille's Divisions, and deployed on both sides of the village of *Rezonville*, whilst the left flank was supported by a brigade of Levassor-Dorval's Division from the 6th Corps. Deligny's Division, Voltigeurs of the Guard, was ordered to go forward as far as the Bois des Ognons, to occupy it with a Jäger Battalion, and to watch the débouchés by which the plateau of Gravelotte could be approached.

At the same time Marshal Leboeuf's manœuvre, which had been ordered at the beginning of the fight, came into effect upon the German left flank. The Marshal was on the march to Doncourt with the 3rd Corps, when he received the order to wheel to the left. After carrying this out his front was towards the south, and Buddenbrock's Division was endangered. General von Alvensleben had only two battalions of the 20th Regiment, which had been kept in reserve to the south-west of Vionville, and the 91st Infantry Regiment which arrived soon after, to oppose to this new enemy who was observed ascending the plateau to the south of Bruville. Towards 2 o'clock, these troops were placed at the disposal of General von Buddenbrock. The 91st Regiment, two battalions of which were already engaged, was directed upon the western border of the wood, which lies to the north of Vionville. To this place it was followed by the 1st Battalion of the 78th Regiment, belonging to Lehmann's Brigade. These battalions afterwards took their share in the heavier fighting which some battalions of

Buddenbrock's Division had to sustain to the north of *Vionville*.

The fight in the wood was at the cost of immense sacrifices, because the French artillery, composed of batteries brought up from the reserve artillery, in a strong position to the north of the road, fired very effectively on the wood as well as upon the German batteries stationed at Vionville. Buddenbrock's Division made assaults against this position of the enemy, which at length, resulted in driving the batteries from their good position and in the capture of a gun.

A second position of the enemy's artillery, upon the plateau more to the east, which endangered General von Buddenbrock's left flank, in connection with the surrounding movement, was attacked by Bredow's Cavalry Brigade, by order of General von Alvensleben. The ground gained was worth maintaining at any price.

General von Bredow advanced with the 7th Cuirassiers and 16th Uhlans. Received by a most vigorous fire, the Uhlans nevertheless broke through the infantry of the right wing of the 6th Corps, and the Cuirassiers forced themselves into the batteries, cutting down the men serving them. Thus they reached the second body of the enemy. De Forton's Cavalry Division, however, threw itself upon their flank, the first body of infantry closed up behind them, and they only effected their retreat amid the greatest losses.

Upon the right wing, Stülpnagel's Division had maintained its position during this combat, and repulsed all the attacks of the enemy.

Between 2 and 3 o'clock, the position of both armies was changed from what it had been at the beginning of the fight, the French front was no longer towards the west, but was now directed towards the south, and was continually being more developed upon the line of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte; the left flank of the Germans was always being further surrounded by the French Corps, although, it is true, they still victoriously held the positions they had originally taken around Vionville and Flévigny, as well as those places themselves.

Marshal Bazaine having observed the sound of cannon from Bruville at 2 o'clock, had issued orders to Marshal Leboeuf to hold his positions strongly with Nayral's Division, to re-establish the connection with the 6th Corps by means of Aymard's Division, and to direct Montaudon's Division upon Gravelotte, for the purpose of occupying the débouchés from Ars-sur-Moselle. Bazaine made the Divisions of the 2nd Corps, which had been repulsed in disorder at the commencement, but were now again collected, march to the same point, and also caused 12-pounder batteries and mitrailleuses to form up in front of the débouchés in order to receive the enemy's columns energetically, which would endeavour to come up that way.

This strong occupation was rendered necessary by the appearance of the 16th Infantry Division of the VIII. Army Corps, which had arrived in Arry at 12 o'clock noon, had crossed the Moselle at Novéant, and by making a further advance, would threaten the extreme left flank and rear of the French army.

In the meantime Ladmirault's Corps had continued its march as far as the battle field, and his first troops arrived in the line of battle at 3 o'clock. Grenier's Division, led by General Ladmirault himself, and supported by de Cisse's Division, at first strengthened the right wing of the 6th Corps, advanced with it by St. Marcel and then directed its attack against the wood to the north of Vionville, which was defended by Buddenbrock's Division; Clerambault's Division moved forward upon the right, accompanied by the 2nd Regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique and a Brigade of Cavalry of the Guard, Lancers and Dragoons, which had just escorted the Emperor Napoleon as far as Etain, and had now returned on hearing the noise of the battle.

This entire force, which by this time consisted of the united Corps of Leboeuf, Ladmirault and Canrobert, did not, however, succeed in driving the III. Army Corps from its position round Vionville.

At 3. 30 o'clock, the Commander in Chief of the II. Army, Prince Frederick Charles, arrived upon the field of battle from Pont-à-Mousson, and reinforcements began, gradually, to arrive from the X., VIII. and IX. Corps.

Kraatz's Division and the Artillery Corps of the X. Corps had taken the road from Thiaucourt by Chambley. From here the batteries of the Artillery Corps hastened forward in the direction of Tronville, and, at about 3. 30 o'clock, took up a position to the west of this place, and to the north of the road from Vionville to Mars-la-Tour, to oppose the columns of Leboeuf's Corps on the march from Bruville. The leading troops of Kraatz's Division arrived at Tronville towards 4 o'clock. The Division engaged in the fight, which was still being vigorously carried on in the wood to the north of Vionville, as the battalions moved up. Two batteries supported the advancing battalions.

Eight battalions of Kraatz's Division were engaged here, three of which remained in reserve with two batteries to the south of the wood, whilst three battalions and two batteries were directed to Flavigny upon their arrival, and from here took part in the fights of Stülpnagel's Division. Of Schwarzkoppen's Division, Wedell's Brigade, with which the Division General was present, arrived at St. Hilaire at 12 o'clock, and from here went away on the right, to the battle. Towards 4 o'clock, it came upon Leboeuf's and Ladmirault's Corps at Mars-la-Tour, and attacked them, whilst the 16th Regiment by Mars-la-Tour, and the 1st and Fusilier Battalions of the 57th Regiment together with two companies of Pioneers, leaving Mars-la-Tour upon the left, went forward against the French position upon the rising ground to the north east of that village. The attack was supported by the two batteries of the Division which had taken up a position in front of the village.

As soon, however, as the 16th Regiment had passed Mars-la-Tour, the enemy opened a vigorous bombardment which set fire to the village. It is true, that the battalions continued to advance beyond the heights, and over the ground lying to the north-east, against the hill upon the other side, but there the onset was broken by strong masses of the enemy's infantry who encountered them. The retreat had to be commenced, amid severe losses, under cover of the Artillery Corps of the X. Corps, which had followed the movements of Wedell's Brigade and had taken up a position close to Mars-la-Tour, upon the east.

Wedell's Brigade formed at Tronville, and its falling back also caused a retrograde movement in Kraatz's Division. General von Voigts-Rhetz, commanding the X. Corps, ordered the Division Commander to return to the heights of Tronville for the reception of Wedell's Brigade. Count Brandenburg II. Guard Dragoons Brigade went forward to release the retreating battalions from the pursuit of the French infantry. During the advance of Wedell's Brigade it had taken up a position to the north of Mars-la-Tour, and after that the 1st Guard Dragoons had been detached to the right, for the protection of the advancing Artillery Corps.

When Wedell's Brigade was forced to retreat, this regiment endeavoured to check the pursuit by an attack upon the right flank of the approaching enemy's infantry. The attack, energetically carried out, was accompanied by heavy losses. The 2nd Guard Dragoons had also, several times, attacked divisions of infantry. Further to the left, Rheinbaben's Division with Barby's Brigade accompanied by the 13th Dragoons and 10th Hussars, had gone round Mars-la-Tour. Here they came upon the French Cavalry Brigade of Guards and the 2nd Regiment of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, and overthrew the enemy in a brilliant attack.

Buddenbrock's and Stülpnagel's Infantry Divisions had maintained their positions all through this fight, in spite of the superiority of the enemy, by extraordinary efforts on the part of the troops, who had been under fire, uninterruptedly, since the beginning of the battle, and with heavy losses. When the enemy, after many ineffectual assaults against the front of these troops, at last attempted to surround them by pressing forward through the woods to the south of Rezonville and Gravelotte, he was stopped by parts of the VIII. and IX. Army Corps which had joined in the fight late in the afternoon, and whose approach by Novéant, had been learnt by Marshal Bazaine soon after midday.

After the march from Frontigny, Lieutenant General von Barnekow had made his Division, the 16th, rest for one hour at Arry (at which place the 11th Infantry Regiment, from the IX. Army Corps, was attached to him by order of Lieutenant General von Wrangel), until 1 o'clock, and then had arrived with his leading troops at Gorze, by Novéant, at 3. 30 o'clock.

From here, after a communication with Lieutenant General von Stülpnagel, three batteries and three squadrons of the 9th Hussars were brought forward to the field of battle of the 5th Division, whilst Rex's Brigade, consisting of the 72nd and 40th Infantry Regiments, in conjunction with the 11th Infantry Regiment, were directed by Côte-Moussa, through the St. Arnould wood, upon Rezonville, for the purpose of attacking the enemy in flank and rear, in pursuance of the arrangements of the Commander in Chief.

On account of the thick brushwood these regiments were ordered to march by a road, and their heads only reached the outskirts of the St. Arnould wood toward 5 o'clock. The 72nd Regiment was ordered to press forward out of the wood, in the direction of Rezonville, and the 40th Regiment was to be the next to follow it.

The attack of this infantry was made under the greatest difficulties, caused partly by the rising, wooded country, full of hollows, and partly by the strong occupation of the positions lying opposite.

As mentioned before, the reserves of the Garde Corps, the 2nd Corps, and a powerful artillery from the Reserve were formed up, and the deployment from the débouchés had to be effected whilst opposed to these superior masses. The fight lasted here until dark, without any considerable acquisition of ground on the side of the Germans, yet it had the great result of keeping Bazaine in anxiety for his flank and rear, and he, therefore, could not venture to employ still stronger masses against Stülpnagel's Division. Towards 7 o'clock in the evening, this Division had also received some re-inforcements from the IX. Army Corps. At 12. 30 o'clock in the afternoon, Prince Frederick Charles, on receiving the first reports from the III. Army Corps, when at Pont-à-Mousson, directed General von Manstein to cover the right flank of that Corps and to support it generally as far as his strength would allow.

In consequence of this, the 49th Infantry Brigade, three batteries and the 1st Cavalry Regiment from the Hessian Division (No. 25), under the leadership of the Division Commander, Lieutenant

General Prince Louis of Hesse, crossed the Moselle at Novéant and moved forward upon Gorze. Two batteries of Stulpnagel's Division were brought out from Gorze, and joined very efficaciously in the fight, towards evening, upon the right front of the artillery of the Division. The 49th Infantry Brigade, which was followed by one battery, was directed through the Bois des Ognons. In this thick wood the 1st Hessian Infantry Regiment met with resistance from the enemy, and a persistent fire fight was carried on there, first with six companies, and later on, supported by two additional companies and the 2nd Hessian Infantry Regiment, which only ended with the fall of night. Thus, whilst fresh forces arrived, at sunset, in the right centre and upon the right flank, the left flank and left centre once again went forward. The Prince Commanding in Chief made parts of Kraatz's and Buddenbrock's Divisions advance in a north-easterly direction, and the Artillery Corps of the III. Army Corps in the mean time took up a position still further forward. Lafont de Villiers' Division, in the French centre, was forced to give way, the eagle of the 93rd Regiment was captured and a gun taken. The enemy was compelled to make renewed efforts and changes of position. Marshal Bazaine stopped the march of Montaudon's Division upon Gravelotte, and made him return for the support of Lebœuf's Corps; he ordered de Forton's Cavalry Division, which had retired, to form up afresh at the wood of Villers, to the north of Rezonville. General Deligny reinforced his 2nd Brigade by four battalions of Voltigeurs, for the purpose of supporting and receiving the retiring Grenadiers of the Guard upon the heights of Rezonville. General Bourbaki united all the guns at his disposal in the centre, in one battery of 54 guns, against the pressing on III. Army Corps. Valabrègue's Cavalry Division charged forward from the Rezonville heights, and wrested the lost eagle and gun from the Germans.

It was towards 8 o'clock when the Prince Commanding in Chief made the Brigades of the 6th Cavalry Division ride on to the attack in the direction of Rezonville, from Flavigny; it was here that the Zietensche Hussars, followed by the 16th Hussars, rode down the French squares. The 5th Cavalry

Division also attacked with success, and endeavoured to surround the right wing of the French at Mars-la-Tour. These were the last actions on this day. Darkness setting in put an end to the sanguinary battle. (v. the map.)

Both armies bivouacked upon the long contested positions.

The loss of the Germans, amounted to about 17,000 men in killed and wounded.

This battle, which had been carried on with marvellous tenacity and boldness on the German side, resulted in the frustration of the French plan of operations. Marshal Bazaine's army was stopped on its march to Verdun; he had lost the main road to the south, and saw the one to the north strongly threatened; the organization of the army was so shaken that the highest aims now attainable were securing the wounded, completing the ammunition, and holding the line of retreat towards Metz, as well as the positions to the west of it. If they were unable to force the inconsiderable forces which opposed their further advance upon the 16th, still less could they think it possible to do so on the following day, for new divisions of the German corps, advancing between Metz and Verdun, were arriving every hour.

Consequently the single tactical advantages in the battle of Vionville, which the French can claim, are entirely without significance. The continuation of the retreat, was alone of great importance to the Marshal. Even if he had purchased it at the sacrifice of a Corps, a success would have been obtained; but his having been forced to develope his whole Army, and in the evening his possessing less ground than in the morning, constitute a strategical and tactical defeat. Nevertheless the Marshal and France claim the victory, because the army was not completely thrown back from all its positions.

FIFTH CHAPTER.

THE BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE.

Marshal Bazaine has been so frequently and perseveringly accused by the French, of "*treason*," even by men who observed the phases of the war comparatively with the object, and with the evident endeavour, to arrive at the truth, that this reproach cannot be, summarily, passed over.

It is certainly not worth the trouble to try to refute the opinion of those who represent the Marshal as having been *bought by Prussia*: but there are others who cite matters, which in themselves are very possible, as the grounds of their severe judgment, and ascribe ambitious views to the Marshal, which he may very probably have entertained.

It therefore comes to this, looking at it in a military point of view, could Bazaine have acted otherwise than he did, in the conduct of the chief command of the army of Metz? The opinions which will here be considered, make out that Bazaine's first, most important step towards the ruin of his army, was not renewing the battle on the 17th, in order to obtain by force a line of retreat towards Verdun. They maintain that Bazaine did not wish to expose himself to any defeat, in order that (as soon as he had been set free from Metz by another army,) he might obtain the regency for himself at the head of an unconquered army, and they ground their accusation upon the possibility of a retreat to Verdun on the 17th of August. Setting aside the probability, that the General who should set Bazaine free from Metz would surely be nearer to the Regency than the liberated Bazaine himself, there is still great

doubt whether Bazaine's army was capable of repulsing the German army on the 17th, and that would have been necessary, in order to get to Verdun. A circuitous march by Briey, for instance, would only have led to a most successful flank attack on the part of the Germans.

It is true that a more talented General, and one of greater energy, would probably have made *the attempt to defeat the German army on the 17th*. But such a general would never, in the first place, have got himself into such a situation as Bazaine had. The chances in favour of the French army, had become essentially worse since the previous day. What was impossible on the 16th, was still less likely to succeed on the 17th.

The fault, lay in the short comings of the days from the 12th to the 16th of August. On the 17th, they could no longer be mended. Thus Bazaine may be called an incapable general, but none will call him a traitor after a careful and impartial examination of his situation on the 17th of August. Such an examination leads one to suppose that Bazaine did not clearly appreciate his position, that he had not judged his opponents intentions correctly, that he, perhaps, hoped Mac Mahon would in some way or other come to his assistance, or that he otherwise deluded himself.

After the battle of Vionville, the Marshal informed the Emperor and the minister of war of the situation of the French army at Metz, in a dispatch dated the 17th of August, from which he has published the following extract:

"It is said to-day that the King of Prussia is in Pange, or in the castle of Aubigny, that an army of 100,000 men follows him, besides the numerous masses of troops which have been seen on the road to Verdun, and at Mont-sous-les-Côtes.

"What gives a certain probability to this news of the King of Prussia's arrival, is the circumstance, that at this moment, when I have the honour of writing to your Majesty, the Prussians are directing a serious attack against Fort Queuleu. They have erected batteries at Magny, Mercy-le-Haut and in the wood of Pouilly; even at this moment the fire is pretty lively.

"What concerns us is, that the Corps are badly off for pro-

visions; I will endeavour to have some brought in by the Ardennes road, which is still open. General Soleille, who I have sent into the fortress, informs me that its supply of ammunition is small, and that it can only furnish us with 800,000 cartridges, which is *one day's* consumption for our soldiers. In the same way and there is only a small amount of shot for the 4-pounders, at hand," — lastly, he adds that "the pyrotechnic establishment has not the means necessary for replenishing the cartridges.

"General Soleille has been obliged to demand from Paris, the indispensable necessities for the instant repair of the field tools; but will they arrive in time? General Frossard's regiments have no more camp equipments and cannot cook their provisions. We will do all we can to make up our stores of every description, so that we may be able to commence our march again in two days, if possible. I will take the road by Briey. We will lose no time, provided that no fresh battle frustrates my plans."

In corroboration of this dispatch, the Marshal writes in his "*Rapport Sommaire*": "Conjectures have been made as to the possibility of having continued the march to Verdun in the night of the 16th. They are erroneous. Those who formed them did not know the situation. The enemy received considerable reinforcements every moment, and had sent out troops to occupy the position of Fresnes, before Verdun; the French army, which had been on the march for several days, had just fought two sanguinary battles, and parts of it were still behind, including the large army reserve park, which was kept in Toul, and waited for a favourable opportunity of uniting with the army, which it did not succeed in doing. The army might have received a very serious shock, which would have had a disadvantageous influence upon later operations."

This representation of the French Commander in Chief is in accordance with the observations, made later, on the German side, and with the light thrown upon the subject by a series of dispatches found in the château of St. Cloud, relative to the defective equipment of the army in the field and of the fortresses. It is however contested and maintained on the other hand, that 500 waggons with provisions remained untouched at Plappeville.

It is, however, certain, that after the battle of Vionville the French army could not have carried out its march upon Verdun, even had it been completely supplied with provisions and ammunition, and had had the reserve park at its disposal.

The road to Verdun could only have been opened on the 17th of August by a victory upon the battle field of the previous day. The southern road to Verdun was no longer in possession of the French, the northern road lay so near the German front that a departure by it was a manifest impossibility; it would, no doubt, have been possible for a well equipped army to *reach* the road by Briey, on which Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes lies; but *to arrive at Verdun* by it, with the German army against it would certainly not have succeeded. Mars-la-Tour lies nearer to Verdun than Briey, and the German army could, therefore, have arrived at Verdun sooner than the French. Besides which, Briey itself could be reached by the German troops from Mars-la-Tour, by Jarny, just as soon as by the French from Gravelotte. Briey lies at the apex of an isosceles triangle, the base of which is formed by the points Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte.

If therefore the security of the wounded on the French side had been abandoned, and the army had retired, even on the night of the 16th, by the road to Briey, there is no doubt that an attack of the German army against Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes on the 17th, would have burst in upon the middle of the army, retiring in long narrow columns upon the road, whilst at the same time a corps, marching by Jarny upon Briey, would have come into collision with the heads of this column. A march of the French by Briey would, consequently, have resulted in their being driven towards Luxemburg and Belgium, whilst engaging in the most difficult retreating fights, but Verdun and a junction with Mac Mahon would have been completely lost.

The situation of the French army would have had this disastrous termination, if it had undertaken the march by Briey, even supposing, that by extraordinary efforts, a sufficiency of provisions could have been collected and that the numerous wounded, lying from Mars-la-Tour to Gravelotte, had been completely disregarded;

but all the accounts prove, that the French army was in no way capable of marching immediately.

Without considering the scarcity of provisions, ammunition and water, which last the Marshal especially emphasizes, the army was greatly disorganized by the battle of Vionville, paying no regard to their corps and divisional combinations. In order to meet the unexpected attack upon the left flank, the troops nearest to this side had been deployed, and then were supported by the divisions wheeling one after another, without regard to the order of battle. The 4th Corps which arrived last, had taken up the retiring Divisions of the 6th corps. Picard's Division, the grenadiers of the Guard had fought intermixed with Vergé's and Bataille's Divisions, from Frossard's Corps, to the north of Rezonville. Deligny's Division, Voltigeurs of the Guard, fought at last, in the centre, at Rezonville, intermixed with the left wing of the 6th Corps, whilst later, part of the Garde Corps, in junction with the divisions of Frossard's Corps which had retired, carried on a fight in the wood to the south of Gravelotte. Montaudon's Division had become separated from its corps (Leboeuf's) during its engagement at Bruville and had been sent on towards Gravelotte. In the middle of the march, at 7 o'clock in the evening, it received a counter order, and was sent back to Mars-la-Tour. The close, intersected country, abounding in woods, especially to the north of Vionville and round Gravelotte, must have transformed this mixture of the divisions into complete disorder. It was quite impossible to place this army on the march under cover of the darkness, which lasted from 9 o'clock in the evening until about 3 o'clock in the morning.

The Commander in Chief decided to do the only thing which appeared to him easy, under the circumstances. He endeavoured to take up a position which would offer the greatest possible advantages of ground for the following day's impending battle, and at the same time devoted his attention to the care of the wounded, and to completing the supply of ammunition and provisions.

The dispatch quoted above, proves clearly that on the 17th, the Marshal was still in darkness as to the real importance of the battle of Vionville, and the main object of the German plan of operations. The conjectured presence of the King at Pange, con-

sequently upon the right bank of the Moselle, as well as the construction of batteries in front of Fort Queuleu occupied the French Direction; the whole importance of the blow which had been directed upon the left bank, only appears to have become palpable to them in the battle of Gravelotte. Perhaps no one at the French head-quarters believed in the possibility of wheeling an army of 200,000 men, 360 degrees, upon a radius of 3 miles*), and in the most difficult country. They did not believe that the German Direction would have been capable of this master-work of energy, arrangement and rapidity, because they would have been unable to carry it out themselves. The attack at Vionville, on the 16th, was considered a skilful diversion by a, relatively, small part of the enemy's forces.

Thus the battle of Gravelotte, this defensive fight on the 18th of August, is only a proof of Bazaine's incapacity. He fought this battle, not because it was necessary, but from embarrassment. He did not know whether to advance or retire, and consequently remained passive in a well chosen tactical position. If, as he has been accused of doing, he wished to avoid any opportunity of a defeat, and to preserve his army for a later occasion, it would have been simpler to have retired upon Metz, and not to have fought at all.

The position taken up by the French army, on the 17th of August, extended from St. Privat-la-Montagne in the north to Rozé-riulles in the south. Thus the only line of retreat by Briey, still remaining open, was held by the right wing, and at the same time the position offered advantages for a favourable defence.

The German Direction, on this day, waited for the battle to be renewed, presuming that the enemy possessed the same qualities as themselves, namely a clear appreciation of the military situation, and a decisive execution of the measures considered advisable. In order to reach Verdun, it was necessary that on the 17th, the French army should renew the attempt to overthrow the German army, standing in its way. Upon the German side it was impos-

*) $11\frac{1}{2}$ English miles.

sible that there could be precise information as to the scarcity of ammunition and provisions, which prohibited all operations on the part of the French army. Such a scarcity could not be imagined in any army which had just left the strongest fortress and the chief place of arms in the country, and was quite incredible.

As early as 4 o'clock, on the morning of the 17th of August, Prince Frederick Charles, who had returned towards Gorze, in the evening after the battle, appeared again upon the battle field, and rode over it, in order to reconnoitre the positions and movements of the enemy. The King, whose head-quarters had been removed to Pont-à-Mousson on the 16th, arrived soon after 6 o'clock, upon the heights of Gorze, inspected the field of battle, and meeting the Prince, took his reports. In the course of the morning the troops which had bivouacked in their positions of the 16th, the X. and III. Army Corps, the cavalry divisions under Duke William and Rheinbaben, parts of the VIII. Corps and the Hessian Regiments were joined by the IX. Corps which took up a covered position to the south of the road from Gorze to Vionville. A strong line of French tirailleurs advanced against the German lines from Rezonville; they did not, however, open the expected battle, but were, apparently, intended to conceal the retreat of the corps into the new position. Cavalry patrols pushed to the front, soon brought this departure to the knowledge of the King.

The immediate pursuit of the enemy with the forces present, was not in accordance with the plan of operations. A destructive blow must be given, and therefore the arrival of the remaining corps must be waited for, before beginning a new battle.

These were approaching by forced marches. The VII. and VIII. Army Corps, had been ordered to follow immediately after the IX. over the Moselle, the Garde Corps pursued the direction of Mars-la-Tour, the Saxon (XII.) Army Corps even marched to this place from Pont-à-Mousson, and arrived in the rendez-vous position shortly after midday, whilst the Guards moved into bivouac at Mars-la-Tour, near the left of the Saxons, at 3 o'clock.

Reconnaissances brought information that the French army was encamped on the plateaux to the east of Gravelotte, and was in movement in the neighbourhood of Verneville, whilst their

rear guards had passed the road from Doncourt to Conflans; consequently, there was an end to all expectation of a battle on this day.

In conformity with the *leading idea of detaining the left wing of the French at Gravelotte, until the right could be surrounded by the German left wing*, the VII. Army Corps was directed to try and feel the enemy. General von Zastrow, therefore took up a position at Ars-sur-Moselle, and along the road leading from this place to Gravelotte. He pushed forward the 7th Jager Battalion into the Bois de Vaux, and extended his line of outposts as far as the plateau to the south of Gravelotte. Here it joined the out posts of the VIII. Corps, which was stationed at Gorze. It could be distinctly seen that the enemy had brought up several batteries to command the open ground round Gravelotte.

The outposts of the second army joined on to those of the VIII. Army Corps, which formed a line from the Bois des Ognons, passing, south of Rezonville, to the northern edge of the wood which lies on the north-west of Vionville, and from there as far as the Yronbach.

Towards 2 o'clock, the King, upon the height to the south of Flavigny, directed General von Moltke, the Chief of the Staff, to issue the following dispositions for the next day:

"The second Army will advance at 5 o'clock to morrow morning, the 18th, in echelon, between the Yronbach and the Gorzebach (the chief part between Ville-sur-Yron and Rezonville). The VIII. Army Corps will conform to this movement, upon the right flank of the second Army. It will be the duty of the VII. Army Corps, at the commencement, to secure the movements of the second Army from any possible attempts made by the enemy on the side of Metz. Further directions will depend upon the measures taken by the enemy. Reports for his Majesty the King to be sent, at first, to the height, south of Flavigny."

From this disposition it is evident that the departure of the enemy by Briey, was no longer considered possible, although a battle was expected in the positions in which it actually took place on the 18th.

The King returned towards evening to Pont-à-Mousson, and Prince Frederick Charles established his head-quarters in Brutières.

No alteration took place in the situation of affairs until the morning of the 18th of August, no disturbances had taken place, and the Prince issued the following dispositions, in accordance with the arrangements made by the King on the previous day:

"The second Army will continue the advance to-day, endeavouring to force back the enemy from his line of retreat, and to beat him wherever he may be found.

"The Army will advance in echelon from the left of the XII. Army Corps, which will march at 5 o'clock, in the direction of Jarny, the Garde Corps next to it on the right, in the direction of Doncourt. The IX. Army Corps will move off at 6 o'clock, upon the right rear of the Garde Corps, and march between Rezonville and Vionville, leaving St. Marcel close on the left in its further advance.

"The VIII. Army Corps will conform to the echelon movement in the right rear of the IX. Army Corps.

"In the second line, the X. Army Corps, with Rhein-baben's Cavalry Division, will follow the XII. Army Corps, the III. Army Corps and Duke William of Mecklenburg's Cavalry Division, will follow between the IX. and Garde Corps.

"The advance is not to be made in columns of march, but the divisions will move forward disposed in separate masses. The Commander in Chief will be in front of the head of III. Army Corps."

In conformity with these dispositions, General von Steinmetz left the VII. and VIII. Army Corps, in the positions which they had occupied on the 17th.

The second Army moved off at the time appointed (v. map I.). The King had left Pont-à-Mousson as early at 4 o'clock in the morning, and driven towards Gorze, where he mounted his horse and arrived upon the height of Flavigny at 6 o'clock.

The reports all agreed that the enemy was not departing towards the north, but had concentrated his principal strength to

the west of Metz. Gravelotte was not occupied by him, and the rear guards had quitted Bruville and St. Marcel.

Apparently the French army was now in the hopeless situation, which had been the aim of the German operations. It must either fight or retire into the fortress. The exact position that it had taken up was not, however, known, and the advance of the second Army towards the north was provisionally arrested until clear information upon this point had been obtained.

The IX. Army Corps, took up a position, at 8.30 o'clock, to the south of the road from Gravelotte to Doncourt, with orders to reconnoitre towards St. Privat-la-Montagne and Amanvillers, and also to establish a connection with the Garde Corps. The latter was ordered at the same time to halt at Doncourt; the XII. Army Corps at Jarny, and the X. at Bruville.

Cavalry were pushed forward by Giraumont and Jouaville upon Coinville, near the road to Briey, upon Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes, and in the direction of the heights of Amanvillers.

Soon after 10 o'clock, the position of the French army was accurately ascertained. (v. map I.)

The undulating plateau on the west of the Moselle, with hills and dales extending in every direction, forms several long ridges in front of Metz, the occupation of which were favourable for the French army. Excellent defensive positions were formed by this chain of heights lying, one behind another in front of the fortress, towards the north-north-west, extending from Malancourt by St. Privat-la-Montagne, Leipzig, and Moscou, as far as Ars, as well as by the heights of the Bois de Saulny, and the plateaux of Plappeville and St. Quentin, lying still nearer to Metz. Marshal Bazaine had occupied the first line, and held his reserves in readiness upon the plateau of Plappeville. His position was very well chosen, and every thing was done to increase its natural strength by artificial means. The ground lying in front of the heights was for the most part free and open, so that the assailants would have to pass over a long tract, without protection from the enemy's fire, whilst the defended positions were provided with cover trenches and gun emplacements one above another. The villages of St. Privat-la-Montagne, Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes, St. Ail, and Amanvillers as well as

numerous farms, were especially adapted for the support of the defence along the whole front. The buildings are in general massive, the roofs covered with tiles, the gardens and partly even the fields enclosed with walls. All this stonework offered opportunities for keeping up a rapid fire *en masse*, with the excellent, long ranged rifles of the French infantry, whilst under safe cover. The position was especially well fortified upon the right flank; the village of St. Privat, on high ground, with about 100 houses and farms, formed the principal point d'appui; here the 6th Corps was placed, to which the Guards Grenadier Division was sent, later, as a reserve. Upon the left flank it joined the 4th Corps, which, again, was united with the 3rd; the 2nd corps formed the left wing, whilst the Guards with the Reserve Artillery, were formed up upon the plateau of Plappeville. The object of this reserve was to support the front line, but at the same time to foil any possible attack against the communications with Metz, by Vaux and St. Ruffine.

The German corps received orders towards 10 o'clock, to re-commence their movements. The IX. Corps was to advance to Verneville and La Folie, the Garde Corps to investigate the country towards Amanvillers and St. Privat, the XII. Corps was also to march towards the road to Briey for the purpose either of stopping the enemy, if by chance he had begun to depart in the direction of Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes, or of attacking his position. The VII. and VIII. Corps, were to begin a detaining fight at Gravelotte, carrying it on until the left flank could be surrounded. The II. Army Corps, which had left Pont-à-Mousson at 2 o'clock in the morning, was to follow the first Army and the III. and X. Army Corps to follow the second Army in the second line.

By these dispositions the fight which was now about to begin, took the character of a front attack which was to be brought to a crisis by a pressure upon the right flank of the French at St. Privat.

In consequence of the nature of the ground, the battle consisted chiefly in infantry and artillery fights for single positions, and the German artillery was of even greater importance than usual, for not only did it open the battle by firing for an hour, along

the whole line, but it was also frequently obliged to support the infantry, who after having begun to attack the enemy's positions were unable to approach nearer on account of the overpowering fire of the concealed French infantry.

The centre of the French Army was attacked first, by the batteries of the IX. Corps in position upon the heights near *Verneville*; this was at midday.

The corps was marched upon the farm *Caulre*, leaving *St. Marcel* upon the left, and had established itself in the wood to the north of this place, the *Bois de la Cusse*, as far as *Anoux-la-Grange*, whilst the enemy opened a vigorous fire of shell and shrapnel, against the advanced troops, from its batteries at *Ste. Marie*, *St. Privat* and *Amanvillers*.

The situation remained the same here, in the centre, until 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The fire of the artillery corps of the IX. Corps, supported by the batteries of the infantry divisions, endeavoured to shake the enemy; the infantry firmly held the positions they had occupied, and served as a protection to the artillery against the assaults which were attempted from time to time. On the side of the French, a continued concentrated cannonade was directed against the artillery and the wood, which occasioned considerable losses to the Germans. At last, at 4 o'clock, the German side obtained the preponderance of fire by the arrival of the batteries belonging to the *Garde Corps*, upon the left wing.

General von *Steinmetz*, who was opposed to the left wing of the French, gave orders for the attack, when the thunder of cannon sounded across from *Verneville*, and announced the engagement in the centre. The Artillery of the VII. Corps deployed upon the heights to the south and east of *Gravelotte*, and then advanced under the most vigorous fire of the enemy, as far as the edge of the plateau, where in the course of about an hour it silenced the French batteries opposed to it. *Goltz's Brigade*, which was stationed at *Arzviller-Moselle* for the security of the valley of the *Moselle*, had previously been engaged in the fight upon the extreme right flank. It had taken the village of *Vaux* in the *Moselle* valley and then stormed the heights of *Jussy*, and kept possession of them. The

main body of the infantry of the VII. Corps, remained provisionally in a covered position in the wooded valley which separates Grave-lotte from the farm Point-du-Jour. Simultaneously with the advance of the VII. Army Corps, the VIII. Army Corps commenced to move forward in an easterly direction from *Rezonville*. It, at first, deployed a strong force of artillery upon the road in its front, whilst the 1st Cavalry Division took up a concealed position in rear, and the infantry advanced to the attack of the wood lying in front, which was strongly occupied. Here a very sanguinary engagement took place for an hour, in which, owing to the ground being of such a nature that it was impossible to overlook it, the contending parties fell into complete confusion, so much so that some parts of the German line which met with the most obstinate resistance, were only able to press slowly forwards, whilst other parts soon reached the eastern edge, and debouching from it, even began the attack upon the further heights and the farm of *St. Humbert*. This last was finally taken by storm and maintained, after repeated attacks and heavy losses, whilst all efforts to press further forward up to the edge of the heights failed in consequence of the strongly occupied cover trenches, owing to which the infantry fight here came to a stand. Soon after 3 o'clock, there was a pause in the fight upon this flank, as the French artillery were silent, and the Germans could not see any object in their front, for an efficacious bombardment. General Steinmetz could not help assuming that, possibly, the enemy was withdrawing, and therefore ordered Hartmann's Cavalry Division to cross the defile in front and to follow the departing enemy, and eventually, to furnish information as to their new positions. Towards 4 o'clock, therefore, two horse batteries, and the 4th Uhlán Regiment advanced across the defile and formed up half-right. Now, however, it became evident that the enemy had not withdrawn, but had only concealed themselves from the hot artillery fire. The troops which had gone forward, fell instead into a murderous infantry fire, supported by guns and mitrailleuses. Numerous killed and wounded marked the road which these brave troops had taken, nevertheless both batteries dismounted under the enemy's fire and powerfully replied to it, whilst the cavalry took up a position in rear for their support.

These two batteries held out in their exposed position until far on in the evening, and were only brought back late by the assistance of reserve horses sent after them; over half the men and horses were left upon the spot. Towards 4 o'clock, the artillery upon the heights of Gravelotte re-opened fire, the enemy having again shewn themselves on this advance being made, and with such good effect that they were deterred from any further attempts; they also set fire to the farms lying within their range, so that the troops holding them were driven out, and in their departure were most effectively cannonaded. The thick black clouds from the burning farms were now added to the smoke of the powder which rose up from afar all over the field of battle.

In conformity with the dispositions of the Chief Command, the German right wing, thus held the enemy fast even to the centre, without pressing him too strongly, until the left wing was able to surround the French right, on the other side.

The French, undoubtedly, opposed the execution of this idea of battle, with great tenacity and bravery, but without the initiative of a counter plan, and without success. In general they remained on the defensive, and submitted to the military situation imposed upon them by the German side, as had been the case from the beginning of the war.

It is true they made use of the utmost exertions to contest the possession of the woods in the centre with their assailants, for they recognized the importance of this *point d'appui* to the whole German order of battle, but their struggles here had the least prospect of success, because the reserves could have been brought into use in case of necessity, with the greatest rapidity.

The IX. Army Corps, however, fought the battle alone until the engagement of the Guards and Saxons.

The French infantry columns advanced, several times, against the *Bois de la Cusse* after preparation had been made for the attack by a fearful cross fire of guns and mitrailleuses. But the German troops, although terribly weakened by the shots striking in the wood (the Army Corps lost about 5000 men in this battle), kept their ground through all the attacks, and drove the French

back into their fortified positions. In the same way the vehement attacks of the French infantry against the Prussian batteries upon the heights of *Verneville*, were repulsed, and in a pursuit of the French, who again gave way, the Fusilier battalion of the 85th Regiment (Holsteiner) reached even as far as the height in front of the village of *Amanvillers*, where, however, it lost half its men and its commander.

A furious combat was also carried on around the *Bois des Geniveaux*, opposite the farms La Folie and Leipzig. Here the 18th Division (Wrangel's) was engaged. The enemy had occupied the edge of the wood in force, and had strengthened it with deep trenches and earth ramparts so that the assailants could be received by a fire *en étages*, besides which the approach was commanded by mitrailleuses. In spite of this a repeated attack was attempted, which although not completely successful, led to the occupation of the south part of the wood as well as of the farm *Chantrenne*.

The severe fighting, in which the IX. Army Corps had been involved, induced Prince Frederick Charles, who had been present and had then gone to the Garde Corps, to place the 3rd Garde Infantry Brigade, with the Garde Schützen battalion, and a battery at the disposal of General von Manstein.

The din of the combat at Verneville, made the Garde Corps hasten its advance, towards Batilly, which had commenced at 10.30 o'clock from Doncourt. From Batilly, their march was directed to the eastward, against the positions of *St. Privat*.

The line of hills which stretches from Amanvillers by *St. Privat* and *Roncourt* to *Malancourt*, lies in a northerly direction with a slight forward bend towards the west. The general height of the hills at Amanvillers is 1150 feet, at *St. Privat* 1028, and at *Malancourt* 1278 feet. The western slope is pretty steep at the commencement, 6—8 degrees, becoming more gradual further on, and is divided into different sections by some small descents. *Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes* lies upon a projection of the slope which forms a kind of plateau. A small brook rises in the village, which flows through a valley in a northerly direction, enclosed by steep

slopes. Towards the east two small neighbouring valleys open into it. The western declivity of this projecting plateau sinks at first in levels, forming several trays and inflections, but afterwards descends with steep sides into the valley as far as the brook of Habonville. The hamlet of *St. Ail* lies upon the road to the north of Habonville half way to Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes, with about 140 inhabitants, consequently about 30 houses and farms. The village of Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes contained 330 inhabitants and, perhaps, 60 houses and farms; it resembled an irregular pentagon, the high road to Montmédy forming a street through it, from which a second street branches off at the church in a westerly direction.

The village of *St. Privat-la-Montagne*, 2500 paces to the east of Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes, lies a little to the north of the high road which leads straight from Metz. It has an open square near the church, and four village streets leading from it. The little cluster of houses called Jerusalem lies upon the high road. The village contains 480 inhabitants with about 100 houses and farms; there is a thicket upon the ridge of the heights to the west of the valley, through which the brook flows which rises at Habonville, and to the south of it is the village of *Batilly* numbering about 200 inhabitants. The French artillery, in position at the foot of the steep slope of St. Privat together with the infantry in the gardens and buildings of Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes, held the country under fire as far as the edge of the valley.

This uncommonly difficult section of the great battle field, most skilfully prepared for defence, was the object of the operations of the Garde Corps and the Saxons.

The Garde Corps commenced the combat, first of all, at midday.

The advanced guard of the 1st Garde Infantry Division, the Garde Fusilier Regiment, advanced with loud hurrahs and made themselves masters of the thicket, on the edge of the brook at *Habonville*, and of the village of *St. Ail*, at the first assault. Shortly before midday, the 1st Garde Infantry Division (the 1st and 3rd, 2nd and 4th Foot Guards, the Garde Fusilier Regiment, and the Garde Jager Battalion) had arrived in the little ravine to

the west of St. Ail. The whole of the artillery corps opened, simultaneously, a vigorous fire upon the commanding position of *St. Privat*. During this attack, and throughout, no cover was to be obtained.

A murderous fire was conducted by the infantry, who were almost invisible to the Germans, from the massive buildings and from behind the stone walls, in conjunction with the artillery in emplacements.

An infantry advance at this place was, for a time, not to be thought of.

The General Commanding, Prince Augustus of Wurtemberg, ordered the fight to be carried on solely by the artillery, in order to shake the enemy's position, and to wait for the arrival of the 2nd Garde Infantry Division and the Saxons.

Major General Prince Hohenlohe, Commander of the Artillery, who had already had nine batteries in position, firing since 1 o'clock, and afterwards brought two more horse batteries into line, and later three batteries of Budritzky's Garde Division, now selected a new position nearer to that of the enemy, and carried out the task entrusted to him with heroic endurance.

At 2.30 o'clock, the Commander in Chief of the second Army, Prince Frederick Charles, who had been upon the hill to the west of Habonville since 2 o'clock, received the report from the Crown Prince of Saxony that the XII. Corps was advancing to the attack upon *Ste. Marie* with the 24th Infantry Division, and with the 23rd Infantry Division, was on the point of surrounding the right flank of the French by Coinville, and the small wood situated between that place and Roncourt.

At this time several batteries of the Saxon Corps were in position to the west of *Ste. Marie*, and directed their fire against this village, which was still occupied by the enemy.

The 47th Infantry Brigade, Colonel von Leonhardi, deployed in a north-westerly direction for an attack upon this place, and at the same time the advanced guard of Pape's Garde Division was on the march against the village from St. Ail.

After a short fight *Ste. Marie* was taken.

The Saxon Artillery Corps now moved forward into a new position to the north of the village, against *St. Privat and Roncourt*.

The Garde Artillery, in position between St. Ail and Habonville, had meanwhile silenced the enemy's artillery by their effective fire, so that at 4 o'clock, Prince Hohenlohe was enabled to bring up the whole mass of his fourteen batteries, in echelon, nearer to St. Privat.

The artillery of the IX. Corps had also silenced the enemy's artillery at Montigny and Amanvillers, but had suffered considerable losses, and fifteen guns were *hors de combat*. Here the farm of *Champanois*, was taken by the Hessian Jäger Battalion, and *Wrangel's* Division held the captured Chantrenne, Verneville, and the Bois de la Cusse, against all attacks of the enemy.

Of the 25th Division, Prince Louis of Hesse's, the 49th Brigade was stationed in the Bois de la Cusse, the 50th Brigade was in reserve between this wood and the Bois Deseuillons, with the Hessian Cavalry Brigade near it.

Of the reserves of the second Army, the III. Army Corps arrived at Verneville at 3 o'clock, and the X. Corps at Batilly at 2 o'clock. The former made the Artillery Corps take up a position between Verneville and the Bois des Genivaux, whilst the latter halted.

The Saxon Army Corps, had a very long distance to march, and only reached the line between Ste. Marie and Joeuf at 5 o'clock.

The advanced hour of the day did not allow time to wait for the execution of the movement which had been begun against Roncourt by Montois; instead, it appeared necessary to bring on a crisis now with the Garde Corps, whose infantry was still waiting for the order to attack. The departure of the whole army appeared to be commencing, as large bodies of the French were already moving between St. Privat and Roncourt, and dusk coming on would have aided the enemy in so doing.

Prince Augustus of Wurtemberg, therefore gave orders at 5 o'clock, for the attack upon St. Privat.

The 4th Garde Infantry Brigade (the Regiments Franz and Augusta) first received this order. They deployed and advanced up the edge of the height for the assault, the artillery fire with

their utmost efforts only masking them slightly. The enemy offered the most tenacious resistance, unseen by the storming Grenadiers, they opened such a fearful, rapid, long-ranged fire, from their secure positions behind houses, walls, and from trenches, that in a few minutes the attacking troops suffered most tremendous losses, especially in officers. The two regiments, nevertheless, pressed forward irresistibly.

In the meanwhile, the 1st Garde Infantry Division had also deployed, and a quarter of an hour later, engaged in the fight upon the left flank of the Garde Infantry Brigade, whilst their advanced guard still firmly held the village of St. Marie-aux-Chênes, which had been previously taken in the course of the afternoon. The Garde Fusilier Regiment was, however, soon brought forward in order to render additional support to the left wing. The 1st Garde Infantry Brigade, under the command of Major General von Kessel (the 1st and 3rd Regiments of Foot Guards), and the 1st Company of the Garde Pioneers advanced upon the left flank, whilst close to them upon the right, the whole of the 2nd Garde Infantry Brigade, (2nd and 4th Foot Guards) under the command of Major General Baron von Medem, stormed St. Privat. The Generals and the Staff remained on horseback at the head of their troops, but in a short time all their horses were shot under them. For about 1500 paces in circumference, the ground and all the troops were overwhelmed by a regular hail storm of bullets. The crash of the explosions drowned all words of command, the smoke of the powder together with the concealment of the enemy prevented the assailants from taking any aim and deprived them of the power of making use of their fire arms.

The General Commanding who had been present during the first part of the fight near the artillery corps, and at the beginning of the infantry attack had gone along the front of the 4th Garde Infantry Brigade to the western exit from Ste. Marie, could observe from here, how severe were the losses already suffered, and decided to check the further onset of the resolute Guards still pressing forward, until the engagement of the Saxons could take effect. He commanded that every thing should stop. General von Pape, the Divisional General, at this moment's pause, hurried along the front

of the troops to encourage them; in this ride he lost two aides-de-camp, and twice his horse was shot under him. The loss of the Guards in officers and men was enormous.

The artillery now carried on the fight alone, with admirable endurance, although themselves under the infantry fire. St. Privat began to burn at several points, but the French, nevertheless, maintained their positions with courage and resolution, and their fire was not in the least diminished.

The Saxon Artillery were, at first, formed up upon the left flank of the Guards, and had opened fire against the enemy, at a great distance, between St. Privat and Roncourt. The Saxon 3rd Infantry Brigade (Regiments 104 and 105) had then taken Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes, in conjunction with the 1st Prussian Garde Brigade.

The XII. Army Corps thus obtained a firm point d'appui for its wheel to the right. It had continued its movement upon *Roncourt*. When the Artillery corps, endeavoured to take up a position against this place, such a hot fire was opened from the walls of the fields, and from the wood which projects between Malancourt and Roncourt, that it was necessary in the first instance, to take the wood.

The 7th Infantry Regiment No. 106, attacked the outskirts, although the greater part of it had been detached for other objects, and took the wood with heavy losses, which it maintained with the assistance of the 2nd Jager Battalion and other reinforcements who had taken *Malancourt*. Thus the country was free and sixteen batteries were immediately deployed against the French right flank.

The French adhered to their positions with the most tenacious energy, but all resistance was in vain against the powerful fire of the Saxon Artillery, carried on with the greatest certainty and calmness.

At 6.30 o'clock, the Saxon Grenadier Brigade advanced, and a quarter of an hour later, Roncourt was taken. At the same time the Prussian Guards, who had got breathing time during the Saxon attack, again renewed their powerful assault against St.

Privat, in which they were supported by the Saxon 45th Infantry Brigade, Major General von Craushaar's, and the batteries of the 23rd Division, Prince George of Saxony's. The Artillery and Kraatz's Division belonging to the X. Army Corps, were also moved forward from Batilly for the decisive blow. The Prussians on the south-west, pressed into the fortress-like village, every house of which was defended with exasperation, some what earlier than the Saxons on the north. The village was gained after a most desperate struggle. The enemy fled in the direction of Metz, pursued by some of the Garde Battalions. General von Craushaar had fallen in the battle.

Thus, was the fight upon this wing decided at 7 o'clock. The French Army was in consequence cut off from all possibility of escape.

But upon the German right wing, the fight still wavered, and in the centre the battle had also come to a stand. When General von Manstein observed the attack of the Guards upon his left flank, soon after 5 o'clock, he ordered the Infantry to break forward towards Amanvillers from the Bois de la Cusse; the 3rd Garde Infantry Brigade, which had been placed at his disposal, was directed to go forward to the south of the little wood. Here also, the troops were obliged to advance over quite open ground, and they suffered the severest losses. They only succeeded in gaining ground upon the left wing, and were able to occupy the heights to the west of Amanvillers, whilst upon the right wing, General von Blumenthal had to be satisfied with maintaining his position at Chantrenne.

The Artillery Corps only of the III. Army Corps, stationed between Verneville and the Bois des Genivaux, with a further reinforcement of ten batteries, had been engaged in this fight.

The first Army had a difficult position at Gravelotte, as the Pomeranian Army Corps, which was appointed to reinforce it was still unable to draw near. At 7 o'clock, when the victory inclined to the German side on the other wing, by the capture of St. Privat, the French here made a vigorous onslaught. Strong columns, with dense and numerous swarms of Tirailleurs in front, amid wild cries and incessant firing, came out at full speed from behind the

heights of *Rozerieulles*, poured into the valley of the Bois de Vaux and the Bois des Ognons, and endeavoured to storm up the other side of the slope towards Gravelotte. The Prussian battalions, reduced by heavy losses, were overcome in the ravine, and there was great danger lest the German line of battle, at this place, should be broken through. The artillery, however, firing over the heads of the infantry, from the heights of Gravelotte, had already severely shaken the French columns as they came down, and the obstinacy of the infantry in the ~~valley~~ brought them to a stand, and then caused them to yield.

Nevertheless the situation was very serious, and the arrival of the Pomeranians was impatiently looked for. The French attack might be renewed at any moment, and the troops were fatigued by the long struggle.

The King himself with his suite, had repaired to the critical point, and remained at Gravelotte exposed to the shell fire, whilst General von Moltke rode to meet the II. Corps.

At last the first columns appeared with General v. Fransecky at their head; General von Moltke drew his sword and led the troops himself to the critical spot.

In spite of the long march of 5 miles*) which they had accomplished, the Pomeranians engaged with the greatest energy.

The French were thrown back from one position to another, the wood and the villages were taken from them with the bayonet, the heights of *Rozerieulles* were occupied and, the battle was decided upon this wing also.

The I. Army Corps, which occupied, a position upon the right bank of the Moselle, to the east of Metz had also a share in this great battle. Zychlinisky's Brigade with a battery and a squadron was moved forward along the right bank in the direction of *Vaux*. The battery came into position upon the northern edge of the height lying opposite to Vaux, and fired upon the enemy's artillery at Sey, under *Mont St. Quentin*. The infantry were shelled from

*) 23 English miles.

this fort and obliged to take up a covered position. This diversion of the Brigade made it impossible for the enemy to make any attempts to break through with single divisions towards the south; he was, on the contrary, obliged to retain reserves at Plappeville, which he would otherwise have employed in the first line, for fear of an attack being made in his rear.

The battle was over, and darkness setting in put an end to the pursuit.

Thus the chief nucleus of the French active forces was cut off from all its communications, and constrained to retreat upon the fortress; it was brought into a situation from which there was but one escape, — capitulation.

The eight German Army Corps, which fought at Gravelotte, still amounted altogether to about 230,000 men, after the losses they had sustained from the 6th to the 18th of August. Reckoning the loss of the French in the battles of Courcelles and Vionville, at 20,000 men, the French Army at Gravelotte was 180,000 strong. The loss of the Germans in killed and wounded exceeded 20,000 men. The French loss is not known, but it appears to have been smaller. As at Courcelles and Vionville, the French had fought with the advantage in positions and with a superior infantry rifle, but had retired when these positions were stormed by the Germans coming up in the open. It was at this moment that they sustained the greatest loss, but it did not last long as the darkness prevented a lengthened pursuit. At the capitulation of Metz the strength of the French Army, including the sick and wounded, whose numbers must have increased considerably between the 18th of August and the 28th of October, was still stated at 173,000 men, in which the garrison of Metz is, doubtless, reckoned. Very few prisoners were made, no colours or eagles fell into the hands of the victors, for the fortress was too near at hand as a city of refuge for the defeated Army.

The resistance made by the French Army had been most desperate, as soon as they perceived that not only their honour was concerned but the only road of escape was endangered. An appreciation of the situation had electrified even the individual

soldiers and bearing in mind their high warlike renown, the Army had accomplished the utmost in courage and tenacity.

But the German warrior also knew what was at stake; he • knew it sooner and better than the French. Seldom in the events of war are the end and means so clearly manifest as in this battle, and seldom is the logic of the Army Direction so evident and intelligible to each of the combatants as was the case in the surrounding of Metz.

The prize of this victory had the prodigious result, that the principal Army of the enemy could be invested in the strongest ~~fortress~~ in the land, under such circumstances, that the powerful means of resistance of the enclosed enemy, were not only unable to render mutual support but, on the contrary, mutually paralysed each other. In this respect the *investment of Metz*, which commenced immediately after the battle of Gravelotte, is a remarkable and interesting event.

The fortress is so strong in itself, that with a garrison of 20,000 men and well provisioned, it might have been able to offer an incalculably long resistance. Bazaine's Army was still sufficiently large and fit for battle, to render important service in the open field. As soon, however, as this army was enclosed in a narrow space, with small débouchés, and its destiny insolubly bound up with that of the fortress, its excessive numbers were an injury to the fortress, and the fortress itself was unable to employ them. On the one hand, the great mass of men and horses consumed all the provisions and necessaries of life in a much shorter time than the defence required, and on the other hand, the army was unable to developé quickly enough to make a successful attempt to break through. Thus the size of the army diminished the power of resistance of the fortress, and the fortress, from its excellent situation in the centre of hills crowned with forts, hindered the development of the strength of the army. The strength of both when united must ~~come~~ lead to ruin.

Before the beginning of the battle, the Saxon Army Corps had, already, received orders to intercept the communications between Metz and Thionville, this instruction was repeated in the evening, whilst attention was drawn to the importance of the point

of Woippy. On the evening of the 18th, the Saxon Cavalry succeeded in tearing up the railroad between the two fortresses. In the following days the investment of Metz was completely effected, and in the closest manner. The German Army encamped round the outer-forts in a large circle, and carefully entrenched itself at all points where an attack from the enemy might be expected, or an attempt made to break through.

SIXTH CHAPTER.

SIXTH THE CAPITULATION OF SEDAN.

After the battle of Gravelotte, the capture of Metz was not the only aim of importance, but the plan of operations against Paris had also to be pursued.

For the latter object, three Corps were separated from what had hitherto been the first and second Armies, the Garde Corps, the IV. and the XII. Corps, and together with the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions were formed into a fourth Army, and placed under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony. This army was to operate in combination with the third Army, whilst the remaining eight Army Corps, reinforced by Kummer's Reserve Division, with the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, and the 3rd Reserve Cavalry Brigade, remained behind as the investing Army of Metz, under the chief command of Prince Frederick Charles.

During the battles near Metz, the Army of the Crown Prince of Prussia, which by this time, had been joined by the VI. Army Corps (General von Tümpling), had covered the operations of the first and second Armies, against any possible disturbance on the part of Marshal Mac Mahon's Army, and after the battle of Gravelotte had commenced its march upon Paris, in which it would be opposed in all probability, by Mac Mahon.

On the 17th of August, the Crown Prince's head-quarters were removed from Luneville to Nancy, the advanced guard, Prince Albert of Prussia's Cavalry Division, had passed the Meuse on the 16th, the infantry of the V. and XI. Army Corps had

moved forward towards this river on the 17th, and on the 19th and 20th the whole of the third Army had crossed, after having first rested on the day of the battle of Gravelotte. The march was continued on Bar-le-Duc.

On the 20th, the Crown Prince left Nancy for the chief headquarters, for a conference with the King, his father; on the 21st he removed his head-quarters to Vaucouleurs.

An Army having been collected at Châlons, under Mac Mahon, this place became the next object of operations, and the fortress of *Toul*, upon the direct line to it, was a considerable obstacle. Toul had refused a summons to surrender, and defeated an attack by a detachment of the IV. Army Corps on the 16th of August, after which it was watched by a brigade of the II. Bavarian Corps.

From Vaucouleurs, the head-quarters of the third Army were moved, on the 23rd, to Ligny.

The Army of the Crown Prince of Saxony, likewise, began the advance against Châlons, and left the neighbourhood of Metz on the 22nd of August. Like the third Army, its charge was to seek out Mac Mahon, and it marched by the very roads to *Verdun* which Bazaine had in vain endeavoured to make use of. Against this fortress, an attack by surprise was attempted on the 23rd, which, however, was unsuccessful. The Saxon Army Corps advanced towards Verdun, the 23rd Infantry Division taking the road by Etain, the 24th Infantry Division and the Artillery Corps taking that by Fresnes. The advanced guard of the 23rd Division, the Schützen Regiment No. 108, gained possession of the Faubourg-le-Pané with great bravery, and kept possession of it in spite of the fire from the works, whilst the artillery vigorously bombarded the fortifications and the town itself.

Verdun was, however, prepared for defence, sufficiently garrisoned, and showed guns of heavy calibre. The summons was most decidedly refused, and the XII. Corps gave up the attack, which could only have been successful through a surprise, and crossed the Meuse above and below Verdun, leaving the 47th Infantry Brigade to watch the fortress.

On the 25th of August the fourth Army had advanced as far as Clermont-en-Argonne, and the head-quarters of the third Army

had already been established at Bar-le-Duc on the 24th. Had the French Army been still in the camp of Châlons, it would have been attacked on two sides by these two Armies, the chief command being held by the King himself. But on the 23rd of August, the surprising announcement that Mac Mahon had evacuated Châlons, reached the head-quarters of the third Army in Ligny. The King had arrived this day in Ligny, and in the evening his head-quarters were removed to Bar-le-Duc. The German Army Direction was in complete ignorance of the line taken by the French Army, and various possibilities were discussed between von Moltke and von Blumenthal, the two Chiefs of the Staff. It was thought most probable, that Mac Mahon considered his army incapable of defending the position of Châlons and had retired towards Paris, in order to gain an advantageous position or in other respects more favourable conditions and prospects for a great battle.

Both armies were, therefore, provisionally to continue the advance on their previous lines of march.

As it turned out the French Army was destined for an operation, which the German Army Direction could not foresee.

Although it must always remain a matter of astonishment, that the feeling between the German armies and Mac Mahon's army was so completely lost, it must on the other hand, be acknowledged as an admirable performance in French railway management, that this large army could be united in Châlons and conveyed from there with such rapidity.

Whilst the battles were taking place before Metz Marshal Mac Mahon had united in the camp of Châlons, the remains of his army beaten at Woerth, with the 5th Corps which had retired from Bitsch, and the 7th Corps which was stationed at Belfort at the beginning of the war, and there also the 12th Corps had been newly formed.

The 1st, 5th and 7th Corps had again nearly attained the strength which they had at the beginning of the war; the regiments had been made up to their complements by numerous drafts of young soldiers of the reserve, and of the second category of the contingent as well as by the recruits of 1869.

The 7th Corps had, it is true, only one brigade of cavalry, the other having remained in Lyons, as previously mentioned.

The 12th Corps was composed of 1 Division of Infantry of the Line (the four Line Regiments which had been on the Spanish frontier); 1 Division, consisting of 3 Line Regiments and 4 Regiments de marche, and 1 Division of Marine Infantry, 12,000 men in strength. Fénélon's Cavalry Division and 15 Batteries of Artillery were allotted to the Corps in addition.

The Corps was consequently, entirely composed of regular troops; the Garde Mobile Division, which was also in the camp of Châlons at the commencement of the war, had been sent to Paris under the command of General Trochu.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE TWELFTH FRENCH CORPS.

Commander in Chief: General of Division *Lebrun*. Chief of the Staff: Brigade General *Greley*.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
1st Inf. Div. General Grandchamp.	1st Brig. Gen. Cambriels.	Jager Marche Battalion. — 22nd and 34th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. de Villeneuve.	58th and 79th R. of the Line.
2nd Inf. Div. General Lacretelle.	1st Brig. Gen. Bernier.	14th, 20th and 30th R. of the Line.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Marquisan.	2nd and 4th R. de Marche.
3rd (Marine) Inf. Div. General de Wassoigne.	1st Brig. Gen. Reboul.	1st and 2nd R. of Marine Infantry.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Martin des Paillères.	3rd and 4th R. of Marine Infantry.
Cav. Div. General Fénélon.	1st Brig. Gen. Savarèse.	1st and 7th R. of Lancers.
	2nd Brig. Gen. de Béville.	5th and 6th R. of Cuirassiers.

In addition to this a new Reserve Cavalry Division was formed and allotted to Marshal Mac Mahon's army, which was composed as follows:

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.
1st Reserve Cav. Div. Brigade General Margueritte.	1st Brig. Gen. Tilliard.	1st R. of Hussars and 6th R. of Chasseurs.
	2nd Brig. Gen. Margueritte.	1st, 3rd and 4th R. of Chasseurs d'Afrique.

In these distributions it is to be remarked,

1st) that Bernier's Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division originally belonged to the 6th Corps, and was cut off from it at Frouard by the surrounding of the second German Army. It had gone to Châlons.

2ndly) that the Regiments of Fénélon's Cavalry Division and of Tilliard's Brigade of Margueritte's Reserve Cavalry Division, likewise belonged to the 6th Corps, but had remained behind on the departure of this corps to Metz, and at a later period they were not able to reach it.

3rdly) that the 1st and 3rd Regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique had belonged to the Emperor's escort on the 16th of August, and had not been sent back to Metz.

The Marshal's Army thus consisted of 4 Corps and 2 Reserve Cavalry Divisions (Margueritte's newly formed Division, and Bonnemain's Division which had been placed under the Marshal since Woerth).

The	1st Corps,	Ducrot,	numbered	40,000	men
"	5th	"	de Failly,	"	25,000 "
"	7th	"	Douay,	"	30,000 "
"	12th	"	Lebrun,	"	45,000 "

Total: 140,000 men.

This Army had over 400 guns.

The employment of this active force formed, however, a point of dispute between the political parties, and public opinion was more considered than the rules of strategy.

Although the Emperor Napoleon had been with this army since the 18th of August, and was still the Head of the State, yet the war minister in Paris, Cousin Montauban, Count Palikao, gave the final word, and it was decided, after much wavering, that the Marshal should turn northwards, in order to reach Metz by a wide circuit, supported by the fortresses lying on the Belgian frontier, and relieve Bazaine.

Success alone could rescue this plan from the reproach of madness.

This army was at the same time, the only one which France

could for the moment place in the field, and half its importance lay in being the main support of the fortress of Paris in offering a long resistance, but then the connection of the army with Paris was given up, and still the army in itself was quite incapable of carrying out such a plan. For this, thoroughly disciplined and hardened troops would be necessary, who were very mobile and capable of marching, and the army was deficient in all these qualifications. Added to which the attempt was to be made in the face of an enemy who was superior in every respect. Never, perhaps, has a plan of operations been undertaken with less prospect of success.

The Gardes Mobiles, who had shewn themselves very mutinous and unmanageable, had, as mentioned above, been sent back from Châlons to the camps of St. Maur and Vincennes; the army which was set in motion from Châlons, on the 21st of August, towards Rheims is described in a French publication*), in the following manner.

"The 1st Corps, formed for the chief part from the African Regiments, had given proof of heroic valour at Froschweiler, which could only be overcome by the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy. These troops, greatly affected by the defeat, and by the crushing effects of the Prussian Artillery, carried away from the battle field had tendencies, which were still more aggravated by the long, incessant marches, and material privations on the retreat to Châlons. Marshal Mac Mahon did not deceive himself on this point and was aware that before bringing them again under fire, it would have been wise to have given them time for repose, and to restore steadiness. They were our oldest troops, surrounded with the renown which rightly belongs to our African soldiers, and they had amply justified it. The spectacle of their discouragement before the rest of the army, was therefore doubly to be feared.

"The 5th Corps, particularly, had already suffered from the effects. Exhausted, also, by the precipitate marches which it had made from Bitsch across the Vosges, by Neuf-Château and la

*) "Des causes qui ont amené la capitulation de Sedan," ascribed to Napoleon III.

Haute-Marne to the camp of Châlons, having lost without fighting, a portion of its material and nearly all its baggage, the 5th Corps presented an aspect of lassitude and disorganization sufficient to cause grave uneasiness.

"The 7th Corps, whose late organization was scarcely yet completed, had it is true, not passed through the same trials as the two preceding Corps; but owing to the long retreating march which it had made from Belfort, through Paris, to the camp of Châlons, it did not present that solidity which could have been desired.

"As to the 12th Corps which had been quite recently created, it contained elements of valour in great variety. The 1st Division was composed of new regiments upon which one had reason to depend; the 2nd was composed of four regiments de marche, formed from fourth battalions with incomplete cadres, and of soldiers who had never fired a shot.

"Lastly, the 3rd Division was composed of four regiments of marine infantry, who behaved bravely at Sedan, but who being little accustomed to long marches, covered the road with stragglers. — Such were the troops on whom was imposed the execution of the boldest and most difficult plan of the campaign."

The observations on the German side in the further course of the war have confirmed the above criticism, with the exceptions of the cajoleries with which it is garnished.

When first it was ordered from Paris that Marshal Mac Mahon should attempt to reach Metz, he declared that he could not expose his troops to this danger, representing the imprudence of such a hopeless endeavour, and, as he considered the position at Châlons untenable, he led his Army to *Rheims* on the 21st. From here he could repulse an enemy advancing towards Paris, both on the side of Paris and also on that of Soissons, by a flank position.

The Emperor accompanied the Army to Rheims.

The command for the relief of Metz was, however, repeated from Paris, and the Marshal forfeited his renown as an able Commander, by obeying this order.

Consequently, on the 23rd the Army again moved off

from Rheims, and proceeded in a north-easterly direction. The march should have been carried out with great rapidity, for speed was the first condition of success, but hardly had a day's march been accomplished and the army formed up on the Suippe, in Bethnville, when the difficulty of provisioning forced the Marshal to approach the line of railway. He made his left wing carry out a movement, and *on the 24th arrived in Rethel* in order to provide his troops with the means of subsistence for several days. The distribution of these occupied the whole of the 25th of August.

From Rethel, the head-quarters were removed to Tournon.

Here the Prince Imperial was sent away from the head-quarters, on account of the great dangers of the expedition, and was conducted to Mézières, whilst the Emperor perseveringly followed the army.

On the 27th the Army arrived at Chêne-populeux. On this day the advanced troops of de Failly's and Douay's Corps encountered the advanced troops of the Crown Prince of Saxony; a cavalry fight at *Busancy* ensued.

By this time it must have been clear to the Marshal that his undertaking would fail, and that he must give up his base of operations, for to make a flank march in the face of the numerically stronger Germans would, naturally, be tempting the enemy to attack him upon his right flank, without his having a prospect of reaching Metz. There was absolutely no chance of being able to appear unexpectedly at Metz, for he had already met with resistance from that army which he ought to have got round unobserved.

The Army of the Crown Prince of Saxony had still continued its march against Châlons on the 25th, although the cavalry Divisions, moving in front, had brought the information that Châlons was found to be unoccupied. Taking into consideration the possibility of Mac Mahon's reaching Metz along the Belgian frontier, although it was not thought probable, the destruction of the railway between Mézières and Tihonville, by a party sent out to the side for that purpose, was not neglected.

On this day the Army of the Crown Prince of Prussia took the little fortress of *Vitry le Français*, without resistance from the garrison, an important point for the connection between Nancy and Paris, as the fortress barred the passage across the Marne and the railroad. The King's head-quarters were established in Commercy.

Perhaps, as it is maintained through the indiscretion of a French newspaper, or more probably earlier still by means of reconnaissances, the new, unexpected direction in which the French army had marched was now learnt, and *the order was issued to both armies, during the night of the 25th, that each was to wheel at once, independently, to the right, to advance in a northerly direction, and intercept the enemy on his way to Metz.*

The third Army commenced this movement from Vitry, by St. Menehould and Suippes, on the 26th, the Meuse Army (fourth Army, Crown Prince of Saxony) wheeled at Clermont, the King's head-quarters on this day, and in the evening reached Varennes with the left wing (the XII. Army Corps), and with the right wing (the IV. Army Corps), Fleury, upon the right bank of the Meuse, whilst the Garde Corps moved up in rear of the centre as far as Dombasle, on the road between Verdun and Clermont. The cavalry was pushed forward a long distance towards the north and discovered the enemy's encampment at Vouziers.

On the 27th, the XII. Army Corps was also moved across the Meuse, in order that this important line might be most resolutely held, against any attack by the French from the west, especially at the points Dun and Stenay. The III. and IX. Corps of the army investing Metz, were also formed up with their front towards Etain, in a north-westerly direction, in order to resist any possible attempt by the French Army to break through between the Meuse Army and the Belgian frontier. The XII. Army Corps reached Dun on this day, and bivouacked on the positions which had been selected for defence.

The 2nd Cavalry Brigade only, whilst reconnoitring *Busancy*, came upon six squadrons of the 12th Chasseurs. An attack was

here made by the first and half of the fifth squadrons of the 3rd Horse Regiment, whilst the fire of Zenker's Horse Battery obliged the enemy to give way. The Commander of the Chasseur Regiment was taken prisoner. This fight confirmed the supposition that the enemy was at Vouziers and to the north of it, and the IV. Corps and Garde Corps therefore continued their march upon Busancy and Vouziers on the 28th, whilst the XII. Army Corps remained in position at Dun.

The royal head-quarters were still in *Clermont*.

The third Army had continued on the march towards the north, on the 26th, so that it must come upon the right flank of the enemy, whilst the Meuse Army moved against him in the front.

The Crown Prince's head-quarters were at St. Mènehould on the 28th. This army having had a longer distance to march was still behind in comparison with the Meuse army, and in order to bring about a general engagement, the latter was obliged to make a slow advance.

On the 28th the French advanced troops were driven back by the 4th Cavalry Division, Marshal Mac Mahon's head-quarters were removed the same day, to Stonne. The Marshal made this movement against his will. The encounter with the Saxons at Busancy on the previous day, had taught him the fruitlessness of his undertaking, and he wished to return. The dispositions for the march to the west had already been made, but in the night of the 27th the most decided order arrived from Paris to continue the march to Metz.

The delays arising from these alterations, made it impossible to concentrate the army at Stonne on the 28th.

The Marshal determined to reach Stenay and from thence to get on to Montmédy; but the enemy already occupied the first of these towns. The German armies moved quickly, whilst the French army had only accomplished 25 leagues) in six days. On the 29th the head-quarters were removed to Raucourt, and the army commenced the passage across the Meuse at Mouzon.*

*) About 67 English miles.

Lebrun's Corps passed the river on the evening of the 29th, and the other corps were to cross in the early morning of the 30th. Generals de Failly and Douay were to remain with their troops upon the left bank until the last, in order to cover the passage against the approaching Germans, and then to go over themselves.

On the German side, the possibility of the French left wing extending its line of retreat towards the Belgian frontier, and perhaps even attempting to cross it, for the sake of safety upon Belgian territory, had to be kept in view; it was therefore determined to compel the enemy to give battle upon the ground between the Ardennes and the Meuse.

The Armies of the Crown Princes of Prussia and Saxony, now united into one Army under command of the King, were advancing, on the 29th, in the following order of march:

Of the third Army, the 1st Bavarian Corps, had, on the 27th, pushed forward by Vouziers upon the road to Stenay, as far as Bar and Busancy; it was now marching upon Sommauthe in front of the enemy at Beaumont, and had established the connection with the IV. Army Corps upon the left flank of the fourth Army. The II. Bavarian Corps followed the first. The V. Army Corps was marching from Brigenay and Authé upon Pierremont and Ochés and thus formed part of the left wing. The Wurtembergers had taken the direction by Chatillon to Chêne-populeux. The XI. Army Corps was also marching towards this point, but had taken the route by Vouziers and Quatrechamps, and, on the left of the Wurtembergers, a flank column of the XI. Corps was to occupy Vonceq on the Aisne. The VI. Army Corps was to march behind them towards Vouziers. The 5th Cavalry Division was to place itself in front of Chêne-populeux, to the west of the place whilst directing its march upon Tourteron, the 4th Cavalry Division was to follow the XI. Corps to Quatrechamps and then wheel up upon Chatillon, the 6th Cavalry Division was to advance upon Semuy, and push forward its out-posts as far as Bouvellemont, whilst it took the direction of Mézières. The 2nd Cavalry Division was to halt near Busancy.

The Cavalry received orders to retain feeling with the

enemy, but not to engage in a serious fight as the infantry were still too far behind.

On the morning of the 29th, directions were given to the Crown Prince of Saxony, to take up a defensive position with his army, between Aincreville and Landres, on the left bank of the Meuse, and to watch the Meuse from Dun to Stenay. In consequence of this, the XII. Army Corps returned from the right to the left bank, the Garde Corps took up a position on its left, and the IV. Army Corps formed the left wing; the Garde Cavalry and the Saxon Cavalry Division reconnoitred towards Ochles and Beaumont.

FIGHT AT NOUART.

When the XII. Army Corps was moving towards Nouart, the advanced guard, the 46th Infantry Brigade, discovered at midday, that the heights in rear of this place were occupied by the 5th French Corps. The Saxons immediately attacked them, and towards evening, after a long resistance, took the heights from the French. At the same time the cavalry brought information that another mass of the enemy's troops was formed up at Fossé, to the north-east of Nouart. The Crown Prince made his troops move into bivouac, and established his head-quarters at Baricourt. The village of Voncq upon the left wing, occupied by infantry, had been taken by storm the same evening, by two dismounted squadrons of Hussars.

Every preparation was made to destroy Mac Mahon's isolated Army.

The difficult problem of a change of front, and the disposition of both armies to the right flank, was completely solved and carried out with surprising rapidity and certainty, in spite of the long distances and the communications being in parts very imperfect.

COMBAT AT BEAUMONT.

The strategical disposition of the third and fourth Armies in one line of about 4 miles*) in extent, was so far completed on the morning of the 30th of August, that both armies, the fourth upon the right flank and the third upon the left, could advance to the attack in a north-easterly direction, fairly in the same line.

Mac Mahon had given orders that the 3rd Corps, which was still upon the left bank of the Meuse, was to cross the river this day at any price. The 5th Corps was to march upon Mouzon, the 7th upon Villers, the 1st upon Remilly.

General Margueritte was to cover the advance towards Mouzon and Carignan, and General Bonnemain to follow the 1st Corps.

The French Army was, however, interrupted in its passage across the Meuse, although it was only de Failly's Corps which was principally engaged upon the left bank.

The King's head-quarters were in Grandpré on the night of the 29th, and the head-quarters of the Crown Prince of Prussia were in Cœuc.

At 10 o'clock, on the morning of the 30th, the Crown Prince of Saxony commenced the advance against Beaumont. The IV. Army Corps formed the left wing, the XII. Army Corps the right wing, the Garde Corps remained in a reserve position at Nouart. The two Corps of the first line moved forward in four columns, each consisting of one Division, with cavalry for investigating the ground in front and upon the flanks.

General de Failly's troops were encamped opposite to them in a position that could be easily defended, namely upon the wooded heights in front of Beaumont, commanding the valley of the Meuse. One Division was laying to the north and the other to the south of the town; although the Corps had been engaged the previous day at Nouart, and could not well ignore the vicinity of the enemy, yet it had marvellously neglected to take the slightest precautions for security. The French troops bivouacked

*) About 18 $\frac{2}{3}$ English miles.

entirely without out-posts in spite of the danger to which they were exposed.

The reconnaissances made by the fourth Army had brought information to the Crown Prince of Saxony, that the nearest stationary Division of de Failly's Corps was in the act of cooking with the greatest negligence. The columns were therefore concealed as much as possible, and approached the French camp without being seen, a battery moved up quickly to within range and succeeded in opening an unexpected fire of shells upon the encampment, which was immediately followed by the attack of the two Infantry Divisions of the IV. Army Corps. The French fled in the greatest confusion, leaving behind them tents and other camp equipage, their cooking kettles and every thing that could hinder a rapid flight.

It is true that their leaders succeeded in bringing them to a halt after having gone some distance, but they were only capable of a short resistance, and quickly retired to Beaumont where they were collected and supported by the remaining parts of de Failly's and Douay's Corps, so that a vigorous fight was now developed, in consequence of which a brigade of Lebrun's Corps was brought back from the right bank of the Meuse.

Nevertheless the 7th Prussian Division, under the command of Lieutenant General von Schwarzhoff, supported by the 8th Division under Lieutenant General von Schöler, took the town and forced the enemy to retreat towards Mouzon.

The small wood of Givodeau to the north of Beaumont was still defended with great obstinacy by the rear guard of the French, and thus relieved the retreat upon the Meuse, yet this wood also was ultimately taken.

The French then once again offered resistance upon the heights of the right bank, in front of Mouzon. They brought a numerous artillery into position, and for a time opened a very hot fire. At this place, only the right wing of the Meuse Army, the Saxon Corps, took part in the fight.

Whilst the IV. Army Corps, upon the left wing, supported by a Bavarian Brigade of von der Tann's Corps, attacked in front, the Saxons advanced upon Beaumont from Nouart, marching by

Laneuville through the Forêt de Dieulet. At the moment of the attack being made against Mouzon, the 45th Infantry Brigade (Leib and 2nd Grenadier Regiments) with the Schützen Regiment reached the action, and by vigorously pressing on with their leading troops, got as far as Villemonttry.

Night coming on put an end to the fight, which had delivered much booty into the hands of the Germans.

Above 3000 prisoners, 19 guns, and 8 mitrailleuses were counted, with considerable war material, including several waggons. The loss of the Germans amounted to 3000 men in killed and wounded in the IV. Army Corps, and between 400 and 500 men in the Saxon Corps. The loss of the Bavarians was small.

The Army of the Crown Prince of Prussia moved on this day, from the south towards Oches, the Bavarians on the right wing, the V. Corps in the centre and the Wurtembergers with the XI. Corps on the left wing, and the VI. Corps forming the reserve of the left wing. This army came upon the French 7th Corps.

The first shots fell precisely at midday. They came from the hills in front upon the further side of the village of Oches, where the French artillery had taken up a position and opened fire upon some guns of the third Army, formed up on the heights behind Busancy. The distance being nearly 5000 paces, the fire of the French was inefficacious. It was also evident that the French had no intention of offering a serious resistance here, as they immediately gave up their position when the German Cavalry advanced from the left flank towards Oches, and retired upon Stonne, following the chain of the heights which rises behind Oches.

The Crown Prince had gone forward through Busancy with his Staff and suite, and taken up his point of observation on the same spot upon which the enemy had directed his cannonade shortly before. At first it was thought that the French would try to make a stand at Stonne. However, in this retreat General Douay strictly followed the orders of the Marshal, who had laid down the passage of the Meuse as the object of first importance.

Dispositions were immediately made to surround the enemy on the south, south-west and south-east, by a semicircular

formation, the terminating points of which should continually encroach towards the north, like a pair of pincers, and surround the enemy.

The numerical superiority of the Germans was well calculated, for this plan, the aim of which was to destroy or take prisoner the whole of the French Army, in case it did not hasten to cross over at once, into Belgian territory towards the north.

The German Armies numbered in all 250,000 men with 800 guns. Provided with a very numerous Cavalry (four independent Cavalry Divisions had been allotted to the third Army) they followed close upon the heels of the French Army, and kept them in constant danger of having to make front to the rear against a surprise.

THE 31st OF AUGUST.

After the victorious combat at Beaumont, the German Armies bivouacked in a line, the approximate direction of which was from Raucourt to Villemoutry. *The King's head-quarters were at Busancy, the Crown Prince of Prussia's at Rourmont, and the Crown Prince of Saxony's at Beaumont.*

The King caused the following dispositions to be given out for the 31st of August.

The Meuse Army will prevent the enemy's left wing escaping in an easterly direction between the Belgian frontier and the Meuse.

The third Army will continue the advance, attack the enemy if he takes up a position on this side of the Meuse, and operate simultaneously against the front and right flank, in order to press the whole French Army into the narrow space between the Meuse and the Belgian frontier.

In accordance with these arrangements the Crown Prince of Saxony ordered the Garde Corps to cross the Meuse at Pouilly, and the XII. Army Corps at Letanne with directions to advance towards the line between Mouzon and Carignan. The IV. Army

Corps was to move forward upon the left bank of the Meuse to Mouzon, and keep up the connection with the third Army.

The Crown Prince of Prussia caused the I. Bavarian Corps to march by Raucourt upon Remilly, the XI. Army Corps from the previous day's positions at Stonne, upon Chémery and Cheveuge; the latter Corps was ordered to halt upon the left bank of the Meuse, and encamp in front of Donchéry. The II. Bavarian Corps was to follow the first, the V. Army Corps the eleventh. The Wurtembergers were to advance by Vendresse and Bontancourt to the Meuse. By this means the lines of march of the third Army converged towards the fortress of Sedan, within whose walls and environs, according to the news brought, the French Army was concentrated. The task was to enclose the enemy in these positions and to force him either to surrender his army, or to take flight over the Belgian frontier. As the latter eventuality was not considered impossible, it was expressly stated in the order of the day for the 30th that the German Corps would have to follow the French without delay, in case they were not immediately disarmed upon Belgian territory.

The 31st of August passed without serious fighting.

Of the Meuse Army, only the Saxon Cavalry Brigade had been engaged. It was ordered to cross the Meuse at Pouilly, on the morning of the 31st, and to go forward down the valley of the Meuse in connection with the Garde Cavalry Division directed to march by Sailly and Carignan, for the purpose of intercepting the departure of the Train belonging to the French army. The Division upon the heights to the north-west of the Bois-de-Vaux discovered some railway trains standing ready in Carignan and columns of the French 12th Corps moving off, against which the horse battery immediately opened fire with success. In the further advance upon Douzy, which was strongly occupied by the enemy's infantry, and therefore could only be fired upon by the horse battery, an opportunity occurred of attacking a large train of provisions and ambulance waggons, partly horsed and partly unhorsed. For this object the Garde Horse Regiment had gone forward at Brevilly across the Chiers in order to attack the columns retreating upon the road; it could not however, press forward

beyond Pouru-St.-Remy, from which place it was fired upon by strong detachments of the enemy's infantry and especially by the inhabitants, and no infantry was at hand.

An attempt made by the 1st Uhlans No. 17 to press into Douzy, failed at the commencement on account of a vigorous infantry fire; the regiment however succeeded, after further preparation by the horse battery, in forcing Douzy, and in capturing the departing train, consisting of about 40 waggons, escorted by two companies of the 24th Infantry Regiment, and thus made several prisoners besides getting possession of the train standing at the station.

Of the third Army, only the I. Bavarian Corps had an encounter with the enemy. In advancing beyond Remilly a few companies of Jagers belonging to the I. Bavarian Division came upon the 12th French Corps which had moved from Mouzon by Douzy towards Sedan, and occupied Bazeilles. A violent fight ensued upon the right bank of the Meuse, in which the Bavarians were repulsed.

In the meanwhile the main body of the corps approached the river and two pontoon bridges were laid at Remilly. The Crown Prince himself was present at this fight. He had taken up a point of observation on an eminence, just behind the church in the village of Stonne, from whence a wide survey of the country could be taken. After the fight was over at about 6 o'clock in the evening, the Crown Prince went to Chémery, where his head-quarters had been established.

The other corps had been able to accomplish the marches prescribed for them, during the day, without difficulty; the French Army had retired to Sedan without any further attempt at resistance.

On the evening of the 31st of August, the German Armies occupied the following positions (v. map I.):

The Meuse Army formed the right wing and stood thus:

The Garde Corps at Carignan upon the right bank of the Chiers.

The XII. Army Corps at Mairy.

The advanced guards of both Corps fronted towards the west and north. They extended from Pouru-aux-Bois to Pouru-St.-Remy and Donzy; patrols had feeling with the enemy and scoured the country as far as Francheval.

The IV. Army Corps was on the left bank of the Meuse at Monzon.

Of the Third Army, on the evening of the 31st:

The I. Bavarian Corps was at Remilly, the II. Bavarian Corps at Raucourt, the V. Army Corps at Chéhery, the XI. Army Corps at Donchéry, the Wurtemberg Division, at first, at Boutancourt; it afterwards advanced to Dom-le-Mesnil. The VI. Army Corps was only able to reach Attigny and Semuy this evening. Thus, in case the enemy should really attempt a night departure, it stood ready to place itself in his front still further to the westward, and then bring him to a stand.

It was the intention to have drawn all the Corps still closer together, round the French Army on the 1st of September, and only to offer battle on the 2nd. However the observations made on the 31st of August, upon the demeanour of the enemy, caused an alteration in this plan.

It had become perfectly clear, that each hour the resistance was prolonged, the enemy's troops lost energy in fighting; whole divisions had thrown away their knapsacks, and fled in masses; the roads were strewn with overturned waggons, and thrown away articles of baggage and equipment. It was above all, apprehended that the enemy was no longer disposed to fight, and perhaps meditated escaping during the night, as quickly as possible, to Mézières or on to Belgian territory.

In order to prevent this, the King, after a long conference with the Crown Prince, his son, with the addition of General von Moltke and Lieutenant General von Blumenthal, commanded that the storming of Sedan, and the French fronts between the Meuse and the Ardennes, should be taken in hand on the following day.

Even this evening, and during the night, the Wurtemberg Division was to advance by Dom-le-Mesnil, lay a bridge there

over the Meuse, and cross the river. The XI. Army Corps was to lay two bridges at Donchéry, and also to cross the Meuse.

Thus it was hoped to cut off the road towards Mézières from the French Army.

Marshal Mac Mahon had most probably, intended to have gone to Mézières, but must have thought that there was still sufficient time to do so on the 1st of September.

After Mouzon had been evacuated by the enemy on the evening of the 30th, and the last troops had been withdrawn to the left bank of the Meuse, the Marshal seeing the manifest impossibility of bringing help to Marshal Bazaine, or even of reaching Montmédy, gave orders on the night of the 30th, that the army was to retire upon Sedan.

This measure was without doubt, the worst of all. The town of Sedan, which is included in the category of fortresses, is commanded on several sides by ground rising above it, and is not well adapted to resist modern artillery. Moreover it was incompletely armed, badly provisioned, and possessed no outer works of defence. It was of no sort of value as a support to a retiring army, and therefore, its only importance consisted in its being connected with Mézières and Paris, by the railroad which passes by Hirson, and which was the sole means of replenishing the provisions and ammunition.

It might have been better to have remained at Mouzon, to have occupied the heights upon the right bank, and to have delivered a battle, which though without hope of success, would at least have *offered the possibility of a retreat.*

But the Marshal probably entertained the hope of reaching Mézières from Sedan. He was, perhaps, not informed of the march direction of the left wing of the German Armies, as the 31st of August appears to indicate.

The troops wearied by their uninterrupted marches, their moral element impaired by the discomfitures which had followed one upon another, retired for the most part in disorder upon Sedan.

The 1st and 5th Corps arrived there on the evening of the 30th and early in the morning of the 31st, and were formed up upon the heights to the west of Dagny and Givonne.

The 7th Corps reached the neighbourhood of Villers-Cernay on the morning of the 31st, and encamped there. It changed its position at 3 o'clock, in the afternoon; leaving a very unfavourable tactical situation at Villers-Cernay, it took up a position to the north-west of Sedan, which it still held on the 1st of September.

The 12th Corps remained at Mouzon until the last, and did not begin to move until the morning of the 31st. This was the only corps of the French Army engaged on the 31st of August, partly with its rear guard at Douzy, and partly at Bazeilles as already related.

The Emperor Napoleon, who was with General Ducrot's Corps at Carignan on the evening of the 30th, where it was intended to have established the head-quarters, received the news of the retreat during the evening, and Marshal Mac Mahon's counsel to him to go by the railroad to Sedan. The Emperor took this advice and then remained in Sedan, preferring to share the fate of his Army, in this desperate situation, to ensuring his own personal safety.

General de Failly was deprived of the command of his Corps on account of his bad leadership, and it was transferred to General Wimpffen.

Thus on the evening of the 31st the different Corps stood as follows:

(v. map I. of the battle of Sedan.)

The 12th Corps with the right wing resting upon Bazeilles, the 1st and 5th Corps at Givonne, Daigny and Moncelle, as well as in the town itself, and the 7th Corps from Floing to Calvaire d'Illy.

The Army was consequently formed in a semi-circle round the town; both flanks resting upon the Meuse, and probably no army ever stood in battle, under more unfavourable conditions. The troops were threatened on all sides, and above all they had no line of retreat. If beaten they must flee into the town, that is into a number of defiles without exit, through narrow gates into streets that were overflowing with waggons and baggage.

Marshal Mac Mahon must, however, have been very ill-informed as to his desperate situation, which is shown by various circumstances that are related of the 31st of August.

Even in the afternoon, when General Douay had proposed to him the change of position of the 7th Corps above mentioned, he answered in the following terms: "I have no intention of being forced into the corner, in a fortress, like Marshal Bazaine at Metz, but I shall manœuvre before the enemy."

Whilst therefore, the 7th Corps executed the movement, which he finally permitted, and whilst fighting was going on at Bazeilles with the Bavarians, a peasant (according to the same French source) informed General Douay that the enemy were crossing the Meuse below Sedan, near Donchéry, and 10,000 men already appeared on the right bank. General Douay gave this information to the Marshal; he however took no counter measures; he had even, altogether, neglected to have the course of the river reconnoitred as far as Mézières. He evidently reckoned upon being able to reach Mézières upon the following day; and considered the crossing of the enemy at Donchéry as a mere demonstration.

In the same way, a staff officer of the newly formed 13th French Corps (which was this day in Mézières), who had been sent by General Vinoy for the purpose of concerting some co-operations with Mac Mahon, after waiting in vain for four hours in the Marshal's anti-room, was finally obliged to return with his mission unfulfilled, as he feared that he might find himself cut off later.

If such faults as these can be rightly laid to the charge of Marshal Mac Mahon, who had always proved himself to be a general of capacity and experience in war, it must be concluded that the impossibility of the success of a plan, which was not his own, had imposed such a crushing weight upon his mind, that through it, he had lost his clear judgment.

BATTLE OF SEDAN.

With the first glimmer of day, on the 1st of September, the attacking movements of the German Armies commenced.

The hour fixed by the Crown Prince of Saxony for the march of his Corps was 5 o'clock, in the morning; the Garde Corps and the XII. Corps were to advance in three columns from Douzy, Pouru-St.-Remy and Pouru-aux-Bois, against the line of Moncelle and Givonne. The 7th Division was to remain in reserve at Mairy, the 8th Division and the Artillery Corps of the IV. Corps were to advance towards Bazeilles for the support of the I. Bavarian Corps.

The Crown Prince of Prussia disposed his Army as follows:

The I. Bavarian Corps to cross the Meuse at Remilly and attack Bazeilles.

The II. Bavarian Corps to go towards Wadelincourt and Frénois.

The XI. Army Corps to direct its march upon St. Monges by Vrine-aux-Bois.

The V. Army Corps and the 4th Cavalry Division to follow this movement.

The Wurtemberg Division to remain on the defensive towards Mézières, and at the same time to be in readiness as a disposable reserve at Donchéry.

Early in the morning of this memorable 1st of September, a battle day, the results of which were the most brilliant if not the most important of the whole war, a thick fog hung over the heights and in the low land of the Meuse valleys, which completely concealed all distant objects from view, as the Bavarians advanced against Bazeilles in the beginning of the fight. It was only later in the morning that this veil, which obscured the scene of the great event, began to sink, the heights became clear, the fog, becoming less dense under the influence of the sun, began to waver and fluctuate intermixed with the smoke of the powder, then withdrew into the valleys, until at last, at midday, all the movements of the army were executed under a clear sky.

The village of *Bazeilles* formed that *point d'appui* of the French Army, which was first contested. It lies about 4000 paces from Sedan in the neighbourhood of the Meuse, and was the outermost point of the semicircular line of villages, farmsteads and foundries which, following the chain of heights on the right bank of the Meuse, indicated the French position. From Bazeilles in a more northerly direction the villages of La Moncelle, Daigny and Givonne should be named as forming part of this line; then to the north-west Illy, Fleigneux, St. Monges and, to the south of the latter, Floing.

Towards the east, the heights from Illy to Bazeilles were of a nature to afford good opportunities for defence to the French Army. They fall down steeply towards the brook, between Daigny and Givonne they are wooded; here, and also further down to the Meuse, they are divided into several sections by small parallel valleys, and offer good positions for the most efficacious infantry and artillery fire against the opposite slope, from which the assailants must approach.

In the north, the Calvaire d'Illy, the height to the south of Illy, was of great importance, and French generalship must venture everything in order to maintain this commanding point, in the centre of the line.

The French left wing, on the other hand, found less favourable conditions of ground. The villages of St. Monges and Floing, with the eminence between them, here served as *points d'appui*. General Douay, however, had done every thing to improve his position, he had made the Engineer Corps lay gun-emplacements, and put the wood in his front into a state of defence.

In the middle of this semicircle, one mile*) in diameter, lay the fortress of Sedan, a town of 16,000 inhabitants, surrounded by extensive Vauban fortifications, which could be advantageously reached with guns of long range from several sides, and particularly well from the heights at Frénois and Wadelincourt upon the left bank of the Meuse, where a mass of destructively efficacious guns were formed up by the Germans, at a later

*) $4\frac{1}{2}$ English miles.

period of the battle, when the French Army was retiring towards Sedan.

At break of day the King repaired to this point for a general survey of the whole battle field, and occupied it until the end of the fight.

Marshal Mac Mahon had issued no dispositions for the battle on the 1st of September (according to French accounts), so that each Corps Commander was obliged to act according to his own judgment. As early as 5 o'clock, he went to the out-posts, and soon after, whilst ordering some details for the 1st Corps, was severely wounded in the thigh by the fragment of a shell. He gave over the command to General Ducrot.

The battle began at *Bazeilles*. This well surrounded place, completely built of stone houses, was occupied by the 3rd Division of Lebrun's Corps, 12,000 men of the Marine Infantry, who defended themselves with the greatest obstinacy, and for nearly six hours contested every foot of ground, each house and every step in the streets, with the storming Bavarians.

The advanced guard of the I. Bavarian Corps, under Major General Dietl, moved forward against Bazeilles towards 4. 30 o'clock in the morning, followed by the 1st and then the 2nd Division, so that the whole Corps was by degrees involved in the fight round this important place. The artillery was driven up on to the heights to the north-east of Bazeilles, and although the majority were obliged to venture into the fire of tirailleurs, they opened a vigorous fire in order to shake the enemy's divisions. The broad main street and the cross streets branching at right angles from it, the old wide village street lying next the Meuse, as well as the park of the Chateau Monville, reaching nearly to the suburbs, were advantageously situated for mutual support, thus considerably increasing the tenacity of the defence, which was effectively aided by cannon and mitrailleuses, whilst the French detachments engaging made a vigorous stand and frequent onslaughts with closed battalions.

Towards 10 o'clock, the whole place was in the hands of the Bavarians, and it presented a terrible picture of destruction. Not a single house remained standing.

Meanwhile, the XI. Army Corps was on the hill upon the opposite side, after having accomplished the passage of the Meuse during the night; in its further advance to Vrigne-aux-Bois it had not met with the enemy, and it was therefore clear that the march to Mézières was not intended.

Each hour the enclosing of the French Army perceptibly drew nearer to its completion.

The leading troops of the Crown Prince of Saxony had commenced fighting at Lamecourt and La Moncelle, at 6. 30 o'clock in the morning. The 1st French Corps, had strongly occupied Montvillers, La Moncelle and Daigny, lying opposite, as well as the heights to the east of this place.

Half an hour later the advanced guard of the Garde Corps, on the right of the XII. Army Corps came upon the French position, whilst its columns, coming up by Pouru-St.-Remy and Pouru-aux-Bois, in part wheeled gradually into line to the left, and in part continued the march in the direction of Fleigneux, in order to take up the connection with the troops who had advanced from Vrigne-aux-Bois to attack the French left wing.

In a short time, the 24th Division succeeded in throwing back the enemy so far that it was enabled to develope between La Moncelle and Daigny. By this means the Saxons established connection with the Bavarians. The first batteries of the Garde Corps came into position at Villers-Cernay, towards 9 o'clock. To oppose their attack, General Ducrot, the new French Commander in Chief, decided to take the offensive, and indeed, attempted to surround the German right wing, between Givonne and Villers-Cernay.

For this object, he made the 2nd Brigade of Grandchamp's Division advance from Daigny, and gave orders to Lartigue's Division to take the plateau to the east of Givonne.

These troops made the attempt to carry out the disposition, but were much too weak for it. They were repulsed, Daigny was taken by the Saxons at midday, and Haybes was wrested from the French by the 2nd Garde Division.

At this time General Ducrot was superseded in the Chief command by his senior, General *Wimpffen*, who claimed it.

The Prussian Garde Corps continued its movement upon Fleigneux and Illy.

The 23rd Division also moved up the valley, and the 8th Division pushed forward into the space between its left flank and the Bavarians.

All the disposable batteries were brought into position upon the stormed heights, so that, upon this wing alone, about 100 guns were in action.

At 2 o'clock, the right wing of the Prussian Garde Corps united with the left wing of the V. Corps at Illy.

Upon this side and at Floing, as well as in the south of Sedan, the battle had developed itself in the following manner:

At 7 o'clock in the morning the Crown Prince of Prussia gave orders to the XI. Corps, which was at Briancourt, to march to the front and wheel to the right upon St. Monges, the V. Corps to follow the XI., and the 4th Cavalry Division to conform to the movements of the last corps.

From the violence of the cannonade at Bazeilles, it was conjectured that the I. Bavarian Corps must have met with considerable resistance. Walter's Division was therefore also ordered, at 7 o'clock, to move to Remilly in support of the I. Corps, Bothmer's Division to Wadelincourt, and there to take up a position against Sedan. Walter's Division crossed the Meuse in rear of the I. Bavarian Corps, formed up upon its left flank, and in conjunction with it threw back the enemy by Bazeilles and Balan towards Sedan.

At 7. 30 o'clock, the XI. Corps directed its advanced guard upon St. Monges, where the 7th French Corps had taken up a position, to the south of the brook.

Here the first shots fell at a quarter to 9 o'clock. After an obstinate resistance the 7th French Corps evacuated the position at St. Monges, and withdrew to its main position, upon the heights between Floing and Illy.

The XI. Corps, perceiving that it could only fulfil its charge by taking possession of the heights lying in front, immediately drove up the two leading batteries on each side of the unwall-

garden, which lies to the south of St. Monges, upon the heights to the west of Floing, and caused the infantry to follow.

The V. Corps had placed its Artillery Corps at its head, and passed the brook to the north of Fleigneux, and had made its batteries form up upon the heights to the south of Fleigneux against the enemy's position. The infantry formed for the attack in rear of the guns. At 11 o'clock, a vigorous cannonade took place, between the batteries of both corps and the enemy's artillery.

The Wurtemberg Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division had crossed the bridges at Dom-le-Mesnil at 9 o'clock, and gone in the direction of Vrine-aux-Bois. At 9. 30 o'clock, the first received orders to move to Donchéry, and remain in reserve to the north of that place.

At 11 o'clock, the troops of the Third Army were disposed as follows:

XI. Corps at St. Monges, the artillery to the south of the place.

V. Corps at Fleigneux, the artillery also to the south.

4th Cavalry Division to the south of Troisfontaine; the horse batteries to the east of the copse, firing upon the enemy's guns at Floing.

The Wurtemberg Division on the march to Donchéry; one detachment of Hügel's Brigade at the bridge of Dom-le-Mesnil and towards Mézières.

The Artillery Corps of the I. Bavarian Corps was upon the heights of Wadelincourt, with two batteries upon the tongue of land to the north-east of Villette, engaged with the enemy's artillery at Floing.

The I. Bavarian Corps and Walter's Division of the II. Corps in Bazeilles.

The 2nd Cavalry Division to the west of Vrine-aux-Bois.

The batteries of the V. Corps, to the south of Fleigneux, constantly outflanked the right wing of the French 7th Corps, and forced it to be always bringing fresh batteries into the line of fire. Conseil Dumesnil's Division was shortly after, ordered to occupy the heights of the plateau towards Illy; Bordas' Brigade,

belonging to Dumont's Division, was then sent out in the same direction and had taken up a position on the left of the road to Illy, with its right flank joining Wolff's Division of the 1st Corps, which had occupied the woods upon this side.

The fight along the whole line was originally an artillery engagement.

Towards 10 o'clock, however, the French remarked that strong infantry columns were descending the heights from St. Monges, and moving towards the position of the 7th Corps.

Two mitrailleuse batteries, which had been brought up against these columns (of the XI. Corps), no doubt inflicted great losses upon them, but were just as little able as all the other means of defence, to prevent the extension of the German front of attack.

At midday General Wimpffen inspected the whole French line of battle, which still formed an unbroken semicircle. On the right, the 12th Corps, supported by the 5th Corps, still vigorously maintained the defensive, although it had lost its original position; in the centre, the 1st Corps fought obstinately with the victorious, but only gradually pressing on, Saxons and Prussian Guards. Upon the left flank, the Divisions of the 7th Corps firmly held their positions. General Douay here drew the Commander in Chief's attention to the importance of the plateau of Illy for his Divisions, which, if taken by the enemy, would immediately make the position of the 7th Corps untenable. General Wimpffen assured him that this part of the battle field was already overstrong in troops.

Shortly afterwards, however, the 7th Corps observed that the plateau mentioned was precipitately evacuated by the 1st Corps. The attack of the Prussian Guards had caused this retreat.

General Douay at once led two battalions to the imperilled point, and requested reinforcements from the Commander in Chief. After some time he sent Lefébvre's Brigade from the 1st Corps.

The resistance, however, was quite inadequate against the resolute advance of the Prussian columns. *When the Garde Corps and the V. Corps united, shortly afterwards, upon the plateau of Illy, the battle was decided.*

The left wing of the French 7th Corps, threatened in the flank, was as little able to maintain its position as the 1st Corps.

General Wimpffen had recourse to the cavalry.

With extraordinary impetuosity the French cavalry regiments repeatedly threw themselves upon the threatening German columns as they advanced, but without success.

Partly in line, partly in squares, the German infantry received the charging troopers and drove them back with enormous losses. Just as had been the case, before, in the battle of Woerth, the devoted bravery of the masses of horsemen, attacking again and again with obstinate persistency, led to no result which could alter the course of the battle. Fresh proof was given that the employment of cavalry, which frequently exhibited decisive results in the battles of Napoleon I., is impossible against the precise and rapid fire of infantry of the present day, and can only be termed, a sacrifice of this arm. It may be that the cavalry attack at Sedan originated chiefly in a feeling of proud shame, which would not suffer the infantry and artillery alone to devote themselves to death.

After these desperate efforts had also failed, whole detachments of the French Army retired upon Sedan, and for the most part gave up the fight.

Considerable masses had been taken prisoners during the combat.

The German artillery now commanded the field of battle from all sides, and produced the greatest confusion amongst the troops both in and outside the fortress.

Towards 3 o'clock in the afternoon, General Wimpffen conceived the plan of attempting to break through at some spot, with a resolute body of 3000 men, in order to deliver the Emperor from the enclosing circle of the German Armies. But the Emperor having been present in person upon the field of battle for a long time, was convinced of the hopelessness of such an attempt, and did not consent to this plan. General Wimpffen, seeing that a capitulation was unavoidable, tendered his resignation. The Emperor did not accede to his request, and addressed a letter to the General in which he expressed his acknowledgement of his services.

At 3 o'clock, (v. the map) the circle of the German Armies was drawn together so closely round the French Army, that the only apparent remaining choice lay between capitulation and destruction. The heavy battery at Fresnois opened fire upon the town, and after only 20 minutes, the falling shells produced conflagrations in different parts.

The King perceiving the desperate situation of the conquered enemy, decided to offer capitulation. He ordered the firing to cease, and sent off Lieutenant Colonel von Bronsart of the Staff as a parlementaire, with the summons for the surrender of the army and the fortress. This parlementaire was met directly by a Bavarian officer, who brought the news to the King that a French parlementaire had appeared at the gate of Sedan.

Simultaneously, therefore, with the King's decision to offer capitulation, the Emperor Napoleon had intended to propose commencing negotiations. When Lieutenant Colonel von Bronsart asked in Sedan, for the Commander in Chief, to his astonishment he was brought before the Emperor, whose presence in Sedan was not known for certain on the German side, although it was conjectured.

In reference to the royal summons for a capitulation, Lieutenant Colonel von Bronsart was then referred to General Wimpffen, and the Emperor wrote a letter to the King in which he surrendered himself as prisoner of war. The imperial Adjutant General, Reille, reached the King with this dispatch at 7 o'clock in the evening, just after von Bronsart, who was somewhat in advance of him, had communicated the presence of the Emperor.

In this memorable moment the war had reached a crisis. The Imperial armies were vanquished. Whilst one, confined between the forts of Metz, had lost all communication with the rest of the country, the other now stood under the German guns, at the mercy of the conqueror.

The object for which the French Emperor had begun the war — moral and material compensation to the empire for the success of Königgrätz — must now be regarded as definitively wrecked. To restore peace on the other hand, if possible under acceptable terms, must now be recognised as the object to be desired.

That this peace did not follow, after such decisive events, is owing to the circumstances, which at this moment, separated the interests of France from those of the Empire.

After the King had given General Reille a letter for the Emperor containing his acceptance of the Imperial sword, and at the same time had verbally laid emphasis upon the disarmament of the French army as a primary condition, he gave over the charge of the diplomatic and military negotiations to the Chancellor of the Confederation and the Chief of the Staff, and repaired to Vendresse for the night, amid the rejoicings of his troops.

Generals von Moltke and de Wimpffen remained together in Donchéry until the evening of the 1st of September.

They came however, to no agreement. The French General could not consent to the conditions offered, which included the imprisonment of the whole army. He returned to Sedan and summoned all the Corps Commanders and Divisional Generals to a council of war. In this 30 votes out of 32 pronounced against the resumption of hostilities. General de Wimpffen had been out of favour with his Imperial master before the war; he had only been recalled to the army after the day of Gravelotte. Upon his report, perhaps on account of his urgency — French sources speak of stormy scenes between him and Napoleon — the Emperor decided in the night; to enter into negotiations personally with Count Bismarck.

Early on the following morning, in the cottage of a weaver near Donchéry, *a conference of several hours took place between the Emperor and the Chancellor*, in which General von Moltke at times took part. What passed here has not, up to the present day, been made known. Hot words may probably have fallen on Napoleon's side.

It can well be imagined, that the conclusion of peace was discussed; the demands however, which Count Bismarck put before the vanquished Emperor, could not have appeared acceptable to him.

Even after the first battles round Metz the French press made use of the phrase, so often repeated later: "France is rich enough to pay for her misfortune"; after the panic in Paris on

the 7th of August, they had accustomed themselves to own the possibility of a disastrous war. "Money but not a foot of land" was their motto.

- The state of affairs was now altered. The unprecedented and extremely rapid successes, entitled the royal General and his counsellors to require *more than money as the price of victory* won by German strength, and the quantity of blood shed, laid them under an obligation, to demand *the country of their own tongue, which had been lost through German weakness, two hundred years before.*

Napoleon was unwilling to give his consent in authorisation of such terms, which hard as they might be, would have spared France a humiliation unexampled in her history. He probably felt convinced that a peace which dismembered French territory would make his dynasty impossible, and therefore referred the peace negotiations to the Empress Regent. That is to say, *he refused the peace*, for the coming events which upset the regency, allowed themselves to be easily foreseen.

Thus General Wimpffen found himself obliged before midday, to conclude with General Moltke the memorable *capitulation of Sedan.*

This served later as a type for most of the other capitulations; its tenor is as follows:

Art. 1. The French Army, under the Chief command of General Wimpffen, surrender, as prisoners of war, being at the present time enclosed in Sedan, by superior forces.

Art. 2. In consideration of the brave defence made by this French army, all generals, officers and officials with the rank of officers are here excepted, as soon as they have given in writing their word of honour not to take up arms again until the conclusion of the present war, and in no way to act against the interests of Germany. The officers and officials who accept these conditions, retain their arms and the personal effects belonging to them.

Art. 3. All arms and war material, consisting of colours, eagles, cannon, ammunition &c., will be given up in Sedan to a military commission, appointed by the French

General, who will be held immediately responsible for them to the German commissioners.

Art. 4. The fortress of Sedan is to be placed at the disposal of his Majesty the King of Prussia, in its present condition, and at the latest, on the evening of the 2nd of September.

Art. 5. The officers who do not enter into the engagement mentioned in Art. 2., will be disarmed as well as the troops, and ordered to surrender according to their regiments or corps in military order. This measure will be commenced on the 2nd of September and completed on the 3rd. These detachments will be conducted on to the ground which is bounded by the Meuse at Iges, in order to be given up to the German commissioners, by the officers, who will then hand over their commands to their non-commissioned officers. The army surgeons, without exception, will remain behind for the care of the wounded.

Given at Fresnois, on the 2nd September 1870.

von Moltke. Count Wimpffen.

The interview which took place *between the two Monarchs* at the Chateau Bellevue, on the road from Sedan to Donchéry (v. the map), did not occur until after this capitulation had been signed. It only lasted for a quarter of an hour; immediately after, the captive Emperor, accompanied at his own request, by a Prussian escort, went by Belgium to Wilhelmshöhe, the residence appointed for him.

The carrying out of the capitulation commenced forthwith. The French Army, without means of subsistence for two days, crowded together in the narrow streets and fortifications in and round Sedan, already presented a picture of complete disorganization.

Of the 140,000 soldiers with which Mac Mahon had begun his march to the north, a small part, about 10,000 men, had escaped to Mézières and over the Belgian frontier, about 20,000 dead and wounded covered the battle field, above 20,000 had been taken prisoners during the fight, and through the capitulation, 39 generals, 230 field officers, 2095 subaltern officers,

excluding 500 released on parole, and 84,433 men, became prisoners of war.

400 field guns, including 70 mitrailleuses, and 150 guns of position belonging to the fortress of Sedan, were amongst the large quantity of material captured.

France's last army in the field was destroyed.

This enormous success called forth the most general rejoicings in Germany; the end of the war was looked upon as imminent. These hopes were doomed to disappointment.

The Republic which raised itself upon the ruins of the overthrown Empire, entered upon the fatal inheritance of this war.



SECOND PART.
THE WAR WITH THE REPUBLIC.

SEVENTH CHAPTER.

THE MILITARY SITUATION OF FRANCE AFTER THE CATASTROPHE OF SEDAN.

What means had France at her command for prosecuting the war, after the Empire had been overthrown, and the men, who previously had formed the opposition, had usurped the reins of government on the 4th of September, in order to carry on the war to the uttermost?

What was the military situation of France?

A victorious *German army*, of 240,000 men, confident of victory, was marching upon the capital; the cavalry of their advanced guards was already scouring the country within a few days march of Paris. A second army of the same strength, was on the Moselle, and kept the strongest fortress in France and her only army, closely surrounded; a hundred thousand German warriors held the captured frontier country, and were gradually enclosing all the fortified places between the Rhine and Paris. The important fortress of Strasburg had nearly succumbed; 180,000 men of the Landwehr were on the march from Germany, and arriving by degrees in the theatre of war; lastly, over 200,000 troops stood in readiness, in Germany, to replace casualties.

On the other hand, a French army in the field did not exist. There were still about 25,000 infantry, 2500 cavalry and 50 guns of the Imperial army, disposable for employment in France; the rest could not, possibly, be withdrawn from Algiers. There were besides, a great number of depôts, from which bodies of troops could be formed in case of need, and had already been

formed to some extent. The old soldiers and officers of the empire, who had served out their time, could be again enrolled. Then the Garde Mobile could be brought into the field; a large number of men, who, however, at first, bore very small resemblance to serviceable troops; lastly the Garde Nationale, a combative element, whose fitness for war was certainly very doubtful.

There was a great scarcity of arms and horses; many of the rifles were of obsolete construction.

France, nevertheless, possessed numerous and very strong fortresses, which might be able to hold out the enemy until an army was formed out of the undrilled, unarmed but numerous forces, capable, with superior handling, of offering some resistance to the German armies. The credit of France sufficed for the purchase of arms and horses, and lastly, her geographical formation offered very favourable elements for a prolonged defence.

Under these circumstances, the new Republican government formed the plan of prosecuting the war against the powerfully developed strength of Germany.

men, who had usurped the reins of government on the 4th of September, in the face of the most dangerous elements of revolt by which it was threatened, were some of France's best, with the exception of Rochefort and a few insignificant individuals, and to them is due the merit of having, by their usurpation, made the dominion of the Communists, at that time, impossible. They were patriots, they loved their country, and were ready to sacrifice themselves for it, but—they possessed neither the judgment, nor the power of *governing*, under the difficult circumstances in which France was then placed. In order to remain at the head, they were obliged to carry the tendencies of public opinion, by which they were supported and entirely borne, too far; republicans through conviction, and without being also endowed with special statesmanlike qualities, they confounded the means with the end, and pursued republican chimeras, under the delusion that they were serving France. At a later period, after having tasted the sweetness of command, a pure lust of power was, in a few, added to their other faults.

A great country possesses rich resources, and France was

quite one of the richest countries in Europe. A great power has further, by its very nature and properties, the advantage of carrying within itself such an immense amount of strength, even after severe defeats, that its victorious opponent would willingly, be satisfied with a cheap peace, contenting himself with the maintenance of his right to secure himself against future danger. For he knows, that a complete destruction of the conquered enemy is accompanied by immense sacrifices upon his own side, and for a long time to come renders a salutary intimacy, in every relation, impossible.

Modern times have to some extent departed from the principle of former days, that a nation's strength is founded in its neighbour's weakness, and statesmen begin to discern that in destroying the prosperity of a neighbouring state, the prosperity of a good customer is also ruined. The Prussian government, the most enlightened of all, certainly never entertained the foolish plan, imputed to it by French organs, of forcing France to the level of a second rate power.

The means of resistance which France still possessed after the capitulation of Sedan, were quite adapted to serve as the basis of a peace, which, although probably painful, would not have been destructive to the state, and the republican government, whose supporters in the legislative body had pleaded so zealously against the war before its commencement, would now have found the most favourable opportunity of offering the hand of peace, whilst imputing all the blame to the Empire.

The members of the new government were, doubtless, not altogether impervious to this view of the case. Whilst the approach of the Germans and the investment of Paris was being effected, a step was taken, by the more moderate among them, which had peace for its aim. The clever parliamentary speaker, *Jules Favre*, appeared several times at the German head-quarters for negotiations with Count Bismarck. These were, however, broken off chiefly upon the same grounds as those which had wrecked the negotiations with Napoleon on the 2nd of September. The men of the 4th of September, had started with the phrase: "*Ni un pouce de notre territoire, ni une pierre de nos forteresses!*"

and from Belleville the echo sounded: "*Ni un écu de notre trésor!*" Then, the republican government would not take upon itself the blame of a separation of territory, in opposition to the French people, deeply wounded in their vanity, and systematically deceived, because in so doing they foresaw their own fall.

The welfare of the whole of great France now fell a victim to the aims of the republican party, just as it had, previously, been sacrificed to the interests of the Bonaparte dynasty. This arose from an internal need; it was the consequence of centuries of a perverted system of government, the terrible result of which was, that no government was able to maintain itself which did not invest the state with external brilliancy.

In this state of affairs, it became the sacred duty of the German government to obtain secure guarantees for the conclusion of a lasting peace; concessions, which might, perhaps, have been practicable if opposed to a strong government and sound state, could not be made to the ephemeral company of the Hôtel de Ville.

This unhappy France had to reap in full measure the bitter fruits of long accumulated faults; the ship of state was driven, rudderless, in the storm among rocks. Under a complete misapprehension of their task, with unparalleled wantonness and haughty boasting, the extreme party, whose soul was *Gambetta*, soon began a work which, in a short time, troubled and exhausted the best sources of the nation's prosperity, and uprooted the foundation of moral and state order.

In order to inflame the nation for the prosecution of the war, a system of lies on a grand scale, was commenced; the successes of the German arms were denied or lessened and their own situation was placed in a favourable light. This however, was managed in such a short-sighted and unskilful manner, that, very soon, the infallible consequences produced by state lies showed themselves in general mistrust and fear.

In order to collect the large armies which were required, the levy of soldiers was carried to excess, and men were assembled in great numbers in the camps, and led to the battle fields, some

of whom were unfit for fighting; and others were taken from civil positions, from which they could ill be spared without considerable detriment to the productive strength of the country. Thus, at first despondency, then general indifference, indolence and negligence gained ground amongst a population, previously famed for its diligence and industrial tastes.

In order to strengthen and confirm their irregularly established government, the rulers of the National Defence gradually loosened all the bands of order, which had been imposed by the former government, (although at the beginning still making use of the old system, but with new members), and made as it were a clear course, on which all the elements, bad and good, raged in unfettered confusion. They appealed to the sympathies of all the countries of Europe, but especially to the sympathies of all republican parties, and at home they called up all the strength and talent, for an unlimited concurrence in the defence of the country.

This produced extraordinary activity and exertion, but at the same time, great confusion and want of design. Not only the generality of the parties, but also all restless spirits, believed that the time and opportunity had arrived, each for himself to make capital out of his own views.

In the general disorder, adventurers were attracted from all the principal countries, in order to seek their own advantage, either by serving their factions, by pursuing selfish and ambitious plans or only by robbery and plunder. With them came to light all those dark existences of the disordered country itself, who, from time to time, are obliged to conceal themselves from a strong government, in the hiding places of the great towns, and are only heard of, now and then, on the discovery of secret papers and a conspiracy. These men now emerged and formed bands of thieves and robbers, or became the heads of factions, in order to begin, later, the war of the Commune against the bourgeoisie.

And hardly less, was the state injured by those more nobly constituted, but unpractical natures, who now enthusiastically urged their chimerical ideas, with proposals and plans, and perplexing interference, in the arrangements of the officials and generals.

That amid such disturbing influences, and under an incapable Chief Direction, a considerable resistance should, nevertheless, have been offered to the German armies, for almost five months longer, is an evidence of the amount of military feeling and of the many resources which France still possessed, and, on the other hand, shows how favourable the geographical and political position of the country was for a defensive war.

With regard to the latter, three points are conspicuous, as of essential moment. *In the first place, the importance of Paris.* This giant city was so completely the central point of the whole of France, where, without exception, all the threads of government and administration met together, and no possibility of any alteration in this respect had ever been taken into consideration, that the occupation of this capital, appeared to the enemy to be indispensably necessary for the conclusion of the war. The Capital was, however, not only of the highest importance as the centre of the state, but it was also a fortress of such strength that its conquest required an unusual exertion of power; it needed such a vast army to enclose it, that comparatively few troops were left for other operations.

Secondly, Bazaine's Army and the fortress of Metz, formed an important factor in every calculation of the eventualities of the war. These two means of strength, united together, hung like a heavy weight on all the operations of the Germans in the west. They represented a great combined force, which required the continual pressure of 200,000 men in order to prevent a dangerous explosion for the Germans.

So long as Metz held out, the armies which opposed the advance of the Germans in the west, or moved on for the relief of Paris, had always a powerful ally in rear of the enemy.

The third substantial support of the defence, was the long line of advantageously placed sections of country, extending from Le Mans, by Orleans, along the course of the Loire as far as the mountains of the Côte d'Or, to the plateau of Langres and to the Vosges, and ending at the still unconquered Strasburg. Upon this whole line, which continually skirted the

lines of communications of the advancing German forces, armies could be united which would find powerful assistance from the extensive country in their rear, and find secure points of support in the nature of the ground. These armies rendered it necessary that the German lines of communication from the Rhine to Paris should be strongly occupied, and thus weakened the German armies destined for further operations, and, as soon as they had obtained a certain amount of organization and strength, even threatened the investing army round Paris.

Again, in consequence of its having been proclaimed "the people's war", a state of general insecurity had been created in the provinces already occupied by the Germans, rendering the employment of troops everywhere necessary, especially in the mountainous and woody country of Lorraine and the north of Champagne. The safety of the Etappen stations and the transport escorts, employed a large number of troops, which reduced the effective strength of the corps in battle.

Lastly, the whole of northern France is dotted with fortresses of different size and importance, which served as points of appui to the resistance, as places of refuge to the bands of *Francs-Tireurs*, as well as troublesome checks in the way of the German lines of communication. The conquest of all these fortified places was essential, and required a considerable expenditure of troops and gun material.

To take advantage of these favourable opportunities for defence, this great country, of almost forty millions of inhabitants, offered a sufficient number of men who could be made into soldiers by military art. In fact, the government succeeded in bringing together a very numerous army, certainly of a very diversified character, and generally, of very little value in a military point of view.

The active forces of France, at the beginning of September, may be divided into the following large bodies.

Of regular troops, only an insignificant number still remained in the field.

Of Infantry there were only seven regiments, and three battalions left, viz. first, the 16th, 38th, 39th and 42nd Regiments of the

Line and the Foreign Regiment, as well as three battalions of Zephirs (Light Infantry, a kind of petal detachment). These, with the exception of the Zephirs, had already been brought over into France from Algiers. Secondly, the 35th and 42nd Regiments of the Line, which had come from Civita Vecchia.

Of *Cavalry*, there were still five regiments of the line existing, the 1st and 2nd Chasseurs and the 8th Hussars, which had, at first, been left in Algiers; the 7th and 8th Chasseurs, which had remained on the Spanish frontier in the beginning.

Of *Artillery*, in formed bodies, there was only one regiment, consisting of eight batteries, disposable; this had been brought over from Algiers.

For the *formation of regular troops*, the *depôts* were the first available means.

There were 114 Infantry *depôts* of 6 companies, 21 Jäger *depôts* of 2 companies, 60 cavalry *depôts* of 1 squadron, and 21 Artillery *depôts* of 400 men, in existence, besides *depôts* of Engineers and Train.

To these foundations other soldiers were added, those who had served their time, partly reserves, partly old soldiers who had been released from all duty in the service, but were now re-engaged, as well as the recruits who had been drawn in. Out of all these troops assembling at the *depôts*, *four battalions* were formed at first, and from these battalions, *Infantry Regiments de Marche*, consisting of three battalions, were formed. Of these regiments, however, four belonging to the 12th Corps had already fallen into captivity at Sedan.

Altogether, there were formed from such troops: of *Infantry*, 56 regiments and 14 battalions (Jäger battalions de marche); of *Cavalry*, 8 cavalry regiments de marche, 4 Zouave and 1 Algerian Tirailleur regiment de marche; a second foreign regiment was also formed at a later period, composed of all sorts of elements. At the beginning of the new epoch in the war the *Artillery* was very deficient in gun material; there were however, a tolerable number of soldiers belonging to that branch.

Thus there could be formed from 150,000 to 200,000 men, who received the name of "regular troops" as a distinction, although the greater part could not raise a very high claim to

the qualifications of such troops, solidity in organization, discipline, and well grounded instruction in the use of arms.

Next to these troops, there were some tactical bodies composed as follows:

A *provisional Zouave regiment* in Paris, formed from the dispersed men of the old Zouave regiments, further three regiments of *mixed cavalry*, and lastly the regiments formed of the Gendarmes in Paris, 1 of foot and 2 of horse. Altogether perhaps 6000 men.

The contingent formed from the *Marine* service must next be mentioned, as a really capable and serviceable element for the defence of the country. The personal state of the whole fleet, including the colonial troops, mechanics and harbour workmen amounted to about 100,000 men. It is true that a considerable portion of the marine infantry had been annihilated at Sedan, but there were still about 6000 men remaining, and in addition to these certainly 20,000 sailors yet for disposal. These men not only formed excellent troops for serving the heavy guns, but were also employed in battalions in the fight.

With regard to all the other active forces, we can only give approximate numbers, as their strength was subject to great fluctuations according to circumstances. In the *first line* must be named the *mobile Garde Nationale*, also called the *Garde Mobile*. This force, according to the organization laws of the 1st of February 1868, ought to have amounted to 550,000 men. The laws of organization, however, never acquired real vital power, and the number of Gardes Mobiles who allowed themselves to be engaged to carry arms during the period up to the 2nd of September 1870, will not be set too low at 400,000. These troops were formed in battalions and regiments, and also possessed artillery. Of cavalry, however, they had none.

Secondly, there was a *mobilised part of the established Garde Nationale*, that is to say, those Gardes Nationaux employed on detachments outside their native places, but who were properly destined for the defence of their native towns. These troops were formed into Legions, but there were, probably, not more than 50,000 men altogether.

A very large proportion of the armed troops was formed, *thirdly*, by the established *Garde Nationale (Garde Sédentaire)*. Yet it is impossible to give their numbers, because they appeared in no regular formations, and also very frequently changed their character and played the part of peaceful citizens. In Paris alone, during the siege, the armed men of the *Garde Nationale* exceeded 300,000 men.

In the *fourth* place, there were different *Legions*, some composed of natives, such as that of Colonel Charette, from the former Papal Zouaves, and others formed of foreigners like Garibaldi's. It is also impossible to give an estimate of these forces. Only this much can be maintained, that, when Garibaldi's Legion was at its strongest, and united with several bands of *Francs-Tireurs*, he had about 30,000 men under his command.

Lastly, in the *fifth* place these *Francs-Tireurs* represented a means of war, which generally showed itself only in small bodies, but here and there also in bands of hundreds up to thousands. Their number is beyond all reckoning. To these the summons in the press referred, calling upon every one to kill one of the enemy whenever an opportunity offered.

A wide field of activity was thus opened for the imagination of the rich as well as for the hatred of the whole people, and many associations, in the most wonderful costumes and with seditious laws, joined the large masses of the poorer classes who went out in a more simple manner to kill.

It is certain that not only all penniless vagrants, the proletarians of the plains and the towns, formed the nucleus of the *Franc Tireur* bands, but also many a foolish and beguiled or intimidated peasant, many a young man, in misguided patriotism, also associated himself with these lawless, robbing and murdering hordes, which finally became more dangerous to the proprietary class of France than the German troops.

On the 2nd of November 1870 the delegation in Tours issued a decree, that *all men from 20 to 40 years of age were to be enrolled in the army.*

What success accompanied this measure will be shown in the

description of the fighting on the Loire, in the north and in the east.

The active forces of France composed of such a varied assemblage, already allowed a conclusion to be formed, as to the *kind of warfare* that would now be developed. Indeed the observer who investigates the war against the Imperial army, with a shudder on account of the enormous sacrifice of human life, whilst however delighting in its military grandeur, finds in the battles of the later period, a prevailing miserable spectacle and turns, with horror, from the single, bloody encounters, which spread beyond the limits of the battle fields, to the fields, woods, villages and upon all the roads.

The *War Direction of the Germans*, remained as grand as before. Its hosts, now increased to 800,000 warriors, covered France's territory, and pressing forward without a pause, pursued great aims only with inexorable consistency, and without one unnecessary step; its art of war always stood as high as its policy, whose fixed and exalted aims it invariably served.

But the undrilled, badly organized masses of French troops, almost without guidance, were no longer able to offer the spectacle of a scientific and tenacious struggle with the enemy, which the tactics of the Imperial troops had done; it is true that they were often thrown upon the decisive spot by able generals, but even in battle, when considerably superior to the enemy in numbers, the French army resembled for the most part a flock of sheep being driven against the wolf. They certainly did not lack courage; they attacked and attacked again, but they did not understand making use of cover, neither did they understand how to take advantage of favourable chances in the fight, and the unrelenting sword of the practised warrior destroyed them; they fell in great numbers, the rest fled, and the prisoners could scarcely be counted.

And very frequently, the German officer and soldier, through the frenzied warfare of the people, unacquainted with the first principles of war, and all the rules for ameliorating its horrors, were forced to have recourse to fire and the sword, whilst their hearts bled for the wretched sacrifice, old men, women and children, whose welfare, means of existence, and whose lives were devoured by the war.

That the kind of war which commenced from this time, did not lead to general barbarity and savagery is a proof of the high point of cultivation attained by both nations, the French as well as the Germans, but especially of the excellent discipline in the German army.

In a long war even the best troops lose pure enthusiasm, the nobler feelings are blunted, war becomes a customary employment, and the mind is chiefly directed to material welfare. When to this is added, the constant betrayal of the confidence which the soldier placed in the citizens and the peasantry, when the forbearance shown towards the host of his quarters is converted into a means for his own destruction, then his good disposition is transformed into mistrust and exasperation, and he begins to impoverish and ill use the population. It required all the noble elements, of which the German army could boast, to maintain such admirable discipline for so long a time.

That the French government was enabled to provide these multitudes called up for battle, with a more or less good *equipment and armament*, is owing to the advantageous coast formation of the country, which enabled large stores to be imported from England and America and landed at several points from whence they could be forwarded inland. France's manufactories of arms alone, would have been insufficient to have increased the existing stores to such an extent as was necessary for the prosecution of the war. It is true that Paris, no longer able to import after the 19th of September, was chiefly furnished with home-made guns and rifles, or with those in possession before the war, but almost everything which the country and the fleet could produce had, also, been conveyed there. The rest of the troops, raised in the further course of the war, were for the most part, furnished with English and American arms. As early as the 17th of September an English newspaper, "The Daily News," brought precise intelligence of 400,000 rifles of the newest construction, such as Martini-Henry, Snider, Remington and 30 millions of cartridges, of which part were in the course of construction on French commission, and part were ready, and on the point of delivery at Dover, Folkestone, Newhaven and Liverpool, for the purpose of being trans-

ported to the French harbours. England, only, was concerned in this and it occurred as early as the 17th of September. Numberless supplies of rifles, revolvers and cannon followed these first consignments, and they were accompanied by large quantities of articles of equipment, such as, shoes, clothes, and leather. Horses were imported from Algiers. In the autumn months of 1870, the equipment of the greater part of the French troops was comparatively inferior—rifles of old construction converted into muzzle loaders, and but little artillery; the number of detachments supplied with good modern rifles, was, however, always increasing, and in the battles which took place later in the winter, there was by no means any deficiency in artillery. In cavalry the Germans always remained numerically superior; yet this branch of the service was of less importance in the winter, than it had been in the previous summer, because the ground was frequently rendered impracticable by snow and ice. It can also be easily understood that the other cavalry duties, patrols, reconnaissances and dispatch service, were much impeded by the universally organized guerilla warfare. In many districts, especially in the south, on the Loire and at Le Mans, enemies were concealed in every thicket, and marksmen lurked in all the houses, who endangered single horsemen and small patrols; even the peasant in the field carried his gun and fired upon the enemy, although seeing his own destruction before his eyes.

The German operations, after the capitulation of Sedan had the following aims:

The conquest of Paris was considered the most important object. For this end the armies of the two Crown Princes, under the personal direction of the King, moved straight towards this capital, from Sedan.

To bring about the capitulation of Metz, and of Marshal Bazaine, was of the next importance: and for this purpose Prince Frederick Charles remained behind, with more than eight Army Corps, for the investment of both.

Then, the whole of Alsace had to be conquered, and above

all the fortress of Strasburg, the most important place in this province. This charge had been committed to General von Werder.

Lastly, the lines of communication from Germany to Alsace and Lorraine, and further to the west as far as Paris, must not only be thoroughly secured from all attacks of the enemy, but freed from all obstructions, and prepared for the transport of reinforcements, provisions, ammunition, and siege guns for Paris. For this it was important that all the fortresses between the Rhine and Paris should be taken, especially the fortress of Toul, which barred the principal railroad, and also, that all the Etappen roads should be strongly occupied. This duty fell chiefly to the share of the Landwehr, and the charge of carrying out the most important operations in this radius, was especially entrusted to the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, with the 17th Division, to which other Divisions were allotted, sometimes of Landwehr, sometimes of Line, according as they were required.

In opposition to these plans, the French government endeavoured, first of all, to place Paris in as perfect a state of defence as possible. Almost all the disposable troops, line, sailors, and Gardes Mobiles, were assembled here; the heavy guns of the fleet were used for arming the forts; the existing fortifications were strengthened as much as possible, and new temporary works erected; provisions were collected in enormous quantities.

Then, new armies destined for the relief of Paris, were formed to the south of the Loire, and in the provinces of Artois and Picardy in the north, as well as in Normandy and Brittany in the west.

Lastly, in Burgundy and Franche Comté, a petty warfare was organized under Garibaldi's Direction, for the purpose of interrupting the communications of the German armies with their base of operations. The hopes of the French defensive rested upon a long resistance being made by Metz and Paris. So long as Metz held out, there was always the possibility of beating the enemy before Paris by overpowering numbers. Paris had to hold out against an army of from 300,000 to 400,000 men, until the armies of relief were organized and fit for battle.

Thus the successful defence of Paris, was the final aim of the French defensive, just as the conquest of this city was the ultimate object of the German offensive.

After the capitulation of Sedan, the whole war, including both the battles in the field and all the siege operations, resolved itself into a contest for Paris.

As the capitulation of Metz forms the peculiar crisis of this long and complicated military process, the development of the important and extensive fighting round this fortress until its fall, will be given first, in the following narration; whilst the closing event, and the consequences resulting from the capitulation, will appear in their corresponding places in the war round Paris.

An account will then follow of the contests around the lines of communication, as well as those for the possession of Alsace and Lorraine, especially the conquest of Strasburg; then the siege of Paris at its different periods, the capitulation of Paris, and the attempts made for its relief.

The description of the siege of Belfort, and General von Werder's conflicts with the French eastern army, as well as the fall of Belfort, will form the conclusion.

EIGHTH CHAPTER.

THE INVESTMENT OF METZ.

Marshal Bazaine had hardly withdrawn his army after the murderous battle of Gravelotte, under the secure shelter of the forts of Plappeville and St. Quentin; scarcely had he begun to restore order to the thinned and shaken masses, when the bayonets of the German outposts, already, appeared upon the heights on the left bank of the Moselle, which he had vainly endeavoured to defend on the 18th of August, and along the whole length of the hilly horizon as far as the eye could reach, whilst the muzzles of German cannon were turned threateningly down upon the conquered army, from the débouchés and the plateaux.

The Marshal pushed forward his reconnaissances towards his opponents across the Moselle, in an easterly direction, to Mercy-le-Haut and Noisseville, where he had previously fought on the 14th, and searched the country along the course of the river to the north and south. Everywhere his patrols came upon the enemy. Everywhere the same spectacle. A circle of observation posts, composed of foot and horse, surrounded the whole of the great fortress with its outer forts, in a close line; behind these, the outposts were encamped in small thickets, in folds of the ground, and in deserted buildings which had been loopholed; and in a third line pick-axes and shovels were at work strengthening the line of supports and securing them against an attack. Batteries were erected, trees were cut down at the edges of the woods to form barricades, in open places entrenchments were thrown up, the adjacent villages were transformed into fortresses, and each single wall and

building was prepared for defence. The railroad to Thionville had been destroyed, and the bridges over the Orne broken up.

The consequences of the Marshal's dilatory, undecided generalship, now stood clear and terrible before his eyes. *He was enclosed in the fortress with his whole Army.* In the early morning of the 19th of August, he had, at first, in all silence withdrawn his corps into a curved line, which still encompassed the heights of Plappeville and St. Quentin, and extended from Longeville by Sey and Lessy to Lorry, Coupillon, and finally, on the right flank, as far as the front of the Moselle fort. On the 20th, these lines were still more contracted; the Garde was drawn back to the eastern slope of St. Quentin, the 4th Corps to Tignomont, and the 3rd Corps placed in rear of the forts of St. Quentin and Plappeville. The 6th Corps remained in the valley in front of the Moselle fort, the 2nd at Longeville. On the 22nd three Divisions of the 3rd Corps moved on to the right bank, and the fourth Division soon after; and upon this bank entrenched works were commenced between the forts of St. Julien and Queulen, similar to those which had already been set on foot on the left bank. For the Marshal now considered it of great importance to fortify his position against attacks by the Germans, until an opportunity presented itself of breaking through. This in any case, was very difficult to accomplish.

On the west side, which was Bazaine's natural line of retreat, a *break through* was quite impracticable. Here, the country was most unfavourable, hills stood in his front like a wall. To march down the valley towards Thionville, was likewise hardly feasible, because an army on the march could be reached and destroyed by a flank fire from the heights on both banks of the river. In the same way towards the south-east, the ground formed obstacles to a break through. The only possibility of escape was towards the *north-east*. Here the even undulations of the country, on a tolerably extended scale from the river to Colombey, would allow the development of the army with a wider front, and although in this direction the departure would lead towards Luxemburg instead of into the interior of France, yet the acquisition of the plateau of Ste. Barbe would be a first and most important step towards

their deliverance, which could be followed up by further operations against the flanks of the investing army. Was this manœuvre, however, practicable? What was the strength of the investing army?

As yet Bazaine was not completely isolated, he succeeded in getting single messengers through the German lines, who conveyed reports to the Emperor and brought back news, and in the same wavering manner, with the same absence of self confidence, that he had previously exhibited in the guidance of the army, the Marshal depended upon deliverance from without, instead of trusting to himself alone, and to the capabilities of his own army.

"The Emperor was endeavouring to send him help; Mac Mahon was on the march to his relief with a new army. The German Armies too, must take precautions against Mac Mahon's Army; it was impossible that all their forces could be united round Metz. An energetic sortie, carried out in combination with Mac Mahon's attack from outside, must make a way of escape from this terrible situation."

On the 19th of August, Bazaine informed the Emperor: "The Army is formed upon the left bank of the Moselle from Longeville to Sansonnet and describes a curved line, passing through the heights of Ban St. Martin in rear of the Forts St. Quentin and Plappeville. The troops are fatigued by the incessant fighting which has not allowed them two or three days rest to supply to some extent, their material wants. The King of Prussia was in Rezonville to-day with Moltke, and every thing indicates that the Prussians will enclose Metz. I still intend to get away towards the north, to Montmédy, upon the St. Ménéhould and Châlons road, if it is not too strongly occupied. In this case I shall turn towards Sedan and even towards Mézières in order to reach Châlons."

On the 20th of August he informed the Emperor:

"My troops still hold the same positions. The enemy appears to be erecting batteries, which are to be points of appui for the blockade. He is constantly receiving reinforcements. In Metz we have more than 16,000 wounded."

On the 22nd of August he informed the Minister of war:

"We are in Metz, we have provisions and ammunition. The enemy is continually accumulating more troops, and it appears to be his intention to enclose us. I have written to the Emperor who will have imparted to you my dispatch. I have received Mac Mahon's dispatch, and told him in reply what I hope to do in a few days."

This last message probably referred to Mac Mahon's information about the famous flank march, which came to an end at Sedan, and in consequence of which measures were commenced, after some days, to lend a helping hand to an attempt at relief, by the army advancing from Châlons.

Then, on the evening of the 25th of August, the Marshal first issued orders, with the object of a sortie upon a grand scale. These are worthy of notice, because, with some modifications, they were given out, at a later period for the battle which took place at Noisseville. They read thus:

"The 3rd Corps will leave one Division at Metz, which will take up a position towards Grigy, in front of Queulen. The three other Divisions, with the cavalry and artillery, will direct their march upon Noisseville, whilst keeping back their right wing, which will rest upon the road to Saarlouis; their left wing will come up to the Mey wood, upon the hill between Mey and Nouilly. The 4th Corps will place itself 1800 metres ($1\frac{1}{8}$ English miles) in front of Grimont, perpendicular to the road to Ste. Barbe, the right wing near the Mey wood, in connection with the 3rd Corps, the left wing 1200 metres ($\frac{3}{4}$ English miles) from Villers l'Orme, and the Cavalry pushed forward. The Corps will cross by the bridge above Chambière. The 6th Corps will take up a position in front of the Grimont wood behind Villers l'Orme, the right wing at equal height with the left wing of the 4th Corps, the left wing as far as the 216th mile stone, drawn back on the left of the Bouzonville road, and the cavalry in front of the bridge below Chambière. The 2nd Corps, will form a second line in rear of the 3rd Corps, with its right wing resting on the farm Belle-Croix, and its left on the heights upon the right side of the Vantoux ravine; it will take the road to Saarlouis, marching off through the Porte de France and then through the Porte des

Allemands. The cavalry Divisions of the 3rd and 2nd Corps, will place themselves upon the right flanks of their respective Corps, for employment as éclaireurs. The reserve Artillery and the companies of Engineers will follow their Corps, and place themselves in rear of the second bodies of each. The Garde, the reserve Cavalry and the Artillery of the Army Reserve, will take up a position between Fort St. Julien and the Grimont wood, à cheval of the road to Bouzonville, the left wing in rear of Châtillon, and the right wing directed towards the 2nd Corps. They will pass over the Chambière bridges after the 4th and 6th Corps, probably at 7.30 o'clock a.m. The head-quarters will be in the village of St. Julien. The whole of the Train and baggage will move towards Chambière.

The 6th Corps, will leave behind, in its lines, one infantry and one cavalry regiment, the 2nd Corps likewise, the 4th Corps one infantry regiment only, and the 3rd Corps one battalion at Montigny. These troops will show themselves as much as possible, and the cavalry will reconnoitre to the front.

The tendency of these arrangements was in short: The offensive of all the Corps massed together to the north-east, in the direction of Ste. Barbe and Malroy-Charly, for the purpose of opening the roads to Thionville, lying nearest to the Moselle, whilst demonstrations were made towards the east and west.

On the morning of the 26th, the execution of the movements commanded began, but met with several hindrances. The weather was cold and rainy from the commencement, so that the roads became heavy, and both men and horses suffered; then, of the two bridges newly built by the artillery, it was found that only one was serviceable for the transit of waggons, which caused considerable delay. Lastly, a violent storm with gales and torrents of rain came on, whilst the positions in front of St. Julien were being taken up in spite of it.

Under these difficult circumstances, Bazaine, considering his plan impracticable, assembled a council of war in the farm Grimont, and then commanded that the troops should again take up their original positions. The advanced troops had come into

contact with the German outposts; slight skirmishes had taken place, and all the German Corps upon the right bank of the Moselle had developed, in expectation of a battle—but the French did not attack; they returned to their old positions and remained quiet.

At the council of war held in the farm, Grimont, a consultation took place, (according to Bazaine's testimony,) not only upon the momentary situation of the army, but also upon the direction of affairs for the future. He arrived at the conclusion that it would be to the advantage of France, if the army remained, provisionally, in Metz. By that means 200,000 of the enemy were, at once, detained before Metz, and France gained time to organize further resistance; the fortress of Metz also required the army, in order to be able to defend herself; without the protection of the army, Metz would be unable to hold out for fourteen days.

Allowing that these assertions are correct, that council of war must, surely, have been obliged to acknowledge that the above named, beneficial results for the further resistance of France, would have been attained in a far higher degree by making a successful sortie, and conquering the Army of Investment, and as the investing army was rightly computed at 200,000 men, the question may, perhaps, be raised: Was the relative strength of the opposing armies such, that the French council of war was, already, obliged to forego the idea of victory?

The *Army of Investment*, under the Chief Command of Prince Frederick Charles, consisted of the First Army under the command of General von Steinmetz, viz. the I., VII. and VIII. Corps, besides the II., III., IX. and X. Corps of the Second Army, the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, and lastly Kummer's Reserve Division, with the 3rd Reserve Cavalry Brigade.

Altogether, eight-and-a-half Army Corps, and two-and-a-half Cavalry Divisions.

After the losses in the previous battles, which, in August, had not as yet been replaced (the reinforcements for the regiments only began to arrive in the middle of September), the strength of this Army, at most, was 200,000 men.

The French Army on the other hand, numbered 135,000 combatants*).

The German Corps stood in a circuit of about 7 miles ($32\frac{1}{2}$ English miles) round Metz, distributed upon both banks of the river, whilst the French Corps were united. Although on the German side numerous bridges had been laid over the river, and above all, no measures had been neglected which would facilitate rapid communication and mutual support of the Corps, yet the circumstance of their extent allowed the possibility of an attack being made from Metz against some part of the investment, with superiority in numbers, for many hours, over the opposing forces; so that by a skilful use of the advantages gained at the beginning, with a due reinforcement by reserves, the German line of defence might have been completely broken through, and even danger to the German flanks was not beyond the reach of possibility.

In fact the German Army was none too strong for its undertaking.

It is possible that the German Direction had estimated the French Army at 30,000 to 40,000 men below its actual strength, and for this reason a greater number of troops had not been left behind for the investment. This low estimate may have been caused by ignorance as to the presence of Lapasset's Brigade, of the 5th Corps, and especially by estimating the French losses too high.

*) According to the official accounts of the capitulation of Metz, which reckon the prisoners of war at 173,000, the strength should be set down as still higher; yet these estimates which are probably made out from the maintenance states, may also include the Garde Sedentaire etc., and thus do not show the combatants of the regular Army only. A good authority (Notes to the translation of "the war round Metz by a Prussian General," by a Staff Officer of the Rhine Army, — which are ascribed to Marshal Bazaine, himself) gives the strength of the French Army on the 14th of August at 168,000 men and 540 cannon, including 84 mitrailleuses, and the loss of the three battles on the 14th, 16th and 18th of August at 32,817 men, among whom were 1342 officers. The French authority also reckons those upon the maintenance states.

Public opinion in Germany, the press, which drew its information from the army, always estimated the invested army, at that time, at from 80—100,000 men, and indeed still lower. (The Prussian "Staatsanzeiger", expressed astonishment, in the beginning of October, at the inactivity of Marshal Bazaine, who, even at the moment of the blockade, had an army of 80,000 men under his command.)

It is, however, also possible, that the strength of Bazaine's Army was not underrated by the German Army Direction, and yet the investing army could not be strengthened, or this would have been done. By so doing the Third and Fourth Armies would have been weakened. Besides, dispositions had been made for the dispatch of troops to replace casualties, and for the concentration of a *new Army Corps*, on the Seille, under the command of the *Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin*; these reinforcements could not, however, arrive until the beginning and middle of September.

Thus, in regard to the numerical strength of the opponents, Bazaine's prospects of breaking through were not, originally, so very unfavourable, although the country, doubtless, was very difficult, and on the north-east side only, would allow of a proper development.

The opinion of the council of war, upon the power of resistance of the fortress of Metz, is very surprising. It was always considered the strongest place in France, and was the principal dépôt of the French Army; it had been rebuilt according to the latest principles in the art of fortification, surrounded with strong outer forts, and was naturally very favourably situated. But it has been proved without doubt, that as late as the 14th of August, the fortress was not in a condition capable of defence; that the forts were unarmed, and not completely finished in the interior. In the battle of Courcelles, single detachments of the German advanced troops, pressed forward, unhindered, up to the glacis of the forts.

It was besides decided, in the council of war, to establish partisan detachments both in the cavalry and the infantry, for

the purpose of fatiguing the enemy by *coups de main* and, at the same time, of raising the moral element of their own army.

On the 30th of August, the prospect of a successful attempt to break through appeared to be approaching. A messenger, who had been sent by Bazaine to the Emperor, returned with the following information:

"Your dispatch of the 19th, received in Rheims. I am moving in the direction of Montmédy; the day after tomorrow I shall have passed the Aisne, and then, acting according to circumstances, will come to your assistance."

Until now nothing had been lost. On the contrary, by sparing the army since the battle of Gravelotte, it had regained the solidity necessary for a powerful offensive. To undertake *the attack upon the investment*, in connection with Mac Mahon, offered the most favourable chances.

Bazaine undertook this attack.

BATTLE OF NOISSEVILLE.

On the 31st of August and 1st of September.

If, even previously, under normal conditions, an offensive attack from Metz had not been entirely without prospect of success, Mac Mahon's march towards the Meuse, in the last days of August, produced circumstances, which now gave a very favourable turn of affairs for Bazaine.

In order to oppose the probable attack of the Army of Châlons, in case the Third and Fourth Armies had not succeeded in stopping it, the *Army of Investment* had taken up a position, during the last days of August, which left but a comparatively small force for the investment proper, whilst strong masses were pushed forward to the north-west of Metz, in the direction of Montmédy and Longwy, as far as the line Verdun-Thionville, and beyond.

On the evening of the 30th of August, the Head-Quarters of the Army were in Malancourt.

The Army was disposed in the following manner:

The 25th (Hessian) Division stood beyond Pierrevillers, 2 miles ($9\frac{1}{2}$ English miles) from Metz; the 18th Division and the Artillery Corps of the IX. Corps beyond Roncourt, at the same distance.

The II. Corps was detached for observation towards Aumetz and Longuyon, about 5 miles ($27\frac{1}{2}$ English miles) to the north-west of Metz.

The III. Corps was at Doncourt and Cofnans, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the west of Metz.

The X. Corps was in reserve, in rear of the IX. Corps, in the neighbourhood of Marange. On the other hand, only the following divisions stood in the neighbourhood of Metz:

Kummer's Division in rear of the line Malroy--Charly, 1 mile ($4\frac{3}{5}$ English miles) north of Metz.

The 1st Infantry Division, in and behind the line Failly-Servigny-Noisseville, at the same distance to the north-east of the fortress.

Joining the left flank of these, the 2nd Infantry Division stood from Ars-Laquenexy as far as Mercy-le-Haut, which was occupied by the advanced troops.

The VII. Corps, *à cheval* of the Moselle, held the southern part of the line of investment.

The occupation of the whole of the western part, the left bank of the Moselle, devolved on the VIII. Corps.

Accordingly the tract of country most endangered, was the most favourable for Bazaine, from Malroy to Flanville, a line $\frac{5}{4}$ of a mile ($3\frac{2}{3}$ English miles) in length, and was occupied by only three Divisions, that is to say by barely 30,000 men; the other parts of the investment line were still more weakly occupied.

It is uncertain, whether Bazaine possessed accurate information as to the situation of affairs. At all events, his attack on the 31st of August was attempted at the right spot, namely where the country was favourable, and where there was a prospect of escaping to the north.

The weather improved on the 29th, after the rain had poured

down, unceasingly, on the 27th and 28th. In the mean time the 2nd Corps had been directed to Montigny, and had extended between the Moselle and Le Sablon, whilst Marshal Leboeuf took up a position with the right wing of his Corps resting upon the Seille.

On the morning of the 30th of August, the Corps Commandants who, for two days, had been in communication by telegraph with the head-quarters, were informed that an operation might, possibly, be carried out at 1 o'clock p.m. The issue of two days rations of biscuit and bacon, was ordered to be set on foot at once. These orders, with little secrecy, were widely promulgated in the corps, so that in a short time they were known throughout the whole camp and town. Towards 10 o'clock, however, it was communicated that the intended operations would be postponed, and finally, in the evening, dispositions were issued, similar to those for the 25th of August, but with the following modifications :

"The 3rd Corps will commence its movement at an early hour; its 3rd Division will remain in Metz. The 4th Corps will reach the Moselle at 6 o'clock, at the latest, and cross it by the three bridges simultaneously. The 6th Corps will, as anticipated, begin the passage at 7.15 o'clock, the Garde at 8.30 o'clock, the Artillery of the Army Reserve at 9.15 o'clock, and the reserve Artillery at 10 o'clock."

Accordingly the passage of the 3rd Corps (Garde, 4th and 6th) which were upon the left bank, was begun at 6 o'clock, on the morning of the 31st of August, by the three Moselle bridges, and the movement was completed at 5 o'clock in the evening. The Artillery of the Army Reserve, which, for some days past had been placed under the command of General Bourbaki, did not reach the plateau until 6 o'clock; the only troops which arrived after it was General Desveaux's Cavalry Corps, which had been formed on the 25th of August, from the Cavalry Division of the Garde, and from General Forton's reserve Cavalry Division; its strength was ten regiments.

It appears astounding and to have been a fault, that the artillery of the Army Reserve was not moved across *in front of*

the other Corps, whilst, just at the commencement, a sufficient artillery could not be employed in the German positions opposite.

In other respects the concentration of the army began at the right time. As early as 7.30 o'clock, the German outposts of the 1st Division, observed great masses of the enemy, forming up in position near the Forts St. Julien and Belle-Croix, with artillery in their front; at the same time the outposts of Kummer's Division discovered columns of the enemy, which were estimated at the strength of a Division; clouds of dust in the background, led to the conclusion that strong reserves were coming up.

The situation was a very hazardous one, for the Army of Investment.

At 8 o'clock in the morning, *Lebœuf's troops* occupied the positions assigned to them, namely three Infantry Divisions and the Cavalry *opposite Noisseville*, the right wing thrown back upon the Saarlouis road, and the left wing upon the hill between Nouilly and Mey. The 2nd Corps stood behind the 3rd, with the right wing near the farm Belle-Croix, and the left upon the hill of Vallières.

Within about an hour, the attack of the French might take place with a force of at least, 40,000 men. The German troops in the first line were insufficient to repulse them, and in all probability, would have to give up their first positions. Reinforcements for Kummer's Division and the 1st Corps could only arrive by degrees, after several hours, and indeed, owing to the provisional state of affairs, from the north side only; on the east and west the investment could not be slackened, because it was not known upon which side the attack was directed, nor whether the development towards the north was anything more than a demonstration.

Had the French 3rd and 2nd Corps been able to obtain reinforcements only quite gradually, yet at the same time uninterruptedly, and the sortie, even in the afternoon, been able take the form of a veritable break through of the whole Army, Bazaine's plan, of having all his Corps upon the right bank before attacking, may, certainly, be defended.

But the whole development lasted much too long, and the

morning and midday were spent in demonstrations, whilst the Germans could quietly take precautions to meet the attack.

At the commencement, the French sortie appeared to be especially directed towards the east. The columns, observed to the south of Fort St. Julien, Lapasset's Brigade, suddenly broke forward against the German 2nd Division, and at 9 o'clock in the morning, were already in possession of Colombey.

Before 8 o'clock, on the first reports of the movements of the enemy, General von Manteuffel had made the following dispositions:

"1st) The 3rd Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Division, with two batteries, will move to the Saarbrücken road, in line with Puche.

2nd) The 1st Cavalry Brigade of the 3rd Cavalry Division will march towards Retonfay, for the purpose of covering the country between the Saarbrücken and Saarlouis roads. (The whole of the 3rd Cavalry Division arrived there, by order of General von Steinmetz.)

3rd) One Cavalry Regiment and one Battery of Kummer's Division will move towards Ste. Barbe.

At the same time, a notification was sent to the Prince Commander in Chief and to the General von Steinmetz.

Prince Frederick Charles, having in view the possibility of an attack by the Châlons Army, would not give up his position against Montmédy, but commanded all the Corps, at a distance from Metz, to concentrate nearer to the fortress.

General von Voigts-Rhetz immediately made the disposable portion of the X. Corps move back, by the bridge laid over the Moselle at Hauconcourt, to the right bank, in conformity with the arrangements, previously made by the Prince, for such a case; the following orders were, besides, issued from the headquarters at Malancourt, in view of the above named general disposition.

To General von Manstein, to concentrate the 25th Hessian Division at Pierrevillers, the 18th Infantry Division and the Artillery Corps at Roncourt, at 8.30 o'clock a.m.

To General von Fransecky, to concentrate the II. Army Corps, at 9.30 o'clock a.m. between Briey and Auboué.

To General von Alvensleben II., to march off, at 9.30 o'clock a.m., with the III. Army Corps, from Doncourt and Conflans, upon St. Privat.

The Prince Commander in Chief repaired to the hill le Hori-mont, north of Fèves, from whence a wide survey of the whole valley of the Moselle, and of the fighting ground, could be obtained; he arrived there at 11 o'clock a.m.

The French, as mentioned, had been successful in their first attack, directed against *Colombey*. It was very soon evident that the security of the right flank and, at the same time, a demonstration, were the only objects at this point; for no very energetic attack was made upon the line Aubigny—Mercy-le-Haut, and after a long, stationary fight, there was a pause, which lasted until 5 o'clock p.m.

The state of the fight appeared to threaten so little danger here, that Major General von Pitzelwitz, who was bringing his Brigade (the 28th) from Pouilly to support the 2nd Division, allowed his men, quietly, to warm up their dinners at Courcelles. The cooking began at 3.30 o'clock, but was not finished, for the attack was renewed upon *Aubigny* soon after.

Bazaine was quite right to be satisfied here with the possession of Colombey, for he had chosen the plateau of *Ste. Barbe* as the object of the principal attack. It was now expected that an energetic, powerfully supported, assault would be made there.

Still, however, it did not come to this; nothing was undertaken upon the left wing but unimportant demonstrations along the Moselle.

At 10.30 o'clock, a single cavalry regiment and a single battery advanced against the position *Malroy-Charly*, and General von Kummer was able to drive away this detachment with some shots from his rifled guns. Neither can the fire of Fort St. Julien, which now began, be considered as an efficient preparation for the attack at this point, for the heavy shot, thrown at intervals, inflicted no losses whatever on General von Kummer's troops.

By this long introduction of the attack, the Germans gained time for new counter measures. As the main body of the French Army, near Forts St. Julien and Belle-Croix, was constantly growing stronger, and, on the whole, it might well be assumed that Bazaine intended to move forward against the *Plateau of Ste. Barbe*, the 3rd Infantry Brigade was formed up at Retonfay and Senden's Landwehr Division at Ste. Barbe. The detachments, appointed to reinforce the X. and IX. Army Corps, were also by this time approaching considerably nearer to the scene of the impending battle. The head of the 25th Division after marching by Haucourt and crossing the Moselle had arrived, at 2.30 o'clock p.m., at Antilly, immediately in rear of the line Malroy — Charly. Nevertheless, at 4 o'clock when the attack on the French side really began, the chances were still very much in Bazaine's favour. Three of the enemy's Corps were still absorbed in watching for the Army of Chalons, and, within the next twelve hours, it was impossible that more than 60,000 Germans, at the most, could be concentrated between Malroy and Flanville, if a skilful demonstration was made towards the south, during the break through, for the purpose of engaging the German VII. Corps. These 60,000 men, moreover, could only be brought together by degrees; for the next few hours, there were only from 30,000 to 40,000 men available.

The French attack, consequently, began at 4 o'clock p. m., after the considerable forces, which had come up on the right bank, had passed some hours in making coffee.

The 4th Corps had taken up its position perpendicular to the Ste. Barbe road, the 6th Corps prolonged this line, with the left wing upon the road to Bouzonville. The Garde, the Army Reserve Artillery, and the Cavalry Corps were coming up between Fort St. Julien and the Grimont wood, the left wing behind Chatillon.

The Corps, forming the first line, stood from the right to the left wing thus: the 3rd, the 4th and the 6th. These would have to commence the attack.

Towards 2 o'clock, Marshal Bazaine had gone forward upon the road to Ste. Barbe, and on the left of this road (in line with the 261st mile stone) he had caused a breast-work to be erected

for a battery, for the support and introduction of the projected attack upon the line Servigny-Failly. At 4 o'clock, six 12-pounders from the Reserve of the 4th Corps were placed behind this breast-work, and another battery from the same reserve, was posted on the right of the road, opposite Poix. In addition to these, three short 24-pounders were taken out of Fort St. Julien, in order to be placed in position, on the right of the road, in front of the farm Grimont.

The fire from these batteries, which began at 4 o'clock, was, however, not sufficient to silence the German batteries posted opposite. On the contrary, these very soon gained the ascendancy, and made the French very sensible of the want of their remaining reserve artillery. Nevertheless, the French attacking columns went forward with energy. Metman's Division was directed against *Nouilly*, Montaudon's Division, supported by Fauvart-Bastoul's Division, attacked *Noisseville* and, with one Brigade on the right, also attacked *Montoy* and *Flanville*.

The right intention lay at the foundation of these movements; which was to take the commanding position of Ste. Barbe, whilst the enemy was engaged in the centre, and his left flank surrounded by Retonfay.

In spite of the strong artillery fire from the German positions, in which, at 5 o'clock, all the batteries of the I. Corps took part, Lebœuf's Corps succeeded in advancing from *Nouilly*, against *Noisseville*, in throwing back the German troops upon *Servigny*, in establishing itself in and round *Noisseville*, in taking the batteries in rear, which were in position before *Servigny*, by the fire of skirmishers, and forcing them to drive off; and then in bringing a number of batteries into position, which vigorously bombarded *Servigny*. *Coincy* was occupied, at the same time, by General Lapasset from *Colombey*. It was now 6.30 o'clock.

With this, however, the good conduct of the sortie, again came to an end. Instead of sending sufficient reserves after the divisions which had gone forward so successfully, which Bazaine was quite able to do, he left the first line, for a time, entirely to itself; the 4th and 6th Corps waited for a further progress to be made by the 3rd before they attacked on their side; the 3rd Corps was

not supported by the 2nd, and hardly advanced at all — the attack was paralyzed and came completely to a stand. At dark, however, Memerty's Prussian Brigade succeeded in re-taking Noisseville. *At 9 o'clock in the evening the most important positions were again in possession of the Germans*, and the fight was considered at an end. The German troops in the first line were, indeed, kept under arms for the night and the Landwehr, from Ste. Barbe, were drawn nearer; but the 2nd Infantry Brigade with the Artillery Corps, were moved back into bivouac.

Then, suddenly, at 10 o'clock at night, a fresh attack ensued, upon the whole line, with the greatest vehemence. Whether this was conducted by Bazaine's arrangement, and in consequence of a premeditated plan, or through accidental circumstances, has not been made clear. According to a good French authority*), the impulse which led to it, proceeded from General Changarnier in an hour of general irresolution. Strong French masses went forward from Lebœuf's Corps, upon the Saarbrücken road, then turning to the north, attacked *Flanville* and took the village with the bayonet, after an obstinate defence.

From here they turned towards Retonfay and Noisseville, and forced the German troops to retire as far as *Chateau Gras*, upon the plateau of Ste. Barbe.

At the same time General Ladmirault had gone forward, with Cissey's Division, on the right of the road to Ste. Barbe, Grenier's Division on the left of it, and Lorencez's Division in the second body, and a concentrated attack by surprise was made upon *Servigny*, which was carried out partly by Metman's Division and partly by the troops of the 4th Corps, Cissey's Division. The French succeeded in getting possession of the greatest part of the village. Grenier's Division and General Cissey's 2nd Brigade, directed their attack upon Poix, to the north-west of Servigny, and upon Faily, but with only partial success, as this night action was, in general, conducted without steadiness on the French side, and without lasting force. Servigny was very soon re-taken by the Germans, and the only positions maintained by the French, were

*) Journal d'un officier de l'armée du Rhin. Bruxelles, C. Muquardt.

Noisseville, Coincy, Flanville and the country round these villages. Upon the left wing of the French line of battle, Marshal Canrobert had taken possession of Chieulles and Vany with his partisan-companies; General Tixier was established on the right, General Lafont de Villiers on the left, and General Levassor-Sorval in reserve, and cavalry fronted the débouché from Malroy.

The retreating movement of the 4th and 3rd Corps, which soon followed, obliged Canrobert likewise to retire.

The battle was concluded for this day, and the result of the 31st of August was, that the French Army — after having been in possession of the most important positions, and, in a tactical point of view, had been able to carry out its break-through — was turned back, into nearly the same situation which it had been in before the attack, from the want of reserves being brought up in time.

Once in the course of the afternoon, when Colombey and Noisseville were taken and Servigny strongly threatened, and again towards 11 o'clock p. m., when even Flanville and Noisseville had been taken, and a concentric attack could have been made upon Faily, the French attacking front was so extended, that nothing but the want of will on the part of the Generals, stood in the way of bringing up strong reserves.

General Ladmirault had not, as yet, exhausted his reserves, the 6th Corps had hardly been engaged, the Garde and 2nd Corps were still completely intact; the numerous cavalry, which could act under favourable circumstances against the roads to Saarlouis and Saarbrücken, by which they could threaten to surround the enemy or attack the foe posted at Retonfay, had not yet taken any serious part in the combat, with the exception of the fight at Coincy.

The difficulties connected with the development of large masses from narrow defiles, cannot well be mentioned, after the first body had already placed itself in possession of villages and other positions, extending over a mile of front ($4\frac{3}{5}$ English miles).

But, how little Marshal Bazaine had the intention of pursuing a plan to break through at any price, is at once proved by his

leaving the battle-field, at 9 o'clock in the evening, before the last attack, and returning to St. Julien.

Bazaine was kept back by the fear of being destroyed by the pursuing German Army, even after a successful break through.

Although, however, the favourable moment had been lost on the 31st of August, and the only advantage that can be mentioned as remaining to the French, was the occupation of the villages of Coincy, Flanville and especially Noisseville, the attempt to break through was repeated on the 1st of September, and naturally, under far more difficult circumstances, and with far less prospect of success.

The *German Army*, stood in readiness, on the 1st of September, in the following order:

Kummer's Division and the I. Army Corps, in the first line, upon the battlefields of the previous night; in the second line, at Antilly; and, on the march to Charly, the 25th and 18th Divisions (the latter had been marching all through the night), so that the whole of the IX. Army Corps was now ready for the fight upon the right bank of the Moselle.

The VII. and VIII. Army Corps, as on the previous day; the II., III. and X. Corps, upon the left bank of the Moselle, towards Montmédy; the first two however were only $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles ($6\frac{9}{10}$ English) from Metz, and the last were immediately on the river, so that it would be possible for them to engage in the fight of the investing army within some hours.

The *French dispositions* for this day, again indicated an assault upon Ste. Barbe, but this was already restricted, by the command to rest satisfied with maintaining the positions of the 31st of August, until the evening, in case the enemy had been reinforced.

The fight began at 4 o'clock a. m. on the German side, by the 3rd Infantry Brigade endeavouring to re-conquer the village of Noisseville, which had been wrested from it.

The morning was very misty, so that only the tops of the hills could be distinguished; in the valley, however, only the objects near at hand were visible.

The first attack of the Germans upon the village, occupied by Clinchant's Brigade and the 32nd Line Regiment, failed; the French held the village and even proceeded to make sorties.

General von Manteuffel brought up the 2nd Infantry Brigade, and begged for assistance from General von Manstein, who supported him by sending at first, the 1st Hessian Infantry Brigade, the Artillery Corps of the IX. Corps, and the Hessian Cavalry Brigade; and later, after the 18th Infantry Division had arrived in rear of Kummer's Division, the 2nd Hessian Infantry Brigade.

As soon as the Hessians were on the march to Ste. Barbe, the second attack upon *Noisseville* was attempted by the 2nd Infantry Brigade. It succeeded, with very heavy losses, in taking the outskirts and part of the village, but the French brought fresh troops into the fight, and also several mitrailleuses, and again drove the Germans out. Three times the outskirts were taken and again lost, until at last, General von Manteuffel desisted from the offensive, withdrew his troops, and contented himself with opposing the further progress of the enemy.

It was now 8 o'clock a.m.

In the meanwhile, the announcement of the re-commencement of the battle had reached Prince Frederick Charles at Malancourt, to which place he had ridden back, from the hill at Fèves, on the previous evening.

Here, in the head-quarters of the Army, between 7 and 8 o'clock, the fire of cannon was now audible in the direction of Montmédy, as to the signification of which, conjectures only could be formed. It was the thunder of the action raging round Bazeilles, 12 miles ($55\frac{1}{5}$ English) off, the commencement of the battle of Sedan. Soon however the hot engagement on the right bank of the Moselle, drowned the dull roar in the distance.

The Prince commanded Lieutenant General von Alvensleben to send an Infantry Division, strengthened by Artillery, towards Maizières-les-Metz, made a part of the X. Army Corps move back upon the right bank of the Moselle, and shortly after 8 o'clock, he again took up his point of observation of the previous day.

As the state of the battle of Noisseville appeared hazardous, General von Zastrow received an order by telegraph, at 9. 15

o'clock, to lead his whole Corps to the assistance of General von Manteuffel's left wing, and to leave only a single brigade in the line of investment.

Simultaneously with this, General von Göben received orders to push the reserve of the VIII. Army Corps to the right, in order to be able eventually, to relieve the investing line of the VII. Corps entirely.

General von Kummer was directed, at 9.30 o'clock, to place himself at the disposal of General von Manteuffel, with the whole Division, as soon as it had been relieved in its position by the leading brigade of the X. Army Corps.

Whilst the German Corps were distributed, in this well considered and careful manner for mutual support and relief, Marshal Leboeuf, on the French side, fought the hard battle of Noisseville, with his Corps almost alone, and even after the action had become general, and extended from Faily to beyond Flanville, the 4th and 6th did not engage in such a manner as to render him supplied. Too large a part of these corps remained inactive, in reserve. The 2nd Corps and the Garde did not even leave their reserve position this day.

Consequently, after the attack of the Germans upon Noisseville had been repulsed, no energetic offensive was taken, which might have turned to good account the advantages, won with so much difficulty. Marshal Leboeuf was satisfied with holding his position, and was obliged passively to allow one battery after another to be brought into position to the south of Ste. Barbe, opposite Noisseville, for the purpose of driving him out of the village by artillery fire. The 1st Hessian Infantry Brigade, which arrived at Ste. Barbe at 8 o'clock, and five Hessian foot batteries, which came up a quarter of an hour later, appeared exactly at the right time for General von Manteuffel. Not long after the Hessian Cavalry Brigade also arrived, and was directed to support General von Manteuffel (3rd Infantry Brigade) behind his left wing, to the north-east of Ste. Barbe.

General von Kummer reported that Wrangel's Division (18th) had arrived, and occupied the Bois de Faily with Below's Brigade

(36th) and one battery, as well as that the 2nd Hessian Infantry Brigade was on the march to Ste. Barbe.

A communication also came soon after, from the Prince Commander in Chief, that the X. Army Corps was to move over the Moselle in rear of Kummer's Division.

It therefore now appeared possible to General von Manteuffel to gain possession of the village of Noisseville, and at first, he made 50 guns open fire, amongst which were the Hessian batteries, in order to shower rifled cannon shot upon the village itself, as well as upon the French reserves, standing behind it.

At the same time, the 28th Infantry Brigade carried out an energetic attack by Puche, against ~~Manville~~, which was successful, and was then directed against Coincey. It managed to drive Fauvart-Bastoul's French Division from its position, and back to the Saarbrücken road in a line with Coincey. As this retreating movement endangered the right wing of the ~~Brigade~~ of Montaudon's Division, which had occupied Montoy, ~~Manville~~, Marshal Leboeuf ordered Fauvart-Bastoul's Division to go forward again. This did not however succeed, and in face of the great losses among the troops, Marshal Leboeuf himself, now gave the order to retire.

This entailed the retreat of Montaudon's Division also.

Noisseville began to burn in several places. The bombardment had been continued for almost two hours, and at 11 o'clock a.m. the capture of the village was effected.

Senden's Landwehr Division and Memery's Brigade moved into Noisseville, amid inconsiderable fighting with the gradually departing troops of the French 3rd Corps, who had held out so brilliantly for seven hours. Thus the chief fight came to an end.

But there had also been hard fighting opposite Faily and Servigny, and, in a south-easterly direction, a demonstration had been undertaken from Metz against *Mercy-le-Haut*, which engaged the German VII. Army Corps.

These fights began at about 8 o'clock in the morning, and took the following course:

The 4th Corps maintained its position for a long time, in front of Poix and Servigny; Lorencez's Division had replaced Olseey's Division in the first line, but was unable to gain any ground, and retired. General Tixier had begun the attack upon Faily, with the 6th Corps, when he perceived the immobility of the 4th Corps and afterwards its retreat, drawing with it the whole of Canrobert's Corps. At 11 o'clock a. m. the general retreat was commanded.

The Germans had gained the victory here, with Kummer's Division, and Below's Brigade. The Hessian Division, and the Artillery Corps of the IX. Army Corps still remained in reserve.

Upon the extreme left flank, masses of French had advanced against Mercy-le-Haut, to whom the castle had to be yielded. Towards 11 o'clock, it was re-taken, but again had to be evacuated at 12 o'clock.

Soon after, the influence of the fight in the centre, and upon the right wing, began to take effect; the French retired here also, and at 4 o'clock the old positions were again taken up.

The loss of the German Army, in the two day's contest, amounted to 120 officers and 2358 men in killed and wounded.

The loss in the French Army amounted to 141 officers and 2664 men.

The latter took up their old positions again on the 2nd of September; the 2nd and 3rd Corps upon the right bank, and the remainder of the Corps upon the left bank.

On the same day, Prince Frederick Charles, after receiving tidings of the action at Beaumont, and being set at rest in regard to an attack by Mac Mahon's Army, issued new orders relative to the Investment of Metz, in conformity with which the position of the II. Army Corps, to the north-west, was confined to the line Arboué — Briey, whilst the remaining corps returned to the enclosing of the fortress; and now, the south-eastern portion of the investment line was especially strongly occupied, for after the unsuccessful attempt to break through towards the north-east, the probability of a sortie in the direction of Strasburg was increased. Also upon the following day, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin's Army Corps, the XIII., consisting of the 17th Infantry

Division, and von Selchow's and von Gayl's Landwehr Divisions, which until now had been concentrated on the Seille, arrived for the reinforcement of the *Investing Army*.

This was now distributed as follows (v. the map "Investment of Metz, on the 3rd of September 1870"):

The First Army, with the Grand Duke's Army Corps, held the right, the Second Army the left bank of the Moselle; and Kummer's Division retained the position Malroy — Charly, which it had hitherto occupied, but later changed to the neighbouring position on the left bank; the I. Army Corps joined on to its left flank, and extended its own left wing until it commanded the Saarbrücken road. Then, the space from this road to Pouilly, was occupied by the Grand Duke. The VII. Army Corps stood upon both banks of the Moselle to the south of Metz, and had detached Woyna's Brigade to the Seille, in order to hold the passage across this river. The country between this Corps and the Grand Duke's was occupied by Count Gröben's Cavalry, whose line of out-posts was pushed forward as far as Bau Frescaty.

Upon the left bank, the VIII. Army Corps occupied the space from Jussy to Chatel, keeping, however, its Artillery Corps and one Infantry Division in reserve, so that it could be immediately detached to the Moselle valley, for the relief of the VII. Army Corps, which in the event of Bazaine's attempting a sortie to the south-east, would move back on the Seille. The III. Army Corps stood further towards the north, from Chatel to Saulny, and the X. Army Corps was in the valley of the Moselle, to the north of Metz, and upon the heights of Saulny as far as Marange. At this point, Bazaine's natural line of retreat to the interior of France, the IX. Army Corps stood in reserve, from Roncourt to Pierrevillers, with its head-quarters in Montois.

In addition to this, Hartmann's Cavalry Division was detached towards the neighbourhood of Jouaville, for the purpose of observing the tract of country from Longuyon to Etain, and securing the lines of communication of the Meuse Army against the raids, which were attempted by the French from Verdun:

The head-quarters of the Army, remained, provisionally, in

Malancourt, but soon after, on the 9th of September, they were removed to Cerny.

On the 2nd of September, the news of the battle of Sedan spread through the German Army, and thundering shouts of joy bore the tidings to the French camp.

The chances of success now left to the Marshal for a breakthrough, were extremely small. In the first place the investing army was stronger, and very judiciously distributed; it had been made aware of the weakness of its former positions in each particular, and was exalted by the feeling of having gained a victory under unfavourable circumstances; then on the other side, the battle of Noisseville had produced a deplorable moral condition in the French army. Mistrust in their leaders and in their own powers gained possession, more and more, of the minds of the officers and soldiers, who were always conquered.

The belief, that Metz might have been left on the 31st of August, spread generally, and, everywhere, Marshal Bazaine's generalship and captured views were most severely criticised.

And in fact, the conduct of the Marshal roused the conjecture, that he wished to act, not only as a General but also as a Statesman; that he wished, independently, to make military action accord with political events; that he even believed, he could pursue his own ambitious views and at the same time the interests of France. The temptation, of playing an important political rôle in the general overthrow of existing affairs, when at the head of the largest military body which France possessed, no doubt came home to an ambitious Bonapartist General.

When Bazaine directed the break-through on the 30th of August, he knew that Mac Mahon's army was on the march. He very probably hoped to beat Prince Frederick Charles in co-operation with Mac Mahon, but it could scarcely have been his plan to undertake the hazardous venture, by himself alone. Even after a successful break-through, if he had been followed by the whole of the Prince's Army, whilst Mac Mahon might also, have been overcome on his side, not only his own plans would have come to an end, but the army also. Consequently he did not

hasten the attack, always expecting to hear the thunder of the cannon of the Chalons Army, from the north-west. Then, when the attack upon the investing Army had been developed, and there appeared to be a very good chance of effecting a break-through, he decided, notwithstanding the advantage gained, to go no further, but to content himself with holding what he had got, because, on this day, nothing could be discovered of the Army of Chalons, but perhaps on the following day he might reckon on Mac Mahon's assistance.

When, however, on the 1st of September still no trace could be seen of the expected army of relief, Bazaine willingly reconciled himself to the necessity of remaining in Metz. He had satisfied his military duty by attempting to break through; as the second condition, the help promised by the Emperor had failed, his remaining in Metz was wiser in every respect, and also in regard to his own ambitious plans. Probably Mac Mahon was conquered, he, Bazaine, was the commander of the only army which France possessed, the Emperor had seen an impossibility, France must now conclude peace, and Metz the pivot round which the peace negotiations turned.

Thus the Marshal might have calculated.

That he *calculated falsely*, is learnt by a succession of great events which developed themselves, in a manner unexpected by all the world.

When the war was prolonged beyond all reckoning, when the army of Metz was in want of the necessary means of existence, Bazaine fell from his commanding situation, into one in which he was completely governed. He was obliged to submit, very much against his will, to the plain military laws of war, although, even at the last moment, fourteen days before the capitulation, he endeavoured to open political negotiations, and to give political importance to his position, by sending General Boyer to the German head-quarters.

The military operations at Metz, which were still attempted by the French after the battle of Noisseville, are of subordinate importance. They were confined to skirmishes with the enemy, and some sorties on a larger scale, for the purpose of occupying

the Army, and acquiring small advantages for the out-post positions, as well as of capturing provisions. No attempt was again made to break through.

The most important, and at the same time the last undertakings of this kind, were the attacks upon the position of *Kummer's Division* on the 2nd and 7th of October.

On the first named day the sortie was directed against Ladonchamps, Ste. Agathe, St. Remy and Bellevue. The Germans were driven from their most advanced line, from Ladonchamps and Ste. Agathe, but held the fortified second line, and in the further progress of the fight completely repulsed the French.

German loss: 6 officers and 109 men killed and wounded.

On the 7th of October, the French made an offensive manoeuvre on an extended scale. Towards 2 o'clock in the afternoon, on the left bank of the Moselle, French infantry columns with two or three batteries were directed against Bellevue, St. Remy, Grandes-Tapes and Petites-Tapes, and threw back the advanced posts of Kummer's Division from all their stations, after an obstinate defence.

General von Voigts-Rhetz sent the 38th Infantry Brigade to their support; General von Alvensleben II. dispatched the 9th Infantry Brigade towards the wood of Woippy.

This attack on two sides caused the enemy to retire, and it ended, at the commencement of dusk, with the re-capture of all the positions.

But a demonstration had also been made by French troops, on the right bank, against the line Malroy — Charly, and such numerous masses of troops had come up against the I. Army Corps at Villers-l'Orme, that General von Manteuffel sounded the alarm for his whole Corps, and made them move into position; the VII. Corps was, also, deployed, and the Prince Commander in Chief made arrangements for the support of the I. Corps by detachments of the X. Army Corps.

The fight in front of the I. Army Corps had, at first, the character of a demonstration, and ended in a hot tirailleur fight upon the line Villers-l'Orme — Nouilly.

No attack was made against the line Malroy — Charly.

At 6.30 o'clock p.m., the fight on the right bank of the Moselle was silent.

The loss on the German side, in killed and wounded, amounted to 65 officers, and 1665 men, and chiefly affected the Landwehr, as Kummer's Division had been most severely engaged.

The situation of the enclosed army, under the twofold influence of moral and physical suffering, became more deplorable every day. The months of September and October brought a great many days of rain, and made the bivouacs outside the town, in which the whole mass of troops was distributed, between and outside the Forts, comfortless and unhealthy. The scarcity of the necessaries of life was detrimental in a still higher degree; it was always becoming more palpable, and from its monotony engendered disease. Horseflesh had been almost the only food, besides bread, during the greater part of the time the investment lasted. The bread was given out daily in rations of 500 grammes, and in the beginning of October, in rations of even 300 and 250 grammes, only. The number on the sick list increased daily.

The German Army also suffered extremely from remaining stationary so long upon great battle fields, in wet weather. The sick list was extraordinarily great, and in many divisions amounted to 50 per cent.

In order to hasten the capitulation, the project was, at one time, proposed, of advancing against *Queulen* from the heights to the south and east of this fort, and for this object 40 rifled 12-pounder siege guns were brought up. The plan was, however, given up, and the guns were distributed round the fortress, to act against possible sorties. It was then determined to dam the Moselle, and cause an inundation which would make it impossible for the French to encamp in the valley. The army was occupied until the end of the investment, in constructing a great number of fascines for this purpose. The capitulation, however, commenced before the plan could be carried out.

From the 14th of August until the 7th of October, the French Army had lost in killed, wounded and missing, without reckoning the sick, 25 generals, 2099 officers of all ranks and 40,339 non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

On the 7th of October, Marshal Bazaine directed a letter to the Commandants of the Corps of the fortress and of the special arms, in which, with a statement of his reasons, he called together a council of war, to decide what further steps should be taken, in this desperate situation. On the 10th of October the council of war assembled, and decided upon the necessity of entering into negotiations with the enemy.

These negotiations, which, at first, were carried on with Versailles, occupied as long as 17 days, during which time the suffering condition of the unfortunate French Army was considerably heightened, and then led to an issue, which had been unavoidable after the unsuccessful attempt to break through at Noisseville,—to the renowned capitulation, which was of decisive importance for the occurrences at Paris and on the Loire.

NINTH CHAPTER.

SIEGE OPERATIONS.

The conquest of the fortresses of Strasburg, Schlettstadt, Neu-Breisach, Pfalzburg, Thionville, Montmédy, Longuy, Mézières, Rocroy, Toul, Soissons, Verdun, La Fère and Péronne.

STRASBURG.

(Compare the plan of the Siege of Strasburg.)

Whilst the two main bodies of the German Army invested Metz on the one side, and on the other side marched upon Sedan, then to Paris, and enclosed the great city, smaller divisions of the army carried on the contest upon other points of the wide theatre of war, *partly in order to gain possession of a country, which it was hoped would be won back for Germany, and partly for the purpose of bringing into German power, the important and necessary communications for carrying on the siege of Paris.*

The most important siege which became necessary for these ends, was the *siege of Strasburg*. The investment of this fortress had already been begun, immediately after the battle of Woerth*), and had been completed on the 15th of August by the occupation of Schiltigheim, Ruprechtsau, and Königshoffen. Strasburg was very

*) Vide page 87.

easily invested. It depended only, upon cutting off the north-west front. As for the rest, the wide extent of artificial inundation, formed as much an investment for the besieged, as a protection against the besiegers. The investment was all the easier, as nothing was undertaken from Strasburg to hinder the enemy's occupation of high points and positions lying near. This neglect on the part of the defence, is sufficiently explained by the defective state of the garrison. The Corps which General *Uhrich* united under his command in the fortress, strong in numbers though it was, could only produce very few serviceable elements. Before the battle of Woerth, the really capable troops in the garrison consisted only of two battalions of artillery, one battalion of pontoon train, two squadrons of cavalry, and the marine troops of the Rhine flotilla. Pioneers were completely wanting, and these would have been just of the most importance. The rest of the garrison consisted of newly formed battalions of the Line and Gardes Mobiles, about 10,000 men, upon whom General *Uhrich* could not sufficiently depend for the difficult operation of occupying and defending the ground in front.

Naturally also, a thoroughly good element, had not been supplied to him in the line troops of the Army beaten at Woerth. Half of them consisted of men, belonging to every variety of regiment, demoralized by defeat; on the other hand, the remaining half, the 87th Regiment of the Line, under command of Colonel Blot, was a very valuable accession. This regiment, whilst marching through to join Mac Mahon's Corps, on the 6th of August, had been commanded by the Marshal to remain in the fortress.

About 7000 men of the *Garde Nationale sédentaire*, of Strasburg, made up the numerical strength of the garrison, by degrees, to about 25,000 men; there were very few officers, and only five engineer officers in the town.

Strasburg was provided with guns in very great number. Besides the 500 guns belonging to the equipment of the fortress, there was the siege train destined for the German fortresses, so that the number of guns amounted to about 1200. The serving troops necessary for the defence were sufficient: with the pontoon

train and marines of the Rhine flotilla there were about 3000 artillerymen in the place.

Thus, no hindrance on the part of the French was placed in the way, of the gradual, close surrounding by the Siege Corps, although at the commencement, until the 13th and 14th of August, this only consisted of the Baden Division, and consequently was not so strong as the garrison. From this time additional detachments, certainly, arrived successively: the 7th Reserve and Garde Landwehr Division, 37 companies of Siege Artillery, a Prussian pioneer battalion and a Bavarian pioneer company, so that altogether, the strength of the *Siege Corps* rose to above 50,000 men.

General von *Werder*, in entering upon his command on the 14th of August, found himself immediately opposite the outworks of the fortress itself, and accordingly, able to proceed at once to the attack, without a long detention at starting, by having to conquer the surrounding villages or earthworks raised on the exterior. The only question was, what manner of attack it should be.

The garrison of Strasburg was as little fitted for an intelligent and devoted defence, as the fortress was prepared for siege in a fortification point of view. The chief strength of the fortress lay in the inundations, which made an attack impossible, except on the north-west front; on this side also, water was a main hindrance to the assailants, as several wet ditches had to be overcome. In other respects, however, the works offered no *unusual* difficulties, though, at the same time, they certainly presented, throughout, no particular weakness.

The revetments are from 24' to 30' in height, 5' thick at the top, 12' at the bottom, with 18' buttresses. In order to increase the capability of resistance of the masonry thus formed, all the important lines are provided with couvrefaces and counter-guards. The command of the different lines of fortification is very trifling, Bastion 12, Ravelin 50 and Lunette 52 have nearly the same height of rampart. The ditches of the fortress, which throughout are wet, have revetted escarps, and upon the north-west front the counterscarp of the main ditch is also revetted. In the year

1867, Strasburg was provided with traverses, as Napoleon had ordered the fortress to be put in order.

The defence was very badly circumstanced, in regard to all measures of preparation, by the sudden outbreak of the war; it was without its proper troops through the lack of foresight on the part of the French Government, and only scantily supplied with ammunition and other material, but superabundantly with guns in respect to numbers. Very little had been done towards strengthening the works, and the security of the garrison by means of bomb proof cover, and through its inactivity during the first, important, period of the investment had imbued the besiegers with a low, but quite correct, opinion of the capability of the defence.

Upon due consideration of the worth of the garrison, as well as of the nature of the works, no doubt could exist, in a military point of view, upon the kind of attack.

Strasburg, from a military point of view, invited a bombardment.

The besiegers duty was to force the fortress to capitulate, as quickly as possible, with the greatest saving of their own troops, and they could count upon a bombardment completely demoralising the garrison, and moving the citizens to exert an influence upon the commandant for the purpose of a surrender. That this second element, the influence of the citizens, was rightly taken into consideration (apart from frequent experience), is clear from a *proclamation* of the commandant, Urich, and the prefect, Baron Pron, dated the 10th of August which says:

"To the inhabitants of Strasburg. Disquieting and terrifying rumours, have been spread during the last few days, unintentionally or by design, in our brave city. Some individuals have dared to entertain the idea that the place would surrender without striking a blow. We protest energetically, in the name of the courageous French population, against this cowardly and criminal pusillanimity. The ramparts are armed with 400 cannon. The garrison is composed of 10,000 men, without counting the *garde nationale sédentaire*. If Strasburg is attacked, Strasburg will defend herself as long as a soldier, a biscuit, or a cartridge remains. The good

may re-assure themselves; as for the others, they have only to go away."

- This proclamation confirms the fact that a smaller or larger party were disposed to surrender, even before a shot had fallen, and indirectly characterises this faction as *German*, by contrasting it with the courageous *French*.

As the necessary guns were not, at first, on the spot, for a heavy and surrounding bombardment, the cannonade was begun with field guns, and directed for the most part against the works of the fortress, in order to disturb the preparations for defence, which were only now commenced, after and during the investment. The garrison only began, on the 8th of August, to clear the ground in front, to place the fortifications in a state of defence against a powerful attack (*armement de sûreté*), and to set about other works in the lines. These works, instead of being the erection of bombproof cover and the construction of traverses etc., consisted, solely, in placing palisades in the covered way; a superfluous measure.

The fire of the German field guns, which was directed against these preparations, also reached the town in places, and wounded and killed some of the inhabitants. The preparations for the defence of the fortress were considerably hindered, whilst the damage to the town was comparatively small.

On the 16th of August the first sortie was made, on the part of the garrison; it was very unfortunately conducted, the troops returned with the loss of 3 guns, 70 killed and wounded, amongst these a colonel of pontoons; they also lost some prisoners. *On the 18th of August the German siege guns first opened fire.* It was directed from the batteries erected at Kehl by the Baden Artillery, against the citadel and the military buildings on the esplanade, and, therefore, *was not as yet the bombardment of the town.* Nevertheless General Ulrich replied to this fire, by firing upon the open town of *Kehl*, which was an unnecessary barbarity as well as a great folly, because, if the town of Strasbourg was now bombarded, the besiegers would only be making reprisals, and this they were formally challenged to do.

In the meanwhile, the Prussian siege train was gradually

drawing near. In the night of the 23rd of August, 13 bombarding batteries (Nos. 1 to 13) were able to be erected in the line Königs-hoffen — Aue, from 1500 to 1800 paces from the enceinte, and were equipped with about 100 guns. These consisted, besides some 50-pound mortars, of rifled 24-pounders.

On the evening of the 24th the firing upon the town commenced, and was continued, with several interruptions, for three days.

The destruction in the town was considerable; many private houses, besides public buildings, were greatly damaged, 40 inhabitants, including 12 women and children, were killed, and a far larger number, about 150, were wounded.

The summons to surrender was refused by General Uhrich.

The bombardment of the town was stopped, and the regular siege began.

The reasons for this change were, however, not of a military nature.

With a reinforcement of the cannonade by mortar batteries in surrounding positions, it was anticipated that the capitulation would follow after a short time. At least, experience has proved the efficacy of this means with twelve other French fortresses — Toul, Soissons, Verdun, Schlettstadt, Neu-Breisach with Fort Mortier, Thionville, Longwy, Montmédy, La Fère, Mézières and Péroune, which were all taken by bombardment. During the whole war, Paris excepted, the bombardment with siege guns has never failed in its object of causing a surrender.

Strasburg was spared on political grounds.

Strasburg, with its renowned cathedral, and so many reminiscences dear to Germany, so long a favourite child of the German nation, became, after the first victorious battles in France, the ardently longed for, and eagerly demanded, object of universal desire. Strasburg must again become a German town.

On this account the first shots which fell in the town, excited sympathy and indignation in Germany; one of the most popular German authors gave expression to his pain in telling language; through the whole country the question was heard: "is this then necessary?" Public opinion demanded the cessation of

the bombardment, with the same force with which, at a later period, it required the bombardment of Paris, whilst the bombardment of less interesting fortresses passed by unnoticed.

But the German Army Direction itself, had also decided with reluctance upon the militarily prescribed bombardment; for Strasburg was to revert to the German empire. It was therefore given up as soon as the first terror had proved to be inefficacious.

The German Army Direction was already in such a favourable position, that it could allow itself to guide the war in a luxurious manner, on some points. It therefore took into account public opinion and its own wishes, and began the regular siege. It is a question whether the population really suffered less from this, than they would have done from the bombardment, had it been continued. It is probable that the smaller but constantly repeated losses during the long period up to the 27th of September, came altogether to a larger sum, than the greater, though transitory damages which would have been produced, had the bombardment been continued. The injuries to numerous civilians during the regular siege, were owing to several shot flying, unintentionally, over the rampart and falling in the town; this was especially apt to be the case at night, when the exact aim could not be seen, and the artillerymen had chiefly to be guided by the laying of the guns. The sum-total of the losses sustained by the civil population is reckoned at 261 killed, and 1100 wounded; very heavy in comparison with the losses during the days of the bombardment.

It is, however, possible that greater conflagrations caused by a prolonged bombardment, would have quickly raised the losses considerably, and increased the injury to the town. Thus there is always reason to suppose, that Strasburg was in reality spared.

The fire of the French garrison had been unable to attain any success against the German batteries, and no fresh sortie was attempted; after the bombardment ceased, no steps were taken to discover the further intentions of the besiegers, no reconnaissances were made, nor were electric lights turned upon the works of the Germans at night. They consequently succeeded in the night of

the 29th of August, quite undisturbed and unobserved, in opening *the first parallel*, at a distance of from 700 to 800 paces from the outermost glacis, under a vigorous fire against the ramparts. It extended from the inundation on the left, to Königshoffen on the right, was half a German mile ($2\frac{3}{10}$ English) in length, 4' deep, and was furnished, the same night, with 10 new batteries lying behind it (Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, and 46 rifled 12-pounders). At the same time, the centre and left communications were completed, by which a covered connection, not overlooked from the fortress, was established with the ground in rear.

On the following morning the garrison saw the gigantic work with surprise and terror.

The attack was, consequently, directed against the Porte de Pierres front.

What reasons the German Head-Quarters had for operating against this more difficult front, rather than against the Porte Nationale front, which is not covered by lunettes lying before it, is unknown. It was learnt at a later period, that the French had expected an attack upon the latter front, and, it was more strongly equipped with guns and provided with a complete system of mines. It is possible that this was known on the German side.

To oppose the fire of the besiegers, now strengthened by 46 new guns, the fire of the garrison was only augmented on the night of the 31st of August, and on the following morning, it certainly obtained some advantages. But during the night the besiegers had again erected two fresh batteries, Nos. 26 and 28, and towards evening gained a decided superiority. Several French guns and many embrasures were dismounted.

The superiority of the quality of the Prussian artillery, both in material and troops, was clearly shown.

On the night of the 1st of September, zig-zags had been pushed forward, by means of flying sap, from the 1st parallel at two points, and the 2nd parallel had been traced. The garrison, on the other hand, undertook two *somies*, directed against the railroad buildings and the island of Waaken. Both were repulsed after some fighting. The works were carried on also in the

day-time, but led to a misfortune. The Prussian engineer officers, Lieutenant Colonel von Gayl and Captain Hertzberg, who were conducting their men in the prolongation of an approach against the fortress, which had been erroneously traced in the night, came within range of the enemy's fire and were killed, together with several of the working party. In consequence of this the works were stopped during the day-time.

From this time the garrison continued their sorties, for the most part, certainly, with small forces. Their most important undertaking, was Colonel Blot's attack on the night of the 2nd of September. He directed it against the right wing of the attack, crossed both parallels and came up to within 30 paces of the Prussian battery No. 4; here, however, he was repulsed.

In addition to hindrances of this sort on the part of the garrison, there was also very unfavourable weather; it rained almost incessantly, so that the trenches were full of water.

It was only on the night of the 5th of September that the construction of the 2nd parallel was completely finished. Its length was 2300 paces, width 12', depth from 4' to 5'.

The cannon fight meanwhile, continued. On the German side, from the 3rd to the 5th, the batteries 16a, 17a, 19a and 21a (taking the place of the batteries 16, 17, 19 and 21) and the dismounting batteries 29, 30 and 33, were erected. The mortar fire upon the works of the fortress was also increased at the same time, by erecting the batteries 31 and 32, each for 4 50pound mortars, and 3 emplacements each for 4 7pound mortars, indicated as batteries 34, 36 and 37. On the 3rd of September, two, quite new descriptions of guns, were added to the siege park, short rifled 24-pounders and rifled 72pound mortars (21 centimetre), from which lunette 44, which disturbed the siege works by a flanking fire, was bombarded (batteries 5 and 35).

The Baden artillery at the same time, bombarded the citadel from Kehl, with 16 rifled 24-pounders, and 16 rifled 12-pounders, as well as 12 25pound and 60pound mortars.

Altogether 152 guns, including 52 mortars, were brought into action against the citadel and the Portè de Pierres front before the 9th of September, and on this day the fire attained

such success that not a single French long barrelled gun could show itself any more upon the ramparts. On the other hand the garrison now began a vigorous mortar fire upon the besiegers, from mortars placed behind the ramparts, which, combined with the fire from the 'wallbüchsen', exacted many a victim. The German works, however, conducted with the greatest circumspection, by most skilful officers, and executed by numerous and courageous troops, progressed with astonishing rapidity.

In the night of the 10th of September, the approaches to the 3rd parallel, and the 3rd parallel itself were constructed with the common sap, and in the 2nd parallel, 7pound mortars were mounted, behind them 50pound mortars (Nos. 45, 46, 7a) and even in front of them, rifled 6-pounders.

The garrison only replied by mortar fire.

In the night of the 11th of September, the 3rd parallel was completed; in the night of the 13th, a half parallel was carried out, which approached to within 40 paces of the edge of the glacis.

Mining operations, which were expected as soon as the besiegers touched the glacis, did not occur. To a certain extent, the inundation, which could not everywhere be appropriately made use of, may have been a hindrance; on the whole, the blame lies with the passiveness of the garrison. Even if miners were wanting, the French engineer officers might still have managed some explosions.

But without any such difficulties the *crowning of the glacis*, in front of the lunettes 52 and 53, was accomplished on the 17th of September, after Captain Edebour, of the Engineers, had discovered and fired the mining system in front of lunette 53.

With this the preparatory works came to an end, and the introduction to an assault could be energetically proceeded with; that is to say, the formation of a breach in the main rampart, and a practicable road leading to the breach for the storming column.

It is here worthy of remark that the breach was not made from the works crowning the glacis, as is the rule in siege operations, but this result was obtained by indirect fire from the 2nd parallel.

Battery No. 8 had already begun the breach, on the right face of lunette 53, on the 14th of September, and completed it

the day before the crowning of the glacis. Battery No. 42, firing 6 short rifled 24-pounders against bastion No. 11, and battery No. 58, firing 4 guns of the same calibre against bastion No. 12, then laid open the breach in the main rampart by indirect firing at the distance of about 900 and 1000 paces. This breach was begun on the 23rd of September. The engineers, in the meanwhile, were actively engaged in forming the road to the breach, in which the ditches filled with water presented very considerable difficulties.

Possession of both the lunettes must first be obtained.

Descents into the ditch were carried down to the water level from the crown-work. The escarp wall of lunette No. 53 was brought down on the 20th, to the width of 12', by a mine, and now the ditches of the lunette could be bridged over by means of a dam, supposing they were not defended.

The bold attempt succeeded. The garrison had been driven out by the fearful artillery fire of the besiegers. The lunettes were given up by the French without fighting.

Lunette 53 was approached by means of a dam leading through the ditches, and occupied; the deeper ditches in front of lunette 52, were bridged over by the engineers, with barrels and planks laid upon them, under the direction of Captain Andrea.

Then, in the night of the 21st, a storming column forced its way into this lunette also, with a loss, it is true, of 50 killed and wounded, caused by the enemy's fire from the main rampart.

From the lunettes thus gained, the sap could now be pushed forward up to the covered way of ravelin No. 50, and then along it, and at the same time the effect of the breaching batteries upon bastions 11 and 12 could be advantageously observed.

The effect of these was excellent. The batteries mentioned had been augmented by three counter batteries, Nos. 51, 53 and 54, erected in the crowning, and on the 27th of September the masonry of the right face of bastion No. 11 was brought down to a width of 30 paces.

In order to make the assault possible, it was now only necessary to bring down, by shot, that part of the earthen rampart, which still remained standing (to make the breach com-

pletely practicable), and to complete the passages over the two wet ditches, upon this side and the further side of the undressed and unoccupied counter-guard.

The commandant of the fortress, however, did not wait for the preliminary measures for the assault to be completed.

After the crowning had been accomplished in front of the counter-guard of ravelin No. 50, on the morning of the 27th of September, and after the existence of a breach in the main rampart had been confirmed, white flags appeared upon the Cathedral Tower, and upon the attacked works, at 5 o'clock, in the afternoon*).

This rapid *surrender of the fortress*, immediately after a breach had been made, whilst, surely, the breach itself might have been very obstinately defended, gives fresh proof, of what had already been indicated by the scarcity of sorties, the neglect of mining operations and other faults, that the garrison was intimidated by the energetic manner of attack of the besiegers, and was especially discouraged by the superiority of the Prussian artillery.

A retreat of the garrison to the citadel, which General Uhrich had spoken of at the commencement of the siege, was impossible, as the batteries at Kehl had destroyed all the buildings of the citadel, and greatly injured the fortifications.

The siege had lasted 50 days, reckoning from the 8th of August, and the regular attack 31 days. The besiegers brought into action, in siege guns, 46 long rifled 24-pounders, 12 short rifled 24-pounders, 80 rifled 12-pounders, 27 50pound and 60pound

*) Very different opinions have been expressed, even by competent judges, upon this capitulation, as well as upon the whole siege of Strasburg. It is not surprising that in France, General Uhrich should have been much extolled before he capitulated, and very hardly condemned after Strasburg had fallen, but with so many diverse judgments on the part of others, one will do well to consider first, the political point of view of the judge, and then also, to remember that a siege is always a favourable object for criticism and counter criticism. It is a complicated process, in which always many steps might have been differently carried out.

On the whole, the siege of Strasburg ran the course that was to be expected. The well prepared, excellently equipped besiegers, flushed with victory, made rapid progress against the unprepared, ill-organized garrison.

mortars, 24 25pound mortars, 30 7pound mortars, 2 rifled (21 Cm.) mortars, and fired from them, altogether, 193,722 shot and shell into the fortress. The total loss of the besiegers amounted to 906 men, in killed and wounded, that of the garrison to about 3000 men..

In the town about 400 houses were so much injured that they required rebuilding from the foundations.

The tenor of the *capitulation* was as follows:

"Lieutenant General von Werder, of the Royal Prussian Army, Commander of the Siege Corps before Strasburg, having been requested by Lieutenant General Uhrich, Governor of Strasburg, to cease hostilities against the fortress, has agreed with him to conclude the following capitulation, in consideration of the honourable and brave defence of the place:

Art. I. At 8 o'clock, on the morning of the 28th of September 1870, General Uhrich will evacuate the Citadel, the Porte d'Austerlitz, the Porte des Pécheurs and the Porte Nationale. At the same time the German troops will occupy these points.

Art. II. At 11 o'clock, on the same day, the French garrison, including the Gardes Mobiles and the Gardes Nationaux, will vacate the fortress by the Porte Nationale, will form up between lunette 44 and redoubt 37, and lay down their arms.

Art. III. The troops of the Line and the Gardes Mobiles become prisoners of war, and will march off at once with their baggage.

The Gardes Nationaux and Francs-Tireurs are free, under a written engagement, not to serve during the war, and must lay down their arms at the Mairie before 11 o'clock, a. m. The list of the officers of these troops will be given over to General von Werder at the same hour.

Art. IV. The officers and officials with the rank of officers, belonging to the French garrison of Strasburg, can depart to such residences as they may select, after they have given a written engagement, upon their word of honour. Those officers who refuse to sign this engagement, will go with the garrison to Germany, as prisoners of war. All the army surgeons will continue their functions, until further orders.

Art. V. Lieutenant General Uhrich binds himself, directly the laying down of the arms has been accomplished, to hand over all military effects, and all public monies etc., in the regular manner, through the officials concerned, to the agents on this side.

The officers and officials, who will be charged with this mission on each side, will be at the Place Broglie in Strasburg at 12 o'clock, noon, on the 28th etc. etc. etc."

In consequence of this capitulation, 17,111 men and 451 officers, about 1200 guns, 1843 horses, great stores of rifles, powder, prepared ammunition, and about 10 millions of francs, in state money, fell into German hands with the fortress.

The conquest of the fortress was of great importance to the Germans. It was an imposing event, and disheartening both for the Parisians, who had already been invested about 14 days when they received the news of it, and were cut off from all intercourse with the rest of France, and also for the bands of Franes-Tireurs, who were wandering about in the Vosges.

From Strasburg the conquest of the fortresses Schlettstadt, Neu-Breisach with Fort Mortier, and Belfort could be proceeded with, and, above all, the whole of Upper Alsace could be subjected to the conqueror.

Already two days after the taking of Strasburg, three mobile columns, acting in concert under command of Major General von Degenfeld went off, for the purpose of clearing out and subjecting the Vosges, which were strongly occupied by Franes-Tireurs (v. Chapter 12, on the operations of the southern Armies), and as early as the 9th of October, Neu-Breisach and Schlettstadt were invested.

The conquest of these fortresses was entrusted to the 4th Reserve Division (*Schmetzing*), which was formed at Freiburg in the Breisgau, in the beginning of October, and had crossed the Rhine at Neuenburg. The Division first endeavoured to make *Neu-Breisach* surrender, by bombarding it with field guns; the attempt, however, failed, and it continued the march to Schlettstadt, after the former fortress had been invested.

The siege train, for both places, was provided from Strasburg.

SCHLETTSTADT.

Schlettstadt, containing 11,000 inhabitants, lies upon the left bank of the Ill, which is navigable from Colmar, and by the side of which runs the upper Alsace railroad, the direct line of communication between Strasburg and Belfort. The place is favourably situated for defence, and is strengthened by inundations, which cover, especially, the east front. All the ditches can be filled with water. The fortress has a high revetment, a great part of which is visible from afar, and a simple bastion tracing with several high cavaliers. The garrison consisted of more than 4000 men, including the National Guard.

General von Schmeling decided upon bombarding the fortress. He commenced the cannonade with siege guns (rifled 12-pounders), on the 19th of October. On this day however, only a single battery could be brought into action in front of Heidelberg, for the rest of the siege train had not yet arrived, and this bombardment was too weak to produce any result.

In the night of the 22nd of October he was able to open the 1st parallel, opposite the Colmar gate, at a distance of from 500 to 700 paces, and to erect six batteries in it, which were equipped with 8 rifled 24-pounders, 8 rifled 12-pounders, 4 25pound mortars and 4 50pound mortars.

The fortress vigorously returned the fire until noon on the following day; the fire from the ramparts then ceased, and began again in the afternoon, in an altered form, as a mortar fire behind the ramparts.

Towards morning, however, after the 2nd parallel had been laid during the night, the fortress capitulated with 2400 men (not including the Garde Nationale) and 120 guns.

The surrender was principally brought about, by the demoralization of the garrison produced by the bombardment. Dis-

discipline was completely slackened, so that the Commandant, Count *Reinach*, was obliged to beg the Germans to accelerate their entry.

The town itself had suffered very little, for the inhabitants had guarded their houses well, and the only buildings which were destroyed were those situated on the front of the attack, which were much exposed.

NEU-BREISACH and FORT MORTIER.

Neu-Breisach, simply a military fortress, with its numerous towers of defence, and very picturesquely situated, has its east front resting upon the Rhone-Rhine canal, which passes near the town. The road parallel to the Rhine, as well as the less important one, which, crossing the Rhine, leads from Alt-Breisach to Neu-Breisach, from whence it runs by Colmar, through the Vosges to St. Dié, are, the one as well as the other, commanded by the fire from the fortress at the point where they cross the Rhone-Rhine canal.

The fortress lies in an open plain near the Rhine; the detached Fort Mortier, a quarter-of-an-hour's walk from the shore rampart of the Alt-Breisach road, is under the same command as the fortress.

The ground tracing of Neu-Breisach, represents a regular octagon; behind the casemate bastions are high tower redoubts, in front of them outworks, lunettes and demi-lunes. The ditches are filled with water. Besides these, there were numerous places of artificial cover, of advantage to the garrison.

General von *Schmeling* began the investment, as already mentioned, on the 9th of October, and on the 2nd of November opened fire upon both portions of the fortress. Against Neu-Breisach, three batteries were erected, at Biesheim and Wolf-gantzen; against Fort Mortier, three batteries at Alt-Breisach. These were armed with 8 short rifled 24-pounders, 4 21centimètre mortars and 4 long 24-pounders, taken from the French.

Fort Mortier capitulated in consequence of the bombardment, on the night of the 6th of November, with 220 men and 5 guns; the excellent cover places of the fortress, however, stood the garrison in such good stead, that they held out against the bombardment, for nine days without capitulating, although, with the exception of a few buildings, the town was completely destroyed by this long continued cannonade.

Indeed the besiegers, doubting the success of the bombardment, intended to proceed to a regular siege, when, on the 10th of November, the capitulation ensued, in consequence of a mutiny of the Gardes Mobiles, which made it impossible for the commandant to continue the defence. 5000 men, and 100 officers became prisoners of war, and 100 guns were taken.

The fortress of Belfort in the most southern part of Alsace, required a long continued siege, and the fighting round this place was closely connected with great operations in the field. (v. Chapter 12.)

Excepting Belfort, and Bitsch (which never fell at all), the last fortified place in Alsace passed into German hands with the capitulation of Neu-Breisach.

In the adjoining *Lorraine*, the places now in question were *Pfalzburg* and *Thionville*, belonging to that part which was to be won back again; as well as *Toul*, which was very important from being a bar to the only direct railroad to Paris; *Verdun*, of great consequence as a point of support to the enemy's undertakings, and *Longwy* and *Montmédy*, places which certainly were of less importance, but still could not remain disregarded, as they were centres for the resistance of the enemy, in the midst of the German lines of communication.

PFALZBURG.

The III. Army had already come in contact with *Pfalzburg*, when marching past it on the 8th of August, and on the 14th it was bombarded, by the whole of the artillery corps of the VI. Army Corps, with 60 field guns.

The strength of *Pfalzburg* consisted in its position upon high rocky hills. The place is only small, numbering 3700 inhabitants, and was garrisoned by a battalion of the 63rd Line Regiment, 100 artillerymen, a battalion of the Garde Mobile, and 500 men, composed of scattered Turcos, Zouaves and other "isolés".

As was always the case in the course of the war, the bombardment of the works of the fortress with field guns produced no result.

A considerable fire was ignited in the town, fifty-seven buildings were destroyed, but the commandant, Major *Taillant*, refused the summons to surrender, sent to him on the 15th of August.

From the 16th therefore, only two battalions of the Line remained behind for the investment, and from the 19th, three Landwehr battalions from the Thuringian Regiments 31 and 71.

This was a very difficult operation, for the country round the fortress can be but little surveyed, and in many parts is deeply intersected, so that the line of investment had to be extended to 5 or 6 hours (from 18 to 22 English miles) in length, and consequently a large number of outposts was necessary. Added to which, the garrison carried on a very energetic petty warfare.

In consequence of two companies being ordered away, and numbers falling sick from the fatigues of outpost duty, the strength of the investing Corps until October was reduced to 1700 men; but from the 20th of October it was again somewhat increased by reinforcements in cavalry.

On the 24th of August, the garrison made a strong sortie, which was very well executed. About 800 men advanced in echelon, with great rapidity against the village Unter-Eichen-

Baracken, then suddenly closing together, took the village and threw back the German out posts. As soon as the investing troops were concentrated and brought up, the French moved back under cover of the guns of their fortress. Similar sorties were made by the garrison, on the 25th of August, against Mittelbronn, and again on the 27th of August, against Unter-Eichen-Baracken.

The situation of the investing troops was exposed to danger, and did not change for the better until reinforced by the arrival of a 4-pounder field battery from the Strasburg siege corps.

On the 14th of September the garrison made a sortie against Büchelberg, which was very successfully repulsed.

Until Strasburg had been taken, however, strong bands of Francs-tireurs filled the country round Lützelburg, so that measures for security had to be considerably increased, even in rear of the cantonment, and the powers of the men were strained to the utmost.

This condition improved from the beginning of October, when the Francs-tireurs departed to the south; a serious attack upon the fortress could not, however, be attempted.

Neither the regular siege nor the bombardment had a prospect of success, for the nature of the ground rendered the formation of covered approaches very difficult, and the rocky structure of the lofty fortifications offered too powerful a resistance to the shot. Besides which, the place was not of sufficient value to justify the toil and sacrifice of a strong attack, in order to gain possession of it.

Upon one occasion, the 24th of November, a short bombardment from field guns, was opened at 10.30 o'clock p.m., to make reprisals for the frequent fire of the garrison upon single posts and patrols; but otherwise, the investment only was carried out with the object of subduing the place by starvation.

These means gained the object.

On the 30th of November parlementaires appeared from the fortress, who tendered the capitulation, but also required the free departure of the garrison.

The offer was refused by Major *von Giese*, commander of the investing troops.

The commandant of the fortress now endeavoured to send away the Gardes Mobiles in bodies as deserters, but the trick was frustrated.

Then, finally, on the 12th of December, at 2 o'clock p.m., Major *Taillant* offered to surrender at discretion.

On the 14th of December, the occupation of the fortress by German troops ensued, 52 officers and 1838 men became prisoners of war, and 65 guns were taken. All these guns had been previously spiked by the garrison, all the powder and ammunition stores destroyed, and 12,000 rifles broken. No reproach can, however, be made on this account, as no stipulation was made for the articles named to be delivered up, and no protocol had been drawn up, as to the mode of surrender.

The commandant of the fortress had simply declared that the gates were open, and the garrison disarmed, although not conquered; he had entered into no engagements in the way of further arrangements.

It was notorious that nothing but starvation, combined with a small-pox epidemic, had brought about the surrender, and it must be acknowledged that the defence had been excellent, especially in regard to the sorties; also, on the other hand, that the investing troops, so weak in numbers, had distinguished themselves by their performances.

THIONVILLE (Now DIEDENHOFEN).

Thionville, with 8000 inhabitants and a garrison of over 4000 men, had already been watched and invested during the investment of Metz, soon after the battle of Gravelotte. This measure was necessary for the security of the investing army.

The attack upon the fortress, however, only began after the fall of Metz.

Situated upon the left bank of the Moselle, about three miles ($13\frac{1}{5}$ English miles), down the stream, from Metz, Thionville has a regular fortification, upon this bank, composed of ravelins and bastions, with counter-guards lying in front, and a girdle of lunettes

outside the covered way. Upon the right bank, there is a double tête de pont, for covering the passage across the Moselle and its neighbouring arm.

- The flat Moselle valley, lying immediately around, is bordered by commanding hills, which endanger the fortress, at a distance of from 2000 to 2500 paces upon the right bank, and 3000 to 4000 paces on the left bank.

The 14th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General *von Kamecke*, was charged with the conquest of the fortress. He moved off from Metz on the 9th and 10th of November, and approached by both banks of the river. On the 10th, 11th and 12th, General von Kamecke made a minute reconnaissance, and then decided upon a bombardment from the heights mentioned. After this the fortress was closely invested, thirteen companies of siege artillery belonging to Metz were brought up, i. e. from Verdun (which at that time had already been taken), and bombarding batteries were constructed upon both banks.

Upon the right bank, 6 rifled 24-pounders, 6 rifled 12-pounders and 4 13 inch French mortars were placed in the Bois d'Illange and the Bois d'Yutz, at a distance of about 2200 paces; besides these, four heavy batteries of the 7th Field artillery Regiment were also brought into position upon the hill of Haute Yutz and the hill to the east, before Illange, partly for the purpose of bombarding the tête de pont, and partly, the north-east front of the town.

Upon the left bank of the Moselle, at a greater distance, as much as 5000 paces, were erected two batteries of 4 rifled 24-pounders at Château Serre; one battery of 4 rifled 24-pounders to the north of the road from Thionville to Marspich, one battery of 5 rifled 24-pounders at Maison neuve, one battery of 4 rifled 12-pounders at Weymerange, one battery of 4 rifled 24-pounders to the south of the road from Thionville to Bauvange, one battery of 4 rifled 12-pounders to the north of the road Bauvange au St. Michel, and three batteries of 4 rifled 12-pounders at Maison rouge, to the west of the Luxemburg road.

This bombardment preparation was extraordinarily large in comparison with its object.

Favoured by the ground, the batteries could, for the most part,

be constructed in the day time; masking objects were at hand, so that the work was but little disturbed by the enemy.

In the night of the 21st of November the construction of all the batteries was completed, and also their equipment, and, at the same time, the line of investment was pushed closer to the fortress. On the 22nd of November, at 7 o'clock a.m., the first shots fell, and a regulated fire was then opened, which lasted until noon.

The fortress replied with vigour, and with well aimed shots.

At 1 o'clock p.m., the fire of the bombardment began afresh, and was slowly sustained until the following morning.

During this night the first parallel was opened at a distance of 800 paces to the west of the town, and this finished the preparations for a regular attack.

The following day the cannonade was continued in the same manner as on the 22nd.

At 1.30 o'clock p.m., the fortress hoisted a white flag.

The commandant demanded a free departure for the women and children, and an armistice for 24 hours. The negotiations were broken off, and the fire was again commenced, and continued until 10.30 o'clock a.m. on the 24th. At this hour the white flag appeared afresh; the commandant, Chef de bataillon *Maurice*, had decided to surrender. On the following day the fortress was occupied; 120 officers and about 4000 men became prisoners of war, 200 guns were taken, and a great quantity of war material and several magazines filled with provisions.

The unlucky little town had suffered very considerably, and more, comparatively, than Strasburg.

MONTMÉDY.

The conquest of *Montmédy* was set on foot, by Lieutenant General *von Kamecke*, immediately after the fall of Thionville, and indeed simultaneously with the observation of Longwy.

The fortress of *Montmédy*, with a small town of about 2500 inhabitants, lies on the *Chiers*, one mile ($4\frac{3}{5}$ Engl. m.) from the

Belgian frontier, and forms a station on the railroad between Thionville and Sedan. The fortress is characterised by two divisions. The "*ville haute*" situated upon a three cornered rock, 200' high, descending on all sides at an angle of from 30 to 45 degrees, is very strong; it contains five barracks for 800 men, an arsenal and two powder magazines. The "*ville basse*", situated between the Chiers and the *ville haute*, is only defended by a loop-holed wall, which being exposed on all sides can easily be shot down.

The garrison numbered over 3000 men, with 65 guns; they had brought themselves into notice on the 11th of October, by making a sortie against Stenay, and seizing the German Etappen command at that place. General von Kamecke decided upon a bombardment, and, on the 7th of December, commenced to construct batteries. The rifled 24-pounders (8 long and 10 short), 20 rifled 12-pounders and 20 rifled 6-pounders, field guns, were placed upon the heights surrounding the fortress, at a distance of from 2000 to 3800 paces, and 4 rifled mortars in the valley, close behind the village of Vigneulles. The construction of the batteries was a very difficult undertaking, both on account of the activity of the garrison, whose cannon and rifle fire forced the besiegers to work exclusively at night, and also from obstacles of the ground—the hill and valley roads being covered with hard frozen snow, which interfered with bringing up guns and other material.

On the morning of the 12th of December, however, the batteries were ready and equipped; the fire upon the fortress began at 7.30 o'clock, in bright weather.

After a short time, it was very energetically replied to, from Montmédy, and, although several guns upon the front attacked were silenced, the fire of the fortress lasted until dusk.

On the following day, there being a thick fog, the cannonade was only continued slowly, in the same manner as it had been during the night; in the evening the town was observed to be on fire, and at 7.30 o'clock, a parlementaire appeared, to negotiate the capitulation. A mutiny amongst part of the garrison had made it impossible to continue the defence. The surrender took place at 2 o'clock p.m., on the 14th of December; in addition to the garrison, 236 German prisoners of war came into German hands.

LONGWY.

Longwy had been invested at the latter end of November, by Colonel *von Cosel*, by order of General von Kamecke, and the bombardment first began on the 16th of January.

The fortress lies upon the right bank of the Chiers, and, like Montmédy, forms an upper and a lower town; the latter is not fortified at all, the upper town, however, is surrounded with bastion fortifications, conforming to the shape of the rock on which it lies, and is unusually strong. The fortress was erected by Vauban in 1680, as a counter fort to Luxemburg. The town contains about 2700 inhabitants.

Longwy held out against the bombardment, from the 16th to the 25th of January 1871, favoured by its high situation and strong rock fortifications. After that, the capitulation ensued, with a garrison of 4000 men and 200 guns.

MÉZIÈRES.

Mézières, an important point of support for the Franc-tireurs in the Ardennes, was invested and bombarded in the latter days of December, after the fall of Montmédy. The siege corps was under the command of Major General *von Woyna*.

The fortress lies upon the right bank of the Meuse, in a bend of the river, which here runs so close that the fortress resembles an island. Thus its capability of resistance lies, to a great extent, in the surrounding water, which fills all the ditches, and can be used for inundation. The town has about 6000 inhabitants and forms the junction of the railroads to Rheims and Thionville. The fortifications are characterised by a citadel with seven bastions upon the east side, which commands the Meuse, and a horn work upon the west side, from which a second horn work, with three lunettes, is thrown out.

A bombardment of some days, which inflicted great losses on the garrison and inhabitants, resulted in the capitulation; this

took place on the 2nd of January 1871, and, with the fortress, 2000 men, 106 guns and large magazines of provisions were brought into German power.

ROCROY.

The fall of Mézières was immediately followed by the taking of *Rocroy*. Three days after the occupation of the former fortress, five battalions and two squadrons of *Senden's* Landwehr Division, with six batteries, under the command of General *von Woyna*, moved forward for the purpose of carrying Rocroy by surprise. Quite unobserved, in a thick fog, they succeeded in enclosing the fortress in the form of a cineture, and in directing 36 guns upon it. The commandant was only made aware of the presence of the enemy, by the arrival of the German parlementaire with the summons to surrender. The capitulation was refused, but marvellous to relate, to the astonishment of the besiegers themselves, the fire from the German guns which lasted for five hours, produced the most decisive success, although there was no object for the gunners to aim at, nor could the efficacy of the shots be discovered anywhere.

As it was imagined that the artillery fire, in such a thick fog, was useless, General von Senden, who arrived at noon, had even given orders for the firing to cease at 5 o'clock p. m. and made arrangements for the departure of his greatly fatigued troops, leaving a rear-guard behind. He would not however, neglect once more summoning the commandant to surrender, and sent the parlementaire, First Lieutenant von Förster, again, into the fortress for this purpose.

Lieutenant von Förster was astonished to see that the shot thrown at random, had ignited considerable fires, and observed that the garrison and inhabitants were in a state of utter confusion.

The commandant, threatened with mutiny, begged that a rapid entrance might be made by the German troops; the disorder had, however, already risen to such a height, that most unusual steps had to be taken instantaneously.

In order to take immediate possession of the gate, Lieutenant von Förster armed 8 liberated German prisoners of war (5 of the cavalry, 1 of infantry and 2 civilians) with rifles belonging to the Garde Mobile, and mounted a guard at the gate which kept order until the arrival of two Prussian companies.

There fell into German hands, with the fortress, 8 officers and 300 men; 72 guns, one colour, many arms, 400 cwt. of powder and enormous stores of provisions, ammunition and articles of clothing were acquired. Possession was taken on the 5th of January, during cutting cold weather.

TOUL.

The conquest of *Toul*, was made long before the forts situated on the Belgian and Luxembourg frontiers had been taken.

As early as the 1st of September the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, who, with the XIII. Army Corps, had belonged to the investing army of Metz since the 3rd of September, received the mission of occupying Châlons and Rheims, in order to secure the lines of communication of the German army before Paris, and to take *Toul*, which barred the railroad to Paris.

The Grand Duke divided his Corps; the 2nd Landwehr Division was directed upon Châlons, the 17th Infantry Division, reinforced by almost the whole of the Artillery Corps, and the 18th Dragoons and 11th Uhlans (two light reserve batteries and the 17th Dragoons followed the Landwehr) marched upon Toul, and arrived in their cantonments round the fortress on the evening of the 12th.

Information was obtained by means of reconnaissances, that Toul could certainly not be taken by a *coup de main*, on account of its wet ditches and high walls, but that it could be bombarded with a prospect of success:

At present there were no heavy guns at hand, (with the exception of some French guns taken at Marsal, which, as yet, the artillery did not rightly understand how to use), and these had to be waited for, from Cologne and Magdeburg. The Grand Duke

gave over the command to General *von Schimmelmann*, and repaired to the chief-head-quarters, by command of the King.

Up to the 19th of September, the attack was limited to a close investment, and an occasional bombardment from field guns. On this day, the 33rd Infantry Brigade, the Uhlan Regiment and three light batteries were moved to Châlons.

The expected siege guns arrived on the following day, and on the morning of the 23rd, the construction and equipment of the batteries had been completed. The Grand Duke was again present at the bombardment.

At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the white flag appeared on one of the towers of the beautiful cathedral, after the fire from the fortress had been tolerably brisk during the day, and the suburb of Mansuy as well as the village of St. Evre, both of which were occupied by the investing troops, had been set on fire.

The capitulation, as was the case with almost all the fortresses, was based upon the capitulation of Sedan. With the fortress, 109 officers, 2240 men, 120 horses, 1 Garde Mobile eagle, 197 bronze guns including 48 rifled, considerable stores of arms, equipment and clothing, as well as large magazines of provisions and forage, fell into the hands of the Germans.

SOISSONS.

The conquest of *Soissons* likewise fell to the charge of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's Corps; this fortress lay so near to Paris, and was so dangerous to the investing army, besides being of much importance as a point of obstruction on the railroad from Rheims to Paris, that its capture was necessary.

The present fortifications of Soissons are of quite a late date, since 1840; they consist of a circumvallation of bastions, a strong earth rampart with high escarp walls, ravelins and several advanced horn works. The ditches are dry, but still the west front had been inundated by damming the Aisne.

The garrison amounted to about 4800 men, and the equipment consisted of 128 guns.

The Siege Corps was formed of the 3rd Landwehr Division, four companies of Siege Artillery, and two companies of Pioneers; it brought 10 rifled 24-pounders, 16 rifled 12-pounders, 6 7-pound mortars, 2 35 centimètre French mortars, and 4 22 centimètre French mortars, besides two field batteries.

The siege batteries were erected partly upon the hill of Vaux, about 2000 paces from the enceinte, and partly upon the hill of Genevière, at a distance of about 3000 paces. The mortars were placed further to the front, behind the railroad embankment.

The preparations were finished on the 12th of October, and the bombardment commenced, combined with an effort to make a breach in the front lying opposite the hill of Vaux. In case the bombardment did not effect the purpose quickly, an assault was to be attempted.

The fire of the fortress was very well directed; it was aimed at the right points for disturbing the work, even during the construction of the batteries, and after that, replied very energetically to the bombardment. On the first day too, the fortress had the upper hand in the cannon fight; it succeeded in dismounting two of the enemy's guns, whilst the besiegers only accomplished the ignition of some fires in the town.

On the following day, however, the besiegers succeeded in gaining the advantage, and a breaching fire was begun. On the 14th of October, in the evening, most of the barrelled guns of the fortress were silenced, and a breach was also effected. The fires in the town could no longer be extinguished. Nevertheless the garrison continued the mortar fire, from behind the ramparts, with great obstinacy.

But on the 15th of October, at 8 o'clock p.m., the commandant, urged by the inhabitants, and disquieted by signs of demoralization in a portion of his troops, commenced negotiations, which led to the conclusion of a capitulation, in the course of the night.

The Grand Duke moved in on the 16th; 4633 prisoners were made, and 128 guns and great depôts and magazines were taken.

VERDUN.

After the attack of the Meuse Army upon *Verdun* (v. Chapter 6.) during their march, had proved abortive, and this fortress had, for a long time, been a cause of disturbance to the investing troops before Metz, and to the lines of communication of the German Army in the west, the observation of the place was changed, on the 25th of September, into a close investment, and a bombardment was projected.

The Meuse flows through Verdun, it is surrounded by a circumvallation of bastions, and has a citadel. The fortress is commanded by heights, on all sides, at the distance of about 3000 paces. The garrison amounted to about 4000 men with 137 guns.

A provisional bombardment with field guns having failed, just as it had already done on the 23rd of August, it became necessary to wait for the arrival of the siege-guns.

These did not make their appearance until the 12th of October, and had, for the most part, been captured in Toul; they were however, French guns throughout, — 12 rifled 24-pounders, 24 rifled 12-pounders, 4 22centimètre mortars and 4 22centimètre howitzers; only two Prussian reserve batteries besides the French material, were at hand, — 12 rifled 6-pounders, with which the fruitless bombardment had been made. The besiegers made preparations for the cannon attack, with an equal number of guns on both sides of the Meuse; they took possession of the heights of Belleville upon the right bank, and of Thierville on the left bank, drove the French out of the villages lying in front, and in the night of the 12th, constructed all the batteries, at a distance of about 3000 paces. The bombardment began on the following morning.

The construction of these batteries had, however, been too hurriedly performed; the battery of 8 rifled 24-pounders, which was to make the breach, was erected on the ridge of the height of Belloville, in such a manner that it could be plainly seen and was greatly exposed. There was also a scarcity of ammunition, so that some had to be manufactured during the night; added to which, the serving troops were quite unacquainted with the French guns.

The fire was thus opened with very unfavourable prospects, and led to no satisfactory result.

The garrison replied by a well aimed, efficacious fire, dismounted several guns and inflicted severe losses upon the troops, particularly those of the breaching battery, and finally attained a decided superiority; although some fires had broken out in the fortress and some guns had been dismounted on the ramparts.

Towards evening on the 15th of October, the German batteries became silent from want of ammunition, and from this moment the siege again changed into an investment.

The garrison, which, shortly before the cessation of the bombardment, had already decided to capitulate, now again took courage, and in a short time made a powerful sortie, in which it succeeded, under cover of night, in penetrating into the enemy's batteries and spiking some of the guns.

Nevertheless on the 8th of November they surrendered, after a considerable siege train had been provided from Metz, which place had, in the meantime, fallen into German hands.

The fortress capitulated with about 4000 men, 2 generals and 161 officers, 136 guns, 23,000 rifles and considerable stock of war material of different descriptions.

LA FÈRE.

The fortress of *La Fère*, lying on the left bank of the Oise, between that river and the Serre, next came into question; an army for the relief of Paris, having been organized to the north of that city, it was important to deprive it of this point of appui. *La Fère* lay in the radius of the French Northern Army, which made an attempt to relieve it on the 20th of November, and, as a rallying point for the *Francs-tireurs*, was a troublesome neighbourhood to Soissons and the surrounding country, now occupied by the Germans.

The fortress is not large, it had a garrison of 2000 men, including the *Gardes Mobiles* and *Francs-tireurs*, and was equipped

with about 70 guns. Its main strength lay in the considerable inundations, which however were so far disadvantageous to its capabilities of resistance that the water penetrated into the cellars and ground floors of the low-lying town, so that the inhabitants could find no shelter during the bombardment.

La Fère was unable to resist a serious bombardment, and the commandant was so much convinced of this, that before the investment began, he determined to save all the artillery material by sending it off to Lille. The inhabitants, however, opposed this, and effected the relief of the commandant by an officer of marines, who declared that the fortress would hold out until its last biscuit.

In the night of the 24th of November, the besiegers brought into position to the west of the fortress, at a distance of about 2000 paces, 8 rifled 24-pounders, 12 rifled 12-pounders, 6 rifled 6-pounders and 6 mortars; these silenced the guns of the fortress, even on the first day, ignited fires in the town, and on the 26th effected the capitulation, without having suffered any loss.

PÉRONNE.

Péronne, lying upon an island in the Somme, is, similar to La Fère, protected by water; this fortress also obtained some importance in the operations of the Northern Armies, and its conquest is worthy of remark, because it resulted exclusively from the fire of captured French guns.

The garrison of Péronne, over 3000 men with about 70 guns, had brought itself into notice, during the time that part of General von Manteuffel's Army occupied Amiens, by seizing a carelessly returning railway detachment in *Ham*; and, in other ways, had caused some uneasiness to the German Northern Army.

In consequence of this the German Artillery commandant of the citadel of Amiens, First Lieutenant *Schmidt*, prepared a siege train, and upon a suggestion of his with respect to the bombardment of Péronne, was sent out against this fortress, (which had

been invested for some days), on the 30th of December, with 6 rifled 12-pounders, 2 22centimètre mortars and 4 22centimètre howitzers. The French Army under General Faidherbe had, at that time, been obliged to retire from the neighbourhood of Amiens.

Lieutenant Schmidt had selected the south-western front for the attack. The expedition met with considerable difficulties from the roads covered with slippery ice upon the hard frozen ground, and was endangered by the neighbourhood of Faidherbe's Army.

The bombardment began on the morning of the 2nd of January, and was carried on for two days with favourable results (the delay in Amiens having given the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the French guns). Then, however, the bombardment had to be suspended for a time in consequence of the issue of the battle of Bapaume, after which both armies retired. The fire was continued with three guns only, whilst the remainder were held in readiness to drive off.

After some days, however, the danger disappeared and the bombardment began afresh, and led to a capitulation on the 9th of January 1871, after having lasted altogether seven days.

The defence of almost all the fortresses was undertaken and prosecuted by the French with praiseworthy courage, and in some cases also in an intelligent manner.

In almost all, the bombardment produced the decisive result, it demoralized the garrison through the constant peril of death, and moved the inhabitants to influence the commandant.

The superior leadership and discipline on the German side, the superiority of the Prussian artillery material, the insight and energy of the German officers always bore away the victory.

TENTH CHAPTER.

THE SIEGE OF PARIS.

The siege of Paris, which resulted in the capitulation of this giant fortress, is, incontestably, one of the greatest military spectacles that the world has ever beheld; it was the most important event in the development of the whole war. Yet, looking at it solely from a military point of view, is not sufficient to obtain a correct idea even of the military importance of the event. Neither the occurrences in Paris, nor the actions of the besiegers can be measured by a military scale alone.

It is the peculiarity of this phase of the war, that not only had a complicated political state of power to be taken into account, but also perfectly new and unexampled factors of military power, and lastly the wavering humours of a large, helpless, excitable and uncertain population.

Never has a policy had more reason and better opportunity for acting with wisdom, than German policy after the overthrow of the empire. The problem was solved with incomparable ability, and yet, as it was not omniscient, at the end a fault was committed which was capable of calling into question the fulfilment of the peace conditions. In stipulating the conditions of the capitulation, neither the disarmament of the National Guard, nor the occupation of the city were insisted upon. Thus it was possible that an event so incredible as an out-break of civil war in the city at last delivered from the enemy, could take place. Certainly—who can tell what harm might have resulted from an occupation of the city!

Mindful of its exalted position, as the director of a great cultivated nation, the Prussian Government could not, from the first moment of the siege, even when considered as a military question, overlook the fact that it was the most beautiful city in the world, although a fortress, with which the German arms were now concerned. It could not overlook the fact that the population of Paris, uniting all the weaknesses and vices of mankind with the amiable and estimable qualities of an educated people, was a most unusual object for warlike measures, not only on account of its multitude but also in regard to its character.

Paris, the nucleus of unequalled treasures in art and science, was the property of the whole world, and what France had forgotten in her downfall, great Germany would bear in mind.

An inextinguishable detestation pursues the destroyer of the great centres of cultivation of mankind; the righteousness of his cause will not, here, protect the conqueror.

The melancholy occurrences of the civil war, which followed the siege by the Germans, have shown to what horrors the conquest of the city by storm could lead, and the manner of defence that the Parisians were capable of under the circumstances.

It adds to the honour of Germany, that it did not fall to the lot of German troops to carry on the war which became the duty of French troops in May and June 1871, through a weak and therefore unfortunate government; and that German troops did not contribute to the destruction of the gorgeous, and historically notable, buildings of the old, renowned city.

The conquest of Paris was in the highest degree honourable both for the rulers and warriors of Germany; but for France — it has needed the sanguinary horrors of the civil war to make the world forget, that the defence of Paris against the Germans was well adapted to cover the French name with lasting ridicule. For four months and a half, half a million of well armed defenders of their country allowed themselves to be shut up, in the greatest fortress of the world, by 200,000 men, whilst, during the whole time, they never ceased congratulating each other upon their heroic courage, and threatening the enemy with total destruction.

In order rightly to appreciate the vastness and multilateral

nature of the tasks for the Direction of the German army and state, one must first recall the external and interior *condition of the great object of operations — Paris*. The natural situation of the fortress is not particularly favourable, but finds advantages in some heights to the east and south-west, for excellently situated, commanding outworks, and at other points, is protected from the approach of the enemy's siege works, by the course of the Seine and Marne, especially so in the west and north-west. Its main strength lies in its, quite unusual, proportions, which have the effect on the one hand, of making it impossible to attack the outer forts, distributed in a circumference of 7 miles ($32\frac{1}{2}$ English miles), by a cross fire, but in the front only, and on the other hand, of obliging the foe to accumulate extraordinarily large masses of troops for a surrounding siege.

(Compare the general map of Paris.)

There is a double line of fortifications. The town itself and part of the suburbs are surrounded by a very strong *enceinte*, a girdle of fortresses, whose longest diameter, from Porte Point du Jour in the south-west, to the outermost point of la Villette in the north-east is $1\frac{5}{8}$ of a mile (about $7\frac{1}{2}$ English miles), whilst its shortest diameter, a line leading through the intersecting point of the Seine (which flows through the *enceinte* and Paris), in the south-east, by the Tuileries to Les Batignolles, is $1\frac{1}{8}$ of a mile ($5\frac{1}{2}$ English miles) in length.

The *enceinte* consists of a circumvallation of bastions, with masonry escarps, without outer works and without casemates; the ditch is 35 feet wide, and can be filled by the Seine. *Ninety four bastions* jut out upon all sides, and enable a concentrated fire to be opened upon the assailant. They are distinguished by numbers, and run from bastion 1, on the right bank of the Seine, at the point where it enters the town, to bastion 94 on the left bank, exactly opposite No. 1. In the interior of the *enceinte*, a paved military road runs along the whole circumvallation, and besides this, a *railroad belt*, which at the same time, unites all the lines entering from outside with one another. Thus there is the most excellent communication within the *enceinte*; in a very

short time, a considerable number of troops can be concentrated upon any threatened point.

The suburbs extend beyond this inner circumvallation, and from them, country houses and villages, in unbroken succession for a mile ($4\frac{3}{5}$ English miles) in extent.

In an outer line of fortifications, a cincture of *detached forts* and *redoubts* intersects these countless excrescences and satellites of the great city. They present the first and strongest resistance to the besieger, and although they do not lie sufficiently distant from the enceinte, to impede, completely, the efficacy of the new guns of the enemy upon the enceinte and beyond, yet they greatly limit this efficacy, and at any rate, prevent an immediate attack upon the town. They lie partly on hills and partly in the plain; on the eastern, southern and northern sides they lie close together, on the west there is only one—but the most important fort. They lie connected in such a manner, that no enemy can penetrate between, and that any two or three of them, can concentrate their fire upon one spot, whilst the assailant finds it impossible to bombard a single one from different sides at the same time.

The *outer forts* form different groups before the different fronts of Paris.

(Compare the three special maps of the south-west front, the east front, and the north front of Paris.)

The *south-west front* is distinguished by the *Fortress of Mont Valérien*, a real fortress in itself, lying furthest towards the west, and then by the Forts *Issy*, *Vanvres*, *Montrouge*, *Arcueil*, *Bicêtre* and *Ivry*. Whilst the fortress upon Mont Valérien is a full mile ($4\frac{3}{5}$ English miles) from the one lying nearest to it, Fort Issy—the interval is filled up by a bend of the Seine—, none of the remaining forts are separated from each other by more than from 2600 to 3000 paces, and thus lie so near one another, that even after one of them has been destroyed by the enemy, he would only be able to advance further under the cross fire of the two neighbouring forts.

In front of these works, however, at a distance of about 1500 paces, there are hills rising to above 400 feet, which if occupied by the besiegers, must greatly imperil the forts by their

dominating fire. These are the *heights of Clamart, Meudon and Chatillon*. As the limited time prohibited the construction of considerable works upon these heights, which, properly, were necessary for the security of the south-west front, General Trochu had to content himself with simple field entrenchments. Works of this description were laid out, before the arrival of the enemy, at *Moulin de la Tour*, in front of Chatillon, at the village of *Villejuif*, and to the east of Villejuif, at *Moulin Saquet*. Moreover the villages of Villejuif and Vitry sur Seine were placed in a state of defence. The very important hill of *Montretout* above St. Cloud, on the other hand, was not fortified — time failed, and the labour force of Paris was not properly utilized. To the north of Mont Valérien, however, a *tête de pont* was erected for the bridge of *Neuilly*, and a fortification raised upon the hill of *St. Ouen*.

The *east front* is the strongest of all; the position of the fortifications here, corresponds exactly with the formation of the ridge of heights which stretches from the suburb Belleville, $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile (about $3\frac{1}{2}$ English miles) outside the enceinte towards the east. Towards the north these heights sink down to the canal de l'Oureq, and in the south, to the Marne. They are occupied by a group of forts which command all the approaches of the enemy from Châlons, Troyes and Melun, as well as the passages over the Seine and Marne near the spot where they unite into one stream. The most northern of these forts is *Romainville*, which lies only 1800 paces from the enceinte; below it, *lines of entrenchments lead down to the canal de l'Oureq*. At 2000 paces to the east of this fort lies *Fort Noisy*, which is connected with *Fort Rosny*, situated 2600 paces to the south-east, by the redoubts of *Montreuil* and *La Boissière*. *Fort Nogent* and the redoubt of *Fontenay* situated to the north of it, crown the south-eastern extremity of the heights, which commence at Belleville, and lie about 3200 paces south of the most advanced lunette of Fort Rosny.

To the south of this the windings of the Marne, which is here 100 paces wide, form a hindrance to an approach; and at the spot where the enemy would have the greatest facilities for

breaking through, in the event of his having succeeded in crossing the river at its south-eastern bend, namely in the defile formed by the bends of the river running near one another, the road is barred by the redoubts of *Gravelle* and *La Faisanderie* with the entrenchments lying between them. Again, 2600 paces from the redoubt of *Gravelle* lies *Fort Charenton*, in the angle between the *Marne* and the *Seine*, uniting the east front with the south-west front. Then, in a second line, lies the *fortified Chateau of Vincennes*, on the east front, 2500 paces from the enceinte.

Fort St. Denis, *Fort Aubervilliers* and the fortifications along the *St. Denis canal* form the *north front*. The town of *St. Denis* lies to the north of *Montmartre* (which played a part at the siege of *Paris* in the year 1814, but is now completely taken up by the increasing city, and rises within the enceinte), is 4400 paces outside the walls and has three forts: *Double Couronne*, *de l'Est* and *de la Briche*. At a later period, another work was erected on the left bank of the *Seine*, at *Villeneuve la Garenne*, in connection with the works of *St. Denis*. Thus *St. Denis* is also a complete fortress in itself, and very strong; the works are all defensively united with one another, and their ditches can be inundated by the stream *Rouillon*. *Fort Aubervilliers*, 2400 paces from the most north-easterly point of the enceinte, covers *Paris* on this side, and commands the road to *Lille*, but is a long way from its neighbouring fort — 4400 paces. In order to give security to this wide interval, redoubts are erected, in a second line, along the *canals of St. Denis and de l'Ourcq*.

All the forts were moreover united with one another, before and during the investment, by a running line of entrenchments.

This must be mentioned to the honour of General *Chabaud-Latour*, who directed the great works of fortification.

Paris is thus surrounded by sixteen forts and, moreover, by a multitude of redoubts and entrenchments, and in its enceinte, presents to the besieger, who has been fortunate enough to overcome the first obstacles, a very strong line of defence. The forts were new, since the year 1840, very strongly and well built; that of *Mont Valérien* was of extraordinary solidity. They were all

equipped with guns of the heaviest calibre, partly before and partly during the first stages of the siege.

The *communications*, inside the whole circle of the outermost fortifications, are the best, altogether, that can be conceived. The ground is intersected in all directions by railroads, broad, well paved or macadamized roads, and these offer the most favourable means for collecting a considerable mass of troops, at any spot where the defenders may desire, in a comparatively short time. The Seine is crossed by a superfluously large number of the finest bridges. Telegraph wires united all the outer forts with the city and with each other, and in the city itself there was a telegraphic communication between all the important points. All the aids of science were at the command of the defence; the great mechanical establishments, as well as the large gun foundries and arm manufactories of the state, were at its service.

It is also important to observe, that for making sorties either on a small scale or on the largest, with hundreds of thousands, no more advantageous formation than that of the fortress of Paris can be imagined. Each two forts make an excellent sortie gate, and these can prepare for it and support it by the fire of their heavy guns. A whole army can, any day, be brought together, unseen, inside the enceinte or at many points immediately behind the forts, which might break forth between the forts the next morning at dawn, in splendid development, and always be four, five or six times superior to an enemy at the given point, who has not a whole million of soldiers for the siege.

Certainly if Mac Mahon had been allowed to lead the army, which came to ruin at Sedan, to Paris, the German Army Direction would not have been able to carry out the investment of this city, and if, instead, of going to the help of Bazaine, he had drawn towards Orléans, the siege of Paris could not have been undertaken at all.

The forces of France were allied with unexampled misfortune; they were squandered away *before* the siege of Paris, and trifled away *whilst it was going on*.

The following active forces were raised for the defence:

- 1) a Corps of able, brave men, expert in arms, the sailors

and marines, under their educated and intelligent officers. In all about 15,000 men. Amongst these regiments of marine infantry, General Trochu has drawn attention to the superiority of Nos. 35 and 42.

2) A mass of soldiers and other state officials, who were experienced in the use of arms, but not organized, and for the most part completely demoralized — a real mosaic troop. They were the *dépôt* battalions of the former Imperial Guard, the troops of the Line which General Vinoy had brought away to Paris from Mézières after the battle of Sedan, and old, time served soldiers, who were again called up, with Douaniers and Forest-keepers of all kinds, and *ci-devant* Sergeants de Ville and Gendarmes. There were besides these, the fugitives from previous battles and marches. Altogether about 70,000 men.

3) The Gardes Mobiles from the province, chiefly Bretons and Burgundians; then there were men from Berry, from Franche Comté and Champagne and other provinces, men who probably had no clear idea of what a rifle was, especially on the system of a Remington, a Chassepot or Martini-Henry; but who possessed patriotism and good physical qualities, and after six weeks of judicious training could have furnished an efficient body of men under a capable leader. General Trochu estimates their number at 100,000.

4) The Parisian Garde Mobile: "This was a corps which combined all the bad qualities of the population of a great city with the weaknesses of the provincial Gardes Mobiles. These Gardes Mobiles had, already, been once attached to the army of Châlons, and had first brought Marshal Canrobert, into a state of despair, and then perplexed Marshal Mac Mahon to such an extent that he decided on dispensing with their assistance and sending them back to Paris. There might have been 30,000 of them.

5) The Garde Nationale of Paris. This armed mass was, according to Trochu's estimate, only 50,000 men strong at the beginning of the siege. In the middle of September a number of so called *battalions* existed, of about 1000 men each, composed of citizens, tradespeople, doctors, lawyers, and officials. They were recruited from the mass of those, who followed similar kinds of

occupation, in the same quarter of the town, and who were possessed of similar means; — during the siege they reached, on an average, a strength of 1200 men. *These* battalions, to distinguish them from those raised later, were called, *old* battalions. In the other quarters of the town, where this regulation did not as yet exist (the Government had always suppressed the legal formation of the Gardes Nationaux, from fear of revolutions), in the suburbs and districts of Belleville and Menilmontant for example, *new* battalions were raised when the siege was threatened, each of which must, very quickly, have reached a capitulation of about 2000. Altogether, in the month of October, the battalions numbered 266, whose strength is reckoned by General Trochu at 260,000 men, and by other authorities at a higher figure, up to more than 300,000 men. Amongst these Gardes Nationaux the best and worst elements were to be found recklessly mixed together. Powerful young men stood shoulder to shoulder with portly elderly gentlemen; men with patriotic enthusiasm stood in the same rank with the most timid egotists. Highly educated men, who, even when pampered by an over-refined life always show themselves of moral courage and great service in battle, were interspersed in a battalion with men who stood far below them mentally, and who could in no way make up for their want of military capability.

At the commencement there was absolutely no selection, no division according to age or the good will of the men, and when it was desired to begin this it was already too late.

The *equipment of the army* was very heterogeneous, still, thanks to the active manufacture of arms, all the combatants were supplied with good rifles in the course of a few weeks, and finally, the artillery also, with numerous guns. Certainly the only arm which the Parisians, with some exceptions, understood how to *serve*, during this siege, was the *stomach*, which was contented with unusually frugal fare. On the whole an enormous material presented itself, the most part of which certainly, remained unemployed, but from which an able general might surely have produced a serviceable army of 200,000 men, and from which a leader of genius, capable of carrying the masses along with him,

might have raised a formidable army for undertakings on the spur of the moment.

The Commander in Chief of this entire army, about half a million of men, had however — and this is the most prominent of all the peculiarities of the defence of Paris — far more deference for his own army than for the enemy; or rather, he possessed a well grounded respect for the enemy, but his fear of an *émeute* in his own troops was so great, that he allowed his regard for the enemy to give place entirely to his anxiety for internal quiet; he arranged little upon his own initiative, but, in most of his acts, allowed himself to be driven by the population — the Garde Nationale.

General *Trochu* was a very unfit Commander in Chief for such forces. A soldier of scientific education, experienced and sensible, he possessed just sufficient penetration to see clearly, all the defects of his army, but had not the energy and talent to obviate these defects and to bring the strong side of it into account.

It may be assumed that, throughout, General Trochu did not deceive himself. He was completely convinced that the fate of the capital, of which he was the governor, depended solely, upon what measures the Germans would or could take. If the German army in pursuit of General Vinoy's defeated troops, had passed the outer line of forts on the 19th of September, suddenly taken the enceinte by storm, and appeared before the Hôtel de Ville on the first day of the siege, General Trochu would have been one of those, least surprised, at such a rapid solution of the affair. If the German army had destroyed some forts in the first four weeks, and then undertaken the assault, General Trochu could not have prevented it.

As however the Germans took a different and a wiser course, which led to peace as well as to the capture of the city, he was filled with amazement at the enemy, and at the same time with satisfaction in regard to his own situation. General Trochu was an actor from the first day of the siege to the last, and was obliged to be so in order to retain his position.

But why had he undertaken such a post?

He thought that he was well able to fill it as any one else, and to perform his duty as a patriot.

Having fallen out of favour, on account of his work on the French army in 1867, and being an object of suspicion to the Court as an Orleanist in spite of his service in Italy and Africa, he had received an insignificant appointment at the beginning of the war, and only on the formation of the 12th Army Corps had he been named its commander, and on the 17th of August, Governor of Paris.

The General has given extensive *explanations*, in the sittings of the National Assembly on the 13th and 14th of June 1871, as to his personal position both with regard to the political and military situation of France, some points of which will be found of interest here. The General affirms, that even before the French defeats at Metz, he had pointed out to the Emperor Napoleon, the necessity of a rapid retreat of the whole army upon Paris, that his motion was approved of in the council of war, but that advices from Paris had prevented the retreat from being carried out.

Later, at another council of war, presided over by the Emperor, he was appointed Governor of Paris with the charge of announcing and preparing for the Emperor's arrival there. He *accepted*, but only on the condition that Mac Mahon should lead his army to Paris. He, Trochu, was to be named Commander in Chief of all the forces, whilst the Emperor himself would resume the reins of government.

On his arrival in Paris, he was however, received with great distrust by the Empress Regent, who declared that the plan of the retreat upon Paris was quite altered. She asserted that the Emperor was not coming to Paris, but would remain in Châlons; Trochu might defend Paris without the Emperor.

Contrary to his own conviction, he, yet, accepted out of loyalty and composed a proclamation beginning: "I come as Governor of Paris, appointed by the Emperor, with the charge of proclaiming a state of siege."

The Empress wished to have the Emperor's name removed from the proclamation, and in spite of his resistance, insisted upon this alteration.

The war minister, Count Palikao, had received him no better than the Regent, and even declared to him that his arrival frustrated all the well prepared measures for the defence. (Trochu had become a favourite with the opposition, since the Imperial Government had slighted him.)

On the night of the 3rd of September he had learnt, from an officer in the street, the news of the capitulation of Sedan, and General Soumain had afterwards given him proof that, unbeknown to him, General Palikao had been placed over Mac Mahon's army and also over that of Paris. His counsels were only met with mistrust both by the Empress and the Minister, Palikao, and the latter had broken off all business relations with him.

From this moment, his efforts were only directed towards the defence of the legislature against the seditious multitude. Summoned to take part in the government now forming at the Hotel de Ville, he had undertaken the Presidency.

In regard to the defence of Paris, Trochu then gives the following explanation: "On the 5th of September, my colleagues Jules Favre and Picard, required me to state what deterred me from the undertaking; I answered that every fortified place, which is not supported by an external army, falls into the enemy's power; that Paris, with her emotions, would be subject to this axiom more than any other town; and consequently, since an army no longer existed, we should be uniting in an heroic folly. But, I added, this heroic folly is necessary, to save the honour of France, and to give time to the amazed world to recover. — I confess that I counted upon America's remembering Lafayette's comrades, England those of Inkerman and Italy those of Solferino."

Trochu further says: "The chief difficulty was to make people *believe* in the siege of Paris. It was declared that the enclosing was impossible, or maintained that, if it were possible, the city would not hold out for fourteen days. I myself only believed in a resistance of 60 days The fortifications of Paris were made for another description of Artillery, and for other rifles. Everything had to be made anew"

Upon the subject of the German lines of fortification, Trochu said: "The Prussian works are the strongest that have ever been

made. I thank heaven, that I possessed the firmness to withstand those who would have forced me to make an attack upon them. Had I led my troops on beyond the first line they would have been lost. It is a consolation to me that numerous families have been spared this misfortune. Recollect gentlemen, the exertions of the insurgents; facts have proved the value of the defensive positions which covered Versailles."

In the further course of his speech, Trochu related how he had followed the plan, projected by General Ducrot, of making a sortie on a large scale from the peninsula Gennevilliers in the direction of Rouen, for the purpose of forming a junction with the Lille Army.

Gambetta's opposition had frustrated this plan. "Gambetta possessed considerable patriotism, but two innate faults. He thought that, after having called up all the strength of the country, he must transfer the guidance of it exclusively to the men of a certain party, and then he was involved in the military traditions of 1792, and believed it possible to fight with undrilled masses against organized armies. That this was not the case, even at that time, is attested by the memoirs of Dumouriez."

General Trochu's further explanations also prove that the measures which he took, especially the sorties, were forced upon him against his better conviction, partly by the population of Paris, and partly by Gambetta.

"More than twenty times", declared the General, "I was on the point of sending in my resignation; I did not do so, I swallowed the most cruelly bitter words, because I looked upon it as an act of cowardice to resign."

For the German Direction, on the other hand, the problem of the conquest of Paris, was combined with very many considerations of the most diverse kinds.

The attainment of a favourable and secure peace was and continued to be the main point. The capture of Paris was important, for it was anticipated that it would bring on the peace, only Paris must be the capture of Paris, that is, of the seat of the government and of prevailing influence upon the whole country.

Further, Paris, when captured, must be really and unconditionally in the hands of the conqueror, completely subjected, inclined for peace, and disposing the provinces to peace.

In the event of Paris overthrowing the government of the National Defence, of anarchy breaking out in the city, or of the German army taking a city in which daily disturbances had to be suppressed — in these very possible cases Paris, had not the high value which the price of its difficult conquest must entail. For under these circumstances, quite apart from the great sacrifices in human life, it was to be feared that a new government would be formed in the provinces, or, above all, that no government would be established, with which peace could be concluded, and lastly, that the provinces would be encouraged to make a longer resistance, by the permanent disturbances in Paris.

Although, therefore, the government of the 4th of September was by no means legitimate, and indeed could not even claim the authority of a municipal government, still the Chancellor of the Confederation, whilst the investment was being completed, entered into negotiations about an armistice with the delegate of this government, Jules Favre, the minister of Foreign Affairs (v. page 289) which might be looked upon as a preliminary to peace; and always having in view the attainment of a legitimate peace as quickly as possible, he proposed the mildest conditions which, altogether, could be offered. Even after these negotiations had been broken off, the German government did not decline to recognise the Parisian government.

This government, bad as it was, must be protected, on the part of the Germans as if it were a real treasure, for it was foreseen that after its overthrow one still worse might spring up. It needed but a trifling difficulty in order to put into its place the dominion of a class of people, whose existence and aims were evidently better known to Count Bismarck than to the French government itself. The negotiations between the Chancellor of the Confederation and the French Minister leave no doubt about this, and it is a wonderful fact that the Frenchman displayed indignation instead of grateful intelligence.

Moreover, at the siege of the city, the German Army Direction

acted consistently with the end in view, that it was necessary to bring the population to recognise their need of peace. The thorough hopelessness of resistance, was clearly placed before them by evidence, time was given them to weigh the circumstances calmly, and everything that could unnecessarily excite or exasperate them was avoided. That this wise moderation, nevertheless, did not spare the great city the horrors of a most rigid siege and of a bombardment, and that the defence against the external foe was followed by the most sanguinary civil war, is entirely the fault of the inhabitants; the result of the frivolity, pride and complete want of political and military intelligence in this people, who had been so badly governed for centuries.

Considered also from the narrower military point of view, the intended conquest of Paris presented very great difficulties. After the battle of Sedan an army of about 240,000 men was disposable for the siege, no great number for a fortress whose outer forts form a cordon 7 miles ($32\frac{1}{3}$ English miles) in length. Besides which, it was known that a new French army was being formed on the Loire, of little importance at first, but in any case worthy of consideration.

It was perfectly well known in the German head-quarters, that the works of the fortress were incompletely equipped and in bad condition, and that the defence, was as yet by no means organized; so that there were some chances for a surprisal. But an attack by force would certainly have cost very heavy sacrifices, and then, the success of an attack by surprise could by no means be reckoned on beforehand, and consequently was not thought of by German Generalship. *In any case an attack by force would have been at variance with the fundamental idea of the German Army Direction and policy.*

In siege operations, another way of quickly attaining the object, is by a *bombardment*. This also was not practicable at once, in the present case. The city, it is true, could be reached by heavy guns from several points. A bombardment of Paris, however, would have very small effect, unless carried out by a *very great* number of guns, as experience proved later, and as had been rightly judged at head-quarters beforehand. The chief effect

of a bombardment is conflagration, but not only is the city so enormously large that the shells and shot from rifled guns, must be too evenly distributed, but the houses are also built, with such solidity that only very inconsiderable damage could be caused by the shot, and ignitions only exceptionally produced. A shot, which in Strasburg would have thrown down a whole house, in Paris, that combination of colossal stones, knocked a hole in the wall, or fell through the roof and a couple of floors, destroying some furniture but without injuring the stability of the house. Therefore, for a bombardment of any importance, such a large park of guns was necessary, that several months must elapse before it could be procured. *

To provide this, however, and the ammunition, necessary for a protracted bombardment, such an enormous transport material was required that the army supplies might have suffered in consequence. *

In order to judge of the difficulties caused by this alone, one must consider that the investing army required on an average *daily*: 150,000 3lb. loaves, 1000 cwt. of rice and barley, 600 oxen, that is, their weight in meat or bacon, 150 cwt. of salt, 28,000 quarts of brandy; in forage, 10,000 cwt. of oats and 24,000 cwt. of hay; and that there was a *monthly* consumption of about 1000 cwt. of tobacco and 12 millions of cigars.

Thus it was, that it being desirable to spare the troops as much as possible, and at the same time only to destroy Paris in case of the most urgent necessity, nothing remained but the slow expedient of the investment, with eventually the regular siege.

Astonishment has frequently been expressed, even by those who understand the subject, that the engineer and artillery attack was so long deferred, and it has been said that even if the *general* attack was necessarily delayed through difficulties recognised on all sides, still that *an attack upon some one single point* might have led to the capture of the line of fortifications far earlier than it actually took place. It is, no doubt, probable, that after six weeks, sufficient siege material could have been at hand for a successful attack, for instance, upon Forts Issy, Vanvres, and

Montrouge, or even St. Denis. Siege guns were on the spot as early as the middle of October. It may also be assumed that the forts would have succumbed to the attack some weeks later, so that, consequently, the enceinte might have been attacked about the middle of November. It is however, very greatly to be questioned, whether any considerable advantage would thus have been gained towards the attainment of the final aim. Strong sallies would, shortly, have been directed against the threatened point, which, in any case, would have exacted many victims. Then, however, even after a successful assault and considerable sacrifices, there was still the risk of encountering long continued street fighting and great destruction, the very evils which it was desirable to avoid. If only some of the forts had been taken, or perhaps the town of St. Denis, then the attack by storm would have to be decided upon. To stop half way was out of the question.

The other expedient led far more surely, and with fewer losses, to the object — that of first conquering the population morally, and then of bringing on a capitulation by threatening the city generally.

Investment, with starvation for its object, had plainly a great prospect of success at Paris, contrasted with the disadvantages of the other means of attack.

But even this way presented considerable difficulties. The army appointed for the investment, must be sufficiently strong to oppose all sorties. The cincture of the investing corps must be between 9 and 10 miles (41 to 46 E. m.) in length, so that the troops should not be placed immediately under the guns of the forts; that is, about 22,000 men of the investing troops to each mile ($4\frac{3}{5}$ E. m.), consequently a very small number. If the investment lasted sufficiently long for the Paris troops to be formed into a serviceable army, the position of the investing troops would become very hazardous. The Parisians could have no difficulty in attacking any point they might choose with a fourfold, or still greater superiority in forces. It was anticipated however that Paris would be unable to endure, for long, a rigidly carried out investment. Cut off from all intercourse with the outer world and deprived of its

supply of provisions, it was generally believed that the luxurious city would very soon capitulate. Even in the German head-quarters, it was probably not expected that four and a half months resistance in privation, would be encountered from the spoilt, excitable, swayed-by-every-wind, unstable foe.

But in this respect Paris deceived all expectation. *Injured vanity, scorn of the "barbarians" and fear, were so strong, that in spite of all the hunger and misery, one day after another of passive resistance passed away, until a series of months was gone.*

SEPTEMBER.

After the news of the capitulation of Sedan had spread in Paris, after the first panic had been overcome; then after some days had been uselessly spent in general rejoicings on account of the *republic of the 4th of September*, the city set to work, in anticipation of the enemy's approach, to prepare for a lengthened siege, and engaged with renewed zeal in laying in provisions and in the equipment of the fortifications.

The *accumulation of the necessities of life* for Paris was an immense task, and it was accomplished in a surprisingly grand way, which does great honour to the Imperial minister of commerce, Clement Duvernois, who had been occupied with it as a precautionary measure since the first defeats of the army.

The new republican government carried on successfully, the work which had been begun.

The whole population of Paris had been raised by the fugitives from the neighbourhood, and the Gardes Mobiles, to a capitulation of about 2,400,000. During the siege this mass of human beings needed in bulk the following quantities*):

*) According to a calculation by A. Emminghaus, which is based upon the statistical estimates of Husson's work "La consommation de Paris" 1856 and upon the „Journal des Economistes“.

Flour . . .	156,000,000 Kilogr.
Meat . . .	32,796,000 -
and cut up for sale . . .	8,189,000 -
Pigs . . .	75,431 head
Sheep . . .	148,876 -
Oxen . . .	60,672 -
Horses . . .	75,021 -
Food for these animals, in hay	63,636,365 Kilogr.
Oats . . .	21,943,642 -
Straw . . .	44,062,330 -
Potatoes . . .	12,257,537 -
Or the whole value in hay .	133,764,708 -
Salt . . .	6,072,000 -
Butter . . .	6,912,000 -
Eggs . . .	17,659,200 -
Sugar . . .	8,786,400 Kilogr.
Coffee . . .	1,342,000 -
Olive oil . .	427,200 Litres
Beer . . .	16,240,800 -
Wine . . .	164,208,000 -
Spirits . . .	5,640,000 -

A great quantity of other provisions, however, of which no calculation can be made, are not here included, such as milk, fowls, salt fish, fresh water fish, oysters, ice, and especially such voluminous edibles as vegetables and potatoes (those mentioned above, were as food for animals), which Paris requires in large quantities under ordinary circumstances; therefore as these articles, with the exception of milk, could not be procured afresh, and very soon ceased to be in store, a still greater need of the above mentioned articles becomes evident. In horses, for example, it is certain that during the siege a far greater number were consumed, and the corresponding amount of hay, oats and straw in hand would be far greater.

The bulk of fuel consumed has not been reckoned.

A Paris newspaper of the 4th of October gives the following official list of the provisions then in hand:

"In the different parks of the capital, as the Bois de Boulogne,

Luxembourg, and others, there are about 220,000 sheep, 40,000 oxen, and 12,000 pigs.

"In flour, Paris has a store of 300,000 cwt., besides the supplies at the bakers, which are estimated at 200,000 cwt.

"There are from 30,000 to 40,000 cwt. of salt and preserved meat, and a considerable amount of salt fish; lastly, an enormous supply of salt, 100,000 cwt. of rice, and 10,000 cwt. of coffee, irrespective of all the other different products which are in the warehouses and shops*)."

The beautiful parks, in which large herds of animals were collected, presented a remarkable spectacle; but the cattle soon suffered greatly for want of proper care. Another remarkable sight was presented by the public buildings, the stations, halls, theatres, and above all the newly erected opera-house in marble and gold, filled from cellar to roof with sacks of flour, grain, potatoes and barrels of wine, the corridors and green rooms arranged as kitchens and offices, and the amphitheatres as hospitals.

The second question was the *fortifications*.

In what manner they were increased and strengthened under the direction of General Trochu has already been mentioned. The last weeks of August and the first half of September were really well employed in the erection of these new works, and from this time forth, they were continued diligently.

But the *equipment* of all the works, also, required great activity, and an enormous material. Neither failed.

The arsenals of Paris and Vincennes were emptied, and every gun, even the old trophies from the Invalides, were conveyed to

*) These estimates differ very much from the former calculation. The number of sheep is much greater, that of oxen and pigs, much smaller. Yet it may be assumed that a great number of animals, of the two last kinds, were at the butchers.

The French estimate of the store of flour, shows only one sixth of the quantity above reckoned, but quotes, on the other hand, considerable quantities of rice.

All calculation is difficult, because private families and tradespeople naturally provided stores on their own account; still A. Emminghaus' estimate is valuable, because it is based upon well founded scientific investigations, into the actual requisites for the maintenance of life.

the ramparts; from Havre all the heavy guns of the fleet were brought to Paris by the Seine, and the equipment of the forts and of the enceinte was gradually completed. The fortress of Mont Valérien carried 79 guns (amongst which were some giant cannon such as the Valérie, and the Josephine), Fort Issy 64, Vanvres 45, Montrouge 43, Bicêtre 40, Ivry 70, Vincennes 117, Charenton 70, Nogent 53, Rosny 56, Noisy 57, Romainville 49, Aubervilliers 66, de l'Est 52, and de la Briche 61 guns.

Altogether at the end of October, in all the fortifications, 2000 guns were to be found.

In order to carry out the preparations, which necessarily precede the defence of every fortress, exertions were made to clear the glacis in order to procure free play for the guns. These efforts led to a terrible devastation all round the city, without gaining their object, in consequence of the great number of thickly dotted villages, villas, chateaux, parks and woods. It was in vain that the axe and fire raged in the charming woods of Boulogne, Vincennes, Bondy and Meudon; the fire would not ignite the wood which was full of sap, and the axe was paralyzed. It was impossible to tear down the countless villages and country seats; these formerly favourite spots of the Parisians, and of all strangers visiting Paris, were in too great abundance. But all the inhabitants were forced to leave their possessions, and numberless families had their happiness and property unnecessarily destroyed.

In the interior, the army for the defence was organized. The defence of the enceinte, and the security of public tranquillity, were consigned to the Garde Nationale, which formed the First Army. A Second Army was formed out of the regular troops and Gardes Mobiles for the purpose of making sorties; and a Third Army of the regular troops and sailors, was organized for the defence of the forts *).

*) This distribution, certainly, did not come into full effect until the beginning of November; as however, an analogous employment of the different kinds of troops took place from the beginning, the order of battle, which was only given out later, here follows, in order that it may be more easily comprehended.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY OF PARIS.

Commander in Chief, General *Trochu*.

Chief of the Staff, General *Schmitz*.

Deputy Chief of the Staff, General Foy.

Commander of the Artillery, General Guiod.

Chief of the Engineers, General de Chabaud-Latour.

Intendant General, General Wolff.

FIRST ARMY.

Chief Commandant, in September and October, General *Tamissier*; from November, General *Thomas*.

Chief of the Staff, Colonel Montagut.

Commandant of the Cavalry Legion, Colonel Queiet.

Commandant of Artillery, Colonel Schöleher.

This army consisted of 266 (according to other authorities 276) battalions and finally numbered 300,000 men.

SECOND ARMY.

Chief Commandant, General *Ducrot*.

Chief of the Staff, General Appert.

Deputy Chief of the Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Warnet.

Commandant of Artillery, General Frébault.

Commandant of Engineers, General Tripier.

First Army Corps: General *Vinoy*. Chief of the Staff, General de Valdan: Commandant of Artillery, General d'Ubexi. Commandant of Engineers, General du Pouet.

1st Division: General *Malray*. 1st Brigade: General Martenot. 2nd Brigade: General Paturel.

2nd Division: General de *Maud'huy*. 1st Brigade (Garde Mobile from the provinces): Colonel Valentin. 2nd Brigade: General Blaise.

3rd Division: General *Blanchard*. 1st Brigade (Garde Mobile from the provinces): Colonel Comte. 2nd Brigade: General de Mariouse.

Second Army Corps: General *Renauld*. Chief of the

Staff, General Ferri-Pisani. Commandant of Artillery, General Boissonnet. Commandant of Engineers, Colonel Corbin.

1st Division: General *Susbielle*. 1st Brigade: Colonel Bonnet.

• 2nd Brigade: General Lecomte.

2nd Division: General *Berthaut*. 1st Brigade: General Bocher. 2nd Brigade: Colonel Boutier.

3rd Division: General *de Maussion*. 1st Brigade: General Courty. 2nd Brigade: General Avril de Lanclos.

Third Army Corps: General *d'Exeu*. Chief of the Staff, Colonel de Belgaric. Commandant of Artillery, General Princeteau. Commandant of Engineers, Colonel Ragon.

1st Division: General *de Belleme*. 1st Brigade: Colonel Fournès. 2nd Brigade: Colonel Colomieu.

2nd Division: General *Mattat*. 1st Brigade (Garde Mobile from the provinces): General Faron. 2nd Brigade: General Daudel.

Cavalry Division: General *de Champéron*. 1st Brigade: General de Gerbrois. 2nd Brigade: General Cousin. Regiment of mounted Gendarmes: Colonel Allaveine.

In November this army numbered 120,000 men, with 80 field and mitrailleuse batteries.

THIRD ARMY

(under the special command of General *Trochu*).

1st Division: General *Soumain*. Chief of the Staff: Lieut. Colonel Péchin. 1st Brigade: General Dargentolle. 2nd Brigade: General de Chassière.

2nd Division: Vice Admiral *de la Roncière*. 1st Brigade: Colonel Lavoignet. 2nd Brigade: Colonel Haurion. 3rd Brigade: Captain of Frigate, Lamotte Ténet.

3rd Division: General *de Liniers*. Chief of the Staff: Major Morlaincourt. 1st Brigade: Colonel Filhol de Camas. 2nd Brigade: Colonel de Chamberet.

4th Division: General *de Beaufort*. Chief of the Staff: Major Lecoy. 1st Brigade: General Dumoulin. 2nd Brigade: Captain of Frigate, d'André.

5th Division: General *Corréard*. Chief of the Staff: Major Vial. 1st Brigade: Colonel Champion. 2nd Brigade: Colonel Porion.

6th Division: General *d'Hugues*. Chief of the Staff: Major d'Elloy. 1st Brigade: Captain of Frigate, de Bray. 2nd Brigade: Colonel Bro.

7th Division: Rear Admiral *Pothuau*. 1st Brigade: Lieut. Colonel Le Mains. 2nd Brigade: Naval Captain Salmon.

Cavalry: 1st Brigade: General de Bernis. 2nd Brigade: Lieut. Colonel Blondel.

The strength of this army was 80,000 men.

In the month of September this distribution was only proceeding gradually. It had probably gone through many changes, as the opinions upon the warlike capacity of the different corps were altered after the first fights in September. This is shown by one of General Trochu's orders on the 11th of September, in accordance with which the Garde Mobile of Paris was divided in the following manner:

1st Division: General de Liniers (Head-Quarters in the Elysée). Battalions of the arrondissements 8, 9, 16 and 17.

2nd Division: General de Beaufort d'Hautpoul (Head-Quarters in the Palais Royal). Battalions of the arrondissements 1, 2, 9 and 18.

3rd Division: General Berthaut (Head-Quarters in the Conservatoire de l'art et de l'industrie). Battalions of the arrondissements 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 19 and 20.

4th Division: General Corréard (Head-Quarters in the Luxembourg). Battalions of the arrondissements 5, 6, 9, 13, 14 and 15.

This distribution does not appear in the order of battle given above; some of the Generals are not mentioned at all, and others have different commands.

The strength estimates in the foregoing order of battle cannot be regarded as very trust-worthy. There was many a corps and many a battalion the strength of which was unknown to its own

commander. Only thus much can be assumed, that the strength of the army altogether was about 500,000 men.

The state of feeling which existed in the largest portion of these masses, viz. the Garde Nationale, may be inferred from a description given by Francisque Sarcey, a member of the Garde Nationale, who has published a narrative of the state of Paris during the siege, and writes as follows, with regard to the general feeling during the advance of the Germans, in the first half of September:

"All the world expected to see the "Prussians" fall upon Paris and force the gates, five or six days after Sedan. Their progress could be traced by the notices in the papers, which announced, one day: "The march to-day is only as far as Bar-le-Duc", the next day: "to Vitry", the following day: "The march to-day is only to Châlons", and then: "They are going to Epernay". Thus we could calculate, by how many miles France had become reduced in size. The railroad material moved back, from town to town, upon Paris, and proclaimed how much country had been abandoned to the enemy. The girdle with which the Prussians enclosed us, drew closer every hour, until Asnières and Vincennes became the termini of the railroad lines. One day more and all the carriages, all the engines, the whole material were collected together in the carriage sheds at Paris, and the gates by which they used to leave the great city were locked and walled up.

"It is highly probable that those who will relate the story of the siege to posterity, will only represent the fixed, immutable purpose of the Parisians at this time, to conquer or to die; they will blazon forth the heroic courage of this great capital, which broke through its habits of luxury and refinement without flinching, and resolved to bury itself in ruins, rather than yield to a cowardly capitulation.

"In reality however, the feelings which agitated the Parisian citizens during this waiting period, were very complicated, and it needs an observer of subtle mind to analyze them.

"At the bottom of every heart lay dormant — it was absurd, irrational and laughable — a secret hope that "the affair would be arranged", and that the Prussians would halt half way.

Upon what were these strange illusions grounded? Upon every thing and upon nothing. William had declared that he only made war against Napoleon. "Now" said they, "as the Emperor is overthrown, why should the King of Prussia continue the campaign against a nation which never did him any harm?" To this was added: "he will be afraid of the French republic, and the spread of democratic ideas in his army." In fact all the democrats of Paris composed long addresses to the soldiers of the enemy, their "German brothers", and posted them on all the walls of Paris, presumably with a view to their being conveniently read by the agents of Monsieur von Bismarck. Besides, the intervention of Europe was counted upon. "Russia will not allow the conquests of Prussia to continue, which endanger the security of Europe. England must perceive that after the conquest of France, William will annex Holland and aspire to the dominion of the sea." On the other hand the article in the "Times" was not quoted, which deliberately enumerated the reasons why Europe must remain neutral, and recommended an indifference, to which Europe was only too much inclined.

"But what nourished this irrational dream of the population more than anything else, was the incurable vanity, which is the principal feature in our national character. To take Paris appeared to us such a monstrous sacrilege, such an astounding outrage against all laws, human and divine, that the thought of such a thing would not enter our heads; such a crime could not be committed, no — it was impossible. Sooner than that, the earth would open and swallow up the accursed ones who should venture to raise their hands against the holy ark. I am convinced that this unconquerable hope held its ground with many amongst us until the last day, that it blended with all their sensations and if it ever entirely ceased to exist, it was only at the first shot from Fort Valerien."

Thus Francisque Sarcy.

And one must do him justice, for the whole demeanour of the population, the diplomatic steps of the government and the military actions of the besieged army, have confirmed his description. It is, besides, worthy of remark, that upon the sum-

mons of the Government for all useless months to leave Paris, the men of the well-to-do classes certainly conducted their families to the south and to the sea side watering places, but whether from curiosity, pride, wantonness or love of the beautiful city, with few exceptions, they returned to Paris themselves, "in order to take part in the siege".

The German Army drew near immediately after the capitulation of Sedan, the XI. Army Corps only, remaining behind provisionally, for the purpose of sending off the captured French Army to Germany.

The King's Head-Quarters were removed to Varennes on the 4th of September, on the 5th to Rheims, on the 14th to Château-Thierry, on the 15th to Meaux and on the 19th to the chateau of Ferrières. The armies of the Crown Princes of Prussia and Saxony marched by the two main roads, leading from Sedan to Paris, without meeting any resistance, and the troops delighted in the beautiful country, which unfolded itself in greater loveliness and richness as each day's march brought them nearer to the capital.

General *Vinoy*, who had been on the march to Mézières, with the 13th Army Corps for Mac Mahon's eventual support, rightly apprehensive for his own safety, had again returned to Paris on the 6th and 7th of September.

The III. Army marched upon the southern line. The Head-Quarters of the Crown Prince of Prussia were in Attigny on the 4th, in Warmerville on the 5th, in Rheims on the 6th, and in Boursault, near Epernay, on the 9th. At this place and at Château-Thierry, the III. Army crossed the Marne, approached the city between the Marne and the Seine, and reached Nogent-sur-Marne and Créteil with the advanced guard on the 15th of September. On this day the Head-Quarters were removed from Montmirail, where they had been since the 12th, to Coulommiers.

The IV. Army marched by Soissons, upon the northern line, taking several roads. It only commenced the march on the 5th of September, after having rested on the previous day. At the same time, on the 5th, an attempt was made on Montmédy

by a strong detachment of the Garde Corps, which however, in spite of a bombardment for several hours, did not produce the desired result upon this rock fortress, and was consequently, not further continued.

The IV. Army Corps, which originally followed the Garde Corps, advanced against Paris by Vendresse upon Laon; the XII. Army Corps by Le Chêne and Rethel upon Cormicy. From Launois, the Garde Corps turned to the south upon Craonne. On the 11th of September, the line Laon-Craonne-Cormicy was reached.

As with the III. Army, the Cavalry Divisions were two days march in advance. On the 9th of September, therefore, Duke William of Mecklenburg, Commander of the 6th Cavalry Division, was able, after a short delay, to move into *Laon*, which was given up by the French General, Theremin. Here occurred the melancholy accident of the ignition of the powder magazine in the citadel, after its surrender, probably by a non-commissioned officer (Garde d'artillerie). The explosion cost the lives of 40 German Jagers, and above 200 French Gardes Mobiles, and wounded many others, including the Duke himself.

The Head-Quarters of the IV. Army were in the chateau Marchais on the 10th and 11th of September, from the 13th to the 17th the advance was continued upon Nanteuil, Acy and Lizy, and Paris itself was reached on the 18th and 19th. The IV. Army Corps passed Soissons on the 14th. The fortress refused the summons to surrender and was invested.

Whilst the IV. Army thus approached the great city *from the north* and then drew its line of investment on the north and east, opposite the forts of *St. Denis, Aubervilliers, Romainville, Noisy, Rosny*, the redoubt of *Fontenay* and *Fort Nogent*, the III. Army continually extended further to the *south* and *west*, and, marching by Bièvre, Palaiseau and Versailles, enclosed the forts of *Charenton, Ivry, Bicêtre, Montrouge, Vanvres, Issy* and the *fortress* of *Mont Valérien*.

On the 19th of September the circle was closed round Paris.

The Head-Quarters of the III. Army were removed to Versailles; those of the IV. Army to Grand-Tremblay.

The enclosing manœuvre of the last few days had not taken place, however, without fighting. Probably the plan of the defence was, if possible, to hold the plateaux of Clamart and Meudon, the heights before the south-west front, already mentioned as important; or perhaps the intention was only to disturb the enemy's manœuvre for the moment.

General Ducrot*) repeatedly directed vehement attacks against the troops which were in the act of shutting off the south-west front, on the 17th and 18th and particularly on the 19th of September.

These attacks would have greatly endangered the III. Army, had sufficient forces been developed. In this they certainly failed. General Ducrot brought into action four Divisions of the regular troops — 30,000 men at the highest estimate —, much too few for so grave an undertaking as here presented itself. Consequently nothing came of his attacks but a totally useless sacrifice of men, and moreover it entailed the disadvantage of a defeat of those troops, on which Paris had to place the greatest reliance at the commencement of the defence.

The fights developed themselves as follows:

The V. Army Corps laid a pontoon bridge over the Seine, above *Villeneuve St. Georges*, on the 17th, and then accompanied by the 2nd Cavalry Division, marched towards Versailles with the cavalry division in front. In order to cover the construction of the bridge, the plateau from Limeil to Boissy St. Leger, north of the point for crossing the Seine, and opposite to Fort Charenton at the distance of a mile ($4\frac{3}{8}$ English miles), had been occupied by the 17th Infantry Brigade, two squadrons and two batteries. This position was attacked, in the wood of *Brevannes*, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, by six French battalions, with two batteries from Créteil. However, on the German side, the five companies which were pushed forward to the northern point of the wood, were sufficient in conjunction with the artillery and cavalry,

*) The same General who commanded at Sedan after Mac Mahon, and escaped the capitulation in some manner not yet quite cleared up.

to overthrow the enemy. The loss of the Germans amounted to 3 officers and 40 men, in killed and wounded.

In the meanwhile the passage of the Seine had been accomplished, and on the following day the march was continued towards Versailles, as far as Bièvre (9th Division) and Palaiseau (10th Division). Whilst this was taking place a skirmish occurred to the north of *Bièvre*, between detachments of the 9th Division and French troops, who attacked from Plessis Piquet.

Early on the 19th the V. Army Corps moved off from Bièvre and Palaiseau, in order to reach Versailles the same day. In rear of the V. marched the I. Bavarian Corps which had crossed by the bridge at Villeneuve, one day later. Peaceable communications with Versailles had been maintained by a patrol, on the previous day.

Even before the commencement of the march, the French made an attack from *Petit-Bicestres*. It was repulsed and the march of the division was proceeded with. Then followed a renewed violent attack, which obliged the Division to devolve for fighting with the front to the north. The combat was so vehement, and General Ducrot developed such overpowering masses of troops, that the 10th Division was also obliged to give up its march in order to move forward, with the artillery corps, to Villa-Coublay in support of the 9th Division. Still before the arrival of this reinforcement, the advanced guard of the I. Bavarian Corps, Dietl's Brigade, had been so judiciously marched against the left flank of the French, and had attacked with such energy, that the assault against the 9th Division fell into disorder, and this Division now succeeded, tolerably quickly, in defeating the enemy. Shortly after 11 o'clock a.m. General von Kirchbach was again able to continue the march with his corps to the west; he could leave the section of ground which he quitted, as well as the enemy who still held the other side of Plessis Piquet, to the care of the II. Bavarian Corps, now marching from Lonjumeau in the south, upon Chatenay and to his support.

General von Hartmann, relieving the V. Corps upon the tract of country between Sceaux and Villa-Coublay, took up the engagement.

Towards 12 o'clock, the French were in the entrenchment

at *Moulin de la Tour* and along the ridge of the plateau to the westward, as far as *Plessis Piquet* and beyond. The slope which they held was furnished with cover trenches formed one above and another, and displayed six batteries in emplacements.

Their position was very strong, both on account of the steepness of the slope and the strength of the fortifications. Then in a short time, the French side again took the offensive.

Of the Bavarian Corps, the brigades of the 3rd Division were moved forward upon *Petit-Bicestres* and upon *Sceaux*, whilst the 4th Division with the 8th Brigade remained at *Croix de Vernis*, and the 7th Brigade was sent against *Bourg*. Movements of the enemy's troops were observed, at 11.45 o'clock, both towards *Plessis Piquet* and towards *Fontenay*, which led to the supposition that an offensive effort was intended. This appeared to be directed from the enemy's left flank, against the infantry advancing by *Bourg*; and General von Hartmann, therefore, commanded the 7th Brigade to confine itself to holding *Bourg* until further orders. At 12 o'clock the 8th Brigade was moved to a reserve position to the east of *Chatenay*, in order that it might be available to support both wings of the corps.

It was, however, confined to an artillery action, and at 2.30 o'clock, the French evacuated their position.

The advanced guard of the 3rd Division followed immediately and took possession of the abandoned entrenchments, with 7 12-pounder field guns which had been left behind.

The French troops had apparently been unable to hold out against the fire of the German artillery. In the meanwhile the VI. Army Corps had advanced by two pontoon bridges over the Seine at *Villeneuve* and by *Villeneuve le Roi* and *Orly*, towards the fortifications of Paris. The artillery fire from the entrenchments at *Villejuif* then put an end to the advance of the VI. Corps. French infantry also showed themselves, but were defeated without any considerable fighting, and advanced posts were established upon the line *Chevilly—Choisy*. Several offensive attacks were still made on the part of the French from the entrenchments, but without success.

On the evening of the 19th of September, the Third Army

held the line Bougival, Sèvres, Meudon, Bourg, L'Hay, Chevilly, Thiais, Choisy le Roi, Bonneuil.

This day, the first of the Investment, had been very disastrous for the French. In a panic of terror, the beaten divisions had fled through the forts, within the gates of the city itself, and there spread alarm and confusion. The population, horrified and at the same time indignant at the sight of the flying demoralized soldiers, overwhelmed them with invectives, and some were arrested by the Garde Nationale, to give an answer for themselves. And yet these were the only regular troops which Paris then possessed. When therefore the cry resounded through the city: "Long live the Mobiles! Down with the Zouaves! Down with the Line!" this could entail the evil consequence of engendering dissension in the army, at the expense of the better troops.

The endeavours of the besieged, after this, were chiefly directed to the instruction of the numerous bands of the Garde Nationale and Garde Mobile. In addition to which, the principle was observed of firing with heavy guns from the forts upon everything that was visible of the besiegers, not only upon small detachments, but also on single posts.

On the German side everything was at first done to render the Investment really impenetrable, both as regards the passing of single messengers as well as the frustration of attempts for an attack. By making use of every advantage of the ground, the most advanced line of out-posts was pushed, with circumspection, as near to the forts as it was anywhere possible, in order to find out each measure adopted by the enemy and every alteration in his position. Entrenchments were made behind as a protection against sorties; the defence capabilities of the outskirts of the villages, were strengthened by earthworks, abatis, covertrenches and barricades; the extensive park walls were everywhere provided with loopholes, passages were made through the walls, and the points best adapted for positions were indicated beforehand by sign boards.

Thus, in the midst of a labyrinth of countless buildings, of the charming and beautiful resorts of pleasure round the city,

a cincture was drawn, of strong defensive entrenchments*), of considerable depth, which in a short time was so completely closed up, that Paris was obliged to resort to quite unusual means of intercourse through the air, in order to avoid absolute isolation.

The month of September only witnessed some unimportant military events.

In the night of the 22nd the German out-posts, observing that the entrenchments of *Villejuif* were evacuated by the French, had established themselves in them. On the following morning, however, they were driven out again by the fire of Forts Bicêtre and Ivry. Still Maud'huy's Division, which now broke out of the forts in pursuit, was repulsed.

On the same day Rear Admiral Saissset undertook a reconnaissance upon the north front, against *Le Bourget*.

On the 24th, the German out-posts at *St. Cloud* and *Sèvres* were bombarded by gunboats, belonging to the Seine flotilla.

On the 30th, a sortie on a larger scale, again took place, under the direction of General Vinoy, from the south-west front. The real attack was made against the VI. Corps from the Forts Montrouge and Bicêtre, and fighting took place round *Villejuif*, *Chevilly*, *Thiais* and *Choisy le Roi*, whilst demonstrations were made against the V. Corps from Fort Issy, and against the XI. Corps from Fort Charenton. The French were repulsed with considerable loss, and amongst others, their able General, Guilhem, was killed.

On the 19th and 20th of September, the negotiations, already mentioned at page 270, had taken place between Count Bismarck and Jules Favre, in the Chateau Haute-Maison, and in Ferrières, the royal head-quarters. The negotiations as to the possibility of a definitive armistice had been broken off, for in fact neither of the two parties was able to accept the demands of his opponent

*) For the better comprehension of the maps, it may be remarked that all the German works, which are not numbered, are field entrenchments and batteries to guard against sorties, therefore of a defensive character, whilst the numbered works are siege batteries, that is bombarding batteries.

for an *armistice* of such a kind. The position of affairs made *peace*, most absolutely necessary; an armistice was, however, impossible if it were not the immediate preliminary to peace.

The negotiations were broken off because the republican government was neither judicious enough, nor strong enough, to admit at once the prospect of a separation of land.

OCTOBER.

The first days of October brought some small encounters between German cavalry and newly formed French troops, in a wider radius round Paris. Immediately after the enclosing was finished, the four Cavalry Divisions of the Investing Army had received the mission of watching the country in the north-west and west, especially also in the south as far as the Loire; and at the same time of bringing in requisitions the produce of which would be for the benefit of the magazines established in Corbeil. Single battalions were assigned for the support of the Cavalry.

General von Bredow, of the 5th Cavalry Division, whose head-quarters were in St. Nom, had undertaken an expedition in the direction of Rouen, on the 30th of September, with the main body of his brigade and six companies; he here came upon irregular troops, which he dispersed, and after destroying the railroad to Rouen, he occupied *Mantes*. Meanwhile the French had again assembled at Pacy; General von Bredow, whilst making a further expedition towards Evreux, attacked them afresh, drove them away on the 5th of October, made requisitions in *Evreux* itself, collected quantities of cattle and forage from the whole neighbourhood, and returned with them to Paris.

The 6th Cavalry Division, at the same time, advanced against *Chartres* and during its march, drove away a Garde Mobile detachment from the neighbourhood of Rambouillet, on the 2nd of October.

The 15th Brigade, reinforced by two companies and a bat-

tery, under command of Colonel von Alvensleben, went forward from Rambouillet upon Epéron, scattered the out posts of a French detachment near the wood of St. Hilaire on the 4th of October, occupied Epéron in the evening, and returned to Rambouillet with the rich results of the requisitions, leaving some small detachments distributed in rear.

One of these detachments remaining behind, a squadron of the 16th Hussars, had quartered itself in the hamlet of *Ablis*, and here, in the night of the 7th of October, the first catastrophe occurred from that new deplorable kind of warfare, which resulted from the measures taken by the republican government and from the instigations of the French press. The inhabitants of Ablis gave information of the presence of the Germans, to a band of Franc-tireurs in the neighbourhood; these surrounded the place in the darkness, and, with the assistance of the inhabitants, killed the greater part of the soldiers who were surprised in sleep. A few only were able to escape. The Germans in consequence burnt down the place as a terrible example.

The 4th Cavalry Division, under command of Prince Albert of Prussia, had gone in the direction of *Orléans*, and on the 4th of October was stationed at Toury. From here the approach of a strong body of French was ascertained, who were advancing from Orleans, in a northerly direction. The Cavalry Division moved back to Etampes, and from there to Authon, and reported the circumstance to the Chief Command.

These were *the first beginnings of the enterprises on the Loire*, which as yet, had certainly shown themselves of no offensive importance for the investing army.

For all that, the circumstance deserved the greatest attention, on account of the strategical importance of the point from whence the French movement had proceeded, and therefore an Army Detachment, under the chief command of General *von der Tann* was immediately formed from the Third Army, consisting of the 1st Bavarian Corps, the 22nd Infantry Division, and the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions, with the mission of discovering the plans of the possibly newly raised French Loire Army and of opposing it in case of necessity.

General von der Tann, marched off for the south on the 7th of October. (For the operations on the Loire, v. Chapter 11.)

Before Paris itself, everything remained quiet at the beginning of the month. *The King removed his head-quarters to Versailles, on the 6th.* On the 9th of October, the first 14 *siege guns* arrived in Nanteuil, via Weissenburg, and were then transported with great trouble, and by a wide circuit to avoid the forts, to Villa-Coublay. There, the siege park was established.

The investing army was satisfied with the absolute isolation of the great fortress, and the latter now began gradually to comprehend what was intended.

The account which Jules Favre publicly gave of his interview with Count Bismarck, in a style which came home to French feelings, inflamed all hearts with fresh indignation, and made the fall of Strasburg, which had now become known, easier to bear. In Paris at that time was sung:

Bismarck si tu continues
De tous tes Prussiens il n'en restera guère,
Bismarck si tu continues
De tous tes Prussiens il n'en restera plus.

Paris firmly counted on the assistance of the provinces, in the same way that the provinces, on the other hand, reckoned upon the endurance of Paris. Each party hoped that the other would do the work.

As three weeks had elapsed since the investment, and still no army of relief was approaching from the south, Gambetta set off on the 6th of October in an air-balloon, in order to inspire the sluggish deputies of the government in Tours, with the fire of his southern French energy. He arrived in Tours on the 9th, after having first descended at Rouen, and at once took away the War Ministry from the aged advocate Crémieux, in order to conduct it simultaneously with the Ministry of the Interior; so that he now had all the forces to be found outside Paris at his disposal.

On the German side a diplomatic act took place. Count Bismarck addressed a circular, in the beginning of October, to the

representatives of the North German Confederation in foreign lands, in which he impressively pointed out the dangers, to which the population would be exposed, if the French capital held out until the provisions were completely exhausted. Amongst other things, this indirectly allowed the conclusion to be drawn, that only a short term of resistance by the enemy, was reckoned upon at the German headquarters. *The provisioning was however on a surprisingly large scale*, and later the Parisians displayed extraordinary frugality.

Bismarck's dispatch had no effect upon the measures of the republican government.

After a rest of twelve days, General Trochu fixed upon *the 13th of October for a new sortie*, probably in consequence of General von der Tann's departure having become known to him, and from over-estimating the weakness thus caused to the investing army. On the day named, three columns, under the chief direction of General Vinoy, broke forth against the heights of *Clamart*, after a vigorous fire had been previously opened from the southern forts; in the centre, one brigade, under the command of General Susbille, moved against *Chatillon*, upon the right flank, one battalion only against *Clamart*, and upon the left flank, two battalions against *Bagneux*.

These troops were, numerically, quite insufficient to attain any success.

General von Hartmann, against whose positions the attack was directed, took measures according to the method always employed against French sorties, on the German side. He allowed the enemy to press so far forward beyond the line of advanced posts, that by surrounding him, he could bring him under the fire of artillery and infantry.

The French columns penetrated into *Bagneux* and *Chatillon*, without meeting considerable resistance, made themselves masters of the stone bridge between the latter place and *Clamart*; then however, were received by such a cross fire, that they commenced their retreat as quickly as possible.

The 2nd Bavarian Corps lost 388 men in killed and wounded, amongst whom were 10 officers; the loss of the French was considerably greater. On the same day, perhaps as a support to

this sortie, or as a demonstration, the fortress upon Mont Valérien overwhelmed the Park and Chateau of *St. Cloud*, where the German out-posts were stationed, with such a hail of the heaviest shot, that this beautiful and historically interesting building broke into flames, and was completely destroyed. It was one of those useless destructions of their own property which, in the contest with the republic, so frequently bore evidence to the great lack of the knowledge of war in many of the French commanders, and of the love of destruction in uneducated, badly disciplined troops.

A sortie again followed on the 21st of October, which it is presumed was only ordered by General Trochu upon the continual urging of the population: "that he would still attempt something."

Three French columns, about 6500 men strong in all, with 48 guns, supported by a reserve of 4600 men with 46 guns, broke forth at 1 o'clock p.m., between the Seine and Rueil, to the east of Rueil, and from Mont Valérien, against the positions of the V. Army Corps, after the attack had been previously announced by a vigorous fire from Mont Valérien and the Seine flotilla.

General Ducrot commanded the sortie.

At *Malmaison* the French encountered the foremost detachments of the V. Corps, and were vigorously received. The 1st Garde Landwehr Regiment also engaged in the fight (the Garde Landwehr Division, which had taken part in the conquest of Strasburg, had arrived shortly before, and was stationed at St. Germain). A fire-fight was developed which lasted for three hours, with heavy losses to the French, and was viewed by the King himself from the *Musée*. Finally the artillery of the IV. Army Corps cannonaded the French columns from the right bank of the Seine.

General Ducrot drew back his troops, with the loss of 2 field guns, as well as 100 prisoners, besides numerous killed and wounded.

Towards the end of the month there was again some serious fighting on the north front of Paris.

The village of *Le Bourget* was in the radius occupied by

the 2nd Infantry Division of the Garde Corps; it was held by one company. On the 28th of October, the French General de Bellemare carried it by a surprise. As this inconsiderable event — Le Bourget in itself was of no importance — was the first lucky stroke for the Parisians, they did not fail to make out that it was an affair of unusual importance, and took fresh courage. The 2nd Garde Division, on the other hand, however, considered it a point of honour to retake the village.

On the morning of the 30th, General von Budritzki undertook a surrounding attack from Dugny, Pont Iblon and Blanc-Mesnil (v. map of the north front of Paris). Five batteries of the artillery corps were at his command besides those of his Division, and some battalions of the 1st Garde Division were held disposable as a reserve. Three attacking columns were formed and stood ready at 7.45 o'clock; that of the right wing, two battalions strong of the Kaiser-Franz-Regiment, under Major von Derenthall, in Dugny; that of the centre at Pont Iblon, under Colonel Count Kanitz, consisting of the Queen Elizabeth's Regiment, one battalion of the Queen's and the pioneer company of the 2nd Garde; and that of the left wing at Blanc-Mesnil, under Colonel von Zeuner, composed of two battalions of the Emperor Alexander's Regiment. In artillery, three horse batteries were brought into position at Pont Iblon, and the four light and four heavy Garde batteries at Blanc-Mesnil. Some cavalry was allotted to each column.

In case support should be necessary, the divisional artillery was placed in readiness at Arnouville, and the 2nd Garde Uhlan Regiment at Bonneuil.

At 8 o'clock the horse batteries opened fire upon *Le Bourget*, and at the same time Zeuner's column was set in motion in order to cross the brook Le Moleret on the road to Drancy, and, moving along it, to take Le Bourget from the south-east.

Half an hour later the two other columns marched off, and arrived at the village at the same time as the surrounding column.

It had been barricaded and placed in a thorough state of defence by the French, who were, besides, supported by the fire of the guns from the Forts d'Aubervilliers and de l'Est, as well as

by their field batteries, between Courneuve and Le Bourget, and also by the rifle fire of a detachment stationed in Drancy.

The fight was hot and sanguinary. Every house was obstinately defended. It was not until 12.30 o'clock that all resistance was subdued, and the village again completely in German hands.

Cut off by Zeuner's column, the French had been unable to fly, and 1250 unwounded prisoners, including 30 officers, were taken. Great was the loss in killed and wounded on both sides.

The Prussian Garde mourned the loss of 14 killed and 21 wounded officers, and 44 killed and 405 wounded men.

The moral effect of this discomfiture in Paris was considerable, because all the illusions raised upon the great importance of Le Bourget now collapsed; but a still more disheartening, almost stunning effect, was produced by the news of *the fall of the fortress of Metz*. The rumour of this great catastrophe was widely spread in Paris during the last days of October, and was known for certain on the 31st.

In truth this event was of the greatest importance for the conduct of the war on both sides.

On the 27th of October the renowned *capitulation of Metz* was concluded with Marshal Bazaine. It delivered into the hands of the victors, an army of 173,000 men, including 6000 officers and 3 marshals; the strong fortress and an enormous war material, valued at 80 millions of francs; about 800 fortress guns, the material for more than 85 batteries, and 66 mitrailleuses; about 300,000 rifles, cuirasses, swords etc. in very great number; about 2000 military waggons, with many other valuable materials, and, as badges of honour, 53 eagles and colours. The fall of Metz happened at the right time for the Germans. In the north as well as on the Loire, circumstances were taking place which would raise the approach of the army, hitherto employed in the investment of Metz, to the most critical importance; although on the German side, no accurate comprehension could at this moment be obtained of the whole danger which lay in them, for the strength of the newly formed republican army was unknown.

But on the French side, the whole importance of the capitulation of Metz was now recognized, and Gambetta's unmeasured

burst of fury against the "traitor" Bazaine, proves the depth of his despair. Within four weeks, a hundred thousand German warriors would be able to reinforce the army detachment, now at Orléans, which, as a weak dam, had to oppose the great French Loire Army in its march upon Paris; and sufficient masses could be thrown against the Northern Army which was now in the act of formation. Several weeks however were still necessary, for the newly organized armies to attain such efficiency that the relief of Paris could be seriously undertaken by them.

Gambetta redoubled his overpowering activity to accelerate this epoch, in order to bring into effect the attack upon the investing army of Paris, before the German troops could draw near from Metz.

Thus the end of October brought into action, in the calmly flowing stream of the war, outside Paris, potent new forces, whose impending collision formed a fresh crisis, full of suspense.

A diplomatic event also took place conjointly with the great military transactions of this time. *Thiers*, who since the 12th of September had been travelling to the capitals of England, Russia, Austria and Italy, in order to gain these powers for France, returned with baffled hopes, and, on the 30th of October, presented himself at Versailles for negotiations. He first received a safe conduct to Paris in order to place himself in communication with the government there, and returned to Versailles on the 1st of November. Once again an armistice was discussed, and once again the negotiations were broken off, ostensibly on the question of the reprovisioning of Paris. It was just as natural that, on the German side, the importation of provisions should not be permitted without an equivalent, as it can be understood that, on the French side, an armistice without this, was regarded as a continuation of the war. The arms of the Parisians were in fact their stomachs.

Thiers's appearance in Paris on the 30th of October, combined besides with the bad news from Metz, and the panic of Le Bourget, produced in Paris itself considerable and very different effects. The *bourgeoisie* suddenly became deeply aware of their need of peace. People were completely satiated with heroism, and at the

sight of Thiers, believed in the near prospect of peace. They breathed more freely; the butchers everywhere brought out the stores of meat which they had kept concealed, in order to sell them at a high price, so that the witticism, *le cochon c'est la paix*, was generally circulated. On the other hand the Proletariats, led by Flourens, Felix Pyat, Delescluze, Ledru-Rollin and their colleagues, rose in open revolt. Even from the beginning of the investment they had been mutinous and threatening; now they declared aloud: Thiers was an agent of the Orleanists, he had sold France, and would make peace for the Duc d'Aumale; Bazaine, Trochu and the whole government were conspiring with the Prussians, and it was just the time to set up the Commune in order to save the country.

With this intention the men of Belleville, Ménilmontant, Montmartre and Clignancourt surrounded the Hôtel de Ville on the 31st of October, and threatened the members of the government there assembled, with death. Thanks to the timely appearance of some battalions which scattered the crowd, the government was saved, but the abyss upon which it stood had displayed itself alarmingly.

NOVEMBER.

The prospects of an armistice were lost after the interviews of the Chancellor with Thiers on the 1st and 3rd of November; on the 6th of November, the negotiations were completely broken off by direction of the Parisian government, and Jules Favre proclaimed to the city that *resistance to the uttermost*, was the only course that France could take.

With this prospect Paris was by no means edified; the disposition for combat had entirely vanished, and the revolt on the 31st of October roused afresh, strong fears in the heart of every proprietor. It was generally asked, of what avail was a longer resistance, for Paris anyhow must fall some time; and Edmond About had even the courage to publish an article of cool reasoning

and sound logic; which concluded with the assertion, that the capture of Paris was simply an engineering calculation for the Germans, and they could quietly await the result. The wisest policy would be to grant them what they might desire, so that they would only go home again. The author expressed what every one thought, and the deepest dejection reigned in the great city.

Provisions had already risen largely in price, so that a very large part of the population was obliged to suffer privations in the most essential requisites of life. The mortality increased rapidly, particularly amongst children. Added to this, the want of gas condemned people to darkness for a far longer time than the Parisians were accustomed to, and consequently many amusements and distractions ceased. The state of isolation from the outer world was still more sensibly felt. Many men had sent away their families, and now remained without news of them; others had been obliged to leave their business and property outside Paris, and lived in anxiety with respect to them. The Gardes Mobiles from the provinces suffered especially from home sickness. All however felt very acutely the absence of political news from the outer world, to which they were quite unaccustomed, and especially of tidings as to the efforts of the provinces to come to the help of the capital.

It is true that a certain connection with the exterior was established in a very ingenious manner, by balloons and pigeon posts; but these means were used especially for government dispatches, and could only respond in a very limited manner to the universal wants of the public.

In order to tranquillize the people, and to prove to them that he was using the utmost activity in the defence of the city, General Trochu very frequently made the outer-forts cannonade, even from the beginning of the investment. To this expedient he added still another, that of often taking in hand the re-organization of his army. Thus at the beginning of November the order of battle appeared, which has already been given at page 278. The Garde Nationale, called the First Army, was appointed for the interior service, and for the occupation of the enceinte, and the

latter was divided into nine sections, each of which comprised about ten bastions. The Second Army — regiments of the line, regiments de marche and Gardes Mobiles — was destined for operations in the field; and the Third Army — sailors, marines, Gardes Mobiles, regiments de marche, douaniers, forest officials and the mobilized Garde Nationale — was to defend the line of the forts.

But even this new order of battle was unable to inspire the Parisians with fresh courage; affairs had reached such a point that the capitulation would probably soon have ensued, had not an impulse come from outside.

The situation changed, however, at one stroke.

On the 9th of November, the French Loire Army, under *d'Aurelle de Paladines* approached against Orléans in such strength, that General von der Tann was obliged to retire upon *Toury*, after a hot fight. The news of this success, with embellishments, arrived in Paris on the 15th, by pigeon post.

The people drew breath; they exulted; in imagination they even saw the investing army scattered, and loudly demanded — resistance to the uttermost.

Nevertheless it was not until the 29th of November that a sortie was again attempted.

SORTIE ON THE 29TH OF NOVEMBER AND FOLLOWING DAYS.

The attack was now directed, as might be conjectured, towards the *south-east*, and aimed, apparently, at establishing a connection with the Loire Army, through the line of investment. Demonstrations at different points were to occupy the Germans.

On the 28th of November, *Mont Avron*, a plateau lying in front of the eastern forts, was occupied by Admiral Saisset and General Hugues with troops of the Third Army; and a battery was erected upon it and equipped, the fire of which could command important passages for the investing troops, across the Marne at Chelles and Gournay. At the same time preparations were made

to lay several bridges over the Marne upon the line Nogent sur Marne — Joinville — St. Maur.

Vice Admiral Roncière le Noury concentrated a considerable mass of troops at *St. Denis*, and two divisions were formed up upon the peninsula of *Nanterre*.

In the night of the 28th and morning of the 29th of November, the forts kept up a vigorous fire in all directions. Then followed a sortie, under the direction of General Vinoy, with large masses from Forts *Ivry* and *Bicêtre*, against the positions of the VI. Army Corps. The attack was supported by the fire of the flotilla upon the Seine. The French indeed succeeded in getting possession of the railway station *Choisy le Roi* for some time, but their attacks at *L'Hay* were repulsed and they retired with great loss, including several hundred prisoners. The German loss amounted to 7 officers and about 100 men.

Upon the north front, the Vice Admiral, and upon the peninsula of Nanterre, General de Beaufort, carried out demonstrations in the afternoon, but otherwise nothing more considerable took place, which appears surprising after such great preparations. General Ducrot had caused a proclamation to be posted at the corners of all the streets, before the commencement of the sortie, in which he promised great things, and declared that he would return victorious or not at all. Why he did not support General Vinoy better on the 29th, or sally forth for an independent undertaking, is not clear. On one side it was asserted that he had been unable to develop his troops because Rochefort's barricades had barred all the roads (Rochefort was a member of the Government and president of the barricade committee), on the other side it was maintained that the bridges over the Marne, by which Ducrot had wished to cross the river, had been partly washed away.

The larger sortie now only took place on the 30th of November, and the object of it was evidently to break through the German lines of investment in the direction of Meaux and Fontainebleau, in order, subsequently, to enter into connection with the Loire Army.

The concentration of large masses of troops for the purpose of breaking forth against the line Champigny — Brie, was covered

and facilitated in a high degree by the conformation of the ground, and by the woods, parks and roads on the right bank of the Marne. The neighbouring forts with that of Mont Avron, and also numerous, lately made entrenchments and batteries, which command the country for afar upon the left bank of the Marne, could, in the most favourable manner, support the fight of the sortie troops against the investing army.

General Trochu himself took the chief Direction from the Chateau de Vincennes, and early in the morning, had eight bridges laid over the bend of the Marne between Joinville and Nogent, by which the 1st and 2nd Corps of the Second Army went forward to attack the Wurtembergers positions. The strength of the French troops was about 70,000 men.

The attack of the French with the main body, over 50,000 men, was made upon *Champigny* and *Villiers*; with one Division, Sushielle's, further to the south, by Créteil, against *Mesly* and *Montmesly*.

Upon the threatened part of the investment line, on the east side of Paris, the German advanced post positions were indicated by the places, Noisy le Grand, Villiers, Champigny, Coeuilly, Chennevières, Sucy en Brie and Brevannes; and indeed the Saxons had occupied *Noisy*, and from 5 o'clock a.m., *Champigny* also, in relief of the Wurtembergers; whilst on all the remaining points the Wurtembergers were stationed — Reitzenstein's Brigade at *Villiers* and *Coeuilly*, Starkloff's Brigade at *Sucy*, and Scheler's Brigade at *Brevannes*. On the left, at *Villeneuve St. Georges*, the 7th Prussian Infantry Brigade (du Trossel's) joined the Wurtembergers. The collective strength of the Germans upon the threatened line amounted to about 17,000 men; of these, however, only about 6000 men, namely Reitzenstein's Brigade and the 1st battalion of the Saxon 107th Infantry Regiment, were opposed to the main assault of the French, which was carried out with 50,000 men.

The only possibility of reinforcing these few troops was from the Saxon side, for the main body of the Wurtembergers, at Sucy and Brevannes, was itself attacked. Of the Saxon Corps, however, the 24th Infantry Division stood with its out-posts from Chelles to Brie, and had the charge of acting as reserve both to the 23rd

Infantry Division (Chelles to Clichy), and also to the Wurtembergers.

As early as 5 o'clock a.m., immediately after the Saxon battalion had relieved the Wurtembergers in Champigny, the leading troops of the French rushed unexpectedly on the former and defeated it, after a violent struggle, with great losses.

The main body of the French then crossed the Marne and assembled, under good cover, upon the plateau of the peninsular sloping down to the river, for the assault against Villiers, whilst at the same time a fearful fire was kept up from the forts and entrenchments, over the whole of the ground occupied by the Germans.

The park of *Villiers*, with a wall certainly not more than $1\frac{1}{2}$ feet high, but strengthened by trenches and embankments, formed the main point of the defence. In front of the park lay orchards and vineyards which could be well defended, and which were also occupied by the Wurtembergers and the Saxon battalion. Coeuilly, moreover, was still held by the Wurtembergers.

The fight against the French, pressing on in tenfold superior strength, was very hot, and the German performances were admirable. The French did not succeed in taking Villiers, and the Wurtembergers even passed at times into the offensive.

Neither did the French gain any advantages against Noisy le Grand and Coeuilly, upon the two flanks, but their thickly placed heavy guns in the forts and entrenchments prevented the Wurtembergers from being successfully supported by the Saxons.

An attack by the 24th Division against the flank of the main body of the French, to the north-west of Villiers, offered every prospect of success, and was of course attempted. The greater part of the 24th Division was concentrated in rear of the line Noisy—Villiers, and Colonel von Abendroth, commander of the 48th Brigade, seeing that the height to the north-west of Villiers was menaced, made the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 107th Regiment, the 3rd light battery and two squadrons of the 2nd Horse Regiment attack at this point. But in spite of a first success—the Saxons succeeded in routing the enemy and taking two guns—

these troops were unable to stay under the fire of the rifled guns; amid very great losses they were obliged to retreat, without being able to carry the two guns away with them (these two guns were represented as captured, in the French accounts of the victory), and six companies of the 104th Regiment were brought up to support them. Villiers itself, however, was reinforced from the south side, by a battalion of the 104th Regiment and the 3rd and 4th light batteries, and towards 2 o'clock they succeeded in deterring the French from attempting any further attacks.

The attack of Susbille's Division, further to the south, encountered immediately behind *Mesly*, *Mont Mesly* and *Bonneuil* (from where the advanced troops of the Wurtembergers had been driven away at 9 o'clock a.m.) the 2nd and 3rd Wurtemberg Brigades, supported by the 7th Prussian Brigade of the II. Army Corps, which had been brought up to Paris after the capitulation of Metz, and was cantoned in the south-east, in rear of the positions of the VI. Army Corps and the Wurtembergers.

The French, here, had only a small numerical superiority and were repulsed at all points. At 1 o'clock, the original position was re-taken.

Thus, the sole advantage to the French, resulting from the whole sortie to the south-east, was the possession of the points *Brie* and *Champigny* with the heights between these two places; an advantage any how, had they been able to continue their attacks, but now without value, for the severe cold of the coming night affected the troops, who encamped without blankets, to such an extent that no further attack could be attempted on the 1st of December. The day was passed in securing the wounded and burying the dead, as well as in fortifying the positions gained.

It must also be observed, that a new description of war machine was made use of on the French side during the fight; two mailed Lowries, each with a heavy gun, were brought into position by an engine, also mailed, on the Mühlhause railroad against the German lines. The carriages were moveable on their axles, so that the muzzles of the guns could be brought into different directions.

Upon the *north front*, Vice Admiral Roncière le Noury had

made a demonstration on the 30th of November, and occupied *Epinai*. This circumstance which was comprised in a dispatch from General Trochu, with exaggerated and indistinct accounts of the fighting in the south-east, and sent off by balloon, gave occasion for proclamations and military measures on the Loire, most characteristic of Gambetta's sanguine temperament and his want of military judgment.

The balloon with Trochu's dispatch went off on the evening of the 30th of November and was driven out of its course, so that it came down at Belle Isle en Mer. From there the dispatch was telegraphed to Tours. The circumstance that the dispatch had not come direct by balloon, caused Gambetta to believe at first that it had come from Paris entirely by road, consequently after the German line of investment had been broken through. Then the name of *Epinai*, gave him the idea that the *Epinay* which lies to the south-east of Longjumeau was meant, and he concluded that Roncière le Noury must be in command of the advanced guard of a sortie army, which, after a great victory, was on the point of establishing communications with the Loire Army.

In consequence of this, he issued proclamations on the 1st of December, saying the moment for France's tardy triumph was at hand, only a great effort by the Loire army was still necessary. General Trochu was at Brie with a victorious army of 150,000 men, 20 kilomètres from Paris (Brie is 3 kilomètres from Fort Nogent), and Admiral Roncière was already at *Epinay*, beyond Longjumeau*). At the same time he gave orders to the Generals to advance forthwith towards Paris.

But on the 2nd of December, the successes of the 30th of November had been lost again.

*) The words run thus: Cette même journée du 30 a donné lieu à une pointe vigoureuse de l'amiral de la Roncière-le-Noury; toujours dans la direction de l'Hay et Chevilly, il s'est avancé sur Longjumeau et a enlevé les positions d'Epinay au delà de Longjumeau, positions retranchées des Prussiens.

DECEMBER.

Not only did the French suffer greatly from the cold on the night of the 30th of November, but also the German troops who had fought so brilliantly during the day; and they too were fully occupied the next day in attending to the killed and wounded. Still measures were taken to meet energetically the fresh attack which it was expected would certainly be made this day; amongst others, the Saxon Artillery Corps was brought up, near to Villiers. The day, however, passed quietly, and dispositions were only made to drive the French completely away again from the Marne peninsula, on the following morning. General von Fransecky received the command for this, and brought some reinforcements to the Saxons and Wurtembergers from the II. and VI. Army Corps. On the French side, d'Exéa's Corps was also brought over on to the left bank of the Marne.

THE FIGHT ROUND BRIE AND CHAMPIGNY.

(Compare the map of the east front of Paris.)

As early as 6 o'clock on the morning of the 2nd of December, consequently favoured by the darkness, a Saxon column, consisting of the 1st and 2nd battalions of Regiment 107, the 3rd battalion of Regiment 104, and the 4th pioneer company, pressed forward against *Brie*, and a Wurtemberg column, Reitzenstein's Brigade, against *Champigny*, and the advanced guards carried both places by surprise.

At 8 o'clock, the fight was decided on both points in favour of the Germans (the Wurtembergers were further supported in it by a battalion of the 49th Prussian Regiment), and several hundred prisoners had fallen into the hands of the Germans.

As soon as the day had broke, a devastating cross fire was opened from all the forts and redoubts, and from a great number of field and mitrailleuse batteries on the right bank of the Marne, upon the points occupied by the Germans, as well as the whole

of the ground in rear, by which the reserves must approach. Soon after, the French infantry again took the offensive in overpowering masses, and after a desperate struggle with the battalions, who obstinately defended house after house in the villages, they again established the fight in their favour, although fresh troops from the II. Army Corps had joined in the action at Champigny. In Brie above 400 Saxons, who would not give way, were taken prisoners, and Champigny was again for the most part occupied by the French. The attack was continued beyond both points, against *Villiers* which was held by the Wurtembergers; from *Noisy* the Saxon 4th heavy battery was driven away by the cannon fire, and the battle-field of the 30th of November was again filled by about 100,000 French. Nevertheless German valour and superior tactics gained the final victory.

General von Fransecky united by degrees about 50,000 men upon the critical points, for the purpose of a surrounding attack against the enemy, crowded together on the peninsula, which was rendered possible by the formation of the ground.

The 3rd Infantry Division, and the Artillery Corps of the II. Corps reinforced the centre, the left wing had already been reinforced by the 7th Infantry Brigade, and the 8th Infantry Brigade with a Brigade of the VI. Corps formed the reserves at Chennevières.

Thus towards 4 o'clock p.m., after a sanguinary fight of many hours the enemy was forced to retreat. At this time Champigny was again, for the greater part, in German hands; at Villiers and Cœuilly the superiority of the Germans was decisive, and Brie with the surrounding heights were alone in French power.

The French, convinced of the hopelessness of further attacks, ceased firing, and also on the German side no fresh assault was attempted, as darkness had commenced.

General Trochu decided upon a complete retreat on the following day; in order to cover it he caused a fresh attack to be made at Brie and Champigny on the morning of the 3rd of December, and meanwhile conducted the army back to the right bank of the Marne. His loss, in the combats from the 30th of November to the

3rd of December, amounted, according to French estimates, to more than 6000 men including 414 officers.

The Germans had lost in the four days about 5000 men. Of these the Wurtembergers suffered the greatest loss, 2019 men and 61 officers; the Saxons 1096 men and 55 officers; and the II. Army Corps 1517 men and 89 officers. This loss is extraordinarily high. It was caused especially by the fire from the forts and entrenchments. It is a wonderful feat that victory was gained in spite of it, and notwithstanding the enormous numerical superiority of the French at times; the Wurtembergers carried off the finest laurels.

A heavy blow was inflicted on the defence of Paris by the failure of this vigorous and obstinate sortie, which had been based on the imaginary advantages of the French Loire Army. *The prospect of an independent rupture of the investing line from within had to vanish completely.*

It was the moment of a general great crisis for Paris, for on the same days, at the end of November and beginning of December, in the north and also in the south the hopes of a relief were frustrated.

The German Army from Metz, divided into two powerful columns, had drawn near when the danger was at its highest. On the 27th of November General von Manteuffel had beaten the French Northern Army, and on the 28th Prince Frederick Charles had led the first victorious conflict against the French Loire Army, at Beaune la Rolande. On the 2nd of December, began the victorious combats of the German Loire Army to the north of Orléans, which led to the occupation of this important city on the night of the 4th.

Such successes could not but excite the hope, that the Government in Paris, perceiving the uselessness of resistance, would surrender the city. General von Moltke informed General Trochu by letter on the 5th of December, of the defeats of the Loire Army, and the occupation of Orléans, at the same time inviting him to send out an officer in order to ascertain the truth. .

General Trochu's situation, however, bore but a small resemblance to that of a real commandant of a fortress; he gave an

answer, of which the Parisians said, "il eut de l'esprit une fois en sa vie." With a caustic repetition of its expressions he informed General von Moltke of the receipt of his letter, and declined an enquiry into the state of the case.

Still each day made it more difficult for the city of Paris to maintain its haughty mien, and cold and hunger began to press severely on the population. Outside, however, the preparations for the bombardment were now seriously undertaken. The French nevertheless, in spite of their sad experiences on the 2nd of December, attempted another great sortie before the commencement of the bombardment, though certainly with little energy, as well as without any judicious strategical combination. For General Trochu could hardly reckon upon a co-operation with the Northern Army under General Faidherbe.

SORTIE ON THE 21st OF DECEMBER.

On the 20th of December, preparations for a sortie, which would apparently be directed against the positions of the Garde Corps, were perceived by the German posts of observation. In the night of the 20th all the forts again opened a vigorous fire, and in the fore-noon of the 21st, Admiral Roncière, leading on the marines and some other detachments, attacked *Stains*, *Dugny* and *Le Bourget* from St. Denis and Fort Aubervilliers. His troops fought remarkably well, took *Stains* and *Le Bourget*, but before 3 o'clock p.m., were completely repulsed by the Prussian Garde Corps. Upon this General Ducrot advanced, occupied *Drancy* and *Le Groslay* with strong masses, and opened fire with his artillery against *Pont Iblon* and *Le Blanc-Mesnil*. He retired again however in the evening without attempting a serious attack.

Moreover, at midday, a Division had been led forward against Sévran, Chelles and Ville Evrart, but soon fell under the fire of the German batteries at *Noisy-le-Grand*, besides being attacked

by the 24th (Saxon) Infantry Division and returned in the night of the 22nd after a protracted fight round Ville Evrart.

Upon other points, *Epinaï* near St. Denis and the peninsula of Nanterre, demonstrations were made by the French.

The day had been without any favourable result for the French, but had led to considerable losses with the capture of above 1000 unwounded prisoners; on the German side the loss was far smaller; in spite of the unremitting fire of the forts, it amounted to about 500 killed and wounded, of which 14 officers and 400 men fell in the Garde Corps.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE ARTILLERY ATTACK. BOMBARDMENT OF MONT AVRON.

It had become evident at the sorties in the end of November and during the fight on the 2nd of December, that *Mont Avron*, which the French had occupied with strong entrenchments and 76 guns, was very troublesome to the investing troops upon the east front. In consequence of this, by directions from Versailles, the Crown Prince of Saxony at a conference, held at Le Vert Galant on the 18th of December, ordered the artillery attack upon this advanced point of the besieged,— *the first offensive advance on the German side*—, and that a demonstration should be made at the same time to divert the attention of the Parisians from the principal points of the projected artillery attack, to the heights of Meudon and Clamart, and the park of St. Cloud.

By the 27th of December the siege batteries were completed by the pioneers of the Garde, IV. and XII. Corps, under the guidance of Major Klemm, in a line surrounding *Mont Avron*, extending from the park of Raincy, and to the south of it, as far as the south-eastern slope of the heights of Pressoir (v. map of the east front of Paris), and were equipped with 76 heavy guns, rifled 24-pounders, rifled 12-pounders and mortars.

At 7 o'clock in the morning of this day the fire was opened.

The effect of the fire, quite unexpected by the French, was considerable; it was returned indeed, but the commandant of Mont Avron, Colonel Stoffel, was convinced even on the first day that a lasting resistance against the German batteries, placed all round, was impossible. He had intended to abandon it. But in the defence of Paris military reasons were seldom of account. Paris was pleased to think that Mont Avron was one of the most important points of the fortifications, and the military authorities, satisfied that the Germans did not dispute their triumph in having occupied this place, had confirmed the population in their opinion.

They were now unable, in opposition to the people, to give up Mont Avron without anything further, and applied forces to maintain it, which the object would not have been worth even had these forces been rightly employed. But the proper measures were also wanting.

General d'Hugues, Commandant of the forts on the east front, collected above 20,000 men on the night of the 27th of December upon the imperilled plateau and in rear of it, in order to be able to resist the possible infantry attack of the enemy.

The German patrols, however, brought information of the occupation on the morning of the 28th, and therefore the bombardment was continued. This resulted, in the withdrawal of the closely packed French troops in rapid flight, under heavy losses, and a general panic was spread in Paris, so that General Trochu further ordered the plateau to be evacuated.

In the night of the 28th, after it had been impossible any longer to reply to the German fire during the day, all the guns were brought away with the exception of two dismounted 24-pounders; and on the morning of the 29th, when the Saxons took possession of the plateau, they found nothing but corpses and ruins. The *Bombardment of the Forts* on the east front could now be commenced, and it was carried on with such good results on the 31st of December and 1st of January, that the French speedily evacuated their advanced positions on this front, and even on the latter day were no longer able to reply to the re-

cognized superiority of the German fire, but contented themselves with repairing the damages caused to the forts.

Yet the besiegers did not approach the east front, for a demonstration only was to be made here.

Before Paris, the year 1870 came to an end amid zealous preparations for the bombardment, which commenced on the 5th of January 1871.

After the defeats of the Loire and Northern Armies, the war had entered its final phase.

In trophies of victory, Germany counted 4 Marshals, 11,160 officers; in non-commissioned officers and men, 333,885 unwounded prisoners; and 4640 guns, 115 eagles and colours. Each of the fortresses of Mayence, Coblenz, Stettin, Erfurt, Magdeburg, Glogau, Neisse, Wesel, Cologne and Kolberg lodged in great camps 12,000, 15,000 up to 24,000 men, and many other small fortresses and open towns enclosed other less numerous divisions of the conquered French armies.

JANUARY 1871.

HET BOMBARDMENT.

The bombardment of Paris began on the 5th of January 1871. It was opened from the heights of Meudon, Clamart and Chatillon and from the park of St. Cloud, against the forts of Issy, Vanvres and Montrouge.

For some months public opinion in Germany had demanded and urged its commencement. But the preparations necessary for this great undertaking required a long time, and besides, the German Army Direction would not begin the bombardment until the period had arrived when the sufferings of the besieged city had been so increased by hunger that the moral impression of the falling shot would perhaps bring the decisive result.

The chief difficulty lay in the transport of the heavy guns and of the enormous stores of ammunition and implements, from

the railway terminus, the station of Lagny, to Villa-Coublay, where the siege park was formed. The distance, it is true, was only about 6 miles ($27\frac{3}{8}$ English miles), but just upon this tract of ground the communications had been destroyed by the Parisians, in several places, previous to the investment; in particular the great Marne bridge at Lagny itself, which had to be replaced by a pontoon bridge above the former one. After all the destroyed communications had been restored, the war material, the transport of which from its nature, required the greatest caution, was brought to the place of its destination, upon country roads, by beasts of draught.

The construction of the batteries also was rendered very difficult in consequence of the chalky nature of the ground, the establishment of Battery No. 1 being particularly described as most laborious. Several batteries had to be very ingeniously erected behind cover, for they lay completely in the range of the fire from the forts.

In the night of the 3rd of January, the *batteries opposite the south-west front*, which were to open the fire, were finally equipped. They were the following (v. map II. of Paris):

No. 1. Position: at *St. Cloud*. Aim: the Seine with its islands, and the works upon the peninsula Boulogne. Equipment: 6 rifled 12-pounders.

No. 2. Position: upon the terrace of *Meudon*. Aim: Boulogne, Billancourt, and the upper Seine. Equipment: 8 rifled 12-pounders.

No. 3. Position: upon the terrace of Meudon. Aim: Enfilading the south front and dismounting the west front of Fort d'Issy. Equipment: 6 long rifled 24-pounders.

No. 4. Position: upon the terrace of Meudon. Aim: the same as No. 3. Equipment as No. 3.

No. 5. Position: to the south of *Clamart*. Aim: enfilading the west front, dismounting the south front of Fort d'Issy. Equipment: 6 long rifled 24-pounders.

No. 6. Position: at *Porte Chatillon*. Aim: enfilading the west front and dismounting the south front of Fort de Vanvres. Equipment: 6 long rifled 24-pounders.

No. 7. Position: to the east of *Tour des Anglais*. Aim: enfilading the west front and dismounting the south-west bastion of Fort Issy. Equipment: 6 long rifled 24-pounders.

No. 8. Position: to the east of Battery 7. Aim: dismounting the south-west front of Fort de Vanvres. Equipment: 6 long rifled 24-pounders.

No. 9. Position: to the south of Battery 8. Aim: enfilading the west front and dismounting the south-west bastion of Fort de Vanvres. Equipment: 8 rifled 12-pounders.

No. 10. Position: to the south-east of Battery 9. Aim: enfilading the west front and dismounting the south front of Fort de Vanvres. Equipment: 6 long rifled 24-pounders.

No. 11. Position: to the north-east of *Fontenay*. Aim: enfilading and dismounting the west front of Fort de Montrouge. Equipment: 8 rifled 12-pounders.

No. 12. Position: to the south of Battery 11. Aim: the same as Battery 11. Equipment: 8 long rifled 24-pounders.

No. 13. Position: near Battery 7, on the west. Aim: to bombard Fort Issy. Equipment: 2 21centimètre mortars.

No. 14. Position: behind Batteries 8 and 9. Aim: to bombard Fort de Vanvres. Equipment: 2 21centimètre mortars.

No. 15. Position: in *Bagneux*. Aim: to bombard Fort Montrouge. Equipment: 2 21centimètre mortars.

No. 16. Position: terrace of *Meudon*. Aim: dismounting the gun emplacements to the west of Fort Issy. Equipment: 4 rifled 12-pounders.

No. 17. Position: between Batteries 7 and 8. Aim: gun emplacements between Issy and Vanvres. Equipment: 6 rifled 12-pounders.

The fire from these 17 batteries was to have begun on the 4th of January.

The thick fog which in January so frequently impeded all distant views in the morning and evening, did not disperse at all on the 4th of January, and delayed the commencement of the bombardment until the 5th of January, on which day the fire was opened at 9 o'clock a.m. in bright weather.

No effect of a decided kind was produced upon the excellently built, strong forts. It is true that some of the buildings in the interiors were destroyed, also many an embrasure and many a gun was dismounted; the superiority of the German artillery came out brilliantly, for even on the second day Fort Issy was no longer able to reply, and gradually the serving troops in the other forts were also unable to continue holding out lastingly; to destroy the fortifications so quickly was, however, not possible. The French stayed in the forts, covered themselves as well as they could, repaired the damages that arose and spared their fire in case the enemy should make a nearer approach. At the same time they began in a very skilful manner to alternate their fire. They had erected two batteries to the west of Fort Issy and also laid out some emplacements between Issy and Vanvres; as soon as they could no longer reply to the enemy's fire in the forts themselves, they began to fire from the batteries mentioned, and if the German artillerymen fired upon the latter, the French began to fire again from the forts. Yet the bombardment on the German side had, at all events, gained the advantage of being able to bombard the city itself from some of the batteries, from the 8th of January, without its being possible for the French fire to prevent it.

By the 14th of January the besiegers had constructed five new batteries Nos. 18 to 22, and ceased firing from No. 4 on the 8th of January, No. 6 on the 9th and Nos. 10 and 11 on the 11th.

No. 18, (6 long rifled 24-pounders) lay to the west of *Bagneux*. Aim: dismounting Fort de Montrouge. The fire commenced on the 8th of January.

No. 19, (4 long rifled and 4 short rifled 24-pounders) lay to the east of *Fleury*, and on the 9th of January, began dismounting and breaching the south-west bastion and the south-west curtain of Fort Issy, and dismounting the enceinte of the city.

No. 20, (6 long rifled 24-pounders) to the west of *Clamart*, to the south of Notre Dame de Clamart, commenced on the 10th of January dismounting the south front and the left face of the north-west bastion of Fort Vanvres.

No. 21, (6 short rifled 24-pounders) lay to the west of *Cha-tillon*, and on the 14th of January began dismounting and demolishing the south front of Fort Vanvres.

No. 22 (6 long rifled 24-pounders) lay to the west of No. 18, and on the 14th began to take over the aims of No. 11.

Although, however, the interior of the city was only fired upon from the 8th of January, still even in the earlier days single shots had flown far beyond the forts. They fell in the arrondissements of Vaugirard, Passy, and even at far greater distances, near the Panthéon, Luxembourg and the Hôtel des Invalides to beyond the Boulevard St. Germain.

The population of Paris received these first rifled cannon shot, as well as later those thrown much more frequently and designedly, with a kind of curiosity and scorn, and also with indignation at the "barbarians"; but the bombardment decidedly made no deep impression. The government was even obliged to publish a proclamation, drawing attention to the danger of running together in places where a shell had fallen, because the people lost sight of all danger in order to snatch a splinter. A tolerable number of persons were no doubt killed and wounded, and a quantity of people moved away from the endangered to the safe parts of the city, but this number was not great enough to cause any confusion, or the partial want of dwelling accommodation.

The material damage was small. The city was too large and the buildings were too solid.

It may be concluded how insignificant the number of injured buildings was in comparison with the whole mass, for after the devastations of the *French* bombardment during the civil war, and after the conflagrations of the Commune, the total number of houses *destroyed* besides public buildings, such as the Tuileries, Hôtel de Ville etc., only amounted altogether to 200, thus only a third part of the number of houses which Haussmann, the Prefect of the Seine, had the charge of pulling down annually for beautifying purposes, under the Imperial government.

By German shot probably very few, perhaps only isolated buildings, were destroyed inside the enceinte; it was not until the

22nd of January that fires were perceived in the city, and fire is the special agent of destruction in a bombardment; the immediate efficacy of the shot can only be material with very slightly built houses. If therefore the bombardment had been continued until the capitulation of Paris, there is still no reason to conclude that this would have been the result of the bombardment.

Paris fell by starvation, and in the German Head-Quarters, the chief authority had no doubt from the commencement as to the right means of obtaining the end, although public opinion was taken into account.

The Parisians attempted some further small attacks in January, and one sortie in large masses. They first attacked the German outposts on the morning of the 10th of January near *Clamart*, and were driven back; then in the night of the 12th an attack, in the strength of perhaps a brigade followed upon the south-west front against the dangerous batteries upon the heights of *Meudon* and *Clamart*. The sortie was very soon repulsed.

Then, late in the evening of the 13th, some detachments once again broke forth against the much contested village of *Le Bourget*, upon the north front. This sortie was also beaten back with little trouble.

SORTIE ON THE 19th OF JANUARY.

On the 19th of January, however, above 100,000 men were developed, for a last desperate struggle upon the south-west front, with the intention of attacking Versailles.

United round Mont Valérien in three great masses under the chief command of General Trochu himself, at 8 o'clock a.m. the centre column pressed forward against *Garches*, under General Bellemare; the column of the left wing, under General Vinoy, against *Montretout*; and after a very disadvantageous delay of three hours, the column of the right wing, under General Ducrot, by *Buzenval*.

The late arrival of the last column, caused partly by a de-

fective execution of the dispositions, and partly by the fire of the German cannon from the right bank of the Seine, at once caused a vacillation in the whole sortie. The troops in the centre and on the left wing only advanced slowly, for they waited for the support of the right wing, and when they met with the tough resistance of the 10th Infantry Division at *Garches*, a long continued stationary fight was developed even here.

On the German side the troops standing nearest, the 9th and 21st Infantry Divisions, acting as reserves to the 10th, the Garde-landwehr Division and the I. Bavarian Corps, were moved forward towards Versailles.

Still the French did not succeed in coming up so far that it was necessary to employ these two last bodies of troops. They were unable to overcome the resistance of the Germans in *Garches*, and satisfied themselves with occupying the heights lying in front, from which the German advanced posts were driven away. They took possession of the entrenchment of *Montretout*, which was only weakly occupied by the Germans. Towards 2 o'clock p.m., however, two battalions of the King's Grenadier Regiment and one battalion of the 59th Regiment made a successful advance, and, at daybreak, completely threw back the French near *Garches*. The entrenchment of *Montretout* was re-taken at 11 o'clock p.m. by battalions of the 47th, 58th and 82nd Regiments. The loss of the Germans amounted to 616 men and 39 officers. The loss of the French was extraordinarily great; it amounted to about 7000 men. General Trochu maintained that the majority of the wounded had suffered from the awkwardness of the Gardes Nationaux, who had continually fired upon their own troops. This is indeed possible. The Garde Nationale, who had unceasingly demanded, during the whole siege, that the Governor should employ the other troops in sorties, was this day led out for the first time, and may probably not have possessed the *sangfroid* necessary to distinguish between friend and foe.

Thus ended the last sortie which the Parisians attempted, their last desperate attempt, still more deplorable than all that had preceded it.

The continual failure of the offensive undertakings was

naturally founded, in general, on the great superiority in the quality of the German troops, and in their excellent defensive positions occupied by a numerous field artillery. Yet two special circumstances which impeded the success of the sorties appear prominently. In the first place, enormous labour and time were required to bring together the badly disciplined French troops, provided with few serviceable officers. It was even necessary to assemble the troops for a sortie the day before, in order to have them on the spot at the right time. This however, naturally, fatigued the soldiers before the fight, and in November, December and January they were benumbed and dispirited by the severe cold.

Then secondly, the unavoidably noisy and visible preparations for the concentration of these troops, made the German posts of observation aware of the enemy's undertaking so early, that in most cases, the army of investment was able to make arrangements for the reception of the enemy quite undisturbed.

Frequently, even, dispatches from Versailles gave information in Germany, that a sortie would take place on the following day. Thus undertakings, where a surprise was the main condition of success, could not possibly have a fortunate result.

On the 21st of January, after the bombardment upon the south-west front and the east front had been continued for sixteen days, a bombardment of the fortifications on the north front (v. map of the north front of Paris) was also begun, combined with the bombardment of the town of *St. Denis*. Here the German shot had far greater success than in Paris itself, and conflagrations could be observed in *St. Denis* even on the second day.

Still the bombardment here, as on the east front, had more the character of a demonstration.

Upon the south-west front, too, where the serious attack was made, it succeeded before the 11th of January in setting fire to the barracks of Forts *Issy*, *Vanvres* and *Montrouge*, and destroying the greater part of them.

On the 14th of January these forts were almost entirely silenced, but took up the fire again later. On the 12th of January the batteries of the city enceinte (v. map of the south-west front

of Paris) at *Point du Jour*, began to fire very vigorously upon battery No. 1 at St. Cloud. The German batteries, in a short time, always attained the superiority when, on the French side, new batteries were brought into action, or the forts re-opened fire; nevertheless the bombardment would probably have had to be continued some time longer for the preparation to appear sufficient for a formal attack or an assault.

However the interior condition of Paris, and France's military situation everywhere, made such measures no longer necessary.

On the 23rd of January negotiations for an armistice commenced, which had so far prospered on the 26th, that from 12 o'clock at night the cannon fire on both sides was stopped.

The population of Paris had arrived at a state of privation, from the siege now lasting 129 days, which, without a fresh supply of provisions and fuel, must lead within the short space of eight to fourteen days, to the death of many thousands from exhaustion. Bread and horse flesh, which for weeks had only been given out in rations by the government, were first reckoned at 300 grammes for each person, and at last at 30 grammes, and added to this the bread was of an uninviting composition.

The "Commune" bestirred itself afresh on the night of the 21st and on the 22nd of January, in a revolutionary attempt under Flourens's direction.

Every hope of a successful sortie had disappeared after the defeat of the 19th of January, and when the repeated overthrows of the former Loire Army at Le Mans, of the Northern Army at St. Quentin and of the Eastern Army at Belfort became known, all hope of relief from without vanished.

Thus the Government at last decided upon negotiations which had for their object the capitulation of Paris, but an armistice at the same time which was to be regarded as a preliminary to peace.

After the failure of the sortie on the 19th, General Trochu, under the pressure of general distrust, had resigned the Chief Command, but still remained President of the Government; thus he kept faithful to his assertion, that the Governor of Paris would never capitulate. Jules Favre conducted the negotiations with

Count Bismarck, and on the 28th of January concluded the capitulation.

This formed part of the *Convention of Versailles**) and determined the occupation of all the forts of Paris by the German Army, the disarmament of the French Line Army, Garde Mobile and Marine troops, who also became prisoners of war, and the immediate re-provisioning of Paris. The Garde Nationale, however, were to keep their arms and undertake the maintenance of order in the city; the German Army was not to occupy Paris during the armistice.

These last resolutions must have been repented of later by the German government, but still more by the French government, which, untaught by four-and-a-half months experience, opposed to the utmost the better judgment and urgent desire of Count Bismarck.

When the Garde Nationale, which was to keep order in Paris, seized the power with armed hands and brought on the civil war, Jules Favre exclaimed in despair: "The German government wanted these men to be disarmed, and I opposed it. I call upon God and men to witness my repentance!"

Differing in all its phenomena from the phases through which ordinary sieges pass, and surpassing the measure of former warlike occurrences, the siege of Paris found a worthy conclusion in most unusual conditions of capitulation.

*) See the tenor of the convention at the close of the book.

ELEVENTH CHAPTER.

THE ATTEMPTS FOR THE RELIEF OF PARIS.

As the dangers which threatened France increased, the attempts for the relief of Paris, undertaken on the French side, grew in magnitude and energy. In the commencement of the war with the Republic, the measures for the Defence were confined to the limits, fixed and prepared by the Imperial government, for raising troops from the people; the government of the National Defence was satisfied with the formation of regiments de marche from dépôt battalions, and time served soldiers, as well as with the formation and instruction of the Garde Mobile and Garde Nationale. But after the fall of Metz and when the war-experienced Corps of Prince Frederick Charles threatened to spread over the interior of France, by forced marches in the direction of Orléans in the south, and Amiens in the north, *Gambetta*, who at that time led the government with dictatorial power, took measures which bore great similarity to the levies of the year 1793. Only, the numerous armies of the republic of 1870 did not meet with the success of the armies of 1793, because this time the war direction of the enemy was not divided and dilatory, and encumbered with obsolete maxims, and did not leave time for the undrilled masses to become bodies of troops.

When we see, however, that in spite of such unfavourable circumstances, and of a fool-hardy dictator, the newly organized republican armies were nevertheless able to oppose the best army in the world, again and again, in the open field, although always

conquered; and to deliver a hundred fights, although no pitched battle, we must willingly allow that the French nation, full of ardent patriotism, has rendered itself worthy of esteem.

I. OPERATIONS OF THE LOIRE ARMIES.

(v. map of the operations of the Loire Armies.)

The attention of the German War Direction was directly drawn to the actual existence of a *Loire Army*, the formation of which it is true had been known for some time, through the reconnaissances of Prince Albert's Cavalry Division, in the beginning of October.

At that time the whole French army on the Loire, consisted of one Army Corps, which bore the number 15 (Nos. 13 and 14 were in Paris). General *de la Motterouge* was in command; it numbered about 10,000 men of the regular infantry, an equal number of Gardes Mobiles, 4000 men of the Francs-tireurs, the cavalry regiments still existing, 2500 horsemen, and perhaps 3000 men of the artillery and train; altogether about 30,000 men.

On the 5th of October, this small army moved out from Orléans for a reconnaissance in the direction of Paris, and encountered the German cavalry. It would surely have been wiser if de la Motterouge had not shown himself, but had kept concealed as much as possible behind the Loire, until his army had become stronger; for the cavalry had no sooner brought the report to Versailles, than General *von der Tann* was sent off from there towards the south (compare page 291).

The valley of the Loire offered superior strategical advantages to a French Army, which was gradually to reinforce itself, in order, ultimately, to advance towards Paris. The *Loire*, a powerful stream bordered on its right bank, in the tract of country from Gien to Orléans, by the wide-extended forest of Orléans, very difficult for troops; and on the left bank, in its whole bend as far as Blois, by the marshy, barren, roadless Sologne, formed an

important line, which drew a sharply defined limit to the operations of the Germans from Paris. Upon the road from Paris to Tours, either by Chateaudun or by Orléans, expeditions would scarcely have now been attempted on the part of the Germans, because weak detachments dared not venture so deep into the country occupied by the enemy, and strong detachments could only be furnished by the investing army under urgent necessity. When therefore General de la Motterouge ventured forward beyond Orléans, probably at the instigation of the delegation in Tours, he drew attention to himself quite unnecessarily, and occasioned the *occupation of the town of Orléans* on the part of the Germans.

The great importance of this town was fully appreciated by the Germans, but, in spite of it, the task of a lasting occupation could not devolve on Prince Albert's Cavalry Division. This charge was for General von der Tann, with a whole Army Detachment.

The situation of the town, in a strategical point of view, is as if made for a fortress, which should secure the south of France and prevent the siege of Paris.

Orléans commands the principal passage over the Loire, and unites the railroads from Nantes, Bordeaux and Toulouse, as well as the central line which connects Lyons with Paris by Bourges. An efficient army placed here, which could constantly be reinforced from the south, might render a siege of Paris almost impossible, by continually threatening the besiegers.

The town possesses rich resources within itself, and has about 70,000 inhabitants, a most well-to-do population.

If France had been able to reckon upon a war such as this, Orléans would surely have been made a fortress.

OCCUPATION OF ORLÉANS BY GENERAL VON DER TANN.

General *von der Tann* approached the town on the 11th of October with the I. Bavarian Corps, the 22nd Infantry Division, and the 4th and 2nd Cavalry Divisions, after having defeated the advanced troops of the French at *Artenay*, on the previous day. The 22nd Division, covered by the 4th Cavalry Division on the right flank, marched by Huêtre and Boulay upon Ormes, the 1st Bavarian Corps advanced in the centre, and upon the left flank the 2nd Cavalry Division drew near by the edge of the great woods.

General de la Motterouge held possession of the country to the north of Orléans, where favourably situated hills, covered with vines, formed natural capabilities for defence, which he had strengthened by entrenchments. The first fight took place between *Boulay* and *Ormes*; after it had lasted for some hours, and reinforcements had been concentrated upon this point, on both sides, de la Motterouge ordered the retreat. The French retired upon the town and from there to the left bank, but still held the outskirts of the suburbs for a short time, so that some batteries were brought into position at Ingré and bombarded the town. Very soon after this the town authorities appeared to announce a peaceable submission. The French Army drew back upon *Bourges* and *Vierzon*.

Orléans was occupied by the Germans on the evening of the 11th of October, and became, with the surrounding country, a rich and tranquil cantonment for a time. From here General von der Tann sent out the 22nd Division and Prince Albert's Cavalry Division towards the north-west, to suppress the movements of the people there. On the 19th of October a hot fight took place in *Chateaudun*, between these troops and about 4000 French, in which this barricaded place was almost entirely destroyed. The march was then continued upon *Chartres*, where a strong position was taken up.

ORLÉANS RETAKEN BY THE FRENCH.

General de la Motterouge was immediately deprived of his command by Gambetta (who had arrived in Tours a few days before), although he had done his duty thoroughly. He was replaced in the command of the Loire Army by General *d'Aurelle de Paladines*, who was furnished by degrees with considerable reinforcements, the 16th Corps and parts of the 17th Corps, and received the mission of re-taking Orléans at any price.

At the end of October General d'Aurelle had concentrated about 40,000 men at *Vierzon*, with a tolerably numerous artillery; these were to be reinforced by 20,000 men from Tours, and the whole would then be thrown between General von der Tann's detachments, standing 8 miles (nearly 37 English miles) distant from one another, in order to fight them singly if possible, or to surround and capture the portion stationed at Orléans.

The main body of the French Army was to be directed from Vierzon upon Beaugency, to encompass Orléans from the west; another division, in the centre, was to make a demonstration only, against Orléans, from the south to keep the Germans in the town; the right wing, principally composed of cavalry, was to cross the Loire at St. Benoît, above Orléans, to enclose the town from the east.

The whole French plan was, however, wrecked by Gambetta's injudicious interference. By his command, the troops, concentrated at Vierzon on the 2nd of November, were not to reach Beaugency by marching, but to travel by rail through Tours. In spite of d'Aurelle's objections this took place, and by this means, not only was there a loss of three days in time, but also the German cavalry remarked the trains continually following one another, and General von der Tann received timely information*).

On the 7th of November the movements of the French be-

* In this assertion the author relies upon the accounts in "Militärische Gedanken und Betrachtungen" by the author of "Krieges um Metz" (a Prussian General), a work whose profound researches merit the deepest study.

came clear to the General, and although he was unable to bring up the 22nd Division quickly enough, yet he baffled the enemy by evacuating Orléans on the 8th of November and taking up a position at *Coulmiers*, which made a forcible separation of his divisions impossible.

The French, who had failed in encompassing Orléans, owing to the slow execution of their movements, advanced to the west of it.

Consequently, on the 9th of November, an encounter took place at *Coulmiers*.

General d'Aurelle very judiciously made his numerous artillery operate chiefly against the enemy, whilst he did not employ his infantry in offensive attacks. Thus his young troops gained confidence, when, they finally saw the enemy retreat at dusk.

General von der Tann had no intention of here making an obstinate resistance against the foe, perhaps four times superior in numbers; he retired upon *St. Péravy*, *Artenay* and *Toury*. At the last place, which he reached on the evening of the 10th of November, the General halted, and brought up the 22nd Division in the night.

General d'Aurelle did not follow him, for correctly estimating the small advantage gained and the quality of his troops, it did not appear to him advisable, even now, to bring the French army very near to the great German army round Paris. He contented himself with the occupation of Orléans, and took up a strong waiting position in order to oppose the German forces which had been newly reinforced, on the 11th of November, by the arrival of the 17th Division.

GAMBETTA'S ORGANIZATIONS IN NOVEMBER 1870.

Gambetta, on the other hand, pushed on with precipitate haste, the reinforcement of the Loire Army, whose Commander in Chief, whose bravery, and whose victory he thought he could not sufficiently extol.

The French active forces at that time appear to have been as follows:

In the middle of October France had been divided into four general governments, with four chief commands: 1st the North, with the head-quarters at Lille, 2nd the West, with the head-quarters at Le Mans, 3rd the Centre, with the head-quarters at Bourges, and 4th the East, with the head-quarters at Besançon. Within these general governments the previous distribution in territorial military divisions was continued, and the forces already called up under the Empire, time-served soldiers, Gardes Mobiles etc., were organized and drilled under the guidance of the chiefs of these military districts.

Moreover Gambetta had recently, on the 2nd of November, in desperation at the fall of Metz, set on foot a decree of the delegation at Tours, according to which all men from 20 to 40 years of age, still free, were to be enrolled in the army. This decree was more fully defined and enlarged in the next few days; the men already previously enrolled were to form a first levy, those called in by the decree of the 2nd of November a second levy, and this second was to be again subdivided into three categories according to age, which would not be summoned all at once, but one after another. It commenced with the first Ban, men from 21 to 30 years of age, then the second Ban, men from 31 to 35, and lastly the third Ban, men from 36 to 40. In order to transform the great masses of men, which the successive levies of the three bans must bring together, into bodies of troops, Gambetta, on the 25th of November, decreed the formation of eleven camps of instruction and defence, at St. Omer, Cherbourg, La Rochelle, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Montpellier, Marseilles, Lyons, Clermont-Ferrand, Nevers and Conlie. By degrees the recruits called in according to the above-named categories and the time-served soldiers would be collected in these camps, and there drilled, and at the same time formed into armies. In view of the great multitude of men composing all these levies, the number of which might be calculated at a million and a half, the camps would have to be very large, each prepared for 60,000 to 250,000 men.

The generals who commanded under the republic, were for

the most part, old officers, who had already retired from active service, but now entered again on active service (de la Motterouge and d'Aurelle de Paladines); partly marine officers, and partly also junior Generals who had been recalled from Algiers. To the last belonged General Faidherbe, Commander of the Northern Army in December and January.

Gambetta's plan, considered by itself, appears judicious and grand. But — it required at least two years time and some thousands of superior officers, to carry it out. In face of the situation of affairs as they were in reality, it was the pursuit of a chimera.

Not that Gambetta could have found an organization more conformable to the purpose, but — *resistance generally was a sin against the prosperity of the country.*

The situation of affairs imperiously demanded peace for France; there were no means of carrying on the war without injuring the country in a high degree. After the army had been destroyed, further resistance was impossible, or ought not to have been made, in opposition to the active and powerful enemy; and no great statesman, no great organizer and general would have attempted it. No genius could now help France. Gambetta made the attempt.

The occupation of Orléans and the fight at Coulmiers having inspired him with fresh courage, he was now anxious, above all things, for an immediate advance against the investing army of Paris, in order to effect the relief before Prince Frederick Charles could approach from Metz.

But in order, for the moment, to reinforce General d'Aurelle sufficiently to enable him to attempt the relief of Paris, the decree of the 2nd of November was still of no use; those troops only could be reckoned on which had already been organized for weeks and months. It is true their training was still very defective, but the great number of old soldiers gave tolerable steadiness to the rest. All were well armed, the artillery was numerous, and even in cavalry, some serviceable corps had been newly formed besides the imperial regiments still existing.

Gambetta, under the pressure of necessity, consequently inter-

rupted all further instruction, collected the detachments from all the towns and camps of the south and west, and at the end of November, brought together an army round Orléans which numbered 250,000 combatants, and might be capable of causing some anxiety at the German Head-Quarters.

Everything now depended upon Prince Frederick Charles's appearing at the right time; otherwise the advance of such a numerous army, combined with a sortie *en masse* from Paris, might have perilous consequences for the investment of the city.

The evacuation of the town of Orléans had, already, been a disagreeable event for the German War Direction, less from the importance of the thing itself, than on account of the moral impression which it exercised upon the French people.

Not only was Paris mad with joy and prepared for a sortie with fresh courage, but the tidings of victory flew through the whole of France, and soon lost all similarity to General d'Aurelle's moderate report. Everywhere a change in the fortunes of war was hailed, even Versailles, which was occupied by the German head-quarters and in the midst of the powerful German army, raised her head.

OPERATIONS OF THE GRAND DUKE OF MECKLENBURG-SCHWERIN. 9th OF NOVEMBER TO THE 1st OF DECEMBER 1870.

Immediately after the announcement of the retreat of General von der Tann, a reinforcement of the troops to the south of Paris was ordered from Versailles, whilst, at the same time, Prince Frederick Charles received orders to approach by forced marches in order to be able to strike in between Paris and the Loire. At that time, the Prince was, with his corps, in the neighbourhood of Troyes, and to the north of the Aube and Seine.

On the 9th of November the *Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin* led the 17th Division, which had been stationed in the line of investment, opposite Fort Charenton and the village of Créteil, since the 10th of October, to the assistance of General

von der Tann's Army Detachment, towards *Angerville*, and on the 11th of November assumed the chief command of the bodies of troops, now united together: — the I. Bavarian Corps, 22nd Division, 17th Division, and 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions.

As to the intentions of the enemy nothing could, at first, be known for certain, for the French, as yet too weak for a decisive advance, fortified their position round Orléans and made very skilful demonstrations in order to decoy the German Army Detachment from the road to Paris and towards the west. General d'Aurelle made detachments of the corps, stationed at Le Mans, march upon Chartres and Dreux for this purpose.

The demonstration, at first, completely succeeded in its object. Upon the accordant reports that French detachments were approaching Paris from Normandy and Brittany, the Grand Duke, believing perhaps that this might be the army of Kératry (who had left Paris on the 6th of October in the same way as Gambetta, and who was known to be organizing an army in Brittany), completely changed his front from the south to the west; made the 17th Division, upon the right wing, march, on the 15th of November, from Angerville to *Dreux*, by Auneau, Rambouillet and Maintenon, and directed the 22nd Division, which was followed by the Bavarian Corps, upon Chateauneuf en Thimerais. (The 17th Division was commanded by the Adjutant General, Lieutenant General von *Tresckow*, from the 16th of November, in place of Lieutenant General von Schimmelmann, invalided.)

On the 17th of November, the 17th Division came upon the enemy near *Dreux*, defeated him after a fight of about three hours, and took the town. On the 18th the 22nd Division took *Chateauneuf*; on the 19th it was engaged with French detachments beyond this place, and on the 21st occupied *La Loupe* after inconsiderable fighting.

Now, however, the Grand Duke learnt that the enemy had not retired towards the west, but to the south-west upon *Le Mans*. He endeavoured to keep feeling with the quickly retiring detachments, once again changed his front and, after a wheel to the left, pressed forward against Le Mans. On the 21st different small fights took place to the south of La Loupe, on the 22nd

Nogent-le-Rotrou was occupied, and on the 23rd and 24th of November, the Grand Duke continued his march as far as *La Ferté Bernard*. Here, however, he received commands from the King's Head-Quarters to proceed no further in the direction of Le Mans and to march towards the east; soon after he also received directions from Prince Frederick Charles — who in the meanwhile had come up by Troyes, Sens and Fontainebleau, and was approaching the theatre of war round Orléans to take the chief command of all the German forces in the south — to march upon Orléans and endeavour to unite with the Prince's army. From *La Ferté Bernard*, the Grand Duke, therefore, continued his zig-zag march towards Chateaudun; but in this march he met with still another passing interruption, for in Bazoches the report suddenly reached the Grand Duke that a French Corps was stationed at *Brou*, thus in rear of the Army Detachment. The march was directed upon *Brou*, a collision took place with an isolated detachment of the enemy, of which there were several wandering about at that time, and it was then continued, in order to lead to the junction with the Prince on the 1st of December at *Orgères* and *Toury*, the starting point for the operations against the west.

ENCOUNTER OF THE FRENCH LOIRE ARMY WITH THE ARMY OF PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES.

Whilst the Grand Duke was executing his marches in the west, General d'Aurelle had drawn together almost all the reinforcements, which at that time could be placed at his disposal, in the south; namely the 17th Corps (General Durieux), the 19th (General Barral) and the 20th (General Crouzat), so that with the 15th Corps (General Pallières) and the 16th (General Chanzy), as well as a Cavalry Corps (General Michel) which had been stationed at Orléans since the middle of November, he united under his command an army of about 200,000 combatants.

There were in addition still two corps in reserve, the 21st

under Kératry, in rear of the left wing, and the 18th under Bourbaki at Nevers, in rear of the right wing. (General Bourbaki, commandant of the 18th Corps had escaped the capitulation of Metz in an accidental and wonderful manner.)

Prince Frederick Charles — a Field Marshal, like the Crown Prince of Prussia, since the capitulation of Metz — brought up three Army Corps, the III., IX. and X. as well as the 1st Cavalry Division, whilst another part of the former investing army of Metz, the I. and VIII. Army Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Division, under the command of General von Manteuffel had turned against the French Northern Army and of the remainder, the II. and VII. Army Corps, the former moved off to Paris and the latter remained behind provisionally for the occupation of Metz, and the siege of Thionville. Both, at last, formed General von Manteuffel's army, which drove Bourbaki's troops over the Swiss frontier.

General d'Aurelle had his large army upon a line of considerable length, on the right bank of the Loire, in part quite concealed from the reconnaissances of the Germans, by the extensive forests of Orléans and Marchenoir, and distributed in a manner, that even now allowed the subsequent division of the army into two parts to be foreseen.

And indeed it appears that such a division was intended for the advance upon Paris.

General d'Aurelle might probably have wished to avoid a great decisive battle with Prince Frederick Charles, and therefore had the plan of marching upon Paris by two roads, far distant from one another, in order to deceive the enemy and to reach Paris with at least one half of the army.

At the time of the first collision with Prince Frederick Charles, the French corps stood partly concentrated on the right wing behind the forest of Orléans, and partly on the left wing to the west of Orléans. Certainly, the exact position of this left wing is not known, but it appears to have stood somewhere between Chateaudun and Vendôme. At all events the centre, in front of the town of Orléans itself, was only weak, and the right wing, whose position and strength were known from the fights on the 24th of November, was not so strong and so far distant from the

centre without intention. D'Aurelle appears on the contrary, to have had the design of turning the Prince's army, which came from the north-east by Fontainebleau and Joigny, upon himself, in order to occupy it and detain it in the forest of Orléans, whilst the left wing was moved forward by Chateaudun and Chartres.

Prince Frederick Charles must have suspected some such plan. He developed his forces cautiously, guarded himself well against engaging too many troops in opposing the French right wing, or of following it into the forest, and likewise unfolded a very extended front, which commanded the whole country between Orléans and Paris, from Beaune la Rolande as far as Chateaudun. Thus it came to pass, that the fights which led to the name of the "battle of Orléans", were fought upon a front of about 6 miles ($27\frac{3}{4}$ English miles), in extent, a disproportionately long line in comparison with the strength of both armies.

FIGHTS AT LADON, MAIZIÈRES AND BOIS COMMUN. 24th OF NOVEMBER.

The first action between the two Loire Armies, took place between a part of the French right wing, the 20th Corps, and the Prince Field Marshal's left flank column, the X. Army Corps, to the north of the great forest of Orléans, as the German army developed itself, fronting south, to advance against Orléans. The X. Army Corps, which crossed the river Loing on the 21st at *Montargis* in the direction of *Pithiviers* had the task of uniting around Beaune la Rolande on the 24th of November, and, in conjunction with the Hessian Cavalry Brigade, of carrying out reconnaissances against the enemy, whose presence at *Gien* on the Loire and to the north of this town, was known.

In order to reach Beaune, where the remainder of the Corps, under General Voigts-Rhetz, had already arrived, Valentini's Brigade, with the Artillery corps advanced from Montargis, and Lehmann's Brigade, by Ladon, towards the west, when the French broke

forth out of the forest of Orléans, in three heavy columns 30,500 men in strength, likewise in the direction of Beaune, with the object of crossing the march of the two brigades, consisting of about 12,000 men. The brigades developed towards the left flank; the artillery corps was brought on towards Beaune, and a vigorous offensive was opposed to the enemy's attack. Lehmann's Brigade took *Ladon*, Valentini's *Maizières*, and the two united then threw the enemy back upon *Bellegarde*. After the fight was ended the march was continued upon Beaune, and the intended junction was carried out.

The loss of the Germans amounted to 13 officers, and 220 men; the French loss was more considerable, besides one officer and 170 men as prisoners.

From the papers of a fallen French officer it was discovered that the three divisions of the 20th Army Corps, General Crouzat's, were to reach the points Beaune la Rolande, Juranville and La Loupe on the 24th; a proof that they commenced by a partial offensive with the right wing.

This was, moreover, continued with vigour. The 20th Corps, after the fights on the 24th of November was reinforced by the 18th Corps, so that, according to French accounts, the strength of the right wing was 70,000 men.

ENGAGEMENT AT BEAUNE LA ROLANDE. 28th OF NOVEMBER.

The Prince Field Marshal did not allow himself to be led astray by these operations. The German left wing received the charge of rebutting the French attacks, and the further development of the army continued notwithstanding.

The X. Army Corps retained, provisionally, its position near *Beaune la Rolande*, in order to serve as a point of support for the operations of the other corps, which gradually formed front to the south, and endeavoured, with the right flank to effect a junction with the Grand Duke's Army Detachment.

On the 28th of November, at 9 o'clock a.m., the right wing of the French made a fresh advance against the X. Corps, and indeed, as the accounts of the German troops acknowledge, with great rapidity and vehemence, as well as with decided obstinacy. Several troops of the Line, old soldiers, formed the principal element of the French attacking columns, and a numerous artillery cannonaded the German positions. The X. Army Corps stood upon the line from Beaune to Longoat, and had fortified its positions. *Beaune* formed the centre of the engagement and was strongly barricaded. The French attacked the place on three sides simultaneously and also in the rear; it was defended by Wedell's Brigade. The fight, along the whole line, was full of desperation, and lasted until the commencement of darkness. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the 5th Infantry Division (from the III. Army Corps) joined in the fight against the left wing of the French, with four battalions from Boynes, and the 1st Cavalry Division came up as a support. The French did not commence their retreat into the forest of Orléans until towards 5 o'clock. A pursuit on the part of the Germans, after so hard a fight, could certainly not be thought of, and moreover this would not have been judicious in the present military situation.

The troops of the X. Army Corps had held out with admirable courage against greatly superior in numbers; their tenacity and knowledge of war, under the excellent generalship of General *von Voigts-Rhetz* overcame the furious assault, in the most glorious manner. The Corps had lost about 1000 men; the loss of the French amounted to considerably more, 1100 killed, 5000 wounded and 1600 prisoners. It was the first example of that enormous prodigality in human life, by which alone the French republic could pay the cost of continuing the war, against the proved and tactically superior army of Germany.

BATTLE OF ORLÉANS. 2nd TO 4th OF DECEMBER.

After the failure of the 28th of November, General d'Aurelle brought his Corps closer together round Orléans and to the north of it, still however retaining a very extended position. Upon the right wing he placed the 18th Corps, opposite Beaune, on the northern boundary of the great forest of Orléans, and the 20th Corps upon the road from Orléans to Pithiviers, also in the forest of Orléans. In rear of these Corps stood the 15th, nearer to Orléans. Perhaps he now meant to entice the enemy upon his centre, in order then to advance by Fontainebleau, with the three corps of the right wing.

In the meantime the Prince Field Marshal completed his disposition towards the south, established his junction with the Grand Duke on the high road from Orléans to Paris, which now formed the right wing of the united German Loire Army, and at the same time leaving his left wing, the X. and III. Army Corps, so far to the eastward, that he commanded the road by Pithiviers, and the country to the west of Loing.

The German Army might amount to 120,000 men, and the French, as far as they could now be brought into battle, to 200,000.

On the 1st of December, Gambetta concluded from Trochu's reports upon the sorties from Paris, that a sortie army was already on this side of Longjumeau, and he therefore now issued the most urgent commands for the advance on all sides, nor did he allow proclamations to be wanting for the inspiration of the troops (v. page 306).

On the 2nd of December both armies stood facing one another, ready to fight, and in fact were so placed that the French centre, the 16th and 17th Corps, was opposite the German right wing, whilst the French left wing, the 19th and 21st Corps, was further to the west and south, behind the forest of Marchenoir. The Corps on the German side had the advantage of being able to unite and mutually support one another, in the open country of Orgères, Artenay, as far as Pithiviers and to the east of it, with greater facility than the French Corps, to whom the forest of

Orléans doubtless offered defensive advantages, but also interfered very much with general supervision and mobility.

The first collision occurred near the Paris and Orléans road, when both the German right wing and the French centre made an offensive advance.

On the evening of the 1st of December, a Bavarian reconnoitring detachment sent out from the Grand Duke's army-division had come upon the advanced guard of the 16th French Corps, between *Orgères* and *Patay*, and was thrown back. The whole of the Grand Duke's army-division immediately moved forward, at 8 o'clock on the following morning; the Bavarians on the right wing, from *Orgères*, flanked by the 4th Cavalry Division; the 17th Division in the centre, by *Bazoches*; and the 22nd Division, upon the left wing, in connection with the IX. Army Corps and supported by the 2nd Cavalry Division, along the high road.

These divisions had hardly passed *Orgères* and *Bazoches* when they were vigorously attacked by the heads of the advancing 16th and 17th French Corps. The Bavarians were, at first, forced back, but the 17th Division soon re-established the combat; the French were defeated after a contest of two hours, *Loigny* was stormed by the centre and right wing, *Poupry* by the left wing, and the pursuit was carried on until close in front of *Artenay*. General d'Aurelle led up the 17th Corps as a reinforcement, but was unable to succeed in bringing the advantage to his side, and on the evening of the 2nd of December, was obliged to leave the points *Loigny* and *Poupry* in possession of the right wing of the German Loire Army.

The 17th Division alone had taken 7 guns, and made 1800 prisoners, including one general and twenty officers.

The Prince Field Marshal now made dispositions for a surrounding attack against Orléans, by all the Corps, upon converging lines. The radiating roads leading to this town, formed the lines of operations.

On the 3rd of December, the Grand Duke again continued his movement on the right of the high road; next to him, in the centre of the whole order of battle, upon this road and to the left of it, was General von Manstein, whilst upon his left flank,

the 2nd Cavalry Division held the connection with General von Alvensleben's III. Army Corps. This Corps marched from Pithiviers upon Chilleurs and, finally, the X. Army Corps, upon the extreme left wing, by Boyne.

General d'Aurelle did not again take the offensive on the 3rd of December, neither was the resistance on this day generally of a tenaciously obstinate character.

The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg and General von Manstein threw the enemy back upon *Chevilly*, General von Alvensleben penetrated beyond *Chilleurs*, and General von Voigts-Rhetz attained an equal level with the centre, in the forest of Orléans.

General d'Aurelle, in spite of his strength, drew back his centre, whilst leaving his wings stationary, and exposed them, even on this day, to the danger of a separation.

Probably the events of the 3rd of December still corresponded with d'Aurelle's original idea, of being able to advance towards Paris with at least one strong wing, *and indeed he must now have counted upon the left wing, which remained still intact, and even unobserved, behind the forest of Marchenoir.*

From this day, however, the French plan fell into confusion, chiefly, it would appear, through Gambetta's interference. No systematic action on the part of the French can any longer be recognised. However, it must certainly not be inferred that the march upon Paris would have succeeded had it not been for the differences between Gambetta and d'Aurelle. The dispositions of the Prince, models of foresight and decision during the whole Loire campaign, would scarcely have allowed a French army to advance unobserved.

Gambetta issued the command that Orléans should be defended, and this naturally was at cross purposes with General d'Aurelle's dispositions; the retreat was continued no further, a fight occurred on the 4th, but the separation was, nevertheless, accomplished.

All the German Corps pressed forward this day against Orléans, in the same direction as on the previous day.

General von Manstein, with the 18th Division in the first line, and the 25th (Hessian) Division in the second line, came upon the main position of the French to the south of *Chevilly*,

in the line Cercottes—Gidy, leading across the high road. A combat ensued, lasting for many hours, with hot fighting in places, which ended in the retreat of the French upon Orléans.

And now, whilst the German corps continued their march upon Orléans with a front becoming continually more drawn in, the marvellous division of the French Army into two great masses took place, parting company up and down the Loire, the one towards the south-west, the other towards the south-east. This movement has since been explained by tactical reasons, for the German corps, in the centre, had advanced so far that the French wings were no longer able to reach Orléans and the centre.

Thus whilst d'Aurelle's conjectured plan was partially fulfilled, he was at the same time hindered from independently exercising his command, and the two strong wings, which should now have gone forward, retired.

The 18th Corps passed the Loire at Sully, the 20th at Jargeau in order to retreat upon Bourges, and the 16th Corps had crossed at Orléans; the remaining corps had commenced their retreat upon Meung, partly also to their former position near Vendôme.

Meanwhile the German Army immediately followed the retreating corps; *the IX. Army Corps was in possession of the suburb of St. Jean by the evening of the 4th of December, after a vigorous fight, and, in common with the Grand Duke's Corps, occupied the town of Orléans early on the morning of the 5th of December.*

In the three days fighting, the losses in the French Army had been extraordinarily large, chiefly in prisoners, of whom above 10,000 fell into the hands of the Germans, together with 77 guns and 4 gun-boats, surprised upon the Loire. But the German loss also was not inconsiderable, it amounted to about 5000 men killed and wounded.

PURSUIT AND OBSERVATION OF THE DIVIDED FRENCH ARMY.

The Prince Field Marshal established his head-quarters in Orléans on the 5th of December, and from here sent out detachments in all directions which were to keep feeling with the enemy.

The division of the French Army, which Gambetta instantly announced to the world as a strategical plan, was confirmed by the German reconnaissances, and the track of the French right wing was followed for several days, with repeated small engagements at *Gien*, *Vierzon* and other points in the south-west and south.

Contrary to Gambetta's hopes, however, the Prince made no further pursuit of Bourbaki's Army (the three Corps of the right wing) after the 10th of December, but now, correctly estimating the importance of the French left wing, the III. Army Corps was recalled from its march upon *Gien*, and the whole German Loire Army was directed against the forces which showed themselves in opposition to the Grand Duke's troops and the IX. Army Corps at *Meung*, *Beaugency* and *Blois*.

The left wing of the army which had been beaten near Orléans, the 16th, 17th, 19th and 21st Corps, had, under the command of General Chanzy — d'Aurelle had fallen out with Gambetta and been dismissed — concentrated on the right bank of the Loire in the line Beaugency — Marchevier, and first offered resistance to the pursuing German Corps on the 7th of December to the north of Meung.

An offensive movement in the direction of Paris, with surrounding the German right wing, was not attempted by this strong army, although the present moment offered a better prospect of success than ever.

Beaten by the 17th Division, the French rear guard drew back upon Beaugency, and on the following day General Chanzy moved against the Grand Duke with his whole force. A hot engagement took place at *Beaugency*, in which the French were once again thrown back with considerable losses (1500 prisoners and 6 guns).

On the 9th of December, amidst repeated fights, the Grand

Duke occupied the forest of Marchenoir and the districts of Bouvalet, Cernay and others to the south of Beaugency, which were still defended by the enemy.

Upon the report of the combat near Meung, the Prince Field Marshal made the X. Army Corps follow the IX. and the Grand Duke.

The 10th of December was to have been a day of rest for the German Army, but on this day General Chanzy attempted the offensive afresh; the combat, principally conducted by artillery, ended in the *retreat of the French, who now went no further towards the south, but by Vendôme upon Le Mans.*

The delegation of Tours had left that town after the battle of Orléans, and fled to Bordeaux.

The German side was at fault, for some days, as to the line of retreat taken by the French; it was believed that they had fallen back upon Blois and Tours, and the march was therefore continued in this direction. The head-quarters were in Beaugency on the 12th, and in Suresnes on the 13th.

On the latter day, however, General Voigts-Rhetz made the discovery, after occupying Blois, that General Chanzy had drawn off towards *Vendôme.*

In consequence of this *the march was directed to the west, upon Vendôme,* and on the 13th of December, the X. Army Corps upon the left wing and the Grand Duke upon the right, in the first line; following them, the III. Army Corps was to turn off from Beaugency towards the west, and the IX. Army Corps was to cross from the left to the right bank of the Loire at Blois.

On the 15th of December a sharp fight took place in the line Vendôme — Morée on the *Loir*, against Chanzy's Army.

But Gambetta now appears to have conceived the new plan of drawing the German Army continually further westward and of occupying it, whilst in the meantime, Bourbaki was to march unimpeded towards the east, and break away, past General von Werder's small Army, into Germany, or completely to interrupt the German communications. (v. Chapter XII).

A lasting resistance was consequently not offered at Vendôme, but the retreat from this favourable position was decided on, and

commenced on the 16th of December. On the same day Vendôme was occupied with some fighting on the part of the Germans, and six guns and a mitrailleuse were taken by the victorious X. Army Corps.

The retreat of the French from Vendôme, combined with the news of *Bourbaki's position at Bourges and Gien*, caused Prince Frederick Charles to suspect that he was to be enticed to the westward, in order, possibly, to send Bourbaki to Paris. He therefore returned to Orléans on the 19th, directed the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg and General von Voigts-Rhetz to pursue General Chanzy as far only as Epuisay and St. Calais, and *then took up a position of observation with his whole army, both against Chanzy and Bourbaki.*

At the same time the latter commenced embarking his army upon the railroad for Besançon.

The Grand Duke and General von Voigts-Rhetz occupied the line Chartres-Chateaudun-Vendôme-Tours with their own Corps and the 1st, 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions, the former on the right and the latter on the left; General von Manstein and General von Alvensleben extended their Corps and the 6th Cavalry Division towards the south-east and made reconnaissances upon Vierzon, Bourges, and upon the right bank of the Loire, as far as Gien and Briare.

These measures for observation were continued for a long time; yet it appears that Bourbaki's movements here were not at first detected, for the Prince remained at Orléans until the beginning of January, and the Southern Army was only set in movement for General Werder's assistance, at the commencement of that month.

General Chanzy too, was in uncertainty on his side as to what the Prince was going to do; his army was not yet fit again to undertake any great operation; it had been terribly weakened, not only by the enemy, but also by the severe weather.

The French troops were in the most deplorable condition, deserting in crowds, large detachments of them without arms, and all most insufficiently clad and fed. On the road from Orléans to Blois alone, more than 6000 French wounded, who had been left

behind entirely without doctors, were found and attended to by the Germans. But the German troops had also suffered from the unceasing fighting and winter bivouacking; their foot-gear was for the most part in a wretched condition, and it is a great triumph for their excellent moral qualities, and the masterly generalship and administration, that they, nevertheless, remained completely ready for the fight.

From the 16th of December 1870 to the 6th of January 1871, nothing but reconnaissances occurred, in conformity with the situation of affairs.

On the 21st of December, the 19th Division from the X. Army Corps, whose head-quarters were at Blois, appeared before *Tours*, via Chateau-Renault, after having defeated some of the enemy's detachments on the 19th. The town, after some rifled cannon shot had been thrown into it, requested a Prussian garrison, but it was not occupied; the Division moved into cantonments in the neighbourhood.

A detachment from the 20th Division at Vendôme, six companies, one squadron and two guns, under Lieutenant Colonel von Boltenstern, went down the Loire on the 27th of December, and came upon a superior force of the enemy between *Montoire* and *La Chartre*, which completely surrounded the detachment after sundry skirmishes. The detachment fought its way through, and returned with a loss of about 100 men and 10 officers, and with 230 men of the enemy as prisoners.

On the 31st of December, the 20th Division, at Vendôme, was attacked by superior forces, but repulsed the attack, and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, under General von Lüderitz, succeeded in taking 4 guns.

ADVANCE UPON LE MANS.

In the beginning of 1871 it was evident that Bourbaki would make a push towards the east (v. Chapter XII), and Prince Frederick Charles, in accordance with the Chief Head-Quarters, whence

special dispositions were made against Bourbaki, now decided, on his side, to attack General Chanzy, who was stationed at Le Mans.

• On the 2nd of January, the Prince commanded the XIII. Army Corps (17th and 22nd Infantry Divisions) to concentrate at Chartres, the IX. at Orléans, the III. at Beaugency and the X. at Vendôme.

On the 6th of January the following points were to be reached:

Brou, upon the right wing, by the XIII. Army Corps and the 4th Cavalry Division, and *Nogent le Rotrou* by a flanking detachment on the right.

Morée, further down on the Loir, by the IX. Army Corps (18th Infantry Division and Artillery Corps) and the 2nd Cavalry Division.

Vendôme, in the centre, by the III. Army Corps, whose advanced guard was to occupy the line of Azai; *Montoire*, upon the left wing, by the X. Army Corps and the 1st and 6th Cavalry Divisions.

These dispositions indicate a surrounding attack against Le Mans, and formed the introduction to a series of fights, which lasted seven days, before coming to a crisis at Le Mans itself.

The peculiar formation of the ground, to the east of the ancient Norman town of Le Mans, explains why the overthrow of the western army was marked by a succession of fights instead of by one great decisive stroke.

The two rivers *Huisne* and *Loir*, running into the Sarthe which flows by Le Mans towards Angers, form with their numerous small tributaries, a number of tactically important positions, lying regularly one behind another, in the hilly and undulating country round Le Mans. The ground is, moreover, intersected by numerous quick-set fences upon low earth banks, which enclose the fields; numerous isolated farms, with several villages, thickets and many solidly built chateaux lie scattered about, forming special points of appui for the defenders. Added to this, a cold of 8 to 10 degrees (Réaumur) with snow and gales increased the difficulties, on both sides it is true, of marching and fighting.

On the 6th of January the fighting began.

The French had, on the 5th of January, strengthened their position opposite the 20th Infantry Division, and occupied the forest of Vendôme; from here, on the 6th of January, they made attacks upon the outposts of the Division, which remained stationary, whilst the latter was moving to the south-west upon Montoire. Soon however, towards midday, the heads of the III. Corps arrived at *Vendôme*, took up the combat and continued it, against the tenacious, and reinforced, resistance of the enemy, until his retreat behind the Azai line.

The X. Corps reached *Montoire* with slight resistance.

The regiments of the 38th Brigade, on the other hand, and parts of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 6th Cavalry Division, who were appointed to cover the march of the X. Corps upon the extreme left flank, in a position at St. Amand, were attacked from Chateau-Renault, from the south-west, and forced back upon Ambloy. — The enemy thus attempted to paralyze the attack, by surrounding the left flank of the Germans.

The IX. Corps had reached *Moree*; the XIII. Corps, however, had met with an obstinate resistance, and had only just reached the vicinity of *Brou*, and not yet Nogent le Rotrou. It had become evident in the course of the day, that Divisions of the 16th and 17th Corps had fought against the III., parts of the 21. Corps against the XIII., and a Division of the 16th Corps had fought at St. Amand.

The Prince Field Marshal decided to continue the surrounding attack upon le Mans, and only to devote a secondary consideration to the enemy at St. Amand.

By his dispositions for the 7th of January, the XIII. Corps was to advance upon *Montmirail*, the IX. upon *Epuisay*, the X. upon *La Chartre*, whilst, abutting the threatening upon its flank, the III. Corps upon *Savigny* and *Epuisay*, and he himself towards *Crilaines*, in the centre.

A thick fog lay upon the ground and shut out the effect of the artillery, so that the fighting had to be carried on by the infantry alone. There were engagements at Epuisay, St. Amand and Nogent le Rotrou. In the evening all the divisions had taken up the previously indicated positions with the exception of the

X. Corps which had been retarded by a victorious fight at St. Amand and only got as far as Montoire with its main body. The Prince established his head-quarters in Vendôme, and ordered a general continuation of the offensive for the 8th of January.

On this day the leading troops of the III. Corps reached Ecorpain without a contest; the IX. Corps, in its rear, reached St. Calais, to which place the head-quarters were also removed; the X. Corps, after a slight resistance, reached la Chartre, and the XIII. La Ferté Bernard, and pushed out an advanced guard beyond.

The orders for the 9th of January directed the XIII. Corps to the hill of Montfort, the III. upon Artenay, the IX. upon Bouloire; and the X. upon Parigné-Evêque. Detached divisions were also commanded to undertake the destruction of the railway connections from Le Mans to Alençon and Tours.

General von Hartmann, with a mixed detachment was charged to throw the enemy's troops further back, which had threatened the left flank of the X. Corps, on the 6th.

The previously indicated points, Artenay, Le Breil, La Belle inutile, L'Homme, Montreuil, St. Georges and Sceaux, were almost reached on all sides, amid hot fighting.

The Prince Field Marshal established his head-quarters in Bouloire and *ordered the surrounding advance upon Le Mans itself, for the 10th of January.* The IX. Corps was to form the reserve of the centre.

The roads, since the 9th of January, had been covered with slippery ice, so that the march was rendered unusually difficult, especially for horses.

But notwithstanding this hindrance and the obstinate resistance offered by the enemy, chiefly against the III. and XIII. Corps, the following points were reached in the evening.

The III. Corps stood in Changé, between this place and *Parigné*, to the west of *St. Hubert* and in *Champagné*. The X. Army Corps at *Grand Lucé*. Of the XIII. Corps, the 22nd Division had only reached the line *Couléon-Château-Connerre* railway station; the 17th Division had not been able to force the

passage over the *Huisne* against Rousseau's Division of the 21st Corps, and stood at *Pont de Gesnes*. The IX. Corps was at *Bouloire*.

THE CRISIS AT LE MANS.

On the evening of the 10th of January, the French Army was formed up with a curved front in a line three miles ($13\frac{1}{2}$ English miles) in extent, to the east and north-east of Le Mans, in excellent positions for further fighting. The 16th Corps was upon the left wing, on the right bank of the *Huisne*, the 17th Corps and parts of the 21st Corps, in the centre, on the left bank of the *Huisne*, and one Division of the 19th Corps, upon the right wing, on the road to La Chartre. The Gardes Mobiles and mobilised Gardes Nationaux, who had only arrived shortly before, were in reserve.

The whole Army might still number 100,000 men.

The Prince Field Marshal again ordered the attack for the 11th of January, in the old, often proved Prussian manner; that of surrounding the enemy with both wings and then attacking vigorously from the centre and the wings.

The XIII. Army Corps was to accomplish the passage over the *Huisne* on this day, and to move forward against Le Mans from the north-east; the remaining Corps were to keep their present directions.

On this day the success was gained of wresting some very important positions from the enemy; still the decisive combat required yet a seventh day.

In the evening of the 11th of January, the III. Corps had gained possession of *Arches Château* and *Noyers Château*, and the 18th Division, after a fight of many hours, had taken the *Plateau d'Anvour*. The XIII. Corps had crossed the river at Connerre with the 17th Division, and in the evening after a hard

fight, this Division occupied the country to the east of *Lombron*, and the 22nd Division, *La Chapelle*.

The X. Army Corps had reached *Les Mortes Aures* and *Mulsanne* late in the evening, and taken the height of *Verdgalant*, an important point of support for the enemy.

The 14th Cavalry Brigade with two battalions was, in the evening, between *Château de la Paillerie* and *Parigné-l'Évêque*.

The Prince Field Marshal established his head-quarters in the *Château d'Artenay*, and gave the following orders for the 12th of January:

"The III. and X. Corps will continue the offensive; the IX. Corps will establish its artillery Corps upon the plateau d'Anvour and, with a brigade of the 18th Division, support the XIII. Corps whilst it debouches by the bridge over the Huisne."

With the commencement of dawn, however, General Chanzy first took the offensive. Shortly after, whilst still dark, the advanced posts of the III. Corps were engaged; at noon, those of the IX. Corps in the neighbourhood of *Fatines*; and, at the same time, the 17th Division, to the south-east of *St. Corneille*, was attacked.

General Chanzy risked a final desperate battle, and it is a matter of astonishment that he was still able to move his Army to such a fight as took place this day, after six days of almost uninterrupted defeats.

On the German side, the 35th Brigade joined in the combat at *St. Corneille* by a flanking movement; the French were defeated, and the Brigade reached *Parance* in the evening.

The 17th Division took *St. Corneille* and the passage over the *Parance* stream at *Thouvois-Château*.

The 22nd Division moved forward from *La Chapelle*, by *St. Célerie* and *Torcé* and reached the *Bonnétable* and *Le Mans* road. In a further advance the Division came upon strong forces of the enemy near *Chanteloup*, and after an obstinate combat, placed itself, towards evening, in possession of *La Croix*.

The 4th Cavalry Division reached *Ballon* and *Souligné*.

General von Manstein had occupied the plateau d'Anvour with

several batteries, which opened fire upon Yvré and the retiring columns of the enemy.

Lastly, upon the left wing, the X. Army Corps was marched upon Le Mans; it had brought batteries into position, and after an hour's cannonade, entered, fighting, into the town at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, without meeting considerable resistance.

The III. Army Corps, reached the ground to the south of *L'Epi* after a protracted fight, brought two batteries into action against Le Mans in the afternoon, and with the 5th Division, followed the X. Corps into the town, whilst the 6th Division still pushed forward advanced posts, across the Huisne, in the evening.

The combat had ended in the complete defeat of the French Army. They were in rapid retreat upon Alençon and Laval, and their losses were enormously great. The German Army had made 18,000 prisoners in the seven days fighting, and taken 20 guns and mitrailleurs, and 2 colours. A large quantity of war material fell into German hands at Le Mans.

The German loss amounted, altogether, in the seven days to 180 officers and 3470 men.

The victory of Le Mans was of decisive result in the theatre of war in the south and west, and weighed heavily in the balance in favour of the conclusion of the war. Chanzy's Army was destroyed. The *débris*, which he led back upon Alençon and Laval, could not undertake any operations again for a long time; also, from the 13th of January, the day after the last decisive battle, they were pursued by the German Army, and lost 6000 men, in addition, as prisoners.

The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg followed with the XIII. Corps, the 4th Cavalry Division and the 12th Cavalry Brigade upon Alençon; General von Schmidt, with the 14th Cavalry Brigade and detachments of the IX. Corps, upon Laval.

On the 14th, the forsaken camp of *Conlie* was found by a

detachment of the X. Army Corps, after some slight skirmishes with the French rear guard, to be evacuated; large stores of provisions, ammunition and arms were captured in this grandly established entrenched camp. Alençon was reached by the German troops on the night of the 16th, and the XIII. Army Corps was directed thence upon *Rouen*, on the 20th, for the purpose of operating against the French Corps at Havre, in company with the Northern Army.

General Chanzy had been completely forced back into Brittany.

German detachments also advanced towards the south; a brigade of the III. Army Corps marched upon Angers, and on the 19th of January General von Hartmann, Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, occupied the town of *Tours* with his mixed detachment of all arms.

Thus, profiting by his victories in all directions, Prince Frederick Charles, who had established his head-quarters at Le Mans, held the departments of Orléanais, Touraine, Anjou, Maine and Normandy under the power of German arms, and frustrated every hope of a relief of Paris from this quarter; until, soon after, the convention of Versailles, also profiting by the results of the admirable successes of this army, put an end to the events of the war.

II. OPERATIONS OF THE NORTHERN ARMIES.

(v. map of the operations of the Northern Armies.)

As early as the beginning of October, the existence of armed French divisions, in the northern departments of Artois and Picardy, had been confirmed by the reports of the cavalry, which had been sent out from Paris, on all sides for reconnoitring purposes and as stationary detachments.

Thus, in the early days of October, a French detachment, several thousand strong, composed of Gardes Mobiles of the Marne

and the Somme, a portion of the 43rd Regiment of the Line and a small force of Cavalry, advanced from Arras to make a reconnaissance towards Paris, and came into collision with two German squadrons in the neighbourhood of *Breteuil*, to the south of Amiens. They at once turned again in rapid retreat upon Amiens and Arras.

These newly organized troops, however, did not gain importance as an army, which could endanger the investment of Paris, until much later, at the same time that the French Loire Army also attained a threatening strength in the south, under General d'Aurelle.

General *Farre* had, originally, been charged with the organization of the active forces in the north; then, on the 22nd of October, *Bourbaki* took over the Chief Command, after his departure from Metz; but in November, before there had been any fighting in the north, he was called away to take up a command on the Loire.

Even at the end of October the organization in the north appeared of sufficient importance to the German Army Direction for General von Manteuffel to be sent there, after the capitulation of Metz, with the I. and VIII. Army Corps (the I. was reduced by having sent away detachments) and the 3rd Cavalry Division.

This Army Detachment, however, was only able to move off from Metz on the 7th of November, for the I. Army (which consisted of the VII. Corps and Senden's Division besides the portions of troops named) had been given the charge of carrying out the evacuation and removal of the captured army, in detachments, from Metz. This arduous work, occupying much time, was finally so arranged that the Landwehr troops, hitherto belonging to Kummer's Division, should undertake the transport to Germany, and then remain at home on guard; it was then only that the I. Army was distributed for the divers tasks of occupying Metz, Thionville, Longwy, Montmédy, Mézières, partially also for the siege and observation of Verdun (cf. Chapter IX.) and to advance against the north-west of France.

Part of the VII. Corps remained in Metz, Senden's Division besieged Thionville and the fortresses on the Belgian frontier,

Zglinitzki's Brigade from the 1st Corps, reinforced by a squadron and a battery, moved forward by the railroad to Soissons for the siege of La Fère, whilst Bentheim's Division was sent away for the investment of Mézières.

On the 7th of November General von Mantouffell commenced his march with the remainder, by two main roads, towards the west. The I. Corps, upon the right wing, followed the line of Briey-Damvillers-Rethel-Laon-Noyon, and the VIII. Corps, upon the left wing, that of Verdun-Varennes-Rheims-Soissons-Compiègne.

On the 21st Ham was occupied.

On the 23rd of November the advance upon *Amiens*, by Montdidier and Roye, was made, preceded by the Cavalry Division. On the following day fighting took place with the advanced guard, under Colonel von Lüdewitz at *Quesnel* and *Mézières*; on the 26th, the presence of strong forces of the enemy at *Thennes* on the line of the Luce was ascertained, and dispositions were made for a battle on the 27th.

Of the I. Corps, only one infantry brigade, the Artillery Corps and a cavalry regiment were on the spot; the 1st Division, now relieved before Mézières by Senden's Division, was still upon the march, the VIII. Corps, on the other hand, was complete. However, the Regiments Kronprinz and No. 41, belonging to the 1st Division, as well as the cavalry and artillery, still arrived in time on the following day.

BATTLE OF AMIENS. 27th OF NOVEMBER.

General Faidherbe reckons the forces*), at that time on the French side in Amiens, as consisting of only three brigades, *Lecoq's*, *Derroja's* and *Bessol's*, with the garrison of Amiens, altogether 25,000 men including 4 squadrons and 7 batteries under

*) In his publication "Campagne de l'Armée du Nord", dedicated to Gambetta; a publication with excellent closing remarks, but written with too decidedly political objects.

the command of General Farre, Gardes Mobiles, Marines and regular infantry, and very numerous officers escaped from the capitulations of Sedan and Metz. If these estimates are correct—and Faidherbe's detailed account makes it probable—the French army^o was about equal in numbers to the German, though much weaker in cavalry and artillery. The entrenchments, in which the French fought, certainly compensated for this disadvantage.

The German Army, on the morning of the 27th of November, advanced for the offensive directly upon Amiens; the VIII. Corps upon the left wing, and the detachments of the I. Corps upon the right wing.

The French Army held an entrenched position, in a very extended line, in front of Amiens.

The VIII. Corps attacked in a northerly direction towards the town, threw back the enemy, who offered a brave resistance, from one position to another, in a fight lasting for many hours, during which several bayonet attacks were carried out, and a battalion of marines was ridden down by the 9th Hussars; and in the evening its leading troops were half a mile ($2\frac{1}{3}$ English miles) from Amiens.

The I. Corps, when advancing against the heights of *Gentelles* and *Villers-Bretonneux*, had to endure a still harder fight; it was attacked by a French detachment which had taken up a position for the defence of Corbie and the railroad to Arras and Lille. The I. Corps was only able to gain ground slowly and amid severe losses, yet being vigorously supported on the right wing by the Cavalry Division, this corps also succeeded at last in defeating the enemy and taking the entrenchment at Villers-Bretonneux.

With this the French army certainly was not driven out of its last position before Amiens; yet its loss was so considerable, and the steadiness of the troops so shaken, that a rapid retreat to the north was commenced in the evening.

The loss of the Germans was pretty considerable; it amounted to 1300 men and 79 officers. Nevertheless 9 guns and 2 colours were taken, and 800 unwounded prisoners made; the loss of the French is estimated, by Faidherbe, at 266 killed and 1117 wounded, besides a great number missing and scattered.

No pursuit was made after the enemy in retreat to the north; and therefore the results of the battle were only momentary. An energetic pursuit would probably have put an end to the whole war in the north, whilst as it was, the French army again recovered and was reinforced in the northern fortresses, so that it was able to repeat many times its attempts to press forward across the Somme towards Paris, and to engage in several fresh battles. Whether a pursuit was impossible, cannot as yet be decided, for sufficiently exact information is wanting as to the positions on both sides and the condition of the troops after the combat. On the French side only, is there a detailed account of the battle by General Faidherbe, according to which the German army was prevented by its losses, and the fatigues of the contest, from profiting by its victory, whilst the French had, for the greater part, retired in good order. Less confidence can be placed in this account than on the strength estimates from the same source, because a description can easily be coloured; nevertheless the course of events gives it some likelihood. As the German army, with its superior and numerous cavalry, had so greatly the advantage, in regard to a pursuit, over an enemy almost entirely deficient in cavalry, it is difficult to explain why better use was not made of the victory. It is true that in general, a pursuit by cavalry, after the fashion of former wars, is no longer possible, and this arises from the new arms of the infantry. Formerly the cavalry remained so close upon the heels of the retiring enemy, that it could take advantage of each moment of disorder to fall upon it; now, however, even a small detachment of infantry with the rapid-firing, long-ranged breech-loaders, keeps the cavalry at such a distance, that all feeling between the rear guard of the retiring body and the pursuing cavalry is easily lost. A pursuit, therefore, is only possible now with all three arms, and principally indeed with infantry still thoroughly fit for marching or at least more fit for marching than the enemy.

The whole war of 1870—71 presents no single instance of a productive pursuit by cavalry, as was the case formerly, and in general, only offers examples of pursuits of little energy and value. This, naturally, is mainly owing to the principal battles

at Metz and Sedan having ended with the retreat of the vanquished foe into a fortress and a capitulation, which without doubt, was of more value than any pursuit; but in other cases, after the battle of Woerth for instance, no pursuit was made, because the victors had not any fresh infantry near enough to the enemy, and because the cavalry was unable to pursue. Here, at Amiens, however, the ground was more favourable for cavalry than at Woerth.

On the 28th, Amiens was occupied by the Germans; but the citadel held out until the following morning, and was only taken after a short fight. At this place, 11 officers and 400 men, 30 guns and considerable war material fell into the hands of the conquerors.

From the beginning of the campaign in the north, the character of the population exhibited quite a different aspect to that met with by the Germans in the south and in the Vosges. Here there was nothing of fanaticism to be observed; the people, well-to-do and of a quiet temperament, looked with great dislike upon the continuance of the war, feared an excess of the Franc-tireur motion, and above all every revolutionary movement, and frequently sought protection from the German military authorities against the armed proletariats of their own country. The towns, for the most part, were not sorry to see a German garrison; the troops were met in a friendly manner, and the billeting and requisitions of the Germans were tolerated, as the lighter of the unavoidable evils of the war, because every thing was done in order.

ADVANCE UPON ROUEN.

On the 29th and 30th of November, detachments followed the enemy in the direction of Arras and Lille; and at the same time the march upon Rouen, where other French forces were to be found, was also arranged. A detachment was left behind to guard against the enemy who had retreated towards the north, the

railroads leading from the north, were also destroyed, for greater security, and General von Manteuffel then moved off on the 1st of December, towards the south-west, against Rouen.

The VIII. Army Corps formed the right wing and went by Poix, Forges and Buchy, and the I. Army Corps, which had now again brought up the greatest part of its troops from Mézières and La Fère, marched upon the left wing and took the direction of Breteuil — Gournay.

The rearmost troops of the enemy retired rapidly, were pursued, and on the 4th of December General von Göben came upon a French corps of observation between Forges and Buchy.

The VIII. Corps attacked immediately; the enemy only offered a slight resistance, and was soon driven away from several positions, with severe loss, besides 400 prisoners. *General von Göben still reached Rouen on the same day.*

The I. Corps likewise advanced, driving before it the enemy's detachments, which made but an indifferent stand.

On the 6th of December, Rouen was occupied by a strong garrison; General von Manteuffel moved in, in the afternoon, and then immediately arranged the march of a detachment upon Dieppe. This seaport town was occupied on the 9th of December.

The result was considerable. The French forces were here completely driven away, and retired towards Havre; the important town of Rouen, with above 100,000 inhabitants, and Dieppe, of consequence as a harbour, were in German power.

The troops, wearied by forced marches and repeated engagements, could now be allowed a little rest.

THE OFFENSIVE BY GENERAL FAIDHERBE.

On the 3rd of December General *Faidherbe* had taken command of the united French forces, in Lille, and in a few weeks had brought them up to the strength of three Divisions, Lecointe's, Paulze d'Ivoy's and Moulac's, whose force, as represented by

Faidherbe, was 30,000 men and 60 guns. With this army he again moved off towards the south.

He directed the 1st Division, Lecointe's, upon St. Quentin. It recaptured *Ham* on the 10th of December, and there made 210 prisoners. He then appeared with his whole force, before *La Fère*, on the 12th. As this little fortress could not be taken without a siege, General Faidherbe turned towards *Amiens*. The special task of the French northern army was the relief of Paris; therefore this march appears remarkable. It was to be expected that Faidherbe would go south from *La Fère*; still he might have feared a flank attack by Manteuffel and therefore would content himself with disturbing the enemy's operations upon Havre.

On the 20th of December he was on the *Hallue*, a tributary of the Somme, with his army, and the sortie by the Parisians against Le Bourget, on the 21st of December, which has been described at page 310, took place in connection with his offensive movement.

General von Manteuffel, however, had received timely intelligence of these movements, and quickly approached the threatened Amiens with his disposable force, which, after the departure of the necessary garrisons for Rouen, Dieppe and other places, still consisted of the VIII. Army Corps, one brigade of the I. Army Corps and the 3rd cavalry Division, altogether perhaps less than 20,000 men.

Even on the 20th a fight took place in the front. The French stood in cantonments in the valley of the Hallue stream, upon the right bank of the Somme, towards the south, covered by this river and the canal, as well as by extensive marshes, and had occupied *Corbie* besides the villages in the Hallue valley. In this position considerable reinforcements were drawn together, which had been organized in Lille, and consequently formed a new corps, so that the French Northern Army now numbered the 22nd and 23rd Corps, altogether about 40,000 men with 78 guns. The 22nd Corps, under General Lecointe, two Divisions and six batteries, took the line along the Hallue, from *Daours* to *Beaucourt*; the 23rd Corps, under General Paulze d'Ivoy, held *Corbie* and its environs with its 1st Division and five batteries, and had

stationed its 2nd Division, in a second line, in the villages to the south-west of Albert.

On the 20th, a German reconnoitring detachment came straight upon the French centre at Querrieux, and a small but hot fight ensued.

BATTLE ON THE HALLUE. 23rd OF DECEMBER.

On the 23rd of December, General *Manteuffel* advanced for the regular attack.

The offensive of the German army was directed from Amiens against the front of the French, who, in the last few days, had strengthened the heights upon the left bank of the *Hallue* by some entrenchments, and intended to offer an energetic resistance. Their position was, in fact, very well chosen, for their left wing, which the German side might have wished to surround, lay greatly protected, and the right wing curving to the rear with the conformation of the chain of heights, rendered an encompassing difficult here also.

The German troops attacked, as always, with great courage, threw back the French advanced troops from the localities and positions which they occupied upon the right bank of the Hallue, and then went forward to storm the heights upon the left bank. The combat revolved chiefly about *Daours* upon the German right wing, and about *Pont-Noyelles* in the centre; upon the German left wing an attack was undertaken against *Frechencourt*. These localities were successfully wrested from the French; yet at Frechencourt, where the attack appears to have been made with weaker forces, no particular further success was gained; the French maintained themselves on this wing.

According to *Faidherbe's* account, towards 4 o'clock in the afternoon, General von Manteuffel had again lost so many of the advantages which he had originally gained, that on the French side an offensive movement could be thought of, and, indeed, the Germans, although at this time still in possession of the left bank,

had been hard pressed in the centre, and it was the intention, on the side of the French, to threaten the German left flank by wheeling up the right wing. The execution of this, however, only resulted in trifling success, as night soon put an end to the operations, the only result gained being the re-capture of Pont-Noyelles and Daours. During the night, it is true, the Germans took possession of both places afresh, and made some hundred prisoners in them.

Faidherbe's account, written altogether with a recognisable object, is here, apparently, at a loss to improve upon the situation of the French Army.

A German detailed account of the battle does not exist; this much is certain, that both armies bivouacked upon the field of battle, and that the French army, which only retired in the afternoon of the following day, was not pursued. These facts are sufficient to form a judgment upon the combat; the battle on the Hallue was certainly, not a success to any great extent; it was very similar to the battle of Amiens on the 27th of November; the enemy was beaten, but he was not deprived of the power of withdrawing upon his basis of operations, in order to return again in a short time with fresh forces. That the French were conquered is, however, not to be doubted, and to beat an enemy doubly superior in numbers and in excellent positions was quite a distinguished feat for the German army and its general.

General Faidherbe estimates his loss at 141 killed, 905 wounded, some hundred prisoners and 1000 dispersed. The German loss amounted to 38 officers and 824 men in killed and wounded, as well as 93 missing.

The French northern army retreated upon Arras and Douay. On the 25th General von Manteuffel commenced the march in pursuit; he reached Albert on the same day, but from here, only followed with single detachments, and only as far as Bapaume. He kept the main body of his force at Amiens, and sent out corps of observation from there, in all directions.

General Faidherbe moved into cantonments between Arras and Douay, with his front towards the south.

On the 27th the investment of Péronne was undertaken from

Amiens, where General Count von der Gröben commanded. This fortress proved itself of special importance at the battle of St. Quentin, which took place later; but even before, it was of essential consequence for the passage over the Somme, and it is an indication of the spontaneous intelligence of the Prussian subaltern officer, as well as of the important position which even the lower officers were obliged to, or could assume, at times, in this long protracted and widely extended war, that the conquest of Péronne was carried out on the plan and proposal of First Lieutenant Schmidt, of the 11th siege artillery division, who was artillery commander in the citadel of Amiens.

The conquest of Péronne (v. page 255) had such a quick result, because Lieutenant Schmidt, upon his own responsibility, had fitted out the requisite siege park with great rapidity, — a park which consisted entirely of French material.

General von Senden was first charged with the siege, then General von Barnekow, with ten battalions, eight squadrons and 54 field guns, whilst Generals von Kummer and Count von der Gröben were pushed forwards toward Arras for their protection, with, altogether twelve battalions, sixteen squadrons and 30 guns. There were besides five battalions, twelve squadrons and 30 guns left at the disposal of General von Göben, who had the direction of the whole operation.

Besides this greater undertaking, the next few days brought some smaller encounters.

On the 28th, a flying column of three companies and three squadrons, under Lieutenant Colonel Pestel, came upon an advancing column of three battalions of Gardes Mobiles near *Longpré*, which were beaten, and lost 10 officers and 230 men as prisoners.

On the 30th of December, Colonel Wittich with another flying column took 5 officers and 170 men prisoners at *Souchez* between Arras and Bethune.

On the 31st of December, five battalions from Rouen, where General von Bentheim was in command, made an attack against the enemy's forces which had shown themselves on the left bank of the Seine. These were partly scattered and partly thrown

back into the strong castle, *Robert le Diable*, which was stormed by the Germans.

Actions of greater importance did not take place until January.

ENGAGEMENTS AT BAPAUME ON THE 2nd AND 3rd OF JANUARY.

In the beginning of January 1871, it was found necessary on the German side to take into consideration that General *Bourbaki* had marched off from the Loire with an army of about 140,000 men, with 300 guns, towards the east, apparently with the intention of falling on the German forces at Dijon, of relieving Belfort, and above all of making the investment of Paris impossible, by operations in rear of the main army of the Germans.

To prevent this, General von Werder, who commanded at Dijon, was principally counted upon; still General *von Manteuffel* was also called away from his command in the north, and received the difficult and honourable charge of attacking the now eastern army of the French, according to circumstances, with an army which was being newly formed, at Châtillon sur Seine, out of the II. and VII. Army Corps.

General *von Göben*, commanding the VIII. Corps, received the chief command in the north, in place of General von Manteuffel, whilst General von Benthien took over the command of the I. Corps.

On the 1st of January, General Faidherbe, again, took the offensive, with the intention of relieving Péronne. He marched upon *Bapaume* by four parallel roads. On the 2nd of January, the 2nd Division of the 22nd Army Corps, at Achiet-le-Grand to the north-west of Bapaume, and the 1st Division to the north of it, at Sapiignies, came upon Strubberg's Brigade, of the 15th Infantry Division, to which place it had been pushed forward; and from midday until evening made vigorous attacks against it, but were always repulsed.

According to General *von Göben's* own account, the infantry of the VIII. Army Corps had, at that time, been so weakened by illness and hardships, that the battalions, on an average, moved

into the fight only 500 men in strength, some even as low as 350 and 400 strong. The five battalions of the 3rd reserve Division now standing before Péronne, which had arrived immediately before, were alone in greater strength. Strubberg's Brigade, therefore, did its work in a superior manner.

In the evening General von Kummer had, in consequence of this fight, concentrated his whole Division — estimated by General von Göben, at the highest, at 5500 men with 400 horses and 24 guns — at Bapaume, and before the following morning, all the troops that could be disposed of were directed there by the corps commanders, so that on the 3rd of December a detachment of 3 battalions, 8 squadrons and 24 guns, under Prince Albert of Prussia, and another of five battalions with 24 guns, were ready at the immediate disposition of General von Göben, for the support of the 15th Division. To the latter Division 12 guns were assigned in addition.

Early in the morning General Faidherbe proceeded to the attack. He succeeded in taking the villages to the north of Bapaume, which were only weakly occupied; his repeated attacks, however, against the main position at Bapaume were completely repulsed, and his attempts at surrounding were also wrecked by the advance of the detachments brought up to assist General Kummer.

The French army found itself compelled to commence its retreat upon Arras early on the 4th of January, whilst General von Göben, on account of scarcity of ammunition, had even given the order to evacuate the Bapaume position.

The loss of the French amounted to 53 officers and 2056 men, besides 800 missing; the loss of the Germans to 47 officers and 996 men.

The German cavalry pursued for some miles, scattering single battalions which were covering the retreat; but then the German troops also retired, for in their weak numbers, they could not have the object of moving forward against the fortresses of the north.

General *von Bentheim*, at the same time, conducted an expedition against the French General Roye, upon the left bank of the Seine. He fell upon this corps on the 4th of January, scattered it, and took 3 colours, 2 guns and about 500 prisoners. •

BATTLE OF ST. QUENTIN. 19th OF JANUARY.

In January the German I. Army was distributed over a very wide extent of country, at Rouen, to the south of this town, and as far as the sea, also at Amiens and Peronne. The distribution of the French Corps necessitated this extended radius of observation and occupation. Upon this General *Faidherbe*, formed the plan of altering his station towards the east, and thus of being able to execute a diversion in rear of the enemy.

He, designedly, caused the news to be spread that it was his intention to advance upon Amiens, and, in the meanwhile, he marched upon St. Quentin, in the middle of the month, with 40,000 men and 70 guns, but weak in cavalry.

General *von Goben*, however, did not allow himself to be deceived by the telegrams from Brussels, announcing Faidherbe's presence at Arras. His reconnaissances kept feeling with the French Army, and in consequence of the reports brought to him by the cavalry, he moved off, on the 18th of January, with all the troops he could bring together, the whole of the VIII. Corps, part of the I. Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Division, from Amiens towards St. Quentin, making use of the railroad. On this day he reached Nesle. Péronne, having fallen on the 10th of January, was in German hands, and secured the left flank.

General Faidherbe had caused the town of *St. Quentin*, situated on both banks of the Somme, an important point of support and a considerable railway station, to be occupied by his advanced guard on the 15th, and, after the weak German garrison had withdrawn, he moved in with his main body on the 17th, and then took up a position upon the heights to the south of the town. As early as the 18th, a collision took place with the German

advanced guard, under General von Memerty, in which the French were defeated. *On the 19th of January a decisive battle was fought*, in which, besides the troops mentioned, Count Lippe's Saxon Cavalry Division with the 12th Jäger battalion and two horse batteries, from La Fère, were able to take part, so that the German strength, altogether, was 39 battalions, 53 squadrons and 162 guns. General von Göben, on the morning of the 19th, directed the 15th Division, in the centre, upon Savy; Count Gröben's Cavalry Division with part of the I. Corps, upon the left wing, for a surrounding, upon Marteville; the 16th Infantry Division, upon the right wing, by Seraucourt upon St. Quentin; and finally, the combined detachment from La Fère to make a surrounding movement against this town upon the extreme right flank.

A reserve consisting of four battalions and regiment of cavalry followed, with the commanding General's Staff, upon the road Douchy -- St. Quentin.

The 16th Division was first engaged. The enemy stood facing it, in a strong position, between the villages of *Grugis* and *Neuville St. Amand*, which was obstinately defended. The last village and *Gauchy* were occupied by the 1st Division of the 22nd French Corps, and the former and *Castres* by the 2nd Division.

Soon after the combat had arisen here, the 15th Division also commenced the attack upon a portion of the French 23rd Corps, at *Javy*. In the centre of the French position, the rising ground with the windmill *Tout-Vent*, General Faidherbe's point of view, was also occupied by the 23rd Corps. The separation of the two Corps by the canal de Crozal, so that they were unable to render each other mutual support except by a circuit through the town, proved disadvantageous for the French. The village of *Castres* was soon evacuated by the 22nd Corps; at *Grugis* and *Neuville* the fighting was hotter. At last, however, when the 16th Division, with the assistance of part of the reserves, had taken both these villages after a contest of many hours, and amid great losses, whilst upon both flanks the surrounding had come into effect, the *whole French line was forced back from its original position*, and constrained to occupy a second line, lying further back. The undulating ground here favoured the French in a high degree.

Whilst the German columns were following, Faidherbe, at 2 o'clock p.m., attempted an offensive movement. He made the 22nd Corps advance with a strong force of artillery. The attack, however, was without success, for the 23rd Corps was unable to render it proper support, and at 4 o'clock, the whole French Army was in full retreat, which, under the efficacious fire of the German batteries, and the numerous pursuing cavalry, degenerated at 7 o'clock in the evening into a rapid flight upon Cambrai and Guise. Here 9000 prisoners and 6 guns fell into the hands of the victors, and in St. Quentin, which was occupied in the evening, after being defended for a short time, 3000 wounded were found.

The German loss amounted to 94 officers and 3369 men.

The victory was dearly bought, but it was decisive, in a high degree. *The French Northern Army, which, for two months, had accomplished great things under its indefatigable and energetic leader, was nearly destroyed, and need no longer be of consideration in the further course of the war.*

Thus the second army, which had been organized for the relief of Paris, was also completely conquered, and its overthrow had a considerable share in the capitulation of the capital, and in the conclusion of the armistice.

General von Göben, in pursuit of the army which continually became more broken up, moved in front of the fortress of Cambrai, and caused it to be bombarded; the armistice, however, which had been concluded in the meantime, put an end to the military undertakings in the north, and brought back the German Northern Army over the line of demarcation.

TWELFTH CHAPTER.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTH-EASTERN ARMIES AND THE FALL OF BELFORT.

(v. the map of the south-eastern theatre of war.)

The *operations* in the south-eastern theatre of war, which were carried on by the *Germans* in the departments of the Vosges, Haute Marne, Côte d'Or, Haute Saône, Doubs and Jura, after the fall of the fortress of Strasburg until the fall of the fortress of Belfort, may be divided into *three sections* according to their different objects. In the first place, the French irregular forces had to be driven away from that neighbourhood, and thus to secure the chief road of communication between Germany and Paris, the Strasburg-Toul-Lagny railway; secondly, Belfort had to be conquered; and lastly, in the final stage of the war, the powerful advance of the French Eastern Army, which threatened to relieve Belfort and to lead on to an invasion of Baden, had to be repelled.

The aim *on the side of the French* was to interrupt and disturb the German undertakings by *petty warfare*. Belfort was very well and very perseveringly defended; there was, however, no serious defence of the country by large masses. It was not until January 1871, that the Eastern Army began *great operations*.

The peculiar formation of the ground in this part of the theatre of war, and its situation with respect to the rest of the operations in the field, traced out the kind of military undertakings and explains their objects.

From the high land of Auvergne, inferior chains of hills extend towards the north, uniting with the *Vosges* by the *Sichelberge*, and dividing the Rhone country from that of the Seine and Meuse. They form two main sections, the Plateau of Langres to the north, and the wine renowned series of hills of the *Côte d'Or*, in the south, and terminate the extended cincture of mountains surrounding, on all sides, the table-land of Burgundy through which flow the rivers Saône, Oignon, Doubs, to the Rhône stream, which receives them. The occupation of this mountainous section of country, so very favourable for petty warfare, was essential for the security of the lines from Strasburg to Paris as well as the Metz-Troyes-Orleans line, Prince Frederick Charles's road to the Loire.

Then again, that remarkable and historically renowned indentation which divides the southern slope of the *Vosges* from the Jura mountains, rising perpendicularly on the other side, leads down from the table-land of Burgundy, through Franche-Comté, and forms a wonderfully, clearly defined, road from France to Southern Germany. This "*Burgundian gate*", which France keeps locked with two powerful bolts, Belfort in the first line and Besançon in the second, gained importance, in a high degree, from General Bourbaki's march in January 1871.

GENERAL von WERDER'S ADVANCE IN OCTOBER 1870.

On the 30th of September, the King, then in Ferrières, issued orders for the formation of the XIV. Army Corps under the command of General *von Werder*, who had just taken Strasburg. This Army Corps was to consist of the Baden Division and another Division, which was formed of a combined Infantry Brigade of the Line under Major General Krug, later von der Goltz (30th and 34th Infantry Regiments), and the 1st combined Landwehr Brigade under Colonel von Buddenbrock (Landwehr Regiments Nos. 14, 21 and 54) as well as two reserve Cavalry Regiments. It was to force the *Vosges* and scatter the masses of

French troops, forming to the south of them, in the Côte d'Or. The order arrived in Strasburg on the 4th of October.

Previously, on the 1st of October, General von Werder, having received information that the numerous bodies of volunteers, between St. Dié, Baccarat and Rambervillers, supported by Gardes Mobiles, were assuming a military formation, had sent out a flying column of Baden troops, composed of six battalions, two-and-a-quarter squadrons and two batteries, under Major General *von Degenfeld*, towards the Vosges with a similar charge. The flying column marched, in three divisions, upon Schirmeck and through the Viller valley, everywhere found the roads entrenched and barricaded, but only once, on the 4th of October, encountered the enemy, at Champenay; and then concentrated, on the 5th of October, at *Raon l'Etape*, a small town on the Meurthe, which was occupied by Francs-tireurs.

These were scattered after a short fire-fight, and suffered very great losses.

On this day General *von Degenfeld* received orders from Strasburg, to consider his column as the advanced guard of the, now newly formed, XIV. Corps, which was set in movement upon Raon l'Etape, Etival and St. Dié. The last place was to be occupied, and reconnaissances were to be made to the west and south. Accordingly, on the 6th of October, he started upon the march for St. Dié, with the greater part of his troops; he was however so vigorously attacked on the right flank, at *Etival*, from Bruyères and Rambervillers, that he was unable to reach the town, but had to content himself with the repulse of the enemy, about 12,000 men in strength, consisting of line regiments de marche and Gardes Mobiles. The fight lasted seven hours, and led to a loss on the Baden side of 22 officers and 382 men; on the French side, of 1400 men, as well as of 582 unwounded men and 6 officers, as prisoners.

On the 7th of October, General von Degenfeld remained stationary to the south of Etival, in order to cover the columns of the XIV. Corps, now debouching from the mountain passes, into the valley of the Meurthe; St. Dié, also, was occupied by the leading troops of the éclaireurs.

On the 8th of October, strong columns of the Baden Division débouched at Etival and St. Dié, and established the junction.

For the moment, General von Werder had only the Baden field Division and a combined Prussian Brigade disposable for his undertakings towards the west and south, as the remainder were required to garrison Strasburg and the rest of Alsace. These troops, were at Raon l'Etape on the 9th of October, after accomplishing the passage of the Vosges, and on the two following days commenced the march upon Epinal, in four columns. On the evening of the 9th, a reconnaissance had already led to a fight at *Rambervillers*; on the 10th, there was a small conflict at *Anould*, and on the 11th, at *Brouvelliers*. On the 12th, the enemy attempted to take up a position at Epinal, but was driven away by artillery fire.

On the 12th of October, General von Werder removed his head-quarters to Epinal, and made reconnaissances towards the west and south. It turned out that the enemy had marched off upon Vesoul.

In consequence of this, from the 15th to the 18th of October, the Corps moved towards Vesoul, by Xertigny and St. Loup, found the communications everywhere interrupted, the railroads and viaducts destroyed and blown up, but met with no encounter as the enemy had gone further back upon *Belfort* and *Besançon*. In the latter fortress, the head-quarters of General *Cambriels*, the Chief Commander of the French forces in the east, it was learnt that *Garibaldi* had also arrived but had again departed to organize a volunteer army in Dijon.

General von Werder established his head-quarters in Vesoul on the 20th and 21st of October, and on the 22nd commenced his movement against *Besançon*, correctly anticipating, that he would find some of the enemy's forces in the neighbourhood of this strong fortress.

The advance against the *Oignon river* was so arranged that the 1st Baden Brigade, Prince William's, forming the right wing, marched from Frasn-le-Château upon Pin, by Autorelle; the 2nd Baden Brigade, Major General von Degenfeld's, in the centre, from Fretigny upon Etuz and Cussey, by Oiselay; and the 3rd Baden

Brigade, Major General von Kellér, upon the left wing, on Voray, by Rioz. The Prussian Brigade followed, in the centre, as a reserve, under General Krug. Finally, Major General von Laroche had been given the mission on this day, of reaching the country of Dôle and Auxonne, and of destroying the railroads there; he had eight squadrons, a horse battery and two companies of infantry in waggons, under his command. In order to secure the connection, Vesoul remained occupied by two battalions and some cavalry; the country was also investigated from Port-sur-Saône to the west and south.

FIGHT ON THE OIGNON. 22nd OF OCTOBER.

The passage of the strongly swollen river had now to be taken in hand, the crossing of which it was anticipated would be defended, even on this side.

In fact at 11 o'clock a.m., reports already came in to General von Werder, in Oiselay, that the left wing had come upon the enemy to the south of *Rioz*, and was driving him before it; that the centre had found *Etuz* and *Cussey* strongly occupied, and that the advanced guard of the right wing, only, had found the passage free at *Pin*.

The order was now given for the centre, Degenfeld's Brigade, to carry on a detaining fight against the positions lying in front, until Prince William, informed of the situation of affairs, had crossed the river, and could take the enemy, in rear, at Cussey, on the left bank. General Keller was to advance steadily.

General von Degenfeld, consequently, attacked *Etuz*, but drove the enemy out of it quicker than was calculated upon, so that he was able to proceed to the attack of *Cussey* before the right wing came up.

The village, lying on the other bank, and rising in the form of terraces, offered considerable advantages for the defence; nevertheless the 2nd Brigade succeeded in taking the position quite alone. The artillery bombarded the village from two points, and

the infantry then rushed to the assault, over a stone bridge which was there. Two *chefs de bataillon* of the enemy, eleven officers and 200 men were taken prisoners, and great losses in killed and wounded were inflicted on the French.

The pursuit however, led to a further continuation of the fight. The cavalry met with resistance in the direction of *Auxon-Dessus*; and upon the heights at *Châtillon-le-Duc*, strong masses of the enemy showed themselves, who also brought artillery into action. The resistance, however, could not last long, for upon the left wing, General von Keller's advanced guard was already in Voray, and upon the right wing, the heads of Prince William's Brigade had reached Auxon-Dessus. Against the last place, two battalions and three batteries were pushed forward from Cussey, two battalions moved against Châtillon-le-Duc, by Geneuille, and one battalion for their support towards Geneuille. Thus the enemy was soon defeated with considerable losses, and Auxon-Dessus was occupied as darkness was setting in.

The losses of the Germans amounted to 3 officers and 96 men.

THE MARCH UPON GRAY.

To attack the fortress of Besançon was not in General von Werder's power, nor did it lie in his mission. The enemy's forces were, here, beaten and scattered; it consequently appeared expedient to turn to the spot where it was presumed, that Garibaldi formed a nucleus for the *Franco-tireurs*.

The march was, therefore, first directed upon *Gray*, important as a railroad-junction; from there it would lead upon Dijon. On the 24th of October, the Army Corps was united in the former town, and for some days, flying columns were sent out from here, all round, to scatter bands of the enemy. Small fights took place on the 27th of October, between the German troops and the *Franco-tireurs* and armed peasants, at three different places,

St. Seine l'Eglise, Reneve and in the immediate neighbourhood of *Gray*.

On the 28th, General von Werder, formed up his troops along the Virgeanne, a tributary stream of the Saône; pushed forward Prince William's Brigade towards Mirebeau, and intended to move towards Dijon on the 29th.

• This plan was, however, crossed by a command from the King's Head-Quarters directing the XIV. Army Corps to *hold Gray* for the purpose of commanding the *plateau of Langres*, in order that Prince Frederick Charles should not be troubled by an enemy on his left flank, during his march from Metz, by Troyes, to the Loire.

General von Werder returned, with the greater part of his force to Gray, but made the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, under command of Lieutenant General von Beyer, continue the advance upon *Dijon*, in order to occupy this important town, which, according to the reports of the advanced guard, was denuded of troops.

The whole country, in a wide circuit, was most insecure; the population was stirred up by the government, by the chiefs of the volunteer bands and by the priests, which latter tried to kindle a religious warfare; the mountainous country favoured the assembly and escape of the lawless bands; thus the German bodies of troops were forced into marching to and fro continually, and to almost daily conflicts; here also, more than elsewhere, executions by martial law and other means of terror were employed against that part of the population who, contrary to all the laws of war, appeared today as armed men and the next day as citizens or peasants, but always with inimical designs.

General von Werder found himself compelled to march back again from Gray to Vesoul, for new enemies had appeared in his rear; meanwhile a contest had taken place at Dijon, in an unexpected manner.

OCCUPATION OF DIJON.

Prince William's Brigade, which left Mirebeau on the 30th of October, met with resistance on the march to Dijon, and although inconsiderable at first, it became every hour more vehement, and culminated in an obstinate defence of the suburb of St. Apollinaire. At the approach of the Germans, line battalions de marche and Gardes Mobiles had, by the desire of some of the inhabitants of Dijon, been brought together at the last moment, out of the entire neighbourhood for the defence of the town, which, although an open one, was still well calculated for resistance. The commandant of these troops, Colonel Fauconay, occupied the wall-enclosed vineyard hills of the suburbs, as well as the ancient rampart with its wet ditches, and only bridge-like approaches to the town.

The fight was very hot. Keller's Brigade not having yet come up, and Prince William's Brigade not having completely concentrated, General von Beyer opened a preliminary fire of artillery with 36 guns, so that several conflagrations had broken out in the town in the evening. The fire was now stopped, while both brigades stood ready, the 2nd upon the right wing near St. Apollinaire, and the 3rd upon the left wing, to be able to commence the assault on the following morning, or again to take up the cannonade. But, even before break of day, a deputation from the town appeared, who offered the capitulation of the city, and declared that Dijon was evacuated by the French troops.

The loss of the Baden troops amounted to 32 killed and 213 wounded; that of the French to 160 killed and about 300 wounded.

Dijon was occupied on the 31st of October.

The siege operations in Alsace stand in connection with the operations in the open field. As has been already related (Chapter IX), the 4th Reserve Division, consisting of the 25th Infantry Regiment of the Line, and the combined east Prussian Landwehr Regiments Nos. 1, 2 and 3, and two reserve Cavalry Regiments, moved into Alsace in October, under command of Major General *von Schmeling*, had brought *Schlettstadt* to capitulate on the 24th, and had then moved before *Neu-Breisach*. This last fortress fell on the 10th

of November. In October another detachment of Prussian Landwehr had been formed, likewise in the Grand Duchy of Baden, consisting of one battalion from each of the Landwehr Regiments 10th and 84th, and two battalions from each of the Landwehr Regiments, 7th, 47th and 51st, as well as two squadrons, under the command of General *von Debschütz*. These moved into Alsace in the end of October, and there took up the duties of General von Tresckow's 1st Pomeranian Landwehr Division. The latter was now able to proceed towards the south, and on the 3rd of November, commenced also the attack of the *fortress of Belfort* by a preliminary investment. After the fall of Neu-Breisach, von Schmeling's Division undertook, on their part, the security of the Etappen roads in the departments of the Vosges, and Haute-Saône, and thereby enabled General von Werder to concentrate his troops of the Line for further enterprises of an offensive nature, without having again to fear a disturbance in his rear.

Prince Frederick Charles's advance towards Orléans had been secured from interruption with complete success, by the XIV. Army Corps, from the plateau of Langres.

GENERAL VON WERDER'S ADVANCE UPON AUXONNE AND DIJON IN NOVEMBER.

Auxonne, a fortified place with a citadel, situated on the Saône, was, like Besançon, a rendez-vous for the ever newly rising bands of Francs-tireurs and foreign adventurers, who followed Garibaldi's flag. General von Werder therefore wished, by an operation upon Auxonne, to attempt to bring the enemy to stand and fight, in the same way as he had succeeded at Besançon. It did not, however, come to this. No enemy showed himself in the open field, and, being deficient in siege guns, General von Werder could not attempt the attack of the small, strongly occupied fortress; it might also be expected, that in the neighbourhood

of Dijon, if not here, a blow could be struck with decisive effect.

Garibaldi was, according to the latest news, at Dijon. This well-known, bold and fantastic Italian had come to France with designs, which probably have completely destroyed his political fame for ever, just as his military renown has been completely annihilated by the very inconsiderable part which he played in the campaign; and had attracted among his adherents, persons whose presence prove that the old free-booter had entirely lost both his knowledge of mankind, as well as the mastery over the elements led by him*). It was also a disgraceful undertaking on his part, to take the field against the sons of a country with which his own land was living in peace.

For all that, however, the acknowledgment is due to him, as well as to his sons and to some of his friends, that in the field itself, in battle, and in their treatment of German prisoners and wounded men, they behaved chivalrously and knew how to respect the enemy and the honour of their own names, better than did many of the French generals and officers. It also will not be forgotten that *Ricciotti Garibaldi* gave back the colour of the 2nd battalion of the 8th Pomeranian Infantry Regiment No. 61, which had fallen into his hands on the 23rd of January, by an unlucky accident — the only colour of the whole German army which was lost —, in just recognition of his brave enemy, as it had not been taken in combat.

Garibaldi's force has been reckoned, in the estimates appearing in the "Riforma" at Florence, upon secure grounds, as follows:

*) Colonel Rüstow, in his interesting work "Der Krieg um die Rheingrenze 1870—71", says: "At the end of the year 1870 the troops of the Italian southern army were reckoned, by the *pay-office* authorities, at 70,000 men, including about 2000 generals and colonels. Upon the battle fields, however, no more than 15,000 men were ever seen, even in the times of the greatest danger, and among them, perhaps, hardly more than 15 generals and colonels". Here, as in almost every respect, this excellent military author has been very well informed. The detailed estimates, since published in the "Riforma", confirm his calculation.

1st Brigade (Bossak - Hauke) . . .	4001 men,
2nd Brigade (Delpech)	2088 "
3rd Brigade (Menotti Garibaldi) . .	5560 "
4th Brigade (Ricciotti Garibaldi) . .	1157 "
Artillery	571 "
Cavalry	520 "
Isolated Volunteer Corps	1585 "
Various branches	1985 "
<hr/>	
Total	17,467 men.

The town of Dijon had, without doubt, been occupied by Garibaldi's bands, shortly after the Baden troops had left it in order to march against Auxonne, in conjunction with the remaining portions of the XIV. Corps.

When, however, General von Werder again turned against Dijon, in the middle of November, the Garibaldians retired towards the south-west, without a contest.

General von Werder established his head-quarters in Dijon, sent out flying columns from here on all sides, but at the same time made Keller's Brigade continue the march by *Nuits* upon *Autun*. A small fight occurred on this march, at *Nuits*, on the 30th of November.

Keller's Brigade described a wide circuit in marching from Nuits to Autun (1st of December), from there again to Beaune, and thence towards the north.

Langres, a fortified place with a strong garrison, was watched by the Prussian Infantry Brigade, now under the command of Major General von der Goltz. On the 16th of December, an engagement took place at *Longeau*, between this brigade and a force of the enemy of about 6000 men, in which the French were beaten.

Another encounter took place at *Châtillon-sur-Seine*. There, Unna's Landwehr battalion and two squadrons of the 5th reserve Hussar Regiment, were attacked, on the 19th of November by bands of volunteers, and were obliged to retire upon Chateau-Vilain, with the loss of 120 men and 70 horses.

A combat also occurred at *Dijon* itself, for Garibaldi's troops suddenly emerged to the north-west of the town. At night-fall

on the 26th of November, the out-posts of a reconnoitring detachment were attacked from Pasques, and, after receiving support, repulsed the enemy. The following day General von Werder himself advanced with three brigades, and through going round by Plombières, reached the rear guard of the enemy at Pasques, already in full retreat. A fight took place which soon converted the retreat of Garibaldi's troops into a flight. The latter suffered a loss of from 300 to 400 men; the loss of the Germans amounted to about 50 men, both days inclusive.

The next serious encounter with the moveable enemy, who was so difficult to catch, did not take place until after the middle of December, when already a large accumulation of troops in the east seemed to wish to announce Bourbaki's powerful advance beforehand.

Besides Garibaldi, a mass of about 15,000 men, Gardes Mobiles and Francs-tireurs — called the *Armée du Rhône* — had collected more to the south, under the French officer, *Cremer*, formerly a captain on the Staff, who had given his word of honour at Metz, on the 31st of October, not to fight against Germany again as long as the war lasted, but now, having broken his word of honour, he officiated as a General.

THE FIGHT OF NUIITS.

The reports which came into Dijon in the middle of December, confirmed the advance of the above mentioned army from Beaune towards the north. This movement was, probably, in connection with Bourbaki's intended approach, and had the object of covering the transport of the eastern army, commencing soon after by the railroads from Bourges, Nevers and Lyons upon Besançon, and then of securing the flank and rear for further operations, by a position at Dijon, in conjunction with Garibaldi. In consequence of this, General von Werder found himself obliged to send off the Baden Division, now under the command of General *von Glümer*, towards

the south, in order to throw back the enemy from his position at Nuits.

General von Glümer moved off on the 18th of December, leading the main body himself, consisting of eight battalions, six squadrons and five batteries, by Longwie and Epernay, against the enemy's right wing; whilst, on his right, two small detachments pressed forward against Villars-Fontaine, by Urey and Tornant, and from Courcelles against Concéur, by Chambœuf.

Rifle skirmishes began with the leading troops, even at *Fenay*, but the march went on without delay, merely detaching numerous parties, and closely searching the hilly, intersected country.

It was at *Boncourt* that an obstinate combat with the advanced guard first took place, which ended at 12.45 o'clock p.m. with the capture of this locality and the piece of wood lying to the north-west of it.

The advanced guard then took up a position in the line La Berchère-Agencourt, and discovered from here that the enemy had very considerable forces for disposal at Nuits, and that columns were on the march from Vougeot and Beaune.

Cremer, having become aware of the danger to which his right wing was exposed, here drew together his main force. The French artillery was very advantageously placed upon the heights to the west of Nuits, from where they could command the free and open field of attack of the Germans.

On the German side, no action of the columns on the right could yet be observed.

Towards 1 o'clock, the Baden troops were formed for the attack, their artillery tried to shake the columns which were visible opposite, and at the same time fired from the bridge, across the Meuzin brook, upon the strongly occupied railway cutting as far as to the Fontaine de Vosne. The cavalry was sent forward upon the extreme left flank.

After the disposition for battle had been completed, the infantry attack against the railway cutting was carried out; General von Glümer, as well as General von Werder himself, joined in this hazardous undertaking. The troops could only advance amid

severe losses in the entirely open country, and under the fearfully rapid fire of the enemy; — the Division commander as well as Prince William were wounded, and Colonel von Renz, who succeeded to the command, was killed with his aide-de-camp —, nevertheless at 3.30 o'clock, the eastern side of the railway cutting was stormed, with extraordinary courage. The artillery had also gained ground, by degrees, in a self-sacrificing manner, as in so doing they drew upon themselves the cannon fire of the enemy. Likewise, after taking the railway cutting, connection was again found with the nearest flanking detachment on the right; but upon the left wing, the cavalry who had to cross the Meuzin brook, was obliged to retire again, under the hot infantry fire of the enemy, to the heights of Agencourt. Cremer's troops were armed, throughout, with Spencer and Chassepot rifles.

The town of Nuits itself had now still to be taken.

Supported by the artillery, of which Porbeck's and Holty's batteries, amongst others, distinguished themselves by making a brilliant advance, the infantry went forward, from the railway cutting, against Nuits, gained the outskirts, stormed one street after another under an obstinate resistance, and at 4.30 o'clock, when it was getting dark, had repulsed the enemy from all his positions and driven him, in full flight, before it.

The losses of the enemy were considerable, above 2000 men in killed and wounded, and 16 officers and 700 men as prisoners.

On the German side the loss amounted to 934 men, including 54 officers.

A report from the column on the extreme right flank only arrived in the night. It had come upon the enemy in a very strong, favourable position at *Villars*, had been unable to defeat him, and had returned by Chamboeuf to Perigny.

As it was not the intention to pursue the totally dispersed enemy any further towards the south, the Baden Division returned to Dijon on the following afternoon, the 19th of December,

THE INVESTMENT AND BOMBARDMENT OF THE FORTRESS OF BELFORT.

• (v. the map of the Siege of Belfort.)

Tresckow's Landwehr Division had, as already mentioned, received the charge of, at first, investing the fortress of Belfort. After several small fights at *Les Errues*, *Rougemont* and *Petit-Magny*, the Division succeeded, on the 3rd of November in approaching so near to the fortress, that a gradual blockade could be commenced.

Even the first steps towards the *investment* were attended with great difficulties, and the complete investment and finally the siege formed one of the most arduous tasks of the whole war.

- The position of the place is unusually favoured by nature, both as regards the capabilities for defence of the fortress and the forts themselves, and also as regards the country, which, in a wide circumference, offers every possible obstacle to the approach of an enemy.

Every spectator, even from afar, must be imbued with a sense of the great power of resistance of this high rock fortress, with its grand outlines, rising aloft from its cleft-divided, richly wooded surroundings.

The fortress forms a pentagon, the regularity of which is interrupted by the protruding citadel in the south-eastern angle, and by a powerful horn-work upon the north front. High tower redoubts, rise on all fronts like the citadel. The latter has two bombproof barracks, three circumvallations furnished with flank casemates, hollow traverses and redoubts in the covered way, and its ditches are all excavated from the rock.

The base of the conical rock, upon which Belfort lies, is washed by the river *Savoureuse*, which winds through the valley with numerous by-streams and tributaries. To the north-east of the fortress, upon the rocky chain of heights whose buttresses fall steeply down to the *Savoureuse*, rise the forts of *La Miotte* and *La Justice*, which are connected, by fortified lines, with Belfort and with one another, and in this manner form an entrenched camp (*camp retranché permanent du vallon*).

Both forts are of considerable strength.

There are also two forts lying in the west, *des Barres* and *Bellevue*. The first, originating from the year 1867 and built in view of the meditated war against Prussia, takes the form of a crown-work and is provided with several covered places; it covers the Faubourg des Ancêtres and the Faubourg de France; the latter fort, to the south of the Faubourg de France, is very irregular and is not of the same importance as the other forts.

In the south and east there are still the Forts *Hautes-Perches* and *Basses-Perches*, 2500 paces from the enceinte, which have already been alluded to in the relation of the retreat of the French corps, after the battle of Woerth (page 83). At that time the troops of the 7th Corps were occupied in completing the earth works of these forts and also of Fort de la Ferme. Both Perches are built in the form of lunettes and crown a ridge of hills 400 feet high. They were quite new, and the present commandant, Colonel *Denfert*, had neglected nothing in order to place them in a condition capable of defence.

Belfort thus forms a great mountainous entrenchment, which is fortified, throughout, in the strongest manner, and is sufficiently large to receive an army of 30,000 men. Added to this, the surrounding villages, the woods, and the hills are all very easy of defence in connection with the fortress.

A regular attack, approaching the enceinte by means of trenches, is nearly impossible, the only expedient is to combine the regular attack and the bombardment, with the object of laying a breach from a distance. That too is associated with infinite trouble. The *complete investment*, however, must be preceded by the conquest of the ground in front.

In order to attain this, Treckow's Division had to accomplish extraordinary things. Belfort was defended by an energetic, capable officer with above 12,000 men.

At first the strong castle of *Montbéliard* (Mümpelgard), came into question, situated in the proximity of the fortress, only 3 (about 14 English miles) miles distant, a junction for several roads, at the confluence of the Allaine, the Savoureuse and the

Lisaine, as well as of the Rhine-Rhône canal, and a point for the besiegers to obtain at all risks.

On the 9th of November the Germans succeeded in occupying the castle, and now, in fourteen days fighting, General von Tresckow gained so much ground round Belfort that the investment was effectually completed. After the occupation of Montbéliard, the German outposts were, at first, at Bourogne, half way between Delle and Belfort, then by degrees, first Sermamagny, in the north, was occupied, and from here Valdoie; Cravanche, Offemont and Vétringe were taken, and on the 23rd of November, after all the positions previously captured had been fortified and secured, the line of investment round Belfort was closed, running nearly by the villages of Bavilliers, Chevremont, Pérouse and Cravanche. The Head-Quarters were removed, this day, from La Chapelle to Fontaine. Continual sorties and constantly recurring fights round the important village of *Bavilliers*, had retarded, thus long, the accomplishment of the investment.

The most important of these fights were: on the 16th of November, a sortie by three battalions and six guns, from the fortress against *Bessoncourt*; then on the 23rd of November, another similar sortie, which ended in the Germans taking possession of important positions, near the fortress. In the first combat, the French suffered the loss of 200 killed and wounded, and 58 prisoners.

In the beginning of December, the construction of batteries and excavation of trenches was commenced; the completion of which the besieged endeavoured to prevent by a vigorous fire from about 70 guns.

Tresckow's Division was reinforced by Prussian and Wurtemberg siege artillery for carrying out the proper siege and bombardment. In spite of the enemy's fire and the rocky ground, the German pioneers succeeded in finishing a series of trenches and embankments, in the night of the 2nd of December, in front of the village of Essert, which may be called the *first parallel*. In the irregular line mentioned, the batteries No. 1 to No. 6 were erected and equipped (v. the map), so that on the morning of the 3rd of December, fire was opened from 28 guns, against the

Forts des Barres and Bellevue, as well as against the citadel itself.

The defenders replied with great energy, and obliged the assailants to withdraw some of the less favourably posted guns. Most of the guns, however, held out, and brought into account the superiority of the Prussian artillery material, in its accustomed brilliant manner, so that, by the 9th of December, under the constantly maintained efficacy of the rifled guns, part of the town had been burnt down, and the works of the forts were considerably injured. However the forts, especially Bellevue, also gained successes against the villages of Essert and, particularly, Bavilliers, up to which the parallel had, by degrees, been opened, and furnished with batteries Nos. 10 to 12.

On the 11th, the garrison attempted a sortie against the batteries, which was, however, repulsed. The bombardment was now also undertaken from the south-east, east and north, and then, in January, although Bourbaki's approach was already in prospect, preliminaries were made for the *regular attack against the Forts Basses-Perches and Hautes-Perches*, from *Danjoutin*, amid unprecedented difficulties. To this end, the village of Danjoutin had first to be taken, with hard fighting, in the night of the 7th of January; thus after a bombardment of nearly five weeks, from distantly situated batteries. At the assault of this village — a testimony to the obstinacy of the defence and the attack —, 700 unwounded prisoners with 18 officers fell into German hands, without reckoning the heavy losses in killed and wounded.

When, however, all these advantages had been gained, and the regular attack could commence, a temporary cessation in the undertakings of the besiegers was brought on *by the attack of the French Eastern Army upon the positions of the XIV. Army Corps*. General von Tresckow was obliged to show front with part of his Division towards the west, and to place a portion of his heavy guns at General von Werder's disposal, against the new offensive of the enemy.

Seldom, perhaps, has a siege been combined with such great difficulties, and seldom so gloriously carried out.

BOURBAKI'S ADVANCE.

• After the engagement at Nuits, General von Werder had again established his Head-Quarters in Dijon, and hoped, from his central position in the Côte d'Or, to carry on, successfully, the suppression of the people's warfare and the dispersion of Garibaldi's and Cremer's bands. It then became evident from various signs (what had long ago been conjectured), that Bourbaki's army, which had been for a long time in the neighbourhood of Bourges and Nevers like a threatening and constantly increasing thunder cloud, was turning towards him. *Bourbaki*, as already mentioned (Chapter XI.) united three Corps under his command, the 15th, 18th, and 20th; the 24th Corps, newly formed in Lyons, was moreover, now placed under him, making a total of about 140,000 men with above 300 guns. *In the last half of December and the first days of January this army was completely concentrated at Besançon*, by making use of the railroads which, on the one side, lead from Nevers to Besançon by Châlons-sur-Saône, as well as from Lyons direct, and on the other side, likewise thither by Châlons. This mode of traffic was obviously injurious to the success of the undertaking*), since it was impossible to conceal from the Germans, the transit across the last tract of country, whilst an unexpected appearance at Besançon was indispensable, and besides, this mode of traffic injured in every respect the fitness for battle of these young troops.

• Bourbaki's departure had also become known in the King's Head-Quarters at Versailles, and a command was issued, from here, to General von Werder to retard the onslaught of the French, whilst rapid measures were taken, at the same time, to send help from the north to the XIV. Army Corps.

General von Werder was in a most hazardous position.

His forces were just sufficient to hold in check the enemy

*) The author here, once more, draws attention to the work "Militärische Gedanken und Betrachtungen", by the author of the "Krieges um Metz", in which Bourbaki's march, in relation to the use of railroads, is very thoroughly treated.

now already upon the scene of war, but a new enemy had joined the first, who *alone* was in numbers threefold superior to the combined German Army Corps. This new powerful army, also, was under the command of a real soldier, the former commander of the Imperial Guard, who was certainly a leader experienced in war, although he could not be called a great general.

The siege of Belfort could not be raised, lest a new, active enemy should arise in rear of the German positions. The gap between the Vosges and the Jura, above all, could not be set free, else nothing could have prevented the entrance of the French into Baden. To oppose the French forces, which, including Garibaldi's and Crémér's troops and the garrisons of Belfort and Besançon, must have amounted to more than 180,000 men, only one corps of about 50,000 men — reckoning all together, even the siege troops of Belfort — could be produced.

Should these troops be overthrown, the rapacious and revenge-thirsting troops of the republic would pour into Baden without a check. Assistance from the north-west, the German "Southern Army" under Manteuffel, could not possibly arrive in time to retard Bourbaki's advance.

The position of the XIV. Army Corps might have been a desperate one, *if — this Corps had not been a German one, every man a capable, faithful soldier, and the commander a general.*

As soon as General von Werder had gained the spot decided on for stopping Bourbaki's army, he gave up the extended line he held possession of, and concentrated all the disposable troops round Vesoul; these consisted of the three Baden brigades, which were at Dijon, von der Goltz's combined Brigade, at Langres, and the 4th reserve Division which was very widely extended from Gray to Lure; a Corps, put together from the most diverse sections of the troops, whose firm cohesion and unanimous action form a brilliant testimony to the excellent leadership and military capability of each single part.

In the latter days of December the Corps was united at *Vesoul*, with the rear guard at *Gray*. Here General von Werder be-

came convinced that Bourbaki's offensive would be directed against Belfort, and took measures accordingly.

- *Bourbaki* approached very slowly. His main body, the 15th, 18th and 20th Corps, commenced its movement in the direction of Belfort from Besançon, his right wing, the 24th Corps, moving along the Jura to the same destination. In order to cover his left flank, Garibaldi and Cremer were to operate from Dijon, and these two commanders were probably destined to advance independently against the German lines of communication, after the hoped-for overthrow of the XIV. Army Corps.

As soon as the Germans had left Dijon on the 28th of December, Garibaldi's and Cremer's troops moved in. On the 2nd of January 1871, Bourbaki himself arrived in Dijon, and on the same day, 200 men, forming the outermost leading troops of the French 24th Corps, who had already stolen near to the investing corps of Belfort, by the extreme frontier of France and Switzerland, were driven on to Swiss territory, by General von Tresckow, at *Croix* to the south of Delle.

On the 5th and 6th of January different outpost fights took place to the south of Vesoul, with the heads of Bourbaki's left wing.

These removed all doubt as to Bourbaki's object. *The French army was going direct for Belfort.*

General von Werder decided to retire upon this fortress, and, without giving up the siege of Belfort, to occupy the favourable positions along the Lisaine, fronting towards the west. He at once made his dispositions for marching to the rear, but first detached von der Goltz's Brigade and the 4th reserve Division against the left flank of the French Army, in order to cause it some further delay.

The bold undertaking of these troops led to the hot *fights at Marat and Villersexel* on the 9th of January.

Villersexel, with its strong castle, and also Marat, had already been strongly occupied by the troops covering the flank of the French, when the German advanced guard approached. The Germans attacked resolutely, stormed (the 25th Infantry Regiment)

the castle of Villersexel, drove out the enemy from both places, and made nearly 500 prisoners in Villersexel alone.

These fights, lasting for sixteen hours, completely fulfilled their object. Bourbaki sent strong columns, from all sides, to the assistance of the beaten troops covering the flank, whose positions had been taken by assault, from noon on the 9th of January, by the Germans, whilst these already re-commenced their further march, in order to unite with the main body of the XIV. Army Corps, which was steadily retiring upon Belfort.

This masterly retreat, in immediate feeling with the overpowering enemy, had the favourable results of enabling General von Werder to reach the defensive positions on the Lisaine as early as the 11th of January, and of allowing him time, before the 15th of January, to fortify his positions and equip them in part with the Belfort siege guns.

THE THREE DAYS BATTLE OF BELFORT.

The small German army made preparations for the first and last defensive battle, which was fought, on the German side, during the whole war — setting aside the sortie battles before Metz and Paris. General von Werder had to occupy a line, the great extent of which was out of all proportion to the numerical strength of his corps, — the whole range of heights and positions, extending from Frahier in the north to Delle in the south-east; a distance of 3 German miles (nearly 14 English miles) on the left bank of the Lisaine which flows into the Doubs and then back as far as the Swiss frontier. The out-posts were stationed upon the right bank, pushed some miles to the front, in order to watch the approach of the enemy, whose mighty masses rolled slowly on, having been detained for several days by the fight at Villersexel.

Schmeling's Division held the centre and the left wing; its chief points of support were Héricourt, Bussurel, Béthencourt and Montbéliard, and its advanced positions, the villages of Ste. Marie,

Aibre and Tavey. On its right stood von der Goltz's Brigade, whose chief point of support was Echenans, and whose advanced troops held Byans and Champey. The Baden Division was upon the right wing as far as Frahier; a large part of it, however, together with detachments from von der Goltz's Brigade, formed the main reserve, between Héricourt and Bréville. Upon the extreme left flank, in Montbéliard, there was still a portion of Debschütz's detachment, whose main body was further to the rear, at Delle. This detachment had been brought up from Alsace to the investing corps of Belfort, at the end of December.

All the villages and country surrounding them were carefully placed in a state of defence before the arrival of the French. The roads and the outskirts of the villages were barricaded, and the walls of the houses and those of the fields and gardens provided with loop-holes and embrasures; small parts of the wood were hewn down where they hindered the range of fire, and parts, in favourable situations, were surrounded with abatis; gun emplacements were prepared in all open places, redoubts constructed and equipped with field artillery and siege guns, — especially upon the great hill, Les Baragues, in the neighbourhood of Héricourt, which commanded the main road through Héricourt and the villages of Byans and Tavey, — and at Bussurel. Lastly, the bridges across the Lisaine were so prepared that they could easily be removed or blown up after the anticipated retreat of the advanced troops.

General von Werder's Head-Quarters were in Bréville.

A remarkable contest then arose between the small, widely extended German troops, but which were pliant, active and firm as iron, and the great, clumsy masses of the French, unaccustomed to war.

On the 13th of January, the first collision took place. Bourbaki's advanced troops attacked the villages of *Ste. Marie*, *Aibre* and *Champey*, occupied by the Germans, and took them after an obstinate retreating fight of the troops who retired, conformably to the dispositions, on to the left bank. Vigorous attacks also took place against Montbéliard, Béthoncourt and Bussurel,

which ended with the capture of *Montbéliard* by the French. The castle only, remained in the hands of the Germans.

The chief attack, however, first commenced on the 15th of January, against the, now recognised, position of the Germans, after Bourbaki had concentrated his corps, already seriously shaken and disorganised, and exhausted by scarcity of good nourishment.

On this day, the attack was, for the most part, directed against the German left wing and centre. Colonel Zimmermann, with the east Prussian Landwehr Brigade, had succeeded on the previous day, in again forcing *Montbéliard* from the French, which had been taken by them on the 13th, and this day was defended with great obstinacy. The French right wing was, however, strongly re-inforced, so that a successful resistance here was not to be expected. General von Werder therefore sent General von Glümer with the 1st Baden Brigade, from the main reserve, to the heights on the north-west of *Montbéliard*, in order to cover, from here, Colonel Zimmermann's retreat from this place. The castle only remained in possession of the Germans, with the strong position to the north-west of this place; in *Montbéliard* itself the French established themselves. In the centre, Bourbaki's repeated attacks remained absolutely without success. Here, the contest on the German side was, especially, an artillery combat. The field batteries, from their excellently prepared positions, as well as the heavy guns, sent a destructive fire upon the enemy's batteries and infantry columns, as soon as they appeared upon the heights on the right bank of the *Lisaine*. The attack upon *Héricourt*, *Béthencourt* and *Bussurel* was the most desperate. In the latter place the French infantry also succeeded in establishing themselves, but still they did not come over the *Lisaine*.

Even the night did not completely put an end to the struggle. Under cover of the darkness the enemy pushed forward his infantry nearer to the German positions, for a renewed attack on the following morning and in doing this repeated fights took place.

On the 16th of January a change was made in the French attack, for Bourbaki now made the attempt to surround the

German right wing, whilst the assaults against Héricourt, in the centre, and against the German left wing, relaxed in vigour. This day more employment fell upon the infantry on both sides, although the artillery still played an important part, chiefly on the German side.

General von Werder held the same positions as on the previous day; the right wing, until now little threatened, was tolerably weak, the main body of the Baden troops was in reserve behind Héricourt, and one brigade still in position behind Montbéliard.

General Bourbaki, whose left wing had now been joined by Cremer's troops— Garibaldi, only, remaining at Dijon— attacked upon all points with the infantry drawn closer up, after having prepared the attack with numerous guns and also mitrailleuses batteries. Upon his right wing, whence the main attack only came on at 3 o'clock, he was very energetically driven back, with very severe losses. In the centre, where General von Schmeling commanded on the German side, the exceedingly hot artillery fire of the French was chiefly subdued by the superior fire of the artillery, in position upon the hill of *Les Baragues*, and four infantry attacks were repulsed. Upon the left wing, on the other hand, Bourbaki, this day, gained some successes.

By 8 o'clock in the morning, the French opened a very lively fire from their guns against *Chénebier* and its environs, which Göbel's and Krutzsch's batteries had to cope with alone. The artillery fire on the French side was continually re-inforced, during the day, by fresh batteries, and at last it was observed, on the German side, that strong masses of infantry were drawing near by the woodlands which border the slope of the valley from Etobon to Fradier. This manœuvre apparently aimed at surrounding the flank. At the same time masses of infantry advanced to the north of Chagey directly against the flank position of the Germans.

Only the most insignificant force, three battalions and three batteries altogether, could be opposed to these attacks, which were led by General Cremer with a force of about 15,000 men. A gradual retreat of the German right wing was here inevitable,

in spite of the greatest bravery and skill. The village of Chénebier was evacuated, and the position at the *Ferme Bougeot* was then again taken up, in order to bar the road to Belfort from the enemy. The obstinate defence had, however, fulfilled, its object for this day; Frahier and Chénebier were, indeed, occupied by the French, still the attack was continued no further. Darkness also soon began to set in.

General von Werder, informed of the dangerous situation of the right wing, sent Keller's Brigade there from the Reserve, during the night, with the charge of retaking Chénebier on the following day. In the centre, also, the night was to bring no rest to the wearied troops, for Bourbaki here attempted an attack by surprise. But this also failed, like the former one, through the watchfulness of the German out-posts, and thus the morning of the 17th of January broke, without a gap having been forced in the positions of the Germans.

On this morning the positions of the right wing, were chiefly concerned, — the village of Chénebier and the woodlands in its neighbourhood.

Two columns under Generals Keller and Degenfeld, altogether eight battalions, four squadrons and four batteries in strength, started from Héricourt and Echevanne, as early as 3.30 o'clock in the morning, against Chénebier and the *Bois des Evants* situated in front of it towards the north, and attacked the enemy with great impetuosity. The intended surprise did not, indeed, fully succeed, for a French out-post beat the alarm, still it was possible to take a part of the village before the French could offer a very considerable resistance. Then, it is true, they showed in such considerable numerical superiority, that, soon after the break of day, General Keller found himself compelled to commence a retreat, with a great number of French prisoners and captured baggage. On his right General von Degenfeld had been involved in a very hot and tedious combat round the *Bois des Evants*, which ended towards noon in the defeat of the French, and General von Degenfeld was able to move forward from Chénebier as far as the northern edge. After General Keller, in conjunction with von der Goltz's Brigade at *Chagey*,

had occupied and stoutly defended the *Bois Fery*, opposite Chéne-bier, the fight lasted until the afternoon, when the exhaustion of both sides caused the chief action to fall to the artillery.

• Upon the other points of the widely extended battle-field, renewed attacks had been constantly made by the French in the same manner as on the previous days, and as before, they failed through the firmness of the German lines.

In despair, Bourbaki commenced the retreat on the 18th of January, endeavouring to cover it by his artillery. This retreat was to lead to a terrible catastrophe.

He had lost from 3000 to 4000 killed and wounded in front of the Lisaine positions, whilst the XIV. Corps had only suffered the loss of about 1500 men; the march towards the south-west was carried out, amid yet far greater losses.

Not only did General von Werder begin the pursuit on the 19th of January, but General von Manteuffel now appeared with the German Southern Army, in a very threatening manner upon the line of retreat of the French Army, which was so terribly weakened by cold, privation and defeat.

MANTEUFFEL'S ARRIVAL AND BOURBAKI'S RETREAT INTO • SWITZERLAND.

In order to render assistance to General von Werder, the German Army Direction had arranged a concentration of the II. and VII. Army Corps at *Châtillon-sur-Seine*. The first Corps came from Paris, the latter from Metz and the Luxemburg frontier. On the 12th of January the two Corps, in the strength of 56 battalions, 20 squadrons and 168 guns, stood formed for battle upon the line Noyers — Nuits — Ravières — Châtillon — Montigny; General *von Manteuffel* assumed the chief command on the same day, and, on the 13th of January, began a rapid advance in the direction of *Vesoul*, in order, if possible, to establish a connection with the XIV. Army Corps before Bourbaki's attack could take place.

The march was unusually difficult on account of the slippery ice, deep snow, cold and mountainous country; yet on the 15th and 16th of January, the leading troops debouched from the chain of mountains of the Côte d'Or, at Selongey, Prauthoy and Longeau, and on the 19th of January, the main body of the army was united at *Fontaine Française* (II. Corps) and *Dampierre* (VII. Corps), whilst the advanced guards had already crossed the Saône at *Gray* and further up. Upon the outermost right wing, and to cover the right flank, Kettler's Brigade, of five battalions, two squadrons and two batteries, drew near the town of *Dijon*, where Garibaldi himself, with wonderful composure, held united about 30,000 men, which France had never needed more than just now. From this time until the end of Manteuffel's manoeuvres, General Kettler kept the whole of Garibaldi's force in check. Upon the left wing, General von Manteuffel had pushed forward a detachment of the VII. Corps by *Luxeuil* and *St. Loup*, in order to seek connection with General von Werder.

The whole great campaign, so rich in surprising strokes, in talented military combinations, and exciting situations, scarcely presents a moment of greater military interest than that shown in the mutual situation of the armies at the moment when Bourbaki made his last desperate attack against the Lisaine position.

An army, still consisting of 120,000 men in the east, pressing on furiously against the small chain barrier of Werder's Corps, in the vicinity of the German frontier; a second German army penetrating, by forced marches, the mountains of the Côte d'Or, in the most hazardous direction, for the French army, imagining that Bourbaki was strongly covered in the rear at Dijon. Added to this the formation of the ground; no way of escape for Bourbaki except by victory; behind him the table-land of Burgundy, stretching in a great bend between mountains, his single road of retreat, and Manteuffel's army already on the northern edge of this plateau. — A remarkable example, indicating the difference between warriors and armed multitudes, between generals and leaders of adventure.

General von Manteuffel had learnt, even at Fontaine-Française-Dampierre, that General von Werder had conquered; that the

Belfort Siege Corps had taken up the attack upon Belfort afresh, and that Bourbaki was retiring. He immediately decided that an advance in the former direction towards the south-east, was no longer necessary, but that the retreat of the French Army must now be cut off.

Conformably to this, the Southern Army executed a wheel to the right on the 19th of January, and marched against the *Doubs*, the VII. Corps upon Besançon, the II. Corps, by Pesmes, upon Dôle, in order, in the first place, to interrupt the railroad communications here and at Villers-Farlay, towards the south.

Thus General von Manteuffel hoped, at any rate, to find the French Eastern Army between the Saône and the Jura, and to force it to fight with its rear against Switzerland or Alsace. It was a very bold undertaking, for the French possessed a double superiority in numbers; a condition of strength which was certainly favourable at the time of the contest against the republic.

Garibaldi on the other hand attempted nothing, and probably he remarked nothing at all; still he might easily have been able to cross and hinder the marches of the German southern army, by marching upon Auxonne and Besançon, so far as the distance was concerned. At that time he issued the well known proclamation to his troops which begins: "Once more, young combatants for freedom, you have seen the heels of King William's formidable soldiers."

Several days still passed away, before it was exactly known on the German side, where Bourbaki was directing his retreat; the heads of the columns of all three Army Corps, amid repeated small encounters, retained close feeling with the main body of the French Army, which they, finally, found concentrated in the neighbourhood of Besançon, whilst, simultaneously, all the ways of exit from the table-land of Burgundy, with the exception of that leading into Switzerland, were barred.

On the 21st the II. Corps occupied Dôle, destroyed the railroad and captured 230 loaded waggons. The VII. Corps, on the same day, marched close past Besançon and wheeling to the south of the fortress, occupied Dampierre and there captured 30 loaded waggons. The passages across the *Doubs* were found undestroyed;

at Quingey, to the south-south-west of Besançon, the railway communication, from Besançon, by Lons le Saulnier to Lyons, was interrupted; on the 23rd the 14th Division had a fight at *Danne-marie*, and confirmed the presence of the 20th French Corps, later, also, of the 15th and 18th French Corps, and *on the 25th of January the road from Besançon to Lyons, Bourbaki's single line of retreat, was completely barred.*

On this day the VII. Corps was at St. Vit and Quingey, and behind it, the II. Corps, upon the line Salins — Dôle.

At the same time the XIV. Corps drew near, towards the north-west, against the French army standing at Besançon. The immediate pursuit had, in the first instance, been made by Schmelting's Division only; on the 25th of January it occupied Baume les Dames, on the Doubs, to the north-east of Besançon. General von Debschütz moved forward from Blamont, nearer to the Swiss frontier, in order, together with General von Schmeling, to operate against the road from Besançon to Pontarlier. General von Werder, pushing to the right, with three brigades of his corps, had at the same moment reached the neighbourhood of Rioz, due north of Besançon, and relieved the detachments of the 14th Division, which had, until now, held possession of the passages across the Oignon at Voray, Etuz and Pin.

Thus Bourbaki at Besançon was surrounded by a circle, which was everywhere closed except towards Switzerland, in the direction of Pontarlier.

The unfortunate General, owing to France's unparalleled defeats in the battles at Metz, at which he had been present, and at the sight of the terrible misery of his army, now surrounded on all sides, had fallen into a condition of the deepest dejection. He saw the disgrace of a capitulation or of a retreat upon Swiss territory before his eyes, and he would not survive this inglorious end of the last French army.

On the 24th of January, he gave up the chief command to General *Clinchant* at Besançon, and sent a bullet into his head — which, it is true, was not destined to put an end to his life.

General Clinchant commenced the retreat of all the Corps, concentrated in the neighbourhood of the fortress, on the morning

of the 25th, upon Pontarlier; the Cavalry Division and about 8000 Infantry, only, of the army had got away, by Lons le Saulnier, towards Lyons, before the German Southern Army had cut off this road. On the 28th of January this retreat was effected, and the French Army stood in the neighbourhood of Pontarlier on the Swiss frontier, fronting towards the north-west; the 18th Corps on the right; the 15th Corps, at Sombacourt and Chaffois, in the centre; the 20th Corps, upon the left wing, as far as Frasn , and lastly, the 24th Corps, which had arrived in the greatest confusion, as a reserve in rear of the centre.

General von Manteuffel, who had now assumed the chief command of all three German Corps, made a surrounding approach, with the II. Army Corps by Nozeroy, the VII. Army Corps by Villeneuve, and Generals von Schmeling and Debschitz, from the north, along the Swiss frontier.

Garibaldi, too, who was still at Dijon, had not been forgotten; after the fight on the 23rd, which had cost the 2nd battalion of the 61st Regiment its colour, in the night, General Hann von Weyhern was sent to the assistance of General von Keller, with Degenfeld's Baden Brigade, Knesbeck's Brigade and Willissen's Baden Cavalry Brigade; he advanced, on the 27th of January, with his united forces, from Pesmes upon Dijon.

Whilst the situation of the French forces in the east was so desperate a one, the Chancellor of the Confederation and Jules Favre were negotiating an armistice in Versailles, and in so doing a *special convention* was made with reference to the east, which is an evidence of the illusions of the French Government, and which was of great importance to the French Eastern Army. The Chancellor demanded, amongst other things, the surrender of the fortress of Belfort. As this might prejudice the question of the annexation of the whole of Alsace with the fortress — and Jules Favre was by no means disposed to give up Belfort, although, as a matter of course, the principle of a cession of territory, already formed the basis of the armistice negotiations, *Jules Favre proposed that in the east, the armistice should not come into effect*. He must therefore have believed, up to the 28th of January, that Bourbaki would be able to relieve Belfort, or otherwise gain suc-

cesses which would make it advantageous for France to carry on the war upon this stage. Count Bismarck had no reason for opposing this desire, and *it was therefore established in the convention, that the military operations in the departments of the Côte d'Or, Jura and Doubs, and also the siege of Belfort should be continued.* Jules Favre at once telegraphed the conclusion of the convention to Gambetta, but neglected to impart the special determinations mentioned; and Gambetta, naturally, simply announced the conclusion of the armistice to all the Generals of the republic; Count Bismarck, on the contrary, caused information to be sent to the German generals, of the article of exception as well.

• Thus misunderstandings were unavoidable.

On the 29th of January Manteuffel made a concentric attack upon the advanced posts of the French Army.

The VII. Corps, retaining possession of Levier, pushed forward to the left, where it held the road from St. Gorgon to Pontarlier as well as that from Levier to Pontarlier; the II. Corps approached from the south, by Frasné, whilst a detachment from it held possession of the mountain road at Les Planches; General von Schmeling and General von Debschütz proceeded with their march against Pontarlier, along the frontier, and von der Goltz's Brigade (XIV. Army Corps) moved upon Villeneuve from Arbois, by Pont d'Héry, and so formed the reserve of the centre. General Clinchant, not being in a position to undertake anything, with his troops in their most wretched condition, remained stationary where he was.

In the afternoon a combat ensued. The advanced guard of the 14th Division came upon the enemy at *Sombacourt* and *Chafvois*, stormed the villages, which were still tolerably obstinately defended, carried off 17 guns and 5000 prisoners, including two generals, and threw the adversary back upon Pontarlier. •

The following day, the II. Corps attacked *Frasné*, captured above 3000 prisoners, occupied the place, and drove the French troops still further back.

On this day, the 30th of January, General Clinchant, upon the strength of the armistice, now began to open negotiations. General von Manteuffel, as may be imagined, could not agree to

them, and made a further advance; on the 31st, after a sharp fight at *Vaux*, he occupied the cross roads at Ste. Marie, in the mountains to the south of Pontarlier, and at mid-day, on the 1st of February, stood ready for the attack with the heads of his columns in front of *Pontarlier*.

On the same morning, however, General Clinchant had concluded a convention with the Swiss Commander in Chief, General Herzog, in accordance with which, the French army was to cross over into Switzerland and there be disarmed.

The retreat began even on the day of its conclusion, the 1st of February, and only a rear-guard still covered the retreat upon French territory. Du Trossel's Brigade came to an engagement with it in the afternoon, took *Pontarlier*, made 4000 prisoners and captured an enormous number of waggons with stores, arms and provisions.

General von Manteuffel established his head-quarters in Pontarlier the same afternoon, whilst the French army moved into Switzerland by various mountain roads, the main body at Les Verrières.

Such a catastrophe was never before known. Switzerland received 85,000 men with 266 guns and about 10,000 horses, and provided for the masses of men, who had suffered so miserably from cold and hunger, with that hospitable generosity, for which this high-minded republic has always been distinguished. About 15,000 men had been taken prisoners in the retreating fights of the last few days; only about 20,000 men altogether, had escaped towards the south, including Cremer's division.

Garibaldi had also appealed to the armistice, when General Hann von Weyhern drew near, but then, as it was not recognised by the enemy, he escaped so quickly to the south, by the railway, that he could no longer be reached.

THE FALL OF BELFORT.

Immediately after the victorious termination of the combats on the Lisaine, the regular siege of the fortress of Belfort was

again taken up with renewed zeal, and was also continued after the conclusion of the armistice, in conformity with Article I. of the Convention. From this the inference may be drawn as well as from the desire of the Chancellor of the Confederation, in opposition to Jules Favre, at Versailles (v. page 397), that the German government held the definitive acquisition of the fortress with that of Alsace to be very essential.

The siege was associated with the greatest difficulties, for the trenches had, partly, to be blasted out of the rock, and the severe cold as well as the thaw which set in later, infinitely increased the difficulties of this work. Between the villages of *Danjoutin* and *Pérouse* — the latter was taken by storm in the night of the 20th of January — the parallels were opened against Forts *Basses-Perches* and *Hautes-Perches*; the batteries were, by degrees, brought to the works, and on the 8th of February the capture of both these forts was successfully carried out.

But a very great work yet remained. It was necessary to force the fortress itself to surrender from the heights of the two forts and from the parallels connecting them. The citadel, however, as well as Fort La Justice, could very well command the heights of the Perches. A cannon fight ensued, lasting for eight days, in which the Germans came off conquerors, as they had done in every action since the beginning of the war.

On the 16th of February the strong fortress capitulated, with 12,000 men. In consideration of the garrison's brave defence, the German Emperor granted it a free departure.

CONCLUSION.

The *convention of Versailles*, which was ratified on the 28th of January 1871, put an end to the military operations of the campaign 1870—71. The tenor of the convention is as follows:

CONVENTION.

The following convention has been concluded between Count von Bismarck, Chancellor of the German confederation, in the name of His Majesty, the German Emperor, King of Prussia, and Monsieur Jules Favre, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the government of the National Defence, as authorized plenipotentiaries:

ARTICLE 1.

A general armistice upon the whole line of the military operations, in the act of being carried out by the German and French armies, begins on this day for Paris, and in three days for the departments. The duration of the armistice will be twenty-one days, commencing from this day, so that, excepting in the case of a renewal, the armistice will have expired, everywhere, at noon on the 19th of February.

The armies engaged in war will retain their respective positions, and these will be separated by a line of demarcation. This line will commence from Pont l'Evêque on the boundary of the Calvados department, will lead to Lignières in the north-east of the Mayenne department, passing between Briouze and Frommentel; touching the Mayenne department at Lignières, it will follow the boundary which divides this department from those of the Orne and the Sarthe, as far as the north of Morannes and will then be carried on to the point where the departments Côte d'Or, Nièvre and Yonne meet together, on the east of Quarré les Tombes, — so that the departments Sarthe, Indre et Loire, Loire et Cher, Loiret and Yonne remain in possession of the Germans. From this point, the direction of the line is

reserved for an agreement, which will take place when the contracting parties have been informed as to the present position of operations in the departments Côte d'Or, Doubs and Jura.

The departments Nord and Pas de Calais, the fortresses Givet and Langres with a radius of 10 kilometres (about $6\frac{1}{4}$ English miles), and the peninsula of Havre as far as the line Etretat — St. Romain, will not be occupied on the German side. Both parties carrying on the war, and their outposts on both sides, are to keep at a distance of, at least, 10 kilometres from the line of demarcation.

Each of the two armies reserves to itself, the right of maintaining its authority in the territory it occupies, and of employing such means as the commanders judge necessary for this end.

The armistice applies equally to the naval powers of both countries, and here the meridian of D  nkirk will form as the line of demarcation. The French fleet will keep to the west of it, and the German men-of-war now in the western waters, will withdraw to the east of it as soon as they have been apprized thereof. The captures that may be made after the conclusion of the armistice and before its notification will be restored, as well as the prisoners made in the interval named.

The operations upon the territory of the departments Doubs, Jura and C  te d'Or as well as the siege of Belfort will be continued, independently of the armistice, until such time as the still reserved settlement of the demarcation line, in the departments named, shall have been supplementarily agreed upon.

ARTICLE 2.

The object of the armistice concluded in this manner, is to allow the government of the National Defence to call together a freely elected assembly who will have to decide the question as to whether the war is to be continued, or upon what conditions peace shall be concluded.

The assembly will meet in the town of Bordeaux.

The commanders of the German Armies will render every assistance to the elections and meeting of the deputies.

ARTICLE 3.

All the outer forts round Paris, with their war material will be delivered up to the German Army, by the French military authorities. The commonalties and the houses outside and between the forts, may be occupied by the German troops up to a line fixed by the military commissioners. The ground between this line and the enceinte of the city of Paris may not be set foot upon by armed men of either side.

The form and mode of surrender of the forts, and the line mentioned will form the subject of an additional protocol to the present convention.

ARTICLE 4.

During the period of the armistice the German army will not enter the city of Paris.

ARTICLE 5.

The enceinte will be disarmed, and the carriages of the guns will be brought into the forts, appointed by a German commission.

ARTICLE 6.

The garrison (Army of the Line, Gardes Mobiles and Marine troops) of the forts and city will be prisoners of war, with the exception of a division of 12,000 men, which the military authorities retain in Paris for duty in the interior.

The troops who are prisoners of war, lay down their arms, and these are collected and delivered up at appointed places, according to the customary arrangements by commissioners. The troops remain in the city, the enceinte of which they are not allowed to pass during the armistice. The French authorities must use vigilance, that each individual of the army and Garde Mobile remains consigned to the interior of the city.

The officers of the troops, who are prisoners of war, will be specified in a list, which will be delivered to the German authorities.

At the expiration of the armistice, all the military, belonging to the army consigned to Paris, must present themselves as prisoners of war to the German army, in case peace is not previously concluded.

The officers, who are prisoners of war, retain their arms.

ARTICLE 7.

The Garde Nationale retains its arms, and is entrusted with the protection of Paris and the maintenance of order. This equally applies to the Gendarmes and troops employed in a similar manner to them in the municipal service, as the Republican Guard, Douaniers and Pompiers; this category amounts, altogether to only 3500 men. All the corps of the Franc-tireurs will be disbanded by command of the French government.

ARTICLE 8.

Immediately after the ratification of the present conditions, and previous to the occupation of the forts, the Commander in Chief of the German armies will facilitate the task of the commissioners, who will be sent by the French government both into the departments and to foreign countries, to make arrangements for the re-provisioning of Paris, and to bring up the stores destined for the city.

ARTICLE 9.

After the surrender of the forts, and the disarmament of the enceinte and of the garrison, in accordance with Articles 5 and 6, the re-provisioning of Paris will proceed unimpeded, by the railways and water communications.

Stores destined for this re-provisioning, are not to be taken out of the districts occupied by the German troops, and the French government binds itself to procure them outside the line of demarcation which surrounds the German armies, unless the commander of the latter grants permission.

ARTICLE 10.

Every-one who wishes to leave Paris, must be provided with a regularly drawn-up permit, by the military authorities, which is subjected to the visé of the German out-posts. These permits and visés will be forwarded as of right, to the candidates of the Provincial Deputation and the deputies of the National Assembly.

The persons provided with the permissions mentioned are only allowed to pass out between 6 o'clock a. m. and 6 o'clock p. m.

ARTICLE 11.

The city of Paris pays a contribution of 200 million francs. The payment must be made before the fifteenth day of the armistice. The mode of payment will be fixed by a mixed French and German commission.

ARTICLE 12.

During the armistice, nothing of public value may be removed, which might serve as a pledge to cover the contributions.

ARTICLE 13.

During the armistice, the importation of arms, ammunition and material for their fabrication, is forbidden.

ARTICLE 14.

The exchange of all prisoners of war made, on the side of the French, since the commencement of the war, will be proceeded with without delay. For this object the French authorities will, as soon as possible, deliver special lists of the German prisoners of war to the German military authorities at Amiens, Le Mans, Orléans and Vesoul. The German prisoners of war will be set at liberty as near the frontier as possible. The German authorities will, on the other hand, give up to the French authorities, in the same manner and as soon as possible, an equal number of French prisoners of war, of corresponding rank.

The exchange refers also to prisoners in civil positions, such as the captains of German merchant vessels and French civilians interned in Germany.

ARTICLE 15.

A postal service for unclosed letters between Paris and the departments, will be regulated through the head-quarters in Versailles.

In ratification of the present convention, it is provided with the signatures and seals of the undersigned.

Versailles, the 28th of January 1871.

Bismarck.

Favre.

The tenor of the protocol appended to the convention, mentioned in article 3 of the convention, is as follows:

Addition to the convention of the 28th of January 1871.

ARTICLE 1.

Boundary line before Paris. — On the French side the boundary line will be formed by the cincture wall of the city. On the German side (v. map I. of Paris):

1) *Upon the south front*, the line runs from the Seine to the northern point of the island of St. Germain, along the conduit of Issy, then between the cincture wall and Forts Issy, Vanvres, Montrouge, Bicêtre and Ivry, keeping at a distance of about 500 metres from the fronts of the forts, up to the spot where the road from Paris separates towards Port-à-l'Anglais and Alfort.

2) *Upon the east front*, from the last mentioned point, the line crosses the junction of the Marne and Seine, then passes along the western and northern boundaries of the village of Charenton, so as to reach the gate of Fontenay just above the Place de l'Obélisque. From this it runs in a northerly direction, to 500 metres west of Fort Rosny, and to the south of Forts Noisy and Romainville, to the spot where the Pantin road strikes the Oureq canal.

The garrison of the château of Vincennes consists of one company of 200 men, and will not be relieved during the armistice.

3) *Upon the north front*, it continues to a point 500 metres south-west of Fort Aubervilliers, then running by the southern border of the village of Aubervilliers and along the St. Denis canal, crosses the latter 500 metres to the south of its bend, and remains, equi-distant to the south of the canal bridge running in a straight line, as far as the Seine.

4) *Upon the west front*, it continues, from the spot where the indicated line reaches the Seine, upon the left bank up the river as far as the conduit of Issy.

Small deviations from this boundary line are permitted to the German troops, in so far as they should be necessary in the position of the out-posts, for the security of the army.

ARTICLE 2.

Passage through the boundary line. — Persons who have been granted permission to pass the German out-posts, may do so only by the following roads: the roads to Calais, Lille, Metz, Strasburg (gate of Fontenay), Basle, Antibes, Toulouse, and road 189 and lastly by the bridges over the Seine, including the one at Sèvres, the reconstruction of which is permitted.

ARTICLE 3.

Surrender of the forts and earth-works. — This surrender will take place on the 29th of January, commencing at 10 o'clock a. m. and in the following manner:

The French troops will withdraw from the forts and neutral ground; in each fort will remain, merely, the Commandant, the Superintendent of Engineers and Artillery, and the gate-keeper.

As soon as a fort has been evacuated, a French staff officer will come to the German out-posts, in order to give any explanations that may be desired about the fort, as well as to show the way leading to it. After taking possession of each single fort, and after the necessary explanations have been given, the fortress commandant, the superintendents of Engineers and Artillery, with the gate-keeper will repair to Paris to the garrison of the forts.

ARTICLE 4.

Surrender of arms and war material. — The rifles, field guns, colours and all the war material will be given up to the German authorities within fourteen days, reckoning from the ratification of the present agreement, and will be brought together in Sévran, through the instrumentality of the French authorities. An inventory of the arms and war material, will be handed over, by the French authorities to the German authorities, before the 4th of February.

The carriages of the cannon upon the ramparts must likewise be removed before the above named time.

On the 15th of February, moreover, *the Convention on the surrender of Belfort* and the continuation of the line of demarcation, succeeded the Convention of the 28th of January in the following terms:

ARTICLE 1.

The fortress of Belfort will be given up to the commandant of the besieging army, with the war material which belongs to the place.

The garrison of Belfort will leave the place with the honours of war, and retain their arms, their means of transport, and the war material belonging to the troops, as well as the military archives. The commandants of Belfort and of the besieging army, will place themselves in communication respecting the execution of the above stipulations, as well as concerning details which have not been foreseen, and in regard to the direction and roads by which the garrison of Belfort will join the French army on the other side of the line of demarcation.

ARTICLE 2.

The German prisoners in Belfort will be released.

ARTICLE 3.

The line of demarcation, fixed as far as the point where the three departments of Yonne, Nièvre and Côte d'Or come in contact, will be continued along the southern boundary of the department of the Côte d'Or to the points where the railroad, which runs from Nevers by Autun and Chagny to Châlons-sur-Saône, crosses the frontier of the department named. This railroad remains outside the German occupation, so that the line of

demarcation, which is drawn at the distance of one kilometre from the railroad, reaches the southern boundary of the Côte d'Or department to the east of Chagny and follows the boundary which divides the Saône et Loire department from the departments of the Côte d'Or and Jura. After following the road from Louhans to Lons le Saulnier it will leave the department boundary upon the height of the village of Malleret, from whence it will run on so as to intersect the railroad from Lons le Saulnier to Bourg at a distance of eleven kilometres to the south of Lons le Saulnier, whilst from there it is directed by the bridges of the Ain upon the Clairvaux road, whence it will follow the northern boundary of the arrondissement of St. Claude as far as the Swiss frontier.

ARTICLE 4.

A radius of ten kilometres will be kept, for the use of the garrison, round the fortress of Besançon. The fortified place, Auxonne, will be surrounded by three kilometres of neutral territory, in which there will be free circulation upon the railroad, leading from Dijon to Gray and Dôle, for the military trains and those of the administration. The commandants of the troops on both sides, will regulate the re-provisioning of the two fortresses and the forts which are in possession of the French troops, in the departments of the Doubs and Jura, as well as the boundaries of the radii of these forts, each of which will have three kilometres. The circulation by the railroad and country roads, which pass through these radii, will be free.

ARTICLE 5.

The three departments, Jura, Doubs and Côte d'Or, will now be included in the armistice, ratified on the 28th of January, and the whole of the stipulations made in the convention of the 28th of January with respect to the duration of the armistice as well as to the other conditions, will apply to them.

Versailles, the 15th of February 1871.

Jules Favre.

v. Bismarck.

The conditions of the convention were carried out without hindrance.

The German Army Direction in consequence attained such an auspicious military situation, that a continuation of the war, on the part of France, could indeed no longer be attempted.

It is true that there were still French armies in existence.

At the conclusion of the convention General Chanzy ought to have had 120,000 men, General Faidherbe 60,000 and General Loysel at Havre 30,000 men, whilst there should have been 250,000 men in the different camps of instruction. These forces, however, existed only on paper. Of troops fit for battle, France probably possessed only about 50,000, and these were demoralized. On the German side, on the other hand, there were 800,000 German soldiers extending from the French — Swiss frontier as far as the southern corner of Touraine, and up to the Atlantic ocean, in possession of nearly all the fortresses and important positions of northern and midland France, and also, by the occupation of the forts of Paris, commanding, in fact, the capital itself.

The whole number of French prisoners provided for in German dépôts and places of internment, now amounted to 11,860 officers and 371,881 men, added to which all the soldiers of the army of Paris were prisoners of war, with the exception of the Garde Nationale in the city itself, so that the number of the prisoners of war almost reached the strength of the German armies. The resumption of hostilities must have appeared impossible even to the most extravagant members of the French Government.

The naval warfare had been devoid of any important encounter, being confined solely to the injury of commerce, and remained quite without any consequence, which, at the conclusion of peace, could have weighed in favour of France.

Seldom perhaps has a state been so completely overthrown, and its military power so crushed to its last members, as France was now cast down and shattered, by the mistaken and criminal continuation of this war, which was begun so thoroughly unpolitically and most wantonly.

Thus then, the armistice became the introduction to peace.

The National Assembly which met in Bordeaux on the 12th of February pronounced for peace, and on the 26th of February 1871, after the armistice had been twice prolonged, the *preliminaries of peace were concluded at Versailles*, which was followed by the *definitive conclusion of peace, at Frankfurt, on the 10th of May 1871.*

Calender of the Campaign.

Summary of the events of the war in chronological order.

July 1870.

15. The demand for credit by the French government for the war is sanctioned (Page 15). The troops in the camp of Châlons, and detachments elsewhere ready for war are directed against the German frontier (P. 15). The King of Prussia orders the mobilization of his army (P. 15).
16. Mobilization of the Bavarian and Baden armies. The German frontier is occupied by detachments for demonstration (P. 19).
17. Mobilization of the Wurtemberg Army.
19. France declares war against Prussia (P. 15).
- 19-30. Skirmishes on the frontier (P. 49).

August.

2. The King takes the chief command in Mayence (P. 52). The Emperor Napoleon attacks Saarbrücken (P. 50).
4. Assault of the position of Weissenburg occupied by Douay's Division by the III. German army (P. 53).
6. Battle of Woerth in which the French right wing under command of Marshal Mac Mahon is beaten by the Crown Prince of Prussia — Battle of Saarbrücken (height of Speichern) where the French left wing, Frossard's Corps is beaten by the leading troops of the I. army, and detachments of the III. Army Corps. The French Army commences its retreat (P. 58-84).
7. Paris is declared in a state of siege. Decree for the Garde Mobile and Garde Nationale (P. 85).
- 7-14. Advance of the German I. and II. armies to Metz, and of the III. Army to Nancy (P. 85).
8. Baden cavalry arrive before Strasburg (P. 87).
9. Lützelstein occupied (P. 86).
10. Lichtenberg occupied (P. 86).
12. Marshal Bazaine receives the chief command of the Army of Metz (P. 92).
13. The King in Herny, Prince Frederick Charles in Pont-à-Mousson (P. 89).
14. Bombardment of Pfalzburg by the VI. Corps (P. 242). Battle of Courcelles in which the retiring French Army is held fast by the I. Army on the right bank of the Moselle (P. 92-98). Reconnaissance against Toul (P. 90). General von Werder, Commandant before Strasburg (P. 89). Napoleon leaves Metz (P. 96).
15. Marsal capitulates (P. 90).

August.

16. Battle of Vionville. The III. Army Corps, gradually reinforced stops Bazaine's departure to Verdun (P. 99-117).
18. Battle of Gravelotte. The I. and II. Armies, under the command of the King, force Bazaine to retire upon Metz (P. 118-142). Kehl is set on fire by cannon from Strasburg (P. 229).
19. The III. Army begins the passage across the Meuse (P. 143).
21. Mac Mahon's Army leaves Châlons for Rheims (P. 148).
22. The IV. Army (newly formed) commences the advance against Châlons (P. 144).
23. Unsuccessful attack upon Verdun by the IV. Army (P. 144). Mac Mahon moves off from Rheims (P. 150).
24. Mac Mahon in Reithel (P. 150). The bombardment of Strasburg begins (P. 230).
25. The III. Army takes Vitry le Français (P. 151). In the night, the German Armies receive orders to wheel to the right (P. 151).
27. Mac Mahon in Chêne-populeux (P. 150). Fight of Busancy (P. 151).
28. Mac Mahon in Stonne (P. 152).
29. Fight at Nouart (P. 154). In the night, the first parallel before Strasburg is opened (P. 232).
30. Engagement at Beaumont (P. 155).
31. The surrounding advance by the Germans against Sedan (P. 158). Bazaine's sortie against Prince Frederick Charles's Army, Battle of Noisseville which lasts till midday on the 1st of September (P. 204-218).

September.

1. Battle of Sedan. The French army is thrown back into the fortress, and inclosed all round by the III. and IV. armies (P. 165-173).
2. Capitulation of Sedan (P. 175).
5. The royal head-quarters in Rheims (P. 283).
9. Laon occupied. The citadel is blown up (P. 284).
12. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg invests Toul (P. 250).
14. The royal head-quarters in Château-Thierry (P. 283).
15. The royal head-quarters in Meaux (P. 283).
19. Fight at Petit-Bicestres. The V. and II. Bavarian corps repulse General Vinoy's sortie (P. 286).
Completion of the investment of Paris (P. 284). Commencement of negotiations between the Chancellor and J. Favre. Royal head-quarters in Ferrières (P. 270 and 289).
23. Capitulation of Toul (P. 251).
Combat at Villejuif to the south of Paris, sortie against the VI. Corps (P. 289).
28. Capitulation of Strasburg (P. 236).
30. General Vinoy's sortie against the VI. Corps (P. 289).

October.

2. Bazaine's sortie against Kummer's Division (P. 222).
4. Colonel von Alvensleben beats the French troops at the wood of St. Hilaire and occupies Epervon (P. 291). Prince Albert of Prussia reconnoitres from Toury towards Orléans and notes the French Loire Army (P. 291).
5. General von Degenfeld's fight at Raon l'Etape (P. 369). Fight of the 5th Cavalry Brigade at Pacy to the west of Paris (P. 290).
7. General von der Tann marches from Paris towards the south (P. 292). Bazaine's sortie against Kummer's Division (P. 222).
9. Gambetta's arrival in Tours (P. 292).

October.

9. Investment of Neu-Breisach (P. 240).
11. General von der Tann occupies Orléans (P. 325).
12. Commencement of the bombardment of Soissons (P. 252).
General von Werder in Epinal (P. 370).
13. General Vinoy's sortie against Clamart, Chatillon, and Bagneux (P. 293).
St. Cloud is set on fire by the cannonade of the French (P. 294).
15. Capitulation of Soissons (P. 252).
19. Beginning of the bombardment of Schlettstadt (P. 239).
Combat round Chateaudun (P. 325).
20. General von Werder in Vesoul (P. 370).
21. Sortie against the V. Army Corps (P. 294).
22. Fight on the Oignon, at Etuz and Cussey. General von Werder beats the French south-eastern army (P. 371).
24. Capitulation of the fortress of Schlettstadt (P. 239).
General von Werder at Gray (P. 372).
27. Capitulation of Metz (P. 296).
28. The French take the village of Le Bourget to the north of Paris. (P. 295).
30. The 2nd Garde-Infantry Division re-take Le Bourget (P. 295).
Thiers negotiates in Versailles (P. 297).
31. General von Werder occupies Dijon (P. 374).

November.

2. Beginning of the bombardment of Neu-Breisach and Fort Mortier (P. 240).
3. The investment of Belfort begun (P. 381).
6. The armistice negotiations are broken off (P. 298).
7. Fort Mortier capitulates (P. 241).
General von Manteuffel marches from Metz (P. 352).
8. Capitulation of Verdun (P. 254).
General von der Tann evacuates Orleans (P. 327).
9. Fight at Coulmiers between General von der Tann and General d'Aurelle de Paladines (P. 327).
10. Neu-Breisach capitulates (P. 241).
11. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin takes the command against d'Aurelle (P. 331).
15. The Grand Duke marches to the west (P. 331).
17. Fight of the 17th Division at Dreux (P. 331).
18. Fight of the 22nd Division at Chateaufort (P. 331).
21. The 22nd Division occupies La Loupe (P. 331).
General von Manteuffel occupies Ham (P. 353).
22. The Grand Duke occupies Nogent le Rotrou (P. 332).
The bombardment of Thionville begun (P. 246).
23. Completion of the investment of Belfort (P. 383).
24. Manteuffel's advanced guard fights at Quesnel and Mézières (P. 353).
Thionville capitulates (P. 246).
The Grand Duke reaches La Ferté Bernard (P. 332).
Fights of the X. Army Corps against the right wing of the French Loire Army at Ladon, Maizières, and Bois commun (P. 334).
26. Capitulation of La Fère (P. 255).
27. Battle of Amiens. General von Manteuffel beats General Farre (P. 353).
28. The Parisians occupy Mont Avre (P. 300).
Engagement at Beanne La Rolande; the X. Army Corps repulses the attack of the French 18th and 20th Corps (P. 335).

November.

- General von Manteuffel occupies Amiens (P. 356).
29. Sortie by the Parisians against the positions of the VI. Army Corps (P. 301).
 30. Great sortie by the Parisians against the south-east front (P. 301 f.). Brie and Champigny remain in possession of the French.

December.

1. The Parisians strengthen themselves at Brie and Champigny (P. 304). General von Manteuffel commences the march upon Rouen (P. 356).
2. The Saxons and Wurtembergers, supported by the II. and VI. Army Corps fight round Brie and Champigny (P. 306). Beginning of the combat at Orléans between Prince Frederick Charles and General d'Aurelle. Fight at Orgères, Patay, Poupry, Loigny (P. 337).
3. The Parisians retire upon the right bank of the Marne (P. 307). Combats at Chevilly and Chilleurs near Orléans (P. 339). The bombardment of Belfort begun (P. 383).
4. Combats at Cernottes and Gidy. Retreat of the French in two separate bodies (P. 340).
5. Prince Frederick Charles occupies Orléans (P. 340).
6. General von Manteuffel occupies Rouen (P. 357).
8. Engagement at Beaugency. The Grand Duke beats General Chanzy (P. 341).
9. The Grand Duke occupies Bouvalet and Cernay (P. 342). Occupation of Dieppe by one of Manteuffel's detachments (P. 357).
10. General Chanzy is forced to retreat upon Vendôme (P. 342).
12. Pfalzburg capitulates (P. 244). The bombardment of Montmédy begun (P. 247).
13. Prince Frederick Charles's march against Vendôme (P. 342). Montmédy capitulates (P. 247).
15. Engagement on the Loir between Prince Frederick Charles and General Chanzy (P. 342).
16. Prince Frederick Charles occupies Vendôme (P. 343).
18. Fight at Nuits. The Baden Division beats the French under Cremer (P. 378).
19. Prince Frederick Charles takes up a position of observation at Orléans (P. 343).
21. Sortie by the Parisians against the Garde-Corps and the Saxons (P. 309).
23. Battle on the Hallue. General von Manteuffel beats General Faidherbe (P. 359).
27. Commencement of the artillery attack upon Paris. Bombardment of Mont Avron (P. 310). Combats at Montoire and La Chartre in the neighbourhood of Vendôme (P. 344).
28. Combat at Longpré (Northern Army) (P. 361).
29. Occupation of Mont Avron by the Saxons (P. 311).
30. Combat at Souchez (Northern Army) (P. 361).
31. Combat of the 20th Division at Vendôme (P. 344). The castle Robert le Diable in Normandy is stormed (P. 362).

January 1871.

2. Mézières capitulates (P. 248). The bombardment of Péronne begun (P. 256).
- 2-3. Combats at Bapaume. Faidherbe's attacks repulsed by General von Göben (P. 362).

January.

4. General von Benthheim scatters the French troops upon the left bank of the Seine near Rouen (P. 864).
5. The southern attack upon Paris begun. Bombardment of the southern forts (P. 312).
Rocroy taken by a coup de main (P. 249).
The advance upon Le Mans begun (P. 344).
- 6-12. Combats against General Chanzy, which end with his complete defeat, and the occupation of Le Mans (P. 345).
8. The bombardment of the city of Paris begun (P. 315).
9. Engagement at Villersexel. General von Werder stops Bourbaki's march by a flank attack (P. 387).
Capitulation of Péronne (P. 256).
10. Sortie by the Parisians against Clamart (P. 317).
13. Sortie by the Parisians against Meudon and Clamart as well as against Le Bourget (P. 317).
14. The camp of Conlie near Le Mans is found forsaken (P. 350).
- 15-17. Battle of Belfort. Bourbaki's repeated attacks upon General von Werder's position on the Lisaine are beaten back (P. 388).
16. The bombardment of Longwy begun (P. 248).
19. Great sortie by the Parisians against Versailles (P. 317).
General von Hartmann occupies Tours (P. 351).
Battle of St. Quentin. General von Göben beats General Faidherbe (P. 364).
21. The bombardment of St. Denis begun (P. 319).
23. Commencement of the armistice-negotiations (P. 320).
25. Longwy capitulates (P. 248).
- 26-27. At 12 o'clock at night firing at Paris ceases (P. 320).
28. Conclusion of the convention of Versailles, which includes the capitulation of Paris (P. 321).
29. Fights at Sombacourt and Chaffois. Manteuffel beats the advanced troops of the French eastern army (P. 398).
30. Fight at Frasne. The French eastern army is forced still nearer to the Swiss frontier (P. 398).
31. General von Manteuffel occupies Ste. Marie. Fight at Vaux (P. 399).

February.

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16. Fall of Belfort (P. 400).

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